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
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

May 9, 1973

Dear Dick:

Your comprehensive report on prospects for stability in the Persian Gulf and Arabian Peninsula was an excellent job. I appreciate very much this survey which can serve for all of us as a base line for your subsequent observations. This is exactly the sort of coverage I had in mind; and I very much count on your developing further what you have begun so well. We continue, of course, to follow your other reporting as well. I am glad that things seem to have started off on the right foot for you.

Sincerely,



The Honorable
Richard Helms
American Ambassador
Tehran
Iran

State Dept.
review
completed
pages 2-18

NSS review completed.

HK chv

MEMORANDUM

THE PRESIDENT H... SEE...

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

INFORMATION

April 24, 1973

SECRET (XGDS)

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

FROM: HENRY A. KISSINGER

SUBJECT: Ambassador Helms Reports on the Persian Gulf

Dean Smith
"Excellence"
Jeff

In response to your wish that Ambassador Helms report to you periodically on the stability of the Persian Gulf states, he has sent you a preliminary assessment based on recent travels

[redacted] He provides

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a brief sketch of each state as follows:

--Kuwait: Despite appearances to the contrary, Kuwait has better prospects for stability than any other state in the area. This is due to the way in which resources are used on behalf of the population and Kuwait's flexible foreign policy. The present ruler is not expected to last long, but succession is assured.

--Bahrain: Bahrain appears to be stable, but in fact many sources of tension exist. Bahrain is less wealthy than Kuwait and therefore less able to buy off opposition elements. The royal family is aloof from the people and follows an ostentatious life style. Bahrain is religiously divided between followers of Sunni and Shia Islam, with Iran taking a special interest in the Shia community. It would not take much for Iran to intervene directly in Bahraini affairs.

--Qatar: The present regime is popular and uses its wealth to promote stability as in Kuwait. The security forces, with many Jordanian officers, are capable of dealing with current threats.

--The United Arab Emirates (UAE): The UAE's future depends heavily on two very different personalities--Shaykh Zayid of Abu Dhabi, a strong ruler of Bedouin background, and Shaykh Rashid of Dubai, a clever merchant. Both are aware of the need

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 DECLAS - Date Impossible to Determine.
 BYAUTH - Dr. Henry A. Kissinger.

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for unity. Subversive organizations are able to operate in the UAE, although some cells have recently been broken up. The security forces of the individual shaykhdoms show little sign of cooperating. Thus far a national identity has not emerged to offset the forces working for division.

--Oman: The guerrilla war in Dhufar province absorbs over half of Oman's budget, thus limiting the possibility for using oil revenues more constructively. The Sultan is not a particularly strong leader and has done little to bring the various parts of the country together. Subversive cells have just been broken up, but the threat remains from rebel activity. The Sultan needs financial and military aid. The UAE has been remiss in not offering more aid to Oman.

--Saudi Arabia: The prognosis for Saudi Arabia is wealth and stability within the framework of a conservative monarchy. There is little opposition to the regime. The army is balanced by the national guard. Returning students are handsomely rewarded. Faysal is in good health and his family contains several potential successors.

On balance, Ambassador Helms feels that where there is local nationalism and accomplishment, as in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Qatar, one can anticipate stability. Where there are internal divisions such as in Bahrain, the UAE and Oman, instability is more likely.

Outside forces that could affect the stability of the area include the Peoples Democratic Republic of Yemen (Aden) and Iran. PDRY is actively seeking to export revolution and represents a threat to any state in the immediate area in a one-to-one situation. Iran is another matter. Arabs feel that Iranians in general and the Shah in particular are so contemptuous of them and are so arrogant in their dealings with them that true cooperation probably is not possible. The Arabs genuinely fear Iranian colonialism in the Gulf.

Ambassador Helms concludes that logically the Arabs and Iran should work together, but emotions militate against this. One of the key roles the US may play in the region is to assure that emotions are kept suppressed and are not permitted to break down the uneasy truce between the two parties.

Ambassador Helms' observations come at a time when several issues of concern to us are emerging in the Arabian Peninsula--Persian Gulf region. Consequently, I feel that a serious review of our policies in this area is warranted and am working on this.

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TO THE WHITE HOUSE

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EYES ONLY TEHRAN 060 SECTION 1 OF 5
TO: DR. HENRY A. KISSINGER, WASHINGTON
FROM: AMB. RICHARD HELMS, TEHRAN
SUBJECT: PERSIAN GULF

1. YOU WILL RECALL THAT YOU CONVEYED TO ME THE PRESIDENT'S
WISH, UNDERLINED IN HIS DECEMBER LETTER TO ME, THAT I MAKE A
RUNNING ASSESSMENT OF STABILITY IN THE PERSIAN GULF STATES
DURING MY TENURE HERE.

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YOU WILL NOTE THAT THE DISCUSSION PROCEEDS GEOGRAPHICALLY
FROM NORTH (KUWAIT) TO SOUTH (OMAN) WITH SAUDI ARABIA, THE
LARGEST AND MOST IMPORTANT STATE, LEFT TO LAST.

3. KUWAIT

MANY OBSERVERS FEEL THAT KUWAIT PRESENTS, SUPERFICIALLY,
THE LEAST POTENTIAL FOR STABILITY. THE KUWAITI POPULATION
OF 750,000 IS TWO THIRDS FOREIGNERS, HALF OF WHOM ARE
PALESTINIANS. IT ALSO HAS A HIGHLY VOCAL LEFTIST ORIENTED
INTERNAL OPPOSITION MOVEMENT REPRESENTED IN PARLIAMENT AND
IN THE PRESS. THE COVETOUS EYES OF IRAQ ARE CAST UPON IT
AND IRAQI TROOP MANEUVERS ALWAYS APPEAR TO BE STRADDLING ITS
BORDER. RADICAL ARAB GROUPS ARE GIVEN FREEDOM OF ACTION
COUTENANCED IN ONLY ONE OTHER ARAB STATE; LEBANON.

