

MEMORANDUM

## THE WHITE HOUSE

~~SECRET~~

WASHINGTON

Thursday - October 16, 1969

## MEMORANDUM FOR HENRY KISSINGER

FROM: Roger Morris<sup>RM</sup> and Richard T. Kennedy<sup>RJK</sup>

SUBJECT: What we want from the Review Group on Southern Africa today.

Background

The concept of the paper:

- The five options are choices of general posture toward the area as a whole. The posture is our relationship (distance from, acceptance of) to the white minorities in power.
- The posture can be general because, despite real differences between the situations in the white states, black irredentism and minority control form a common problem.
- The posture should be general because our actions toward any one regime are seen by both whites and blacks as affecting our relations with everybody in the area. Thus, because others (in the UN, etc.) react to our policies as a coherent whole, we need a coordinated posture to take account of that reaction.
- However, this does not rule out dealing with specific issues regarding each of the states individually. The general posture, therefore, is simply the sum of specific operational decisions on outstanding issues in our policy toward each of the parties in the area.
- This approach takes into account the differences between the whites. The range of choices on posture -- and thus on policy in specific issues -- with the Portuguese Territories does proceed from the special aspects of the Portuguese situation. That is, the fact that the Territories are a colonial problem, and that we have a NATO relationship with Lisbon. Likewise, the policy choices reflect the fact that our current adherence to the UN sanctions program is a particular restraint on our Rhodesian policy.

Thus, the decision-making problem is how to present the choices on general posture, and the specific issues which make it up, to the President. You want some agreement from the RG on the NSC agenda.

DHS, USAID, USAF,  
JCS, NASA, NSS,  
DOS, OSD, reviews  
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But here is where we run into the old bureaucratic quarrels we described to you.

If you ask the RG how to proceed:

- State will probably suggest raising only general posture, for reasons you know well.
- Defense, CIA, Commerce, Treasury and OEP have long wanted specific decisions on ship visits to South Africa, chrome imports, etc., with general posture a secondary concern.

If you ask for a discussion of the options, you'll risk a repeat of the sterile bureaucratic debates that absorbed the last six months on this paper.

You need to nail down (as in the Latin American study) both a general posture decision and some specific operational decisions to define the posture as well as guide the bureaucracy in further policy actions.

The attached Talking Points take this tack.

Attachments

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

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October 15, 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR HENRY KISSINGER

FROM: Richard T. Kennedy *RTK*  
Charles H. Hermann *CH*  
Roger Morris *Roger*

SUBJECT: Southern Africa - NSC Review Group - Thursday,  
October 16.

Attached are your talking points and a self-contained summary of the basic paper for your NSC Review Group meeting on Thursday. (The IG summary was inadequate as to essential background and description of the issues and options.)

We have included also:

- (a) a table relating the five options to the basic objectives for Southern Africa and a table illustrating specific actions associated with each option;
- (b) a brief summary of specific issues which may be raised;
- (c) the IG paper ; and
- (d) a copy of NSSM -39.

A map of the region precedes your talking points.

Your talking points highlight differences on basic judgment on policy on policy questions raised by the NSSM. For your background, our views on these judgments and questions are:

Judgments

Prospects for change in White attitudes.

- Prospects for major change which would satisfy the blacks are slim. Any change will be slow and modest. But violence won't bring change -- the whites have control and blacks can't overcome that reality, however they continue to try.
- There are forces for moderation in white states -- some Church leaders, a few politicians, youth and the social effects of a modern economy.

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- The black states have problems of their own -- tribalism, insurgency, poverty -- which demand attention and resources. They will find it hard to divert much energy (as contrasted with ritual rhetoric) to the liberation struggle.
- Their own problems could spawn, however, radicals whose rhetoric on Southern Africa (and abuse of us) could grow in proportion to frustration vis-a-vis the whites. This is much less likely than pragmatic resignation, but it's possible.

### US Influence

- Isolating the whites has failed. (Rhodesian sanctions, arms embargoes, verbal attacks). Outside pressure has tended to reinforce their "seige mentality" and their autarchy -- generating reaction rather than moderation.
- But pressures have generated black demands for still more action. The radical blacks want really unrealistic sanctions and use of force.
- US influence is marginal with both sides. We might get some leverage from the whites' desire for better relations and the blacks' need for political and economic support -- but not much.

### Penalty for relations with whites

- We might suffer from black reaction. Harsh words are more likely than expropriations, base denials, etc.
- The blacks know our support will be crucial to their ultimate success and they want our aid money.

### Policy Questions

#### Nature and Extent of Involvement

- We are involved because of (a) our official presence in the Space Station, etc., as well as trade and investment and (b) because others (with Communist help) have made the racial issue in Southern Africa a chronic international issue in the UN and elsewhere.
- Opting out (Option 5) may limit involvement. But we could hardly ignore a race war. And complete disengagement would forfeit whatever leverage we may possess against

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some distant calamity.

- But the sheer uncertainties argue against active involvement to the extent proposed in Option 2. We need to keep our options open to defuse the blacks and promote white moderation.
- Continued equivocation (Option 3) will only postpone decision and generate pressures from the blacks for greater support. Moreover, the operational effect (which State intends) is gradually to dissociate from the white (moving toward Option 4) with a growing commitment to the blacks.
- A posture between Option 2 and Option 3 would keep our options open while attempting as we can to cope on both sides within a potentially dangerous situation. We should never ignore racism or excuse the whites. But both white strength and growing black realism about it argue that we stay in the game with both sides.

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Present Policy

Policy toward the white states in Southern Africa has sought progress toward majority rule through political arrangements which guarantee increasing participation by the whole population. Tangible evidence of such progress has been considered a pre-condition for improved US relations with the white states. We maintain cordial relations with the black states and provide limited aid principally through regional and multi-donor projects. We maintain discreet contact with the liberation movements.

