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FM JOCK COVEY //HAKTO 02//

TO THE SITUATION ROOM

UNCLAS

FEBRUARY 29, 1976

TO: GENERAL SCOWCROFT  
FROM: JOCK COVEY

FOLLOWING IS THE OSWALD JOHNSTON ARTICLE FROM THE  
"LOS ANGELES TIMES" OF SATURDAY, FEBRUARY 28, 1976  
WHICH YOU REQUESTED.  
BEGIN TEXT:

OFFICIAL CRITICIZES U.S. ARMS PACT PLAN  
BY OSWALD JOHNSTON  
TIMES STAFF WRITER

WASHINGTON- THE FORD ADMINISTRATION'S LATEST REPORTED COMPROMISE  
ON WHAT STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION FORMULA TO OFFER THE RUSSIANS  
CAME UNDER VEILED CRITICISM FRIDAY FROM THE HEAD OF THE  
GOVERNMENT AGENCY RESPONSIBLE FOR FURTHERING ARMS CONTROL  
PROGRAMS.

FRED C. IKLE, HEAD OF THE ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY,  
TOLD A NEWS CONFERENCE THAT LIMITING THE RANGE OF CERTAIN  
TYPES OF CRUISE MISSILES TO 375 MILES WOULD BE IMPOSSIBLE TO  
VERIFY AND THAT SUCH PROPOSALS WERE THEREFORE DAMAGING TO THE  
LONG-TERM FUTURE OF AN ARMS PACT BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND  
THE SOVIET UNION.

IKLE CALLED REPORTERS INTO HIS OFFICE OSTENSIBLY TO CRITICIZE  
A PROPOSAL BY THREE LIBERAL SENATORS THAT BOTH SUPERPOWERS  
DELAY FLIGHT TESTS OF SEA-LAUNCHED CRUISE MISSILES OF STRATEGIC  
RANGE.

BUT IT BECAME EVIDENT THAT CRITICISM OF THE SENATORS' PLAN  
APPLIED ALSO TO SOME ASPECTS OF THE PROPOSALS SECRETARY OF STATE  
HENRY A. KISSINGER HAS FORWARDED TO THE RUSSIANS DURING THE  
CURRENT NEGOTIATIONS ON A NEW STRATEGIC ARMS TREATY.

AT ISSUE IS THE EXTREMELY COMPLICATED QUESTION OF HOW TO

\* \* \* \* \* W H S R C O M M E N T \* \* \* \* \*

SCOWCROFT, HYLAND

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\*\*\*\*\*U N C L A S S I F I E D\*\*\*\*\*S COPY

VERIFY A WEAPON AS VERSATILE AS THE CRUISE MISSILE.

THE WEAPON CAN BE FIRED FROM AN AIRPLANE OR LAUNCHED FROM A SURFACE SHIP OR THROUGH THE TORPEDO TUBE OF A SUBMERGED SUBMARINE, FLY AT RANGES FROM A FEW HUNDRED MILES TO MORE THAN A THOUSAND MILES AND DELIVER EITHER A CONVENTIONAL OR A NUCLEAR WARHEAD WITHIN A FEW FEET OF A TARGET.

UNDER PRESENT TECHNIQUES OF VERIFICATION, IT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO DETERMINE HOW MANY CRUISE MISSILES ARE DEPLOYED, WHAT THEIR RANGE IS OR WHETHER THEIR STRIKING CAPACITY IS CONVENTIONAL, NUCLEAR, TACTICAL OR STRATEGIC.

AGAINST THE BACKGROUND OF REPEATED CHARGES BY CRITICS OF KISSINGER AND HIS ARMS CONTROL POLICIES THAT PREVIOUS STRATEGIC ARMS AGREEMENTS HAVE BEEN VIOLATED BY THE RUSSIANS, ANY NEW AGREEMENT CONTAINING UNVERIFIABLE LIMITS ON CRUISE MISSILES IS BOUND TO COME UNDER SHARP ATTACK-ESPECIALLY IN AN ELECTION YEAR.

NEVERTHELESS, KISSINGER CAME AWAY FROM MOSCOW AFTER TALKS THERE LAST MONTH WITH A TENTATIVE AGREEMENT TO BAN TESTING AND DEPLOYMENT OF SUBMARINE-LAUNCHED CRUISE MISSILES WITH A RANGE EXCEEDING 375 MILES.

IN SUPPORT OF THIS PROPOSAL, WHICH HAS BEEN UNDER FIRE FROM THE PENTAGON, KISSINGER AIDES HAVE ARGUED THAT FLIGHT TESTS OF CRUISE MISSILES CAN BE MONITORED AND THAT THE RUSSIANS WOULD BE UNLIKELY TO DEPLOY A WEAPON FOR STRATEGIC PURPOSES IF IT HAD ONLY BEEN FLIGHT-TESTED AT SUBSTRATEGIC-TACTICAL-RANGES.

THESE OFFICIALS HAVE ALSO ARGUED THAT, GIVEN THE 5-TO-10- YEAR ADVANTAGE IN COMPUTER TECHNOLOGY THAT THE UNITED STATES NOW HAS OVER THE SOVIET UNION, VERIFICATION PROBLEMS INVOLVING CRUISE MISSILES ARE "THEIR PROBLEM WITH US, RATHER THAN OUR PROBLEM WITH THEM."

IKLE EXPLICITLY REJECTED BOTH OF THESE ARGUMENTS FRIDAY. A CRUISE MISSILE, HE SAID, IS SO VERSATILE IT COULD EASILY BE TESTED AS THOUGH IT WERE DESIGNED TO BE LAUNCHED FROM A HEAVY BOMBER, THEN SURREPTITIOUSLY DEPLOYED ON A SUBMARINE.

HE SAID FURTHER THAT ARMS PACT NEGOTIATORS SHOULD LOOK AHEAD TO THE FUTURE, EVEN THOUGH, IN THE SHORT RUN, VIOLATIONS OR PROBLEMS ARE RELATIVELY UNIMPORTANT.

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END TEXT.

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