



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

SCOWCROFT ASKS FOR DRAFT
PRESIDENTIAL LETTER.

HAIG MAKES CLEAR TO SCHLESIN-
GER THAT HE CANNOT MAKE AN
END RUN ON SALT.

WICKHAM PROMISES TO MOVE
SLOWLY ON EQUIPMENT.

SCOWCROFT WILL TAKE CARE
OF SCHLESINGER ON LASERS.

IT LOOKS AS THOUGH FULBRIGHT
WILL LOSE.

State Dept., OSD
Reviews Completed

ON-FILE NSC RELEASE
INSTRUCTIONS APPLY

MORI/CDF C03344701
page 2,
C03344662 pages 4-9

O 020047Z MAY 74 ZFF-1 ZFF-4 ZYH
FM THE SITUATION ROOM
TO AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
ZEM
S E C R E T SENSITIVE EYES ONLY

3 MAY 84 03 54Z

WH41099

25X1

TOHAK 43

DELIVER IN SEALED ENVELOPE TO PETER RODMAN

TO: HENRY A. KISSINGER
FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT

HAKTO 25 HAS BEEN SENT UP TO CAMP DAVID. ASSUMING AN AFFIRMATIVE RESPONSE FROM THE PRESIDENT, WE WILL HAVE LITTLE TIME TO GET A LETTER DRAFTED AND APPROVED. I THINK IT WOULD BE HELPFUL IF YOU COULD HAVE SAUNDERS AND SISCO DRAFT SOMETHING WHICH WOULD MEET YOUR NEEDS AND SEND IT TO ME TO ARRIVE BY OPENING OF BUSINESS FRIDAY.

HAIG DID TALK TO SCHLESINGER ABOUT SALT. SCHLESINGER APPARENTLY STARTED TO MOAN GENERALLY ALONG THE LINE OF TOHAK 23 AND HAIG BROUGHT HIM UP SHORT. SCHLESINGER NOW KNOWS HE CAN NOT MAKE AN END RUN, BUT THERE SEEMS LITTLE DOUBT THAT WE HAVE A SERIOUS PROBLEM.

REF HAKTO 23. WICKHAM SAYS DEFENSE CAN MOVE VERY VERY SLOWLY WITHOUT ANY FORMAL HOLD ON THE EQUIPMENT. NO LETTERS WILL BE SENT TO THE CONGRESS WITHOUT YOUR APPROVAL.

I WILL TAKE CARE OF SCHLESINGER ON THE LASER BOMBS (HAKTO 26). YOU WILL RECALL THIS IS NOT THE FIRST TIME THAT THEY HAVE TAKEN THIS PARTICULAR TACK.

REPORTS ARE THAT FULBRIGHT IS IN DEEP TROUBLE IN HIS PRIMARY FIGHT. CURRENT POLLS GIVE HIM ONLY FROM 20 TO 30 PERCENT OF THE VOTE AND, WITHOUT SOMETHING APPROACHING A MIRACLE, IT WOULD APPEAR THAT HE HAS HAD IT.

WARM REGARDS.

256
2084

NNNN

S E C R E T/SENSITIVE 022159Z MAY 74

25X1

HAKTO: 25

EYES ONLY

MAY 2, 1974

TO: GENERAL SCOWCROFT

FROM: SECRETARY KISSINGER

1. SCHLESINGER HAS APPARENTLY TOLD THE ISRAELIS THAT HE WILL GIVE THEM THE LASER BOMBS IF I WILL RELEASE MY HOLD ON THEM. I WASN'T AWARE THAT THE QUESTION WAS EVEN BEING CONSIDERED.

2. TELL SCHLESINGER THAT THIS KIND OF MANEUVERING SHOULD STOP.

3. IF HE WILL TELL ME THE ISSUES FROM A TECHNICAL POINT OF VIEW, I WILL TELL HIM WHAT I THINK POLITICALLY.

4. BEST REGARDS.

S E C R E T/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY

25X1

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

HAKTO 25

May 2, 1974

IMMEDIATE

TO: GENERAL SCOWCROFT
FROM: SECRETARY KISSINGER

Please transmit the following message to the President from
me.

State Dept. review completed pages 4-9

BEGIN TEXT:

1. I am reporting to you promptly on my private meeting with Prime Minister Meir and subsequently another meeting with her and all her principal colleagues because the Israeli position presented to me today foreshadows, in my judgment, a possible break in the negotiations at an early stage.

2. Before I came I made clear to both sides my assessment of what would be required in order to achieve a Syrian-Israeli disengagement. I said specifically that there would have to be Israeli withdrawal to a point roughly 2-3 kilometers west of the October 6 line including line west of the town of Kineitra. As you know, for the past several weeks both the Israelis and the Syrians have encouraged me strongly to come to the area once again to see whether the disengagement agreement could be concluded and in the knowledge of my judgment as to what was required in order to achieve agreement. Despite the internal crises in Israel, both publicly

MORI/CDF
C03344662
pages 4-9

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

2

and officially, the Israelis have been insistent that I pursue the negotiations in the area.