Specific policy decisions on Southern Africa, however, have been largely ad hoc, based on judgments of benefits and political costs at a given moment. The strength of this approach -- its flexibility in a situation where US interests are conflicting -- is also its weakness. Decisions have not reflected a coherent and conscious effort in policy to achieve agreed objectives. Moreover, because differences of view in some instances have been irreconcilable, some decisions have been held in suspense "pending review of policy" (e.g., naval calls in South Africa; imports of Rhodesian chrome ore; status of Consulate in Rhodesia).

The Options

Each of the five options outlines a general direction of policy based on a specific premise about Southern Africa's future and the nature of US involvement. Specific operational actions are included with each option for illustration. Selection of a basic policy, however, need not dictate an inflexible set of specific actions.

The central element of each option is our policy toward the white states.

- Options 1 and 2 move closer to the white states;
- Options 3 and 4 increase our distance from them;
- Option 5 disassociates from both black and white states to limit involvement in the area.

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Option One (pp 23-26)

Closer association with the white regimes to protect and enhance our economic, strategic and scientific interests.

Premise: Our disagreement with the domestic policies of either side should not inhibit our relations with them. We can have no significant effect on the situation in the region. Therefore, we should pursue our economic, strategic and scientific interests because the political costs will not be excessive.

Pro: This policy would preserve and expand our scientific, strategic and economic interests in the white states; would remove an irritant in our relations with Portugal; and would establish friendly relations with the strongest powers in the region.

Con: This policy does nothing to deal with the problems of racial repression and potential violent confrontation. It would damage our standing in Africa and elsewhere on the racial issue, lose African support on East-West issues in the UN, and enhance the standing of the USSR and Communist China with the black states and liberation movements.

Option Two (pp 27-31)

Broader association with both black and white states in an effort to encourage moderation in the white states, to enlist cooperation of the black states in reducing tensions and the likelihood of increasing cross-border violence, and to encourage improved relations among states in the area.

Premise: The blacks cannot gain political rights through violence. Constructive change can come only by acquiescence of the whites. We can by selective relaxation of our stance toward the white states and increased economic assistance to the black states in the region help to draw the two groups together. Our tangible interests are a basis for contacts with the whites and can be maintained at acceptable political cost.

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Pro: This policy would encourage existing tendencies toward broadened relations between black states and white thereby reducing tensions; would lift seige mentality of the whites and encourage forces for moderation within the white states; would preserve economic, scientific and strategic interests in the white states; and would reduce a major irritant in relations with Portugal.

Con: There is no assurance that we could persuade black states to cooperate with us in pursuing this policy . If they do not, our standing in Africa and elsewhere on the racial issue will be damaged as in option 1. There is virtually no evidence that the whites would change their policy in response to our actions. The policy requires extensive diplomatic and economic involvement probably for several years in a situation in which the outcome is doubtful at best.

Option Three (pp 32-34)

Codifies and extends present policy. Limited association with the white states and continuing association with the blacks in an effort to retain some economic, scientific, and strategic interests in the white states while maintaining a posture on the racial issue which the blacks will accept, despite our opposition to violence.

Premise: We cannot significantly influence the domestic policies of the white states; nor is there any internal indication of change. Maintenance of a posture on the racial question acceptable to the blacks need not entail giving up all material interests in the white states.

Pro: This policy would preserve most major economic, scientific and strategic interests in the short run while giving us some access to the black states in the region and some standing with the Afro-Asians. It retains some flexibility for the future and could bring some improvement in relations with Portugal.



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Con: This policy would be seen as expedient and hypocritical by both sides and satisfy neither. It does nothing to deal with the problems of violence or increasing Communist influence in the area. Some potential US economic and defense assets in the area would be given up.

Option Four (pp 35-37)

Disassociation from the white states with closer relations with the black states in an effort to enhance our standing on the racial issue in Africa and internationally.

Premise: We cannot influence the white states for constructive change and therefore increasing violence is likely. Only by cutting our ties with the white regimes can we protect our standing on the race issue in black Africa and internationally. Since our tangible interests are not vital, this is a reasonable price to pay.

Pro: This policy would increase our credibility in black Africa and the UN on the racial issue and give maximum leverage to limit Soviet and Chinese influence with the black states and liberation groups.

Con: This policy would increase our involvement with liberation movements and stimulate demands for more far-reaching action. We would sacrifice economic, scientific, and strategic interests in the white states. France and the UK are not likely to support us and our relations with Portugal will be more difficult.

Option Five (pp 38-40)

Disassociation from both black and white states in an effort to limit our involvement in the problems of the area.

Premise: The racial confrontation in southern Africa is unmanageable and potentially dangerous and will grow worse despite any efforts we might make. Thus we should lower our profile in the area and avoid identification with either side.

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Pro: This policy would relieve pressures in the UN and elsewhere which flowed from our diplomatic "leadership" on Southern Africa issues and give us greater flexibility to cope in the future with pressure for greater involvement. The danger of miscalculation by either blacks or whites as to our support in a future confrontation would be lessened.

Con: This policy sacrifices our economic, scientific and strategic interests in the area, foregoes influence on both sides and does nothing to ease racial confrontation. We would open the door to communist influence in the region and lose support on East-West issues in the UN.

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SECRETHAK TALKING POINTS

Review Group Meeting on Southern Africa, October 16, 1969

1. The five options are choices of general posture toward the area. They differ as to (a) degree of association with white states and (b) degree of involvement in the area.

Present policy (option 3) is equivocation -- attempt to balance posture on the racial issue acceptable to blacks with retention of some material interests in white states. It is flexible but satisfies neither blacks nor whites.

