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HAK  
Chiron

SECRET/EYES ONLY

March 18, 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR HAL SONNENFELDT

FROM: Al Haig 19/  
SUBJECT: CIA Report, "The World Situation in 1970"

The President has read the March 11 memorandum to him from HAK (attached) that you prepared and has made some comments that require follow-up action.

Can We Do More in Eastern Europe to Take Advantage of the Changing Situation? (pages 2-3)

The President thought our present policy (as noted in the second paragraph on page 3) is the gradual and asked HAK to develop a more aggressive approach with a few bold, unexpected moves.

Action: Recommendation to HAK on how we go about developing this program for the President.

A New Look at Radio Free Europe (page 3)

The President agreed that we should review RFE in connection with the Fiscal 1972 budget, but commented that he favors continuing it and not cutting it.

MORI/CDF C05106193 page 1  
C05106195 pages 2-7

DOS review completed pages 2-7

ON-FILE NSC RELEASE  
INSTRUCTIONS APPLY

Attachment

AMH:WL:ms:3/18/70

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MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

7484

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INFORMATION

March 11, 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: Henry A. Kissinger *K*

SUBJECT: CIA Report: "The World Situation in 1970"

You raised certain questions in connection with this CIA report; this memorandum comments on these questions.

1. Weakness of Soviet Military Forces in the Western USSR

This CIA paper suggests that the Soviet build-up of military forces along the Sino-Soviet border has absorbed resources which would otherwise have gone to Soviet forces in Western Russia and that these latter forces are consequently inadequately supplied.

I think this conclusion is probably somewhat overdrawn. It is true that some 30 Soviet divisions have over the last several years been diverted to the Chinese border regions. Twelve of these are at the highest state of readiness and much of the equipment is of the most up-to-date type. Divisions in the Far East have unusually strong artillery support and some of the equipment has not even appeared in Soviet units in East Germany, which are among the best and most ready the Soviets maintain. One reason why Soviet forces adjacent to China are so well stocked is that they are deployed at the end of long lines of communication and in an emergency could not be rapidly brought up to highest readiness status.

CIA's assumption is that if it were not for the China problem, Soviet forces on the "western front" would be getting all or most of the resources now going east. Unfortunately, we do not know enough about Soviet resource decisions or arguments within their leadership to be able to accept this assumption with complete assurance. The Soviets have other demands on their resources, including from their strategic forces, and it is therefore at least conceivable that some resources now going to the east would not necessarily have been allocated to the western forces. Unless the Soviets were deliberately planning to attack Europe (or expected an imminent NATO attack) and therefore wanted to build up their western forces to complete readiness, they would have no great compulsion to keep all their divisions in the western USSR at a high pitch of readiness.

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C05106195 pages  
2-7

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At present, they maintain 31 combat ready divisions in Eastern Europe. Some 12 additional ones at or near combat readiness are further back, in the Western USSR. Numerous additional divisions in the Western USSR would require a great deal of build-up over periods ranging from weeks to months before they were combat ready. If it were not for China, there would probably be fewer of these low-readiness units and all Soviet forces might have somewhat better and newer equipment. But it is doubtful that the Soviets would maintain in constant readiness, at top manning and equipment levels, the 80-90 divisions generally thought to be needed for an attack westward.

China has undoubtedly served to complicate any Soviet planning for attack against the West; but it has not prevented the Soviets from maintaining large forces in the west, useful both to suppress dissidents, as in Czechoslovakia, and to remind Western Europe of the close proximity of Soviet power. Of course, even more relevant in the latter respect is the large Soviet MR/IRBM forces pointed at Europe. The demands placed on Soviet resources by the Chinese front may have had some effect in slowing the modernization of the MR/IRBMs.

West European detente-mindedness is not so much a function of the precise military posture the Soviets maintain, as of the expectations people have of Soviet intentions. In this regard, many Europeans now feel that the Soviets are so pre-occupied with China that they want quiet in the West. Some Europeans also question our readiness to resort to nuclear weapons in defense of Europe and therefore want, through detente, to lessen the likelihood of Soviet attack, or of crises that might lead to war. The Soviets have of course encouraged this mood by their proposals on "European security" and by intensified contacts of all kinds with West European countries.

It is unlikely that even if Soviet forces were somewhat better off than they are today, these West European attitudes would be much different under present circumstances.

2. Can We Do More in Eastern Europe to Take Advantage of the Changing Situation?

By your Romanian trip and the policy associated with it, you have signaled your readiness for improved relations with the countries of Eastern Europe. Your Foreign Policy Statement points out that the pace for such improvement should depend on what the East Europeans themselves think the traffic will bear. This is an important qualification because we have no interest in arousing the Russians to clamp down. Some minor gradual improvements in relations with Hungary and Poland are possible but realistically we cannot expect any of the East European countries to go as far as Romania at present. But we have taken a major step in indicating that if and when they are ready for bona fide and reciprocal improvements, we will be receptive.

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
A sober attitude on our part toward the Soviet Union will also help us in Eastern Europe, because, like others, the people there would find a grand US-Soviet love-match discomfoting. For them it would mean that we had written them off and underwritten the Soviet sphere of influence. It is characteristic of the Soviets that in the past they have used both the extremes of an alleged threat from the US and of alleged prospects for a grandiose US-Soviet deal to try to frighten the East Europeans into submission. We have to operate in the middle ground between the two.