* * * * * W H S R C O M M E N T * * * * *

SENT TO S.C. FOR HAK, KENNEDY

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IN FACT, KUWAIT IS VERY MUCH LIKE LEBANON POLITICALLY; AND JUST AS THE RADICAL ARAB STATES TOLERATE BOURGEOIS LEBANON FOR THE FREEDOM OF ACTION THEY DO NOT HAVE IN OTHER STATES, SO THEY TOLERATE AND NEED REACTIONARY KUWAIT. KUWAIT, HOWEVER, UNLIKE LEBANON, IS NOT JUST A PASSIVE VIEWER OF EVENTS--IT CONTROLS THINGS AND THERIN LIES THE KEY TO KUWAIT'S STABILITY--A STABILITY OF GREATER DURABILITY THAN ANY OTHER GULF STATE, INCLUDING SAUDI ARABIA. OBSERVERS ARE OFTEN BOTHERED BY KUWAIT'S APPARENT SUPINE NATURE AND LACK OF MORAL FIBRE IN PERMITTING RADICAL GROUPS TO OPERATE FROM ITS TERRITORY. KUWAITIS LOVE TO PROMOTE THIS OUTWARD APPEARANCE OF "SUPINE-NESS" AND ARE LITTLE BOTHERED BY THE MORALITY OF THEIR POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY. THE KUWAIT RULING FAMILY AND THE 250,000 OTHER KUWAITIS ARE ONLY CONCERNED THAT THEY KEEP KUWAIT FOR THE KUWAITIS. THEY BELIEVE THEY HAVE THE FINANCIAL CLOUT, THE PROGRESSIVE IMAGE AND INTERNAL SECURITY PHILOSOPHY TO KEEP KUWAIT FOR THE KUWAITIS. IN THIS WE AGREE WITH THEM, AT LEAST FOR THE NEXT FIVE YEARS. THE KUWAITIS CERTAINLY ARE AWARE OF THE POTENTIAL TROUBLE THEIR POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY MAY BREED AND THEY HAVE A SYSTEM OF INTERNAL CHECKS AND BALANCES WHICH THEY WATCH CLOSELY. SHOULD ONE ELEMENT BECOME UNACCEPTABLE, IT IS PURGED, QUIETLY. THE REAL PROBLEM, IN THE LONG RUN, IS THAT THE REVOLUTION THAT THE KUWAITIS PERMIT TO BE EXPORTED FROM THEIR SHORE MAY ONE DAY RETURN TO DEVOUR THE BIG, FAT, CONTENTED HEN THAT HATCHED IT. THE KUWAITIS MUST BE MADE MORE AWARE OF THIS ASPECT OF THEIR POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY.

THE RULER OF KUWAIT IS IN BAD HEALTH AND IS NOT EXPECTED TO LIVE LONG. THE SUCCESSION HAS BEEN WORKED OUT AND, AS USUAL, THE TWO CLANS OF THE RULING FAMILY, THE SALIMS AND THE JABIRS, WILL SPLIT THE GOVERNMENT PIE. THE CROWN PRINCE JABIR AL AHMAD, IS A

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TO THE WHITE HOUSE

S E C R E T 310906Z MAR 73 []

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EYES ONLY TEHRAN 060 SECTION 2 OF 5
TO: DR. HENRY A. DISSINGER, WASHINGTON
FROM: AMB. RICHARD HELMS, TEHRAN
OF LOYAL BADU (BEDOUIN) WHO ARE OVER-ARMED AND UNDER-TRAINED.
VARIOUS MEMBERS OF THE RULING FAMILY HOLD COMMISSIONS IN
THE MILITARY AT MOST LEVELS AND SERVE AS AN EYE ON ACTIVITIES.

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[]
AS LONG AS THE OIL MONEY CONTINUES, AND THE RULING FAMILY
USES MORE CARROT THAN STICK, THE POLITICAL SITUATION WILL
REMAIN STABLE.

4. BAHRAIN RPT BAHRAIN

IN CONTRAST TO KUWAIT, BAHRAIN GIVES THE DURWARD
APPEARANCE OF TRANQUILITY AND STABILITY. THE BAHRAINIS
HAVE THE OLDEST AND BEST EDUCATIONAL SYSTEM IN THE GULF.
AS THE FIRST OIL PRODUCER IN THAT AREA, AN ARTISAN AND
MIDDLE CLASS HAVE EVOLVED AND THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE
CLASSES ARE NOT SO GREAT. BUT BECAUSE THE BRITISH STAYED
ON LONGER IN BAHRAIN THAN KUWAIT ANF SUPPRESSED THE SOPHIS-
TICATED NATIONALIST MOVEMENT FOR ALMOST TWENTY YEARS OF
ITS EXISTENCE, THERE IS MORE BITTERNESS, MORE URGENCY AND
A BETTER CLANDESTINE POLITICAL ORGANIZATION.

ALTHOUGH FAR BETTER PREPARED FOR POLITICAL ACTIVITY
THAN KUWAIT, BAHRAIN DID NOT HAVE ITS FIRST FREE ELECTION
UNTIL DECEMBER 1972 (VS. 1964 IN KUWAIT). IN ADDITION,
THERE ARE OTHER NEGATIVE FACTORS IN BAHRAIN NOT PRESENT IN
KUWAIT. BAHRAIN IS NOT A WEALTHY OIL STATE AND CANNOT
AFFORD TO BUY OFF WOULD-BE AGITATORS. THE ROYAL FAMILY IS
ALDOP FROM AND A BURDEN ON THE PEOPLE. IT MAINTAINS ITS
OSTENTATIOUSNESS IN SPITE OF ITS SMALL INCOME. THE MERCHANT
CLASS DOES NOT DEPEND ON THE GRANTING OF CONCESSIONS BY THE
ROYAL FAMILY FOR ITS INCOME, BUT RATHER ON ITS OWN MERCANTILE
SKILLS. THE SUNNI ROYAL FAMILY DOES NOT TRUST THE SHI'A
BAHRAINIS OR EVEN THE NON-SAUDI-DERIVED SUNNIS. THE FAMILY

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IS ALIEN TO THE ISLAND AND LOOKS TO RECRUITED TRIBESMEN FROM SAUDIA FOR ITS PERSONAL GUARDS.