Greater isolation from whites and closer relations with blacks (option 4) -- acceptable to blacks, at least for a time, but sacrifices interests in white states.

Greater contact with whites:

- To pursue material interests (option 1) which might damage relationship with blacks, or
- To try to deal actively with area tensions (option 2) with uncertain prospects for cooperation by either blacks or whites.

Disengagement from both sides (option 5):

- Limits involvement but tends to sacrifice material interests.

2. Do the options cover the full range of policy choices?

3. Basic posture (as in the Latin America review) is the sum of operational decisions on specific issues.

- Many operational decisions have been held in abeyance pending policy review.
- We want a decision on general posture but we also need decisions on some specific issues, to illustrate the application of that posture to particular countries.

4. Can we agree that the NSC agenda should seek:

- Decision on general posture.
- Decisions on the following specific issues illustrating policy toward individual states. (These issues are sketched in the tab "Specific Issues.")

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- Rhodesia - chrome ore imports (effect of UN sanctions);  
Consulate in Salisbury.
- South Africa - ship visits.
- Portuguese Territories - arms embargo.
- Black States - bilateral economic aid.
- Liberation movements - US contact and assistance.

5. Anticipated Review Group Positions

- OEP has an annex on Rhodesian chrome (attached).
- Commerce may submit an annex on domestic effects of sanctions.
- State may propose a new option for general posture to substitute for option 3 of the basic paper. We just learned of this but have not seen it.
- Defense and the JCS may propose some clarifying language changes to the basic paper and will emphasize strategic importance of the area.

6. You may wish to suggest that the NSC meeting scheduled for October 22 be delayed to allow time for:

- Preparation of specific issues papers.
- Consideration of the anticipated new option to be proposed by State.

Attachment

OEP annex.

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REQUESTS OF UNION CARBIDE AND FOOTE MINERAL  
TO IMPORT THEIR CHROME ORE FROM RHODESIA

The issue is whether or not to approve the requests of Union Carbide and Foote Mineral to import into the United States 150,000 and 57,000 tons respectively of chrome ore already mined in their mines in Rhodesia and paid for. Rhodesia is the only major Free World source of chrome, which is used in stainless steel and other steel alloys, including high-temperature alloys. The other principal source is the USSR.

When the US Executive Order was issued on January 5, 1967, supporting the economic sanctions against Rhodesia in the UN Security Council resolution of December 16, 1966, the White House press release stated that "provision will be made in the regulations to deal with cases of undue hardship arising from transactions commenced before the date of the Order." Union Carbide transferred its funds after the date of the UN Security Council resolution but before the date of the Executive Order. Foote Mineral transferred its funds after the date of the first Executive Order, to maintain its mine. The Order permitted such transfers, provided that the materials produced were kept in Rhodesia. Foote Mineral faced the alternatives of risking deterioration and possible permanent loss of its mine, or of having to commit funds to maintain operations. At the beginning of 1968, the Rhodesian authorities took over operation of the mine to maintain it, and Foote ceased to transfer funds. A subsequent UN resolution of May 29, 1968, and US Executive Order of July 29, 1968, prohibited all transfers of funds. The Rhodesian authorities have periodically reconsidered their operation of the mine but have, thus far, continued it. They may decide at some time, however, not to continue it further.

PRO

1. Union Carbide, having paid for the ore before the date of the first Executive Order, is entitled to a hardship exception.

2. Although Foote Mineral paid after the date of the first Executive Order, it nevertheless paid for the

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ore prior to the date of the second Executive Order. Foote's transfer of funds had the effect of maintaining the operability of a major Free World source of chrome ore. After having been permitted to transfer these funds, Foote was subsequently deprived by the 1968 UN Resolution and US Executive Order of the right to resume such transfers if the Rhodesian authorities were to cease their operation of the mine. Under these circumstances, Foote should be allowed to recoup its expenditures by importation of the ore.

3. Both cases involve a basic general principle of embargoes -- that the country subject to embargo should not be allowed to keep both the foreign exchange benefits and the commodity purchased.

CON

1. The UN Resolution made no provisions for hardship exceptions. The legal justification for such exceptions, if any, must be that of transitional measures necessary in connection with making the prohibitions generally applicable and effective. Such an exception cannot be justified at this time as a transitional measure.

2. Foote Mineral transferred its funds after the date of the first Executive Order and on the basis of a clear understanding that the ore must remain in Rhodesia. To adopt the principle of granting hardship exceptions for such reasons as the discontinuance of expenditures imposed by the second Executive Order might prejudice enforcement of the China and Cuba embargoes.

3. Approval of either request would have serious adverse effects on US relations with most African countries, on US relations with the United Kingdom, and on the US position in the United Nations.

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TALKING POINTS

Review Group Meeting on NSSM 39 -- Southern Africa

1. I appreciate that this was a difficult paper to tackle. The policy choices cover several issues -- some with broad implications.
2. The paper identifies five broad objectives:
  - Improve US standing on the racial issue. *- why*
  - Minimize violence and risk of US involvement.
  - Minimize Soviet and Chinese opportunities to exploit. *How?*
  - Encourage moderation of white policies.
  - Protect economic, scientific and strategic interests.