In sum, I think our general policy approach as now enunciated and implemented is best calculated to promote the gradual growth of greater autonomy in Eastern Europe. Later, we might consider selective relaxation in our economic policies, and more intensive contacts, including at high levels of government. We must also make a constant, though tactful, effort through NATO to keep the Western allies generally on the same policy lines toward Eastern Europe. In time, the new Committee on Challenges of Modern Society might be one means of developing relations with those Eastern countries that are ready to participate.

3. A New Look at Radio Free Europe.

It is my understanding that evaluation of RFE in 1969 indicated that it continues to enjoy a sizeable audience in Eastern Europe. Many people regard it as the most reliable and comprehensive source of information. The regimes are of course unhappy with it, as are the Soviets. Funding for Fiscal 1971 will remain at about 30 million dollars and will not allow some of the modernization that RFE and CIA felt desirable to maintain the quality of service. It might be appropriate to consider a small additional sum of money if it turns out that the service is running down. I believe that in connection with the Fiscal 1972 budget a complete and independent review of RFE's activities and effectiveness should be taken. This could well begin by mid-spring.

*I think this is the slow & unimpaired development of more of this kind of a few bold & unimpaired moves*



SECRET/EYES ONLY

*I believe we should review it - but I favor continuing it & not cutting it*

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4. Increased Exchange Programs.

There is no question that as regards the East European countries increased exchanges of various types can over time help to reinforce trends favorable to us. We must however be careful not to press prematurely because the regimes are suspicious and fear Soviet reactions. They also are skillful in obstructing contact with their population and otherwise constraining the activities of our people. However, many private US institutions and individuals maintain contacts, exchange visits, and engage in various projects, and the Administration should encourage this kind of activity. It will be to our advantage to demonstrate that Romania is benefitting most (apart from Yugoslavia) from contact with us because this will show the practical advantages of good relations with us.

As regards the Soviets, we still face an extremely restrictive approach on the part of the Soviet leadership. The Soviets are eager to send people here to earn dollars or learn from our technology; our biannual exchange agreements (the latest one was just negotiated) guarantee us some degree of reciprocal access by our people to the Soviet scene. Without such agreements the Soviets would never grant us this and exchanges would be largely a one-way street. At best, exchanges with the USSR will grow slowly because of the attitude of the Soviet rulers, but we should keep up the pressure for steady expansion. Opinions in the West differ, but there may well be at least a marginal impact in breaking down Soviet prejudices even from the limited programs we are able to conduct.

In your recent conversation with Ambassador Beam you agreed to arrangements for reciprocal visits of government officials. Over time, it cannot harm us and may help if the new generation of Soviet leaders sees some of our accomplishments (and, for that matter, some of our problems and the way we tackle them).

We must, however, not oversell the exchange program. Its effect will at best be extremely gradual; and any boasting about its impact on Soviet attitudes may provide the most rigid among the Kremlin leaders a pretext for scuttling the program.

This is also an area where some coordination and exchange of experience with the Allies and Japan could be helpful.

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SECRET/EYES ONLY5. Increased Trade with the Communist Countries

Four general premises should be borne in mind in considering the effect increased trade might have on our relations with the Communist countries, or any other countries:

- Increased trade has greater effects over time than in any given year (such as 1970).
- The increased interdependence of the world economy, coupled with the continued independence of national policies, has, however, raised the sensitivity of all countries -- including Communist countries -- to trade to its highest point in history.
- Trade policies, as contrasted with trade itself, can have significant effects in any given year.

As with other countries, we could use trade policy more actively to promote our foreign policy objectives with the Communist countries. At a minimum, we must be careful that it does not seriously impede achievement of those objectives.

Trade per se will always be marginal in our dealings with the Soviet Union, though it could be relatively more important with other countries including China. Our trade with Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union is now about \$200 million in each direction, about twice the volume of 1962. This amounts to well under one percent of our total trade. Even if we relaxed our export controls and the grain shipping requirements, and granted most favored nation treatment, it is unlikely that the actual volume of trade would in the next two or three years more than double to \$400 million in each direction.

The prospects for trade with China are even smaller. A recent private study for the National Committee on U. S. - China relations arrived at the conclusion that the high estimate for our trade with China was about \$250 million in each direction. Thus, even with these fairly optimistic assumptions, our trade with the Communist world would be only about two percent of our total trade.

However, it is clear that virtually all the Communist countries badly want increased trade with the United States. We could thus use trade as

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part of a general political improvement of relations. (The resulting trade would be of much less importance than a U. S. decision to foster its development.) Conversely, a tightening of our present controls would clearly display disapproval of their policies. Differential treatment of different Communist countries is of course an important variant on either the positive or negative themes.

6. Raising Food Production

In response to your comment the Secretary of Agriculture in coordination with the Secretary of Defense and other appropriate agencies, has been directed to initiate a study designed to determine what world-wide population could be supported if world food production could be raised to the level currently achieved through U.S. agricultural methods. The results are due on April 6, 1970.

*I consider this  
very important -  
Discuss with me when  
it comes to it.*

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