THE SPLIT BETWEEN THE IRANIAN DERIVED FAMILIES (SHI'A AND SUNNI) AND ARAB FAMILIES IS GREAT, AND THE SUNNI-SHI'A SPLIT EVEN GREATER. THE SHI'AS PROBABLY OUTNUMBER THE SUNNIS, BUT THE SUNNIS CONTROL THE GOVERNMENT OF THE ISLAND. IT IS AMONG THE SHI'A THAT THE LABOR MOVEMENT AND COMMUNIST ACTIVITY IS MOST STRONG. AT THE SAME TIME, MANY OF THE GREAT MERCHANT FAMILIES ARE SHI'A AND THEY LOOK TO IRAN FOR PROTECTION. IRAN HAS RESPONDED WITH AN ACTIVE, HIGH POWERED DIPLOMATIC MISSION WHICH SEEKS TO PROMOTE THE IRAN-NESS OF BAHRAIN.

THE ARAB BAHRAINIS HAVE FORMED THE NATIONALIST PARTIES IN BAHRAIN AND HAVE, AT LEAST ON THE EXTREME LEFT OF THE POLITICAL SPECTRUM, ON OCCASION FORMED FRONTS WITH THE ANTI-REGIME SHI'AS. THE KEY ANTI-REGIME RADICAL ACTIVIST PARTIES ARE, HOWEVER, ARAB AND DRAW THEIR PHILOSOPHIES FROM THE ANM, THE BA'ATH AND ARAB SOCIALIST PARTIES. A SOPHISTICATED SPECIAL BRANCH, OFFICERED BY BRITISH EXPATRIATES, HAS BEEN ABLE TO KEEP THESE PARTIES UNDER CONTROL, BUT IN SO DOING, THEY HAVE FORCED THE PARTIES TO IMPROVE THEMSELVES ORGANIZATIONALLY TO A VERY HIGH DEGREE. CELL STRUCTURE AND COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEMS ARE PROBABLY SURPASSED ONLY BY THE MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD IN THEIR SOPHISTICATION. SHOULD THE EXPATRIATES BE FORCED OUT, THESE GROUPS WOULD PRESENT A REAL THREAT AS THE ONLY GROUPS WITH A SUFFICIENT DEGREE OF ORGANIZATION TO ASSUME IMMEDIATE ACTION. AS LONG AS THE EXPATRIATES SURVIVE, HOWEVER, THE UNPOPULAR REGIME WILL EXIST.

ANOTHER FACTOR IS THE IRANIAN. IT IS VERY APPARENT THAT THE IRANIANS HAVE SET THEMSELVES UP AS THE PROTECTORS OF THE SHI'AS ON BAHRAIN. IT PROBABLY WOULD NOT TAKE MUCH OF AN EXCUSE FOR THE IRANIANS TO LAND A FORCE TO PROTECT THE SHI'AS AGAINST THE "ARABS". THE BAHRAIN DEFENSE FORCE (BDF) IS NOT LARGE, EFFICIENT OR LOYAL AND ONCE THE IRANIANS LANDED, THE ARABS COULD NOT DO MUCH ABOUT IT.

5. QATAR RPT QATAR

THE COUP WHICH BROUGHT SHAYKH KHALIFAH BIN HAMAD TO THE THRONE IN FEBRUARY 1972 WAS GREETED WITH A SIGH OF RELIEF BY THE QATARIS AND, ONE YEAR LATER, THE PEOPLE STILL ARE EXPERIENCING THE SAME EUPHORIA. PRIOR TO THE BLOODLESS COUP, THE LARGE RULING FAMILY (AL-THANI) WAS A GREAT BURDEN ON THE PEOPLE. IN SPITE OF THE LARGE OIL INCOME (200 MILLION DOLLARS/80,000 POPULATION) QATARI DEVELOPMENT WAS SLOW BECAUSE OF THE DEMANDS OF THE AL-THANIS. SHAYKH KHALIFAH HAS NOW CUT THE AL-THANI SUBSIDY AND ENCOURAGED THE FAMILY MEMBERS TO ENGAGE IN PRODUCTIVE ENTERPRISES. WITH FASTER DEVELOPMENT AND MORE MONEY IN CIRCULATION, THE PEOPLE ARE APPROACHING THE KUWAITI VIEW TOWARD THE RULING FAMILY. THE EX-RULER, AHMAD, AND PARTICULARLY HIS SON ABD-AL-AZIZ, HAVE NOT GIVEN UP HOPE OF A COUNTER-COUP, BUT TO DATE THEY

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HAVE HAD LITTLE SUCCESS IN GATHERING TOGETHER A FORCE. ALSO, THE SAUDIS ARE WATCHING EVENTS IN QATAR CLOSELY AND MUCH PREFER A STABLE, KHALIFAH-LED QATAR TO A POTENTIAL LEFTIST REGIME THAT MIGHT EVOLVE SHOULD AHMAD HAVE TO BE DUSTED AGAIN.

QATAR'S EXPATRIATE (MOSTLY JORDANIAN) OFFICERED SECURITY FORCE IS QUITE CAPABLE OF MEETING ANY OF THE CURRENT THREATS. THERE ARE LARGE PALESTINIAN AND PERSIAN COMMUNITIEE IN QATAR. THE PALESTINIANS ARE PERMITTED TO HAVE ORGANIZATIONS AND HOLD RALLIES, BUT ARE HELD IN CHECK BY THREAT OF EXPULSION. THE PERSIANS, MOSTLY MERCHANTS, ENJOY COMPLETE FREEDOM AND EQUALITY IN KEEPING WITH KHALIFAH'S GOOD RELATIONS WITH IRAN.