3. Both in my private meeting with the Prime Minister and subsequently with the Cabinet, at which the Chief of Staff made a detailed presentation, the line to which Israel indicated it would be willing to withdraw ^{WAS} ~~was~~ one several kilometers east of the October 6 line with the Israelis occupying the high ground throughout. The new Chief of Staff Gur, used the specious argument that there was no other line further west to which Israel could withdraw which it would consider defensible. The line was essentially the same line which Dayan gave me four weeks ago with some slight change favorable to the Syrians in the south but with a more important change in the north on Mount Hermon in favor of the Israelis. In short, the line I received today can be considered, if anything, a retrogression from the line given to me by Dayan four weeks ago which I told him then would prove unacceptable. If I were to present this line to the Syrians there would be a blowup in the negotiations and the likelihood of a renewal of war greatly increased. Once again, the Israelis have continued to view the disengagement line in narrow military terms -- and even in these terms, it is not wholly defensible since there is a high ground on which a line could be drawn roughly

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

3

~~about~~ 3 kilometers west of the October 6 line which in our judgment would be defensible. I ~~cannot~~ am therefore playing for time and will discuss secondary issues when I go to Damascus to give Israel an opportunity to reconsider.

4. I pointed out to the Israelis that disengagement could not be viewed only on basis of these narrow military considerations. I stressed that Israel faces two choices: to stick with the present very unsatisfactory position which in my judgment would have the following consequences; it would break the negotiations with the onus on Israeli shoulders; it would reverse the trend in the Arab world towards moderation; it would weaken the Sadat leadership in the Arab world; it would offer both the Soviets as well as the West Europeans an opportunity to inject themselves into the picture in a most unfavorable way; it would throw the whole matter into international forums, ie. ~~the~~ the United Nations Security Council and the Geneva Conference; it would result in a loss of control by the United States in both the negotiations and the trend of developments in the area; it would probably result in the reinstituting of the embargo since the oil Ministers are again scheduled to meet to review the situation again on June 1; it is likely to result in Syria starting another war against Israel, a war of attrition in which even the moderate Arabs would be under

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

4

pressure to come to Syria's support, where the Soviets would see an opportunity to regain influence by all-out military support of Syria and in circumstances where the United States would be isolated and in the likelihood that the kind of support necessary would be dependent on a most uncertain public and Congressional opinion.

5. At the same time I openly acknowledged that there was a risk for Israel in going forward on the kind of line which has been previously discussed as one that is within reason. I agreed with Mrs. Meir that there could be no absolute guarantee that if they withdrew to this point that a war would not result eventually, but I felt that time is on the side of Israel. If an agreement is achieved, this would permit Sadat to continue to take the lead toward a peaceful settlement, and there was less risk, in my judgment, in this course than the one which the Israelis seem stuck on.

6. I am, therefore, meeting with Mrs. Meir this evening to consider together the consequences of the failure of my mission and how one could proceed in these circumstances.

7. It is, of course, possible that what we have heard today is tactical, for the Israelis have asked us to go to Damascus tomorrow and to take up a number of specific elements in the disengagement agreement other than the question of the line. I will do this and I

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

5

will be able to get by for this one round with Asad, but in the absence of anything more from the Israelis, it cannot be strung out much beyond early next week.

8. I, therefore, would like you to consider on an urgent basis the consequences which will face us should this mission be terminated in the circumstances that I have described. I believe a letter from you which lays out frankly the consequences which would ensue particularly with respect to U.S. policy would be most helpful at this juncture. If you agree, I would like it sent soonest and I could have the opportunity to review it before it is transmitted. You will wish to weigh, Mr. President, what specifically you would want to tell Mrs. Meir regarding American policy in these circumstances. What would the reaction of the American people be to a course which is likely to result in not only the maintenance of the high prices of oil but the ~~repositioning~~ ^{repositioning} of the embargo? Could Israel expect American support for an airlift of the kind which would ~~be~~ required in order to prevent an Israeli defeat? What could Israel expect by way of changes in our ongoing arms policy? These are very fundamental ^{questions} ~~questions~~ and I would hope that your letter would deal with these matters.

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

6

Finally, could Israel expect the consistent and steadfast political and diplomatic support we have given in circumstances where the United States would be isolate? I do not wish to prejudge your ^{ANSWERS} ~~enormous task~~ -- my own idea is that we may have to take some very painful decisions.

9. I would appreciate your reconsideration of the above on a most urgent basis.

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

SECRET/SENSITIVE

HAK TO 23

May 2, 1974

FLASH

TO: GENERAL SCOWCROFT

FROM: SECRETARY KISSINGER

Further to my HAK TO 21, I want it to be clear that the hold should be removed on the equipment but that Defense should move it at an imperceptible pace.