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U 062013Z MAY 74 ZFF-1 ZYM  
FM THE SITUATION ROOM

TO AMCONSUL JERUSALEM

S E C R E T

SECTION 01 OF 02

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TOMAK 85

DELIVER TO BREMER/RODMAN FOR THE SECRETARY.

TO SECRETARY KISSINGER  
FROM BRENT SCOWCROFT

State Dept. review completed

Sonnenfeldt asked me to send you the following in this channel.

THIS IS IN REGARD TO SECTO 144 AND YOUR CAUTION NOT TO GET  
THE CONFIDENCE BUILDING ISSUE RESOLVED BEFORE THE PRESIDENT'S  
TRIP. THE CSCE SITUATION IS SUCH THAT ON SEVERAL ISSUES  
THERE SEEMS LITTLE IF ANY PROSPECT THAT THEY WILL GET RESOLVED  
IN THE NEXT SEVERAL WEEKS.

OSD review completed

ON THE BASKET THREE PREAMBLE WE ARE GETTING CLOSE TO A  
SUBSTANTIVE RESOLUTION IN OUR BILATERAL TALKS BUT THERE  
REMAINS A TOTAL DEADLOCK OVER THE TACTICS OF GETTING THE  
COMPROMISE FLOATED. IN MY TALKS WITH SOVIET CSCE DELEGATION  
HEAD KOVALYEV IN GENEVA HE WAS RIGID IN REJECTING ANY SOVIET  
INITIATIVE IN FINDING A "COUNTRY X" THAT MIGHT BE PERSUADED TO  
INTRODUCE THE COMPROMISE. WE ON THE OTHER HAND SIMPLY MUST NOT  
RISK HAVING OUR OWN HAND DETECTED IN THIS, AT LEAST IN MY  
JUDGMENT. ONCE A COMPROMISE IS FLOATED WE SHOULD THEN OF COURSE  
EXERT OUR INFLUENCE WITH THE ALLIES TO MOVE TOWARD IT. THE  
SOVIETS, INCIDENTALLY TOLD ME IN GENEVA, THAT THEIR PLAN ONCE  
THE COMPROMISE IS ON THE TABLE IS TO MOVE TOWARD IT ONLY VERY  
GRADUALLY, BY FIRST TARTING A SLIGHT MODIFICATION OF THEIR CURRENT  
POSITION AND SLOWLY RECEDING FROM IT TOWARD THE COMPROMISE.  
EVEN ASSUMING YOU CAN PERSUADE GROMYKO TO FIND "COUNTRY X"  
THIS WHOLE PROCESS IS LIKELY TO TAKE TIME.

MORI/CDF  
C03344802

ON-FILE NSC RELEASE  
INSTRUCTIONS APPLY

SECONDLY, THERE IS THE SUBSTANCE OF BASKET THREE ITSELF.  
THE SOVIETS HAVE YET TO SHOW THEIR HAND ON PRECISELY WHAT

\*\*\*\*\*WHSR COMMENT\*\*\*\*\*

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CONTENT THEY ARE PREPARED TO ACCEPT. THIS IS BOUND TO BE LESS THAN WHAT THE NINE WANT. HENCE THERE WILL BE FURTHER HAGGLING ON THIS.

THIRD, AS REGARDS THE COMS [REDACTED]

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AND THE SOVIETS AT THE MOMENT HAVE A VERY RIGID POSITION, I.E. LIMITED FRONTIER ZONES FOR THE NOTIFICATION AREAS, SIX DAYS ADVANCE NOTICE AND ONLY CORPS OR ARMY-SIZE MANEUVERS TO BE NOTIFIED. WE WILL OF COURSE IMPLEMENT YOUR INSTRUCTION IN SECTO 144, BUT OUR PROBLEM WITH THE BRITISH IS THAT THEY INTERPRETED YOUR GENERAL ENDORSEMENT OF THEIR APPROACH ON MARCH 28 AS CONSTITUTING FULL BACKING FOR IT. IN FACT, YOU ONLY TOLD THEM THAT THEIR APPROACH IS A GOOD BASIS ONCE THE GEORGIANIC AREA AND UNIT SIZE ISSUES HAD BEEN SETTLED.

FOURTH, THE WHOLE QUESTION OF FOLLOW-ON MACHINERY HAS NOT EVEN BEEN BROACHED YET IN GENEVA AND IT WILL UNDOUBTEDLY TAKE SOME TIME TO RESOLVE.

IN SUM, OUR PROBLEM IS ALMOST CERTAINLY NOT THAT OF GETTING ISSUES SOLVED TOO FAST BUT RATHER THAT OF HAVING A NUMBER OF THEM STILL OPEN WHEN THE PRESIDENT GOES TO MOSCOW AND HIS BEING PUT UNDER PRESSURE FROM BREZHNEV TO GET THEM SOLVED.