THE QATARIS THEMSELVES ARE FAIRLY UNSOPHISTICATED POLITICALLY. THE STUDENTS THEY SEND ABROAD ALL HAVE USEFUL POSITIONS, NOW FILLED BY EXPATRIATES, WAITING FOR THEM WHEN THEY RETURN SO THERE IS A LACK OF DISCONTENT FROM THAT SIDE. ALSO, THE SMALL, INBRED LOCAL POPULATION IS CONSERVATIVE AND THE USUAL POLITICAL MOVEMENTS IN THE GULF (ANM, PFLOAG, ETC,) HAVE NOT FOUND QATAR A FERTILE PLACE FOR THEIR PHILOSOPHIES.

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TO THE WHITE HOUSE

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EYES ONLY TEHRAN 060 SECTION 3 OF 5
TO: DR. HENRY A. KISSINGER, WASHINGTON
FROM: AMB. RICHARD HELMS, TEHRAN

AS LONG AS SHAYKH KHALIFAH RULES AND THE WEALTH IS DIS-
TRIBUTED EQUITABLY, THERE WILL BE NO TROUBLE IN QATAR.

6. THE UAE RPT UAE

THE UAE'S FUTURE DEPENDS TO A GREAT DEGREE ON THE PERSON-
ALITIES OF ITS TWO LEADING SHAYKHS AND THEIR ABILITY TO GET
ALONG WITH EACH OTHER. SHAYKH ZAYID OF ABU DHABI AND SHAYKH
RASHID OF DUBAI ARE THE KEY PLAYERS, AND TWO MEN COULD NOT
BE MORE DIFFERENT. ZAYID, RULER OF ABU DHABI AND PRESIDENT
OF THE UAE, IS A BEDU WITH ALL THE GUILLE, CHARM AND PRIDE
THAT IS CHARACTERISTIC OF BEDUIN. SHAYKH RASHID, RULER OF
DUBAI AND VICE PRESIDENT OF THE UAE, IS A TOWNSMAN, A MER-
CHANT WHO LIVES BY HIS WITS, BY HIS ABILITY TO MAKE A DEAL AND BY
HIS BASIC DISTRUST OF THOSE WHO HAVEN'T HAD TO EARN THEIR
MONEY BY THEIR OWN DEVICES. SEVERAL FACTORS, HOWEVER,
MILITATE AGAINST A SPLIT. FIRST, THE PEOPLE OF THE UAE
GENUINELY WANT THE UNION, PARTICULARLY THE CITIZENS OF THE
SMALLER, HAVE-NOT SHAYKHOOMS (AJMAN, RAS AL-KHAYMAH, FUJAYRAH
AND UMM AL-QAYWAYN). SECONDLY, ALTHOUGH DUBAI, ABU DHABI,
AND SHORTLY SHARJAH COULD GO IT ALONE, THE OTHER STATES
WOULD HAVE TO LOOK FOR OUTSIDE AID AND IRAQ IS ALL TOO WILL-
ING TO BE THE PROVIDER: ZAYID AND RASHID DON'T WANT REVOLU-
TION ON THEIR DOORSTEPS. LASTLY, THE OLD DICTUM "UNITED WE
STAND, DIVIDED WE FALL" IS VERY MUCH IN THEIR MINDS. THERE
ARE TOO MANY BIG NEIGHBORS (IRAN, IRAQ AND SAUDIA) WAITING
IN THE WINGS TO PICK OFF A WEAK PLAYER, OR SO THEY FEEL.

ONE OF THE GREAT PROBLEMS FACING THE UAE IS THAT IT IS
TRYING TO BE TOO PROGRESSIVE TOO SOON. THE UAE IS FAIRLY
TOLERANT TOWARD POLITICAL ACTIVITY AND DISSENT BUT IS NOT
SOPHISTICATED ENOUGH TO HANDLE IT. THUS, IDEOLOGIES FIND
FERTILE GROUND IN THE UAE, PARTICULARLY AMONG THE EDUCATED,
WHILE THERE IS NO COUNTER EFFORT BY THE GOVERNMENT. THE
RECENT WRAP-UP OF PFLOAG CELLS IN THE UAE SHOWED THE EXTENT

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TO WHICH SUCH AN ORGANIZATION HAD INFILTRATED THE STATE. (THE POPULAR FRONT FOR THE LIBERATION OF OMAN AND THE ARAB GULF IS A RADICAL MARXIST-LENINIST ORGANIZATION FORMED BY CADRE WITH ANM TIES AND IS ATTEMPTING TO OVERTHROW CONSERVATIVE REGIMES BY SUBVERSION, TERRORISM AND GUERRILLA WARFARE.) THE PFLOAG GROUP IN THE UAE WAS WELL ORGANIZED WITH HIGH LEVEL PENETRATIONS OF THE UNION DEFENSE FORCE (UDF). THE LUCKY BREAK THAT BROUGHT ABOUT THE WRAP-UP OF THE PFLOAG ORGANIZATION HAS PROBABLY SET PFLOAG'S PLANS FOR OPERATIONS IN THE UAE BACK AT LEAST A YEAR. BECAUSE EACH SHAYKHDOM MAINTAINS ITS OWN SPECIAL BRANCH, AND THERE IS LITTLE COOPERATION BETWEEN THEM, THERE IS SMALL DOUBT THAT PFFAG WILL REDORGANIZE RAPIDLY IN THE FAIRLY PERMISSIVE POLITICAL ATMOSPHERE OF THE UAE. SHOULD BE EXPATRIATES BE FORCED OUT OF THE E SPECIAL BRANCHES OR SHOULD THE UAE BREAK UP, PFLOAG'S PROGRAM COULD MOVE FASTER.

PALESTINIAN FORTYSEVEN ORGANIZATIONS, SUCH AS FATAH/BSO, ARE ALSO GIVEN A FAIRLY FREE HAND IN THE UAE. AT THE CURRENT TIME, THE UAE DOES NOT PERCEIVE THESE ORGANIZATIONS AS A THREAT AND THEY DO NOT REALIZE THE DEGREE TO WHICH THESE ORGANIZATIONS ARE COOPERATING WITH PFLOAG. PALESTINIANS ARE REQUIRED TO FILL MANY SLOTS IN THE UAE GOVERNMENT, BUT THE GOVERNMENT'S FAILURE TO RECOGNIZE THE EXTRA CURRICULAR ACTIVITIES OF THESE MEN AND WOMEN IS A WEAKNESS THAT MUST BE CORRECTED RAPIDLY.

