

**SECRET**

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IMMEDIATE

HAKTO 40

MAY 5, 1974

TO: GENERAL SCOWCROFT  
FROM: SECRETARY KISSINGER

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PLEASE PASS THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO THE PRESIDENT:

ON-FILE NSC RELEASE  
INSTRUCTIONS APPLY

BEGIN TEXT

WE HAVE REACHED THE CRUCIAL STAGE IN THE NEGOTIATIONS. THE ISRAELI CABINET MEETING SUNDAY AFTERNOON WILL BE CRITICAL IN DETERMINING IN LARGE MEASURE THE DIRECTION IN WHICH THINGS WILL TAKE. IN MY MEETING WITH MRS. MEIR AND HER CLOSEST CABINET COLLEAGUES (ALLON, DAYAN AND EBAN) AND IN A 1:00 AM PRIVATE MEETING WITH HER SUBSEQUENTLY, I ONCE AGAIN REVIEWED THE CONSIDERATIONS WHICH MAKE IT ESSENTIAL THAT THE CABINET DECIDE ON A POSITION THAT IS WITHIN NEGOTIATING RANGE AND THAT I CAN PRESENT TO ASAD AS SUCH.

MORI/CDF  
C03344658

PRIOR TO THESE MEETINGS, I HAD SPENT THE ENTIRE DAY WITH SADAT REVIEWING WHERE MATTERS STAND. HE WAS DISPLEASED BOTH WITH THE SYRIAN AND THE ISRAELI POSITION. SADAT HAS A VITAL STAKE IN THE ACHIEVEMENT OF A SYRIAN-ISRAELI DISENGAGEMENT AGREEMENT SINCE HE FULLY REALIZES THAT TO FAIL AT THIS JUNCTURE WOULD NOT ONLY REVERSE ALL THE POSITIVE TRENDS IN THE AREA BUT WOULD IN FACT EXPOSE HIM TO THE RADICAL TENDENCIES IN THE AREA WHICH HE WOULD BE FORCED TO JOIN IN ONE WAY OR ANOTHER. HE BELIEVES THAT IF IT IS POSSIBLE TO SECURE ISRAELI AGREEMENT TO A LINE THAT INCLUDES SOME MODEST MODIFICATIONS IN THE OCTOBER 6 LINE INCLUDING ALL OF QUNEITRA HE CAN HELP MOBILIZE KEY ARAB SUPPORT AND WILL HIMSELF EXERCISE INFLUENCE ALSO TO GET SYRIAN AGREEMENT. I SUGGESTED THAT TO HELP ACHIEVE THIS THAT I SEND A MEMBER OF MY PARTY, HAROLD SAUNDERS, TO JIDDA AND ALGIERS TO TALK TO FAISAL AND BOUMEDIENE. SADAT AGREED AND MADE AVAILABLE A CLOSE ASSISTANT OF HIS, ASHRAF MARWAN, WHO WILL MAKE PARALLEL EFFORTS IN THESE TWO CAPITALS

State Dept. review  
completed

SADAT MADE CLEAR THAT IF THE ISRAELIS WOULD ACCEPT THIS PROPOSAL HE WOULD AGREE TO SUPPORT IT PUBLICLY. MOREOVER, SADAT SAID THAT ONCE SYRIAN-ISRAELI DISENGAGEMENT IS ACHIEVED, HE IS PREPARED TO EMBARK ON A SERIOUS NEGOTIATION WITH THE ISRAELIS ON A SECOND PHASE.

I DESCRIBED THIS STRATEGY FULLY TO THE ISRAELIS LAST NIGHT AS WELL AS ASAD'S REACTIONS TO OTHER ELEMENTS OF A DISENGAGEMENT AGREEMENT, MOST OF WHICH I POINTED OUT ARE NEGOTIABLE BUT WOULD INVOLVE A VERY HEAVY STRUGGLE INDEED.

THE DECISION THE ISRAELI CABINET MUST MAKE TODAY IS WHETHER I CAN TAKE AN ISRAELI POSITION TO DAMASCUS LATE MONDAY NIGHT OR TUESDAY MORNING AS CLOSE AS POSSIBLE TO THE ABOVE PROPOSITION. MY IMPRESSION IS THAT THE ISRAELIS WILL BE WILLING TO DRAW THE LINE SO THAT THE EASTERN PART OF QUNEITRA WILL BE UNDER SYRIAN CIVIL ADMINISTRATION WITH THE WESTERN PART UNDER THE UN. THIS IS INSUFFICIENT IN MY JUDGMENT. IT WILL EVEN BE CONSIDERED AN INSULT BY ASAD. IF THIS PROVES TO BE THE FINAL WORD AT THIS JUNCTURE WE WILL THEN HAVE TO DEVELOP A COURSE OF ACTION WHICH MINIMIZES THE ADVERSE IMPACT ON US AND AT LEAST SLOWS DOWN THE PROBABLE ADVERSE TREND INIMICABLE TO OUR INTERESTS. I WOULD THEN RETURN HOME FAIRLY QUICKLY.

YOUR LETTER ARRIVED SUNDAY EVENING AS I WAS MEETING WITH MRS. MEIR AND I BELIEVE HELPED IMMENSELY IN BRINGING TO MRS. MEIR AND HER COLLEAGUES THE REALITY OF THE SITUATION ISRAEL FACES.

I MEET WITH MRS. MEIR AND A LARGER NUMBER OF CABINET MEMBERS THIS MORNING BEFORE I GO ON TO AMMAN, RETURNING TO ISRAEL ONCE AGAIN ON MONDAY.  
END TEXT

WARM REGARDS.