You might ask:

- Should "economic development" be one of our objectives? Several of the options propose economic aid. I don't think we need to return the paper to the IG to make this addition.
  - Is there consensus that these are our objectives?
3. There has been no agreement on priorities to be given any of these objectives. They are often in conflict.
  4. The problem of establishing priority among objectives and choosing a policy arises from difference in judgment as to:
    - Prospects for change in white attitudes
      - Does only prospect lie in violence because whites are intractable, and blacks determined to force change at any cost, or
      - Are there forces within white states which make change inevitable and is black resolve questionable?
    - Degree and kind of influence US can have. Can the whites be moved by:
      - Isolation which would be acceptable to the blacks but tends to stiffen white reaction, or

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- Contact which infuriates the blacks without clear assurance of white cooperation?
  - Extent to which blacks penalize US for relations with whites
  - Will we suffer appreciable damage to our interests because of closer relations with whites, or
  - Will black reaction be restrained by self-interest?
  - Do State, Defense, CIA wish to express views?
5. The policy questions then seem to be:
- How much and in what ways should we be involved, and
  - What is price to us for involvement or non-involvement?
6. The five options give a broad choice of posture differing as to (a) degree of association with white states and (b) degree of involvement in the area. (Relation between the options and the objectives appears in table at Tab A).
- Present policy (option 3) is equivocation -- attempt to balance posture on the racial issue acceptable to blacks with retention of some material interests in white states. It is flexible but satisfies neither blacks nor whites.
  - Greater isolation from whites and closer relations with blacks (option 4) -- acceptable to blacks, at least for a time, but sacrifices interests in white states.
  - Greater contact with whites:
    - To pursue material interests (option 1) which will sacrifice any relationship with blacks, or
    - To try to deal actively with area tension (option 2) with uncertain prospects for cooperation by either blacks or whites.
  - Disengagement from both sides (option 5):
    - Limits involvement but sacrifices material interests.



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7. Do options cover full range of policy choices? Are arguments clear?

8. Basic posture is the sum of decisions on specific issues:

-- The paper gives illustrative actions for each policy choice.  
(Table summarizing specific actions for each option is at Tab B).

-- Many operational decisions have been held in abeyance pending policy review.

Are there important specific issues, in addition to broad policy, which require President's decision? (Summary of specific issues which you may wish to discuss or others may raise is at Tab C).

9. Commerce may submit an annex on domestic effects of sanctions.

OEP has annex on Rhodesian chrome.

-- We will include these annexes with the paper if desired.

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SUMMARY

Situation in the Region

The problem centers on (a) the racial repression of black majorities (30 million) by entrenched white minorities (4 million) in South Africa and Rhodesia and (b) Portugal's continued colonial hold on Mozambique and Angola.

The whites are sensitive of outside criticism and want friendly relations with the West -- but not at the price of their political control. The South Africans, Rhodesians, and (less so) the Portuguese are tough and increasingly self-confident. They command efficient security organizations and relatively powerful military forces. African nationalist movements, supported by the Organization of African Unity (OAU -- which includes all African states except the white states), and by communist countries and organizations, are trying to overthrow the white minority governments. So far, armed guerrilla activity has been significant only in parts of the Portuguese colonies of Angola and Mozambique (tying down 100,000 troops of which over two-thirds are regular Portuguese forces).

The black-ruled states of the region -- Zambia, Malawi, Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland -- are in varying degrees economically dependent on the white-ruled states. All of them need outside aid to develop or just stay even.

US Interests

Our interests in the region are important but not vital. US investments, primarily in South Africa, total about \$1 billion, and our trade with South Africa yields a highly favorable balance of payments advantage. South Africa and the Portuguese Territories have major ship repair and logistics facilities which can be useful now to our naval forces moving to and from Southeast Asia and could be valuable in future contingencies in the Indian Ocean area. NASA has an important space tracking station in South Africa. Before imposition of UN sanctions, the US imported a major portion of its chrome-ore needs from Rhodesia.

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Outside of the region our investments in Africa total about \$1.5 billion (\$1.0 billion in black Africa South of the Sahara) and profitable trade relations are expanding. These economic assets and other interests, such as overflight rights and communications stations in black Africa, could be jeopardized if our policies toward the white governments in southern Africa generate intense adverse reaction.

Policies toward the whites also affect our political interests in black Africa and the UN. In the UN, the US has joined nearly universal opposition to the racial and colonial policies of the white regimes. Since 1960, however, the Afro-Asian states have steadily increased demands for stronger UN measures, including sanctions against South Africa and the use of force. The US, Britain and France have resisted these demands as unrealistic, with the result that we are now seen by the non-white states to be "defending" the white states. While the Soviet Union and China do not accord southern Africa a high priority, they have taken firm positions supporting liberation goals of the blacks and given some arms and money to liberation movements. In so doing, they have made some gains in Africa and in the UN.

### Objectives

Our broad objectives in the region are:

- To improve the US standing in black Africa and internationally on the racial issue.
- To minimize the likelihood of escalation of violence in the area and the risk of US involvement.
- To minimize the opportunities for the USSR and Communist China to exploit the racial issue in the region for propaganda advantage and to gain political influence with black governments and liberation movements.
- To encourage moderation of the current rigid racial and colonial policies of the white regimes.

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- To protect economic, scientific and strategic interests and opportunities in the region, including the orderly marketing of South Africa's gold production.

But these objectives are often in conflict. Efforts to restrain violence by black liberation movements or steps to protect our tangible interests in the white states tend to be seen as favoring the white governments. So perceived, these actions run counter to efforts to improve our standing in black Africa and internationally on the racial issue. There has been no consensus within the bureaucracy about the region's future or as to the effect of our policies.

There is disagreement over:

- Prospects for non-violent change in the region. All agree that some violence is inevitable. The disagreement turns on whether (1) any meaningful change in white attitudes will occur except in response to violence and (2) the blacks have either the capability or resolve to sustain a level of violence which would force change.
- External influence or internal development as factors to induce moderation by either blacks or whites. The disagreement turns on whether (1) any influence other than isolation and stronger pressures against them would lead the whites to modify their policies and (2) the prospects for success in efforts to exert moderating influence warrant the level of involvement required.
- The damage to our present and long-term political interests which would result from pursuit of our tangible interests in the white states. The disagreement turns on the reaction to our policies, whether we will suffer serious political damage, or whether reaction will be restrained by the forces of self-interest in the black states.

