

Kissinger leaked secret US-Soviet SALT

By Richard Burt
Special to The Globe

9/10/73

WASHINGTON — After approving of telephone wiretap investigations of his own White House staff, presidential national security adviser Henry Kissinger leaked substantial amounts of information concerning the first round of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) with the Soviet Union between 1970 and 1972, according to officials close to the negotiations.

The officials, who asked not to be identified, said John Newhouse, a

free-lance writer here, was the recipient of Kissinger's SALT disclosures. Newhouse would not comment on the officials' reports.

Newhouse is the author of the book, "Cold Dawn: The Story of SALT," which was published last spring by Holt, Rinehart and Winston. Parts of the book earlier were published by New Yorker magazine. The book bills itself as "the definitive account of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks."

Newhouse's account of the US-

Soviet negotiations has upset many present and former high-ranking officials connected with the US effort at SALT, including Gerard Smith, the former director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and Paul Nitze, a former deputy secretary of defense and now a special assistant to the Secretary of Defense on SALT.

Some officials indicated that Kissinger's disclosure of sensitive portions of the arms control talks may hamper further efforts to achieve an agreement at the sec-

information to author

ond round of SALT, now under way in Geneva.

During the 2½-year period of the first round of SALT, Kissinger had chief responsibility for the SALT planning and negotiating process. Kissinger was also chairman of the National Security Council verification panel, which worked out positions on SALT. Kissinger is now before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee seeking approval of his nomination as Secretary of State.

Officials said Kissinger's disclosures to Newhouse ranged from pri-

vate discussions of the US negotiating position at SALT to allowing Newhouse to read top secret cable messages transmitted between Washington and the US negotiating team in Europe.

One source also said Kissinger instructed a member of his National Security Council staff to read the preliminary drafts of Newhouse's book to insure the accuracy of the study. The staff assistant, who did not want to be identified, did not deny the report.

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"For anyone on the NSC staff to have talked with Newhouse without instructions would have been sudden death," he said. "No one would have helped him (Newhouse) unless they were under clear instructions from Henry (Kissinger)."

A former member of the SALT negotiating team also said that members of the US delegation to the talks were instructed in a "for your eyes only" memo sent by Kissinger to avoid all contact with Newhouse.

When the former official was asked why Kissinger would instruct his negotiators to stay away from Newhouse while Kissinger himself discussed the talks with Newhouse in detail, he said: "I guess Kissinger wanted to make sure that the book reflected his point of view." While another former SALT official disputed the story of the Kissinger memo, he called the Newhouse book "the Kissinger version of SALT."

There are differences among officials on how many details of the Newhouse book were provided by Kissinger. Newhouse did speak with other SALT officials. But there is general agreement, as one source said, that the book is "clearly not a paste job of bits and pieces." Another official said: "Some of the leaks in the book can only be traced to Kissinger."

Included in this category, officials said, are detailed descriptions by Newhouse of private talks between Kissinger and Soviet Ambassador Anatoliy Dobrynin.

The Newhouse book has ignited a growing controversy among the small circle of officials involved in policy-making for SALT, particularly after recent disclosures that Kissinger had been aware of 17 wiretap investigations of White House personnel, government officials and journalists between 1969 and 1971.

The taps, ordered by President Nixon for "national security" reasons,

were conducted by the FBI. In addition to the release of the Pentagon Papers, a 1971 New York Times story that purported to reveal the US negotiating position at SALT has been used by White House spokesmen to justify the wiretap probes designed to find the source of leaks to the press.

(None of the officials interviewed said that Kissinger was the source of the New York Times disclosure on SALT. But some said that Kissinger was the source of other sensitive material on SALT published prior to Newhouse's book.)

Kissinger has admitted knowing of the wiretap investigations, and, in the case of his own staff, having approved them. Some officials said that Kissinger had compromised himself by approving of these probes while at the same time providing Newhouse and other writers with highly sensitive information about arms negotiations with the Soviets.

Ironically, one of the targets of the White House wiretap investigations was former Security Council member Morton Halperin, who sources said was a primary source of Newhouse's depiction of arms control planning in the pre-SALT era, in the latter days of the Johnson Administration.

One former Security Council official said the Kissinger leaks raise fundamental questions about security procedures in the White House during the first Nixon Administration.

"How can you justify probes of people to find the source of leaks when you're leaking information yourself?" he asked.

The former official expressed the fear that Kissinger had approved of wiretaps of White House personnel over and above those conducted by the

FBI. "Kissinger was extremely paranoid about his staff," he said.

In addition to raising questions connected to the probes approved by Kissinger, some officials said the revelations contained in the Newhouse book constitute a breach of national security and that Kissinger broke an agreement with the Soviets in confiding in Newhouse.

At an early stage in the SALT negotiations, the United States and the Soviet Union agreed to maintain strict confidentiality about the negotiations. "In leaking all that material to Newhouse, Kissinger did not abide by the security agreement," one official said.

"While secrecy was broken once or twice earlier in the talks, the Newhouse book goes a great deal further than before," the official said.

It is feared that certain disclosures in the Newhouse book may have embarrassed the Soviets, causing them to be much less candid at the second round of SALT.

"Cold Dawn," for in-

stance, details the Soviet offer, early in the talks, of a "provocative attack proposal," which would have called for the two sides to consult when a third power behaved in what was deemed a dangerous manner.

"The provocative attack offer was clearly aimed at China," said one official,

"and it was essentially a blueprint for a superpower condominium. I'm sure the Soviets were as angry as hell when Newhouse revealed their proposal."

An official close to the second round of the talks admitted that the Soviets have complained to US negotiators at SALT about the Newhouse revelations.