THE UAE GOVERNMENT IS FACED WITH NUMEROUS PROBLEMS, WHICH MAY BE SUMMARIZED AS FOLLOWS:

THE GOVERNMENT MUST BEGIN TO UTILIZE QUALIFIED YOUTH, SPREAD MORE OF THE WEALTH TO THE MIDDLE CLASS, STEP UP SOCIAL REFORM AND DEVELOP A NATIONAL APPROACH (ONE BUDGET, ONE ARMY, ONE PASSPORT), OR THE RADICAL ELEMENTS, SUCH AS PFLOAG, WILL CONTINUE TO FIND FERTILE GROUND FOR THEIR IDEOLOGIES. THE RECENT PFLOAG WRAP-UP PROBABLY AWAKENED THE RULERS TO THE PROBLEMS THEY FACE AND THE NEED FOR COOPERATION, BUT THE DIVISIONS, JEALOUSIES AND SUSPICIONS RUN DEEP. IF A MEANINGFUL UNION CAN EVOLVE QUICKLY, AND THE CHANCES FOR THIS HAPPENING WERE NEVER BETTER (FEAR IS STRONGER THAN JEALOUSY), THE UAE CAN LOOK AHEAD TO A STABLE EXISTENCE. ALSO, THE UAE MUST COME TO GRIPS WITH ITS NEIGHBORS--IRAN, SAUDI ARABIA AND OMAN. OUTSTANDING PROBLEMS, SUCH AS BURAIMI, THE GULF ISLANDS, ETC. MUST BE SOLVED AND BILATERAL AGREEMENTS SIGNED. THE UAE MUST BE A NATION IN FACT, NOT JUST IN NAME. IT MUST ESTABLISH ITS NATIONAL IDENTITY ON SOMETHING MORE THAN OIL ROYALTIES OR IT WILL FALL PREY TO INTERNAL SUBVERSION OR EXTERNAL TAKEOVER RESULTING FROM REACTION TO THAT SUBVERSION. THE U.S. EMBASSY IN THE UAE, AND THE AMBASSADOR, WHEN HE VISITS FROM KUWAIT, SHOULD BE ENCOURAGED IN THEIR CONTACTS WITH LOCAL OFFICIALS, TO POINT OUT THESE PROBLEMS AND THE NECESSITY FOR THE RAPID SOLUTION OF THEM.

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7. OMAN RPT OMAN

WHEN YOUNG SULTAN QABUS TOOK OVER OMAN BY DUSTING HIS FATHER IN JULY 1970, HE PROMISED THE PEOPLE THAT HE WOULD UTILIZE THE OIL REVENUES (NOW ABOUT \$120 MILLION PER YEAR) TO BRING ABOUT SOCIAL REFORM AND DEVELOPMENT IN THE COUNTRY. THE WAR IN DHUFAR PROVINCE, WHICH ABSORBS 50-60 PERCENT OF THE BUDGET, HAS PUT A DAMPER ON QABUS' PLANS AND THE PEOPLE ARE BEGINNING TO GET IMPATIENT. ALTHOUGH THE SUCCESSFUL CONCLUSION OF THE GUERRILLA WAR IN DHUFAR IS IMPORTANT TO THE SECURITY OF THE COUNTRY, THE OMANIS DO NOT SEE THIS AND QABUS HAS NOT TRIED TO MAKE THIS CLEAR. TO THE OMANIS, DHUFAR HAS ALWAYS BEEN CONSIDERED A FIEF OF THE AL BU SA'ID DYNASTY, REMOTE, A PLACE FOR MERCENARIES. THE SULTAN HAS NOT TRIED TO CHANGE THIS CONCEPT. THE SULTAN IS NOT A POLITICIAN OR AN INSTINCTIVE LEADER, IN SPITE OF HIS GREAT PERSONAL CHARM. HE HAS NOT GOTTEN OUT AMONG THE PEOPLE, DRIVING AROUND AND PRESSING FLESH. HE IS, TO MOST, A NON-PERSON--A PICTURE IN THE PAPER, A VOICE ON THE RADIO. YET HIS MOST IMPORTANT TASK IS TO BRING THE DISPARATE PARTS OF THE COUNTRY TOGETHER
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TO THE WHITE HOUSE

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EYES ONLY TEHRAN 060 SECTION 4 OF 5

TO: DR. HENRY A. KISSINGER, WASHINGTON

FROM: AMB. RICHARD HELMS, TEHRAN

IN A SENSE OF NATIONHOOD UNDER HIS LEADERSHIP. FOR FIFTY YEARS OMAN HAS BEEN DIVIDED AND THUS IT HAS BEEN EASY PREY FOR SUBVERSIVE MOVEMENTS. ALSO, THE SULTAN IS NOT BRAVE, A CHARACTERISTIC MUCH ADMIRER BY THE ARABS--HE TRAVELS THE ROAD FROM HIS PALACE IN SIB TO HIS PALACE IN MUSCAT AT 60 MPH UNDER HEAVY GUARD. OUT OF HIS CAR HE IS SURROUNDED BY TROOPS. THE SULTAN HAS GREATER NEED FOR PUBLIC RELATIONS EXPERT NOW THAN FOR MILITARY EXPERTS. GETTING THE PEOPLE BEHIND HIM IS IMPORTANT AT THIS STAGE, YET HE IS SINGULARLY UNIMAGINATIVE AND SURROUNDS HIMSELF WITH SYCOPHANTS. WHAT LITTLE PROGRESS HAS BEEN MADE IN THE COUNTRY IS NOT ATTRIBUTED TO THE SULTAN BUT TO THE FOREIGN EXPERTS WHO WORK IN THE FIELD.