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SPECIFIC ISSUES

Consulate in Rhodesia. The United States maintains a reduced staff at our Consulate in Salisbury. With the Rhodesian determination to declare itself a republic, the British have withdrawn their representation. Both the UK and Black Africa are disturbed by the support for Rhodesia implied by our presence. The Consulate provides facilities [redacted] and services to the approximately 1100 American residents in that country. State has urged that the Consulate be closed. ✓

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Rhodesian Chrome Ore. Union Carbide and Foote Mineral want to import a total 207,000 tons of chrome ore produced in their Rhodesian mines. The companies claim that the ore has already been purchased and, therefore, no further economic benefit would accrue to Rhodesia if the chrome ore were exported. The controversy centers on the Executive Order directing US participation in UN sanctions. The Order recognizes the possibility of "hardship cases" but leaves the term undefined. State opposes both claims. Commerce and OEP support both claims, and Treasury supports only Union Carbide. (OEP memo attached)

Bilateral Aid to Black States. Under current AID policies, assistance to the black states of Southern Africa is limited to regional and multi-donor projects and small self-help programs. Bilateral assistance has been limited to 10 concentration countries in Africa, none of which are in the southern region. State contends that regional programs are impractical for these states and wants bilateral assistance as an indication of our support. AID opposes new bilateral programs.

Arms Aid to Black States. The US gives no military aid to any of the states in Southern Africa -- black or white. The black states -- particularly Zambia -- are fearful of attacks by the white regimes in retaliation for the passage of liberation groups through their territory. Zambia is purchasing air defense missiles and possibly jet aircraft from the UK. The Conte Amendment requires reduction of US aid in an amount equivalent to expenditures by a recipient state for sophisticated weapons. The Administration has introduced legislation to change the Amendment to provide greater flexibility, but Congress has not acted. State would like this flexibility and wants to be able to respond to arms purchase requests from the black states (particularly Zambia.)

Naval Calls - South Africa. No US navy ships have called at South African ports (except in emergency) since the issue of segregated facilities ashore arose in 1967 when the Carrier FDR planned to visit

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Capetown. Thirty-eight Congressmen protested at that time to exposure of US personnel to South African racial policies. South African ports have the best support facilities in the region. Defense would like to resume operational calls to ease refueling problems. State opposes arguing that the other Africans would see this as signalling closer association with the white states.

Arms Embargo - Portuguese Territories . We have enforced a unilateral embargo on the use of US-supplied arms by Portugal in the African Territories. This has been an irritant in our relations with Portugal and may come up during the Azores base negotiations. State opposes any relaxation of the embargo and export controls. Defense may propose some relaxation to improve relations with a NATO partner.

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EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT  
OFFICE OF EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT DIRECTOR

October 14, 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR: Dr. Henry A. Kissinger  
Mr. Richard F. Pedersen (State)  
Mr. G. Warren Nutter (Defense)  
Mr. R. Jack Smith (CIA)  
Lt. Gen. F. T. Unger (JCS)

SUBJECT: Annex 4 of the NSSM 39 Study on Southern Africa

Attached is a paper on the requests of Union Carbide and Foote Mineral to import ore they have already mined in Rhodesia. We believe the attached paper states the issue involved more concisely and accurately than does the present Annex 4 of the NSSM 39 study.

An interagency committee was convened in mid-August under the chairmanship of a representative of the NSC Staff, to consider these requests. Participating in its work were the Departments of State, Treasury, Commerce, and Defense, and OEP. (OEP is interested in the Union Carbide and Foote Mineral requests because they are related to an OEP ferroalloys investigation under Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, on which the findings are to be announced soon.) The committee has not completed its consideration of the problem.

In the October 16 Review Group meeting, OEP will recommend that the attached draft be substituted for Annex 4 of the NSSM 39 study.

*Haakon Lindjord*  
Haakon Lindjord  
Assistant Director

Attachment

cc:  
Mr. Frank Shakespeare, USIA  
Mr. Anthony J. Jurich, Treasury  
Mr. K. N. Davis, Commerce

MORI/CDF  
C03235152  
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REQUESTS OF UNION CARBIDE AND FOOTE MINERAL  
TO IMPORT THEIR CHROME ORE FROM RHODESIA

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3. Both cases involve a basic general principle of embargoes -- that the country subject to embargo should not be allowed to keep both the foreign exchange benefits and the commodity purchased.

CON

1. The UN Resolution made no provisions for hardship exceptions. The legal justification for such exceptions, if any, must be that of transitional measures necessary in connection with making the prohibitions generally applicable and effective. Such an exception cannot be justified at this time as a transitional measure.

2. Foote Mineral transferred its funds after the date of the first Executive Order and on the basis of a clear understanding that the ore must remain in Rhodesia. To adopt the principle of granting hardship exceptions for such reasons as the discontinuance of expenditures imposed by the second Executive Order might prejudice enforcement of the China and Cuba embargoes.

3. Approval of either request would have serious adverse effects on US relations with most African countries, on US relations with the United Kingdom, and on the US position in the United Nations.

**CONFIDENTIAL**

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

April 10, 1969

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National Security Study Memorandum 39

TO:           The Secretary of State  
              The Secretary of Defense  
              Director, Central Intelligence Agency

SUBJECT:     Southern Africa

The President has directed a comprehensive review of U. S. policy toward Southern Africa (south of Congo (K) and Tanzania).

The study should consider (1) the background and future prospects of major problems in the area; (2) alternative views of the U. S. interest in Southern Africa; and (3) the full range of basic strategies and policy options open to the United States.

The review of interests and policy options should encompass the area as a whole -- including Southern Rhodesia, South Africa, the Portuguese territories, and adjacent African states.