OUR WHOLE POSITION ON CSCE HAS BECOME RATHER IRONIC. HERE WE WERE ALWAYS THE MOST SKEPTICAL AND YET TODAY WE SEEM TO HAVE BECOME THE KEY TO SUCCESS IN BOTH SOVIET AND WEST EUROPEAN EYES. THE SOVIETS, EVIDENTLY CALCULATING THAT THE PRESIDENT IS PAGER FOR A SUCCESSFUL SUMMIT FINALE, CONSTANTLY BADGER US TO GET MATTERS MOVING AND WE HAVE TO SOME EXTENT ENCOURAGED THIS. THE NINE MEANWHILE, HAVING DISCOVERED THAT THEIR EARLIER ENTHUSIASM FOR THIS CONFERENCE WAS MISPLACED AND BEING INCREASINGLY SUBJECTED TO DOMESTIC CRITICISM ABOUT IT, WANT US TO USE OUR CLOUT WITH THE SOVIETS TO OBTAIN RESULTS THAT WILL LOOK GOOD IN EUROPEAN PARLIAMENTS. FAILING THAT, THEY ARE TRYING TO POSITION THEMSELVES IN A WAY THAT A DISAPPOINTING RESULT, ESPECIALLY IF CONSECRATED AT THE SUMMIT LEVEL, CAN BE ATTRIBUTED TO US-SOVIET CONNIVANCE AND THE PRESIDENT'S EAGERNESS FOR A "SUCCESS". YET THE STARK FACT IS THAT NOW AS BEFORE THERE IS NOTHING OF CONSEQUENCE IN THIS EXERCISE FOR US EXCEPT TO THE DEGREE THAT WE CAN USE THE MANEUVERING ABOUT IT FOR OTHER PURPOSES WITH THE SOVIETS.

MY OWN JUDGMENT WOULD BE THAT WE OUGHT NOT TO EXTEND OURSELVES MUCH FURTHER BEYOND OUR EFFORTS TO GET A TOLERABLE BASKET THREE ARRANGEMENT AND TO BRING THE COM POSITIONS CLOSER, AND THAT WE SHOULD DO NOTHING FURTHER THAT MIGHT RESULT IN OUR BEING OUT AHEAD ON THE SUMMIT ISSUE. THE MAIN POINT REMAINS TO GET THIS OPERATION OVER WITH AS SOON AS FEASIBLE, IF NECESSARY

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WITH ESSENTIALLY MINIMAL RESULTS AND AT FOREIGN MINISTERS LEVEL. I SEE LITTLE TO COMMEND THE BRIMELOW VIEW THAT SINCE THE SOVIETS ARE EAGER TO GET THE SUMMIT WE SHOULD USE THIS TO EXTORT MAJOR SOVIET CONCESSIONS. WE WILL NOT GET SUCH CONCESSIONS -- ESPECIALLY IF THE SOVIETS THINK THAT THEY CAN GET A SUMMIT ANYWAY -- AND EVEN IF WE DID THEY WOULD MERELY BE THE SOURCE OF SUBSEQUENT DISPUTES. MOREOVER, I SEE NO REASON WHY WE SHOULD DO THE EXTORTING, AS THE EUROPEANS SEEM TO THINK WE SHOULD. FINALLY, THE SOONER THIS CONFERENCE ENDS THE QUICKER WE WILL REMOVE A SOURCE OF INCREASING IRRITATION WITH THE ALLIES FOR ESSENTIALLY A WORTHLESS CAUSE. AND ON TOP OF THAT, HYLAND AND I ARE BOTH PERSUADED THAT WE WILL NOT GET THE SOVIETS TO MOVE ON MPFR UNTIL THE CSCE IS OUT OF THE WAY.

WHAT ALL THIS ARGUES FOR IS THAT WE PROCEED AS WE ARE DOING UNTIL THE PRESIDENT'S MOSCOW TRIP: THAT ON THE OCCASION WE

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AVOID AS MUCH AS WE CAN FURTHER COMMITMENTS TO MOVE THE EUROPEANS;  
AND THAT AFTER THE SUMMIT WE LET MATTERS TAKE THEIR COURSE TOWARD  
A FAIRLY PROMPT AND SUBSTANTIVELY MODEST CONCLUSION.

I APOLOGIZE FOR THE LENGTH OF THIS MESSAGE BUT I WANTED TO GIVE YOU MY PERSPECTIVE ON THIS MATTER BEFORE YOUR NEXT MEETING WITH GROMYKO. ART AND I ARE SENDING YOU A FRONTCHANNEL MESSAGE WITH TALKING POINTS AND OTHER PERTINENT MATERIAL.

\* \* \* \* \* #WHSR COMMENT \* \* \* \* \*

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