THE WRAP-UP OF PFLOAG CELLS IN THE MUSCAT-MATRAH REGION IN JANUARY-FEBRUARY 1973 IS AN INDICATION OF THE SUBVERSIVE POTENTIAL IN THE COUNTRY. THESE CELLS, REMNANTS OF NAFLOAG CELLS, WHICH WERE BROKEN UP IN 1970-71 AND WHICH WERE WELL ESTABLISHED IN MUSANDUM, JABA AL-AKHDAR AND MUSCAT, PLANNED A CAMPAIGN OF URBAN TERRORISM TO BE UNDERTAKEN IN CONJUNCTION WITH AN OFFENSIVE BY THE REBELS IN DHUFAR. IT WAS A HIGHLY SOPHISTICATED OPERATION AND, HAD NOT THE URBAN OPERATION BEEN THWARTED, COULD HAVE CAUSED SERIOUS DISRUPTION IN THE COUNTRY. AS IT WAS, THE OFFENSIVE BY THE REBELS IN DHUFAR WAS QUITE SUCCESSFUL. THEY WERE ABLE TO PIN DOWN AN OMANI BRIGADE, WHICH ULTIMATELY HAD TO BE RELIEVED BY IRANIAN HELICOPTERS. THE REBELS HAVE SINCE RETURNED TO THEIR SANCTUARY, BUT HAD THE URBAN TERRORISTS BEEN ABLE TO MOUNT THEIR CAMPAIGN, THE OMANI GOVERNMENT WOULD HAVE BEEN IN SEVERE STRAITS. EXPATRIATE ADVISORS TO THE OMANI FORCES NOW ESTIMATE THE REBEL STRENGTH AT 1200 (FROM A PREVIOUS ESTIMATE OF 600) AND HAVE A MUCH GREATER APPRECIATION OF REBEL ABILITY. THE CAMPAIGN IN DHUFAR IS DRAGGING ON WITHOUT ANY END IN SIGHT. THE REBELS STILL CAN RETIRE TO PDRY

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
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WHEN THINGS GET TOUGH AND THEY STILL CONTROL THE QARRA MTS. NORTH OF SALALAH, WHERE THEY CAN COUNT ON THE SUPPORT OF LOCAL "MILITIA" AND FROM WHERE THEY CAN ROCKET THE TOWN AND MINE THE KNH ROADS. ON THE OTHER HAND THE REBELS HAVE NOT BEEN ABLE TO MOUNT A SUSTAINED ATTACK, NOR DO THEY HAVE THE WIDE POPULAR SUPPORT THEY REQUIRE. THE SULTAN IS TRYING TO IMPROVE THE LOT OF THE DHUFARIS AND HAS SUCCEEDED IN WINNING THEM OVER TO A GREAT EXTENT. THE COST OF THIS, AND THE MILITARY CAMPAIGN HAS, HOWEVER, DRAWN ON DEVELOPMENT FUNDS FROM THE REST OF OMAN.

THE SULTAN BADLY NEEDS FINANCIAL AND MILITARY AID, FAST. ALSO, HE NEEDS TO IMPROVE HIS IMAGE. OTHER STATES IN THE REGION HAVE A GREAT STAKE IN HIS SUCCESS AND MUST BE CONVINCED TO BE MORE FORTHCOMING. THE UAE, FOR ONE, HAS BEEN PARTICULARLY REMISS IN THIS. IT IS HOPED THAT THE SULTAN'S VISIT TO THE UAE, PLANNED FOR LATE MARCH, WILL BRING SOME FUNDS FROM SHAYKH ZAYID.



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8. SAUDI ARABIA RPT SAUDI ARABIA

IN THREE YEARS, KING FAYSAL WILL BE 70 YEARS OLD. HIS COUNTRY WILL HAVE AN ACCUMULATION OF TEN BILLION DOLLARS IT CAN'T POSSIBLY SPEND INTERNALLY, AND IT WILL HAVE TWO SEPARATE ARMED FORCES AND SEVERAL THOUSAND MORE STUDENTS AND OFFICERS WHO HAVE BEEN TRAINED IN THE WEST. AT THE SAME TIME IT WILL STILL BE RULED BY AN ABSOLUTE, CONSERVATIVE, TRADITIONALIST MONARCH AND IT WILL BE THE LEAST PROGRESSIVE ARAB COUNTRY SOCIALLY. IT WILL HAVE NO RELATIONS WITH SOCIALIST BLOC. ANACHRONISTIC AS SAUDIA IS AND, BASICALLY, WILL REMAIN, THE PROGNOSIS FOR THE FUTURE IS ONE OF STABILITY. THE REASONS FOR THIS ARE MANY. FIRST, THE OPPOSITION WHICH DOES EXIST, IS FRAGMENTED BY TRIBALISM AND REGIONALISM. SECONDLY, THE TRADITIONAL SPRINGBOARD FOR COUPS IN THE ARAB WORLD, THE ARMY, IS CONTENT AND BALANCED BY THE NATIONAL GUARD. THE STUDENT RETURNING TO SAUDIA FINDS THAT HIS TALENTS ARE REWARDED, IF NOT UTILIZED. LASTLY, THE ROYAL FAMILY IS AWARE OF THE ADHESIVE NATURE OF ITS ROLE AND CAN USUALLY BE COUNTED ON TO PUT ASIDE PERSONAL ANIMOSITIES TO WORK TOGETHER IN TIMES OF CRISIS.