The President has directed that the NSC Interdepartmental Group for Africa perform this study.

The study should be forwarded to the NSC Review Group by April 25th.

  
Henry A. Kissinger

cc: Secretary of the Treasury  
      Secretary of Commerce  
      Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff  
      Administrator, AID  
      Acting Director, NASA

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NSC REVIEW GROUP MEETING

Thursday, October 16, 1969

Time and Place: 2:04 P.M. - 3:20 P.M., White House Situation Room

Subject: Southern Africa (NSSM 39)

Participation:

Chairman - Henry A. Kissinger	JCS - LTG F. T. Unger
State - Richard F. Pedersen	OEP - Haakon Lindjord
- William I. Cargo	
- David Newsom	USIA - Henry Loomis
- Donald McHenry	
Defense - Richard A. Ware	Commerce - Kenneth N. Davis
	NSC Staff - Roger P. Morris
CIA - Edward W. Proctor	- Richard T. Kennedy
	- Jeanne W. Davis

SUMMARY OF DECISIONS

The I. G. paper is to be reworked to refine the options along the following lines and to indicate their most significant operational consequences:

- a. restate Option 1 as a more faithful rendition of the "Acheson view" of U.S. interests and policies in Southern Africa,
- b. add the revised Option 3 as a different option between the present Options 2 and 3,
- c. retain Option 4,
- d. restate Option 5 to call for hands off on the political aspects and business as usual as U. S. interests indicate;
- e. add an option which would be an attempt to change the white states by exerting more economic pressure.

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Mr. Kissinger opened the meeting referring to the "substantial" paper and its five options and associated measures. He stated that as a general rule the President does not wish to receive general options since he finds that, once a general option has been approved, those actions which were listed under the rejected options are suddenly found to be consistent with the option which he had accepted. The President wants to see the precise steps which will flow from each posture. He pointed out that these comments did not necessarily apply to the South Africa paper. He assumed that when the options are discussed the associated measures are implied as a part of the general approval, although these measures are of course not an exhaustive list.

He asked if the options as stated are a reasonable list of those available. Are there any options not listed? He noted that the NSC Staff had undertaken a survey of the outside literature on the question and had satisfied itself that it contained no new ideas not considered in the paper.

Mr. Pedersen said the State Department is submitting a substantial revision of Option 3 and a minor revision of Option 4.

Mr. Kissinger commented that since he and others had not seen these revisions he thought we should discuss the options as they existed in the paper, possibly adding the State Department revisions as Options 6 and 7.

Mr. Ware noted that the Defense Department had prepared an expanded summary of the paper which would be distributed at the table.

Mr. Davis asked if the agencies had yet taken a position on the options.

Mr. Pedersen said the agencies had not yet been asked to take a position. He assumed this would be done at the NSC meeting.

Mr. Kissinger asked if this was not an IG paper and did Mr. Davis mean positions taken by agencies not represented on the IG.

Mr. Cargo said if Mr. Davis was asking whether the State Department had indicated which option they preferred, the answer was no.

Mr. Pedersen noted that while this was strictly true, there was certainly an indication of the direction in which State would go.

Mr. Davis commented that the IG had not attempted to define agency positions but had attempted to project the broad spectrum of choices.

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Mr. Kissinger said that he had received a statement of Mr. Acheson's position. He asked if, with the proposed State Department modifications, the paper put forward a reasonable statement of the choices.

Mr. Pedersen described the general nature of the revised Option 3 as a phased strategy with steps taken in sequence, first to improve our position in the black states and, somewhat later, to consider steps in pursuit of our interests in the white states. The revision of Option 4, he said, was to soften the coercive elements of the original draft which were not intended as such.

Mr. Kissinger asked if it was reasonable to try to form general proposals covering Mozambique, Angola, Rhodesia and South Africa.

Mr. Newsom replied that these four areas cannot be satisfactorily grouped in discussing the premises. He thought the two Portuguese territories (Angola and Mozambique) could be considered together but that South Africa, Southwest Africa and Rhodesia each required somewhat different consideration.

Mr. Kissinger asked what we are asking the President to do, then, in choosing a general posture.

Mr. Newsom thought that we could ask for a general posture expressing priorities and emphasis in Southern Africa in terms of dealing with the black states and with the white states. The operational examples could then be broken down into specific actions suitable to the specific territory.

Mr. Kissinger asked if we are saying that the same philosophy can govern policy toward these areas but that the differences will lie in the application of that policy. For example, he asked if Option 1 can apply to the colonial regimes as well as to the more indigenous regimes.

Mr. Pedersen noted that in Option 3 he thought that the degree of our association would be different.

Mr. Newsom thought there would be specific variations in the basic philosophy in some options. He noted, for example, that the Portuguese territories have a different racial philosophy and therefore a different degree of political acceptability in the area.

Mr. Kissinger asked if their political acceptability was more or less.

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Mr. Newsom replied that they were more acceptable because of their racial attitude.

Mr. Kissinger asked, with regard to Option 1, if we had to move closer to the white regimes to protect our interests.

Mr. Newsom replied that, in a sense, Option 1 was the Acheson option. There was little reason for us to restrict ourselves in our relations with the white states since we have little to lose from reaction by the black states. This option would lift our self-imposed restrictions. In effect, we would attempt to maintain our presence in the black states but not at the sacrifice of our other interests.

Mr. Kissinger commented that we would seek closer association with the white states by trying to avoid squeezing them.

He asked who seriously holds the view as stated in Option 1. He considered it a caricature of the Acheson position and thought Mr. Acheson's view was closer to Option 5.

Mr. Newsom described Option 5 as complete disengagement in which we would not try to improve or expand our relations with either side.

Mr. Kissinger asked if we could state the Acheson view in a non-absurd way. He described this view as having no interest in giving up U. S. economic and strategic interests in the white states for the sake of illusory gains with the black states. He thought it should be stated in terms of not sacrificing our relations with the white states rather than proposing an expansion of our activities there.

Mr. Pedersen thought this view lay somewhere between Options 1 and 2.

Mr. Newsom noted that there were no advocates of Option 1 in the IG but that the option was put forward to cover the complete range and was not intended as an overstatement of Mr. Acheson's view. He thought in general the option assumed the U. S. had little to gain by attention to the black states.

Mr. Davis asked whether such matters as flexibility on the sale of dual purpose items were taken care of in terms of the options.

Mr. Cargo and Mr. Pedersen thought this was taken care of in Options 2 and 3 in the statement of priorities and emphasis and in operational examples.

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Mr. Pedersen thought the statement of a general posture is important and that Options 2 through 4 cover the spectrum.

Mr. Kissinger commented that while we were supposed to pose choices to the President, the present Option 1 apparently has no support in the bureaucracy and he sees no reason to include it in its present form. At least, it should be rephrased so that it can be reasonably considered, though no necessarily accepted.

Mr. Proctor asked if we were ruling out consideration of Options 1 and 5.

Mr. Kissinger commented "or rewrite Option 1 so that it can be discussed."

Mr. Newsom thought that Option 2 takes care of Mr. Kissinger's point on not sacrificing our interests in the white states, but noted that, while Option 2 is supported by Defense and by the NSC Staff, State has serious problems with it. Option 2 calls for unrequited U.S. initiatives toward the white states over a three to five-year period, and he thought that any valid features in a restated Option 1 could be combined with the present Option 2.

Mr. Kissinger thought Option 2 called for broader association with both black and white states. An intermediate option would be not to seek broader association with the whites but not to give up our interests there; or to maintain the status quo with the white states but not give up our interests with the black states.

Mr. Newsom commented that the revised Option 3 would attempt to establish our credibility and status in the black states in order to explain the necessity for preserving our interests in the white states -- in other words, under the umbrella of improved relations with the blacks, we could do what we should do in the white states to advance our national interests.

Mr. Kissinger reiterated that since he had not seen the revised Option 3 he could not comment. He asked if we envisaged maintaining our present position on the white states without prejudice toward the blacks -- in other words, don't seek out the white states but don't kick them in the teeth.

Mr. Pedersen thought this position lay somewhere between Options 2 and 3. He considered the revised Option 3 more activist toward the black states.

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Mr. Kissinger thought this would depend on what you are trying to do with Option 3. He thought the possibility of leaving the domestic policies of the white states alone, while maintaining our interests there, and of continuing with the black states, was not covered in the existing options.

Mr. Newsom thought this was covered in Option 3 (present policy) but acknowledged that our present policy was not that well defined.

Mr. Morris noted there was considerable bureaucratic disagreement on Option 2. He considered it was activist in the sense that it ceases to squeeze the white states.

Mr. Kissinger thought his statement above might be considered as a variation of Option 2.

Mr. Newsom said that our present position toward the white states constitutes a restriction on U.S. activities in those states. He thought this was the present Option 3. He thought an agreement to stop kicking the whites in the interests of pursuing U.S. national interests was included in Option 2.

Mr. Pedersen said while the present Option 3 is feasible, the revised Option 3 was in fact a shift toward Mr. Kissinger's position and fell somewhere between the present Options 2 and 3.

Mr. Kissinger repeated he had not seen revised Option 3 and could not comment.

Mr. Pedersen characterized the present Option 3 as "stay where we are" and the revised Option 3 as taking steps with the black states to improve our position so that we could then relax our restrictions and pursue our interests in the white states.

Mr. Kissinger asked about concrete steps.

Mr. Pedersen cited the liberalization of our attitude toward investment.

Mr. Newsom cited creation of a development fund for the three black states next to South Africa, accreditation of one ambassador to the three states, continuation of at least one major development project relating to Zambia and Tanzania, technical assistance to Tanzania and Zambia, an invitation to the heads of state of Tanzania and Zambia for official visits to the U.S. termination of our involvement in Rhodesia including

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closing the Consulate in Salisbury and releasing the chrome stocks under the hardship clause of the Treasury announcement and liberalization of our economic position toward the Portuguese territories. After six months, we might reconsider our position toward South Africa to achieve flexibility on the sale of dual purpose items, permit naval visits on a racially integrated basis while in port, etc.

Mr. Kissinger asked that the revised Option 3 be circulated so that participants may comment on it. He noted that it appeared to be almost a new option.

Mr. Newsom apologized for the late distribution of the revision, noting that final clearance within State and with AID had been obtained only late last night.

Mr. Lindjord asked about the solution of the chrome problem and Mr. Newsom commented that the proposed closure of our Consulate in Salisbury was directly related to a solution of the chrome problem.

Mr. Pedersen suggested we could remove Option 5 if it was decided to exclude the extreme positions.

Mr. Kissinger said he wanted to explore all the options but that the elimination of Option 1 as presently stated represented no problem. He noted that we must include in our consideration the fact that the President has decided not to close our Consulate in Salisbury.

Mr. Newsom noted that Option 2 calls for certain unrequited moves toward the whites such as naval calls, removal of constraints on EXIM Bank facilities, etc.

Mr. Davis commented that it does things for the black states, too.

Mr. Newsom said these were minor aspects of the option that were outweighed by the three to five-year period of unrequited moves toward the whites.

Mr. Morris commented that the word "unrequited" was used in the sense of limiting our squeezing measures without necessarily expecting change. He thought some of these examples were in the same category as some of those in the revised Option 3.

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Mr. Kissinger noted that the revised Option 3 apparently called only for consideration of moves toward the white states following a six-month period.