KING FAYSAL IS IN GOOD HEALTH, ALTHOUGH AT HIS AGE ANY NUMBER OF THINGS CAN HAPPEN TO CAUSE HIS INCAPACITY OR DEATH. AS THINGS NOW STAND,



THERE ARE CLAIMS THAT FAYSAL IS BECOMING SENILE, BUT IT MAY BE THAT HE IS ONLY BECOMING

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MORE CANTANKEROUS AND INFLEXIBLE. IN ANY EVENT, FAYSAL MAY WELL OUTLIVE CROWN PRINCE KHALID, WHO IS ONLY A FEW YEARS YOUNGER AND HAS A HISTORY OF HEART TROUBLE. AS SUCCESSION NOW STANDS, KHALID WOULD SUCCEED FAYSAL AND STRONGMAN PRINCE FAHD WOULD MOVE UP A NOTCH TO CROWN PRINCE AND ALSO TAKE OVER AS PRIME MINISTER, A ROLE USUALLY RESERVED FOR THE MONARCH. ONE OF THE PROBLEMS THAT COULD ARISE FROM THE LATTER IS THAT KHALID JUST MIGHT NOT ACCEPT THE "REIGN BUT NOT RULE" ROLE AND THIS COULD CAUSE A FAMILY CRISIS. ALSO, FAHD AND HIS SIX FULL BROTHERS (KNOWN AS THE SUDAYRI SEVEN) MAY NOT BE AS CLOSE AS PEOPLE THINK. THEIR MOTHER, WHO MADE SURE THEY STOOD TOGETHER, IS NOW DEAD AND SULTAN, FAHD'S NEXT BROTHER AND MINISTER OF DEFENSE, IS VERY AMBITIOUS AND MIGHT MAKE A MOVE ON FAHD IF FAHD REVERTS TO HIS OLD DISSOLUTE WAYS. IF A CRISIS OCCURS IN SAUDIA, IT WILL DOUBTLESS OCCUR WITHIN THE RANKS OF THE ROYAL FAMILY, ALTHOUGH FOR REASONS SET OUT BELOW, THIS SEEMS UNLIKELY.

THE MILITARY IS WELL-TREATED. THEY GET GOOD ARMS, TRAINING ABROAD, GOOD SALARIES AND PROMOTIONS, AND ARE GIVEN OTHER INCENTIVES, SUCH AS PIECES OF PRIME LAND, TO 1000

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TO THE WHITE HOUSE

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EYES ONLY TEHRAN 060 SECTION 5 OF 5

TO: DR. HENRY A. KISSINGER, WASHINGTON

FROM: AMB. RICHARD HELMS, TEHRAN

BIND THEM MORE CLOSELY TO THE REGIME. ALSO, BRIGHT, LIBERAL MEMBERS OF THE ROYAL FAMILY HAVE BEEN ENCOURAGED TO ENTER THE MILITARY AS JUNIOR OFFICERS AND THEY ARE QUITE POPULAR WITH THE OTHER OFFICERS. THEY ARE ALSO RESPECTED FOR THEIR PROFESSIONAL SKILLS--SOME OF THE BEST PILOTS ARE PRINCES. IN CASE THERE IS ANY DOUBT ABOUT THE MILITARY, THE TRIBALLY CONSTITUTED NATIONAL GUARD IS ON HAND. THIS GROUP, ABOUT EQUAL IN SIZE TO THE ARMY, IS A HIGHLY MOBILE FORCE ORIGINALLY FORMED TO QUELL INTERNAL DISORDERS. HOWEVER, ITS AMBITIOUS COMMANDER, PRINCE ABDALLAH, HAS BUILT THIS FORCE INTO MORE OF A COUNTER-ARMY, WITH THE BLESSING OF THE ROYAL FAMILY.

AS FOR THE YOUTH OF THE KINGDOM, ONE WOULD EXPECT THAT THEIR CAPACITY FOR TOLERATION OF THE ANACHRONISTIC SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT WOULD BE PRETTY LOW. CERTAINLY, SAUDI STUDENTS IN THE U.S. TALK FREELY AGAINST THE REGIME. THE TALK IS USUALLY BROUGHT ON BY CONTACT WITH "PROGRESSIVE" ARABS THEY MEET AND THE NEW LIFE THEY ARE EXPOSED TO. WHEN THE STUDENT RETURNS TO SAUDI ARABIA, HOWEVER, HE FINDS WAITING FOR HIM A JOB WITH A NICE SALARY, A GOVERNMENT HOUSE, FREE EDUCATION AND HEALTH CARE FOR HIS KIDS, RADIO, TELEVISION AND AT LEAST THE TRAPPINGS OF PROGRESS. AROUND HIM, THE OTHER ARAB STATES ARE IN CHAOS. IF HE WANTS TO LET OFF STEAM HE CAN GO TO BEIRUT. IN ADDITION, THE ROLE THE SAUDIS HAVE PLAYED IN THE OIL NEGOTIATIONS HAS GIVEN THE YOUNG MAN A SENSE OF PRIDE AND ACCOMPLISHMENT. THE MINISTER OF PETROLEUM, AHMAD ZAKI YAMANI, IS HIS HERO, AND YAMANI IS PART OF THE ESTABLISHMENT. SAUDIS ARE NOW SOMETHING TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT, NOT BE LAUGHED AT. WHO PAYS A SUBSIDY TO WHOM--THE EQYPTIANS OR THE SAUDIS? THIS IS IMPORTANT IN UNDERSTANDING THE SAUDIS' ACCEPTANCE OF THEIR LOT. THOSE EDUCATED IN THE WEST ARE NOT RED HOT

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RADICALS, THEY SEE THAT THEY CAN WORK WITHIN THE SYSTEM, AND THAT THE SYSTEM WORKS. LIKE THE YOUNG KUWAITI, WHAT REGIME WOULD A YOUNG SAUDI EMULATE?

DISCUSSING THE STABILITY OF SAUDIA, OR ANY OF THE GULF STATES, IS A COMPLEX MATTER. THE WESTERN OBSERVER IS TOO READY TO WRITE OFF FAMILY, TRIBE, LOCAL NATIONALISM AND PRIDE. WHERE THERE IS THIS SENSE OF LOCAL NATIONALISM AND ACCOMPLISHMENT--IN SAUDIA, KUWAIT AND QATAR--STABILITY CAN BE PREDICTED. WHERE THERE ARE INTERNAL DIVISIONS SUCH AS BAHRAIN (SHI'A-SUNNI), THE UAE (DUBAI-ABU DHABI) AND OMAN (TRIBAL VS. SETTLED AND DHUFARI VS. OMANI) INSTABILITY CAN BE EXPECTED.

A NOTE OF CAUTION MUST BE ADDED TO THE ABOVE ASSESSMENTS. FIRST, THE STABILITY OF THESE STATES, IN THE SHORT RUN, IS DEPENDENT ON ONE OR TWO KEY PERSONALITIES. THE SUDDEN DEMISE--NATURAL OR PLANNED--OF SEVERAL OF THESE LEADERS COULD CAUSE TURMOIL IN THE REGION. SECOND, THE MOST VULNERABLE STATES ALL HAVE MILITARY AND SECURITY FORCES OFFICERED BY EXPATRIATES, USUALLY BRITISH. SHOULD THESE MEN BE FORCED TO RESIGN, THROUGH NATIONALIST PRESSURE, OR ELIMINATED BY ASSASSINATION OR THREAT OF ASSASSINATION, OPPOSITION FORCES WILL HAVE A FAIRLY FREE HAND TO OPERATE. LASTLY, IN SPITE OF OUR OPTIMISTIC NOTE ON THE YOUTH OF THE AREA, I.E. THEY GENERALLY APPEAR PREPARED TO WORK WITHIN THE SYSTEM, WE SHOULD REALIZE THAT THE DESIRE FOR SOCIAL REFORM AND THE EVOLUTION OF NEW SETS OF VALUES WILL CAUSE PRESSURE ON THE REGIMES. THE DEGREE TO WHICH THE REGIMES ARE PREPARED TO ACCOMMODATE NEW IDEAS WILL DETERMINE THE EXTENT TO WHICH THE YOUTH WILL CONTINUE TO OPERATE WITHIN THE SYSTEM.

FINAL FACTORS ARE PDRY AND IRAN. PDRY IS THE ONLY ARAB STATE IN WHICH A RADICAL MARXIST-LENINIST REGIME HAS ATTAINED AND RETAINED POWER. IN ADDITION, THIS REGIME IS ACTIVELY SEEKING TO EXPORT ITS REVOLUTION, DIRECTLY IN DHUFAR AND THE YEMEN ARAB REPUBLIC, AND INDIRECTLY BY COOPERATING WITH ANM-ORIGINATED FRONTS SUCH AS PFLOAG. THE ABILITY OF THE STATES OF THE PENINSULA TO WORK TOGETHER TO MEET THIS THREAT--TO ISOLATE IT, OR DESTROY IT--WILL BE A DETERMINING FACTOR IN THE FUTURE STABILITY OF THE AREA. ALTHOUGH PDRY IS SMALL, IT HAS A WELL-TRAINED AND HIGHLY MOTIVATED POLITICAL CADRE, IT HAS INCREASED MILITARY CAPABILITY, AND REPRESENTS A THREAT TO ANY STATE IN THE AREA IN A ONE-ON-ONE SITUATION.

REGIONAL COOPERATION BETWEEN IRAN AND THE ARAB STATES IN THE GULF IS A CORNERSTONE OF U.S. POLICY. THE ARABS FEEL THAT THE IRANIANS IN GENERAL AND THE SHAH IN PARTICULAR ARE SO CONTEMPTUOUS OF THEM AND ARE SO ARROGANT IN THEIR DEALINGS WITH THEM THAT TRUE COOPERATION PROBABLY IS NOT POSSIBLE. IF THE U.S. CAN GUIDE THE TWO PARTIES AWAY FROM POSSIBLE AREAS OF CONFLICT, WE WILL BE DOING AS MUCH AS WE CAN TRULY HOPE TO DO. NOT ONLY DO THE ARABS SENSE AND RESENT IRANIAN

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CONTEMPT, THEY ALSO FEAR IRANIAN COLONIALISM IN THE GULF. THERE IS NOT ONE ARAB STATE IN THE REGION THAT IS NOT FULLY AWARE THAT THE IRANIANS ARE CAPABLE OF TAKING OVER ANY OR ALL OF THEM ANY TIME THEY CHOOSE. THE ARABS, THEREFORE, APPROACH THE QUESTION OF COOPERATION, PARTICULARLY MILITARY COOPERATION, WITH UNDERSTANDABLE RELUCTANCE. EACH TIME IRAN SAYS TO A COUNTRY-LIKE KUWAIT--"DON'T FEAR IRAQ, WE'LL PROTECT YOU"--OR RESPONDS RAPIDLY TO A REQUEST FOR AID--SUCH AS FROM OMAN--THIS ONLY RUBS THE ARAB NOSES IN THEIR OWN INADEQUACIES AND INCREASES SUSPICION AND RESENTMENT. LOGICALLY, THE ARABS AND IRANIANS SHOULD WORK TOGETHER, BUT EMOTIONS MILITATE AGAINST THIS. ONE OF THE KEY ROLES THE U.S. MUST PLAY IN THE REGION IS TO ASSURE THAT EMOTIONS ARE KEPT SUPPRESSED AND ARE NOT PERMITTED TO BREAK DOWN THE UNEASY TRUCE BETWEEN THE TWO PARTIES.

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April 4, 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: DR. KISSINGER

FROM: HAROLD H. SAUNDERS

SUBJECT: Ambassador Helms Reports on the
Persian Gulf

Attached at Tab A as requested you will find a summary for the President of Ambassador Helms' observations on the stability of the states in the Persian Gulf. At Tab B is the full report. In this preliminary survey, Helms has limited himself to a general assessment of the forces working for and against stability. His analysis is useful, but contains no surprises. It can, however, serve as background for a broader look at US interests and policy in the Arabian Peninsula and Persian Gulf area.

I am preparing for you an analysis of some of the recent developments in this region that are of concern to us and suggest the need for a review of our policies. One possible course would be to ask for a NSSM on the policy questions confronting the US in this region, either within the framework of the NSSM you have discussed with Dick Kennedy or as a separate topic. That will be dealt with in a separate memo.

RECOMMENDATION: That you send the memo at Tab A to the President.

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DECLAS - Date Impossible to Determine.

BYAUTH - Dr. Henry A. Kissinger

SECRET (XGDS)

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