Mr. Kissinger noted that under revised Option 3 relations with the blacks would determine the nature of our relations with the whites -- in other words, we would use improvement of our relations with the blacks to make possible improvement of our position in the white states.

Mr. Newsom said this reflected Secretary Rogers' feelings following his meetings in New York that we can take certain steps in the white states if we explained them adequately to the blacks and if we limit them to things directly in the U. S. interest and not necessarily in support of the white regimes. He thought the blacks were open to such explanations if we convince them that we are also interested in their problems.

Mr. Lindjord asked if this could include relaxation on chrome sales.

Mr. Newsom reiterated that this was related to the decision on the Salisbury Consulate. He noted that while the office is small and other agencies were withdrawing their personnel, maintenance of the Consulate is a symbol.

Mr. Pedersen noted that Secretary Rogers had not been entirely clear on the factual and legal situation on the chrome sales -- specifically, whether any shipment of chrome out of Rhodesia would constitute a violation of the UN sanctions.

Mr. Davis asked if we were sure we would be physically able to get the chrome out. Could the Rhodesians block us?

Mr. Newsom thought this would be considered by the Rhodesians as a step toward improvement and that it would represent no problem.

Mr. Kissinger again reminded the group that the President up to now has not permitted closure of the Salisbury Consulate. This, of course, did not mean that the President could not change his mind.

Mr. Newsom noted that the release of the chrome would be politically acceptable only with regard to a complete closing off of our relations with Rhodesia.

Mr. Lindjord asked if there were any other off-setting measures which might be taken, and Mr. Newsom replied no.

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Mr. Davis asked if the Rhodesians would really consider a close-out of U.S. relations as progress.

Mr. Lindjord replied that it would be considered in relation to the chrome stock release but noted real problems on timing.

Mr. Newsom commented that a U.S. Government team has determined that we do not face a critical chrome problem in the U.S. for another year and a half.

Mr. Kissinger noted that he had sat in on Mr. Acheson's conversations with the President and that the Acheson view must be presented fairly to the NSC, even if it were only to be rejected. He thought the present Option 1 exaggerated the Acheson position.

Mr. Newsom commented that Option 1 was based to some extent on Mr. Acheson's preface to the Nogueira book.

Mr. Kissinger thought we could try to produce a version of Acheson's views and circulate it for comment. He thought we would not violate bureaucratic interests by stating this option and thought it extremely unlikely that the President would choose to overrule the Secretary of State in this regard.

Mr. Newsom agreed.

Mr. Cargo asked if the Acheson position could be fairly stated as "relax restrictions on the white states and take other steps to protect our interests in the region." He asked if this captured the intent of the Acheson proposal.

Mr. Kissinger added that this would be without prejudice to the black states.

Mr. Kissinger said he had a problem with the premise as stated for Option 2. To induce moderation, we would have to convince the blacks that they have no hope in improving their position through violence. Did this not require that the blacks accept extensive oppression? Is it not true that the objectives of the blacks and the whites are incompatible and that they cannot be reconciled?

Mr. Newsom thought it was unrealistic to think that the U.S. could convince the blacks of this.

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Mr. Kissinger added "or convince the whites that moderation does not produce violence."

Mr. Pedersen agreed that the whites would say that moderation would not work.

Mr. Kissinger thought that the old and the new versions of Option 3 were fairly different and suggested that we keep both as separate options.

He then asked how we can keep Chinese influence out of Souther Africa. What incentives do African leaders have not to be radical? He noted recent conversations with Ogden Reid to the effect that Nyerere will soon take Chinese help. He asked what incentives Nyerere or other area leaders would have not to take Chinese help. He thought no black state can do less than accept outside Communist support when it is offered and asked if this were a fair statement.

Mr. Newsom agreed that it was a fair statement for Tanzania and Zambia who were under the greatest pressure both from the liberation movements within their own countries and from the white states. He saw little hope of forestalling Chinese advances in view of their activities on the TanZam railroad and in arms supply. But he thought that the Tanzania and Zambia leaders do not wish to become completely identified with the Chinese or the Soviets. He believes they hoped that the U. S. would take a position which would be defensible from their own political standpoints. While we cannot expect to move Tanzania and Zambia in our direction, he thought we could maintain a foothold there.

Mr. Pedersen noted the influence of the two personalities -- Nyerere and Kaunda -- saying he thought they would like to turn in our direction but cannot. He noted that they had tried to get us to build the TanZam railroad.

Mr. Kissinger asked if Nyerere does not have his own reasons for not wanting China -- is it not in his own interest not to sell himself completely?

Mr. Newsom agreed but noted that China was now the only source of assistance to the military in Tanzania and that, after Nyerere, the military held power.

Mr. Kissinger asked what would happen after Nyerere, noting that under the revised Option 3 we would still not be giving military assistance to Tanzania.

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Mr. Pedersen agreed that the revised Option 3 did not improve the situation.

Mr. Kissinger asked "why do it?"

Mr. Newsom commented that the present policy calls for no more bilateral assistance to Zambia but it does not refine relations with Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland. Kaunda looks on economic assistance as evidence of our general interest in black-white problems in the area. He thought Option 4 was better in this regard but would not do what should be done with regard to U.S. interests in the white states.

Mr. Kissinger commented that Option 4 still might not keep China out. With regard to strengthening moderate regimes, he noted trends in the Middle East and Africa and asked if these trends were not stronger than anything we could do.

Mr. Newsom thought we could do little under present aid policies and with present aid funds but that we might maintain a better balance if we could make some dramatic economic move, for example, assisting with the railroad.

Mr. Pedersen doubted if this would create much of a shift but noted that revised Option 3 would be beneficial in Tanzania and Zambia.

Mr. Kissinger asked if we were dismissing Option 5. He asked why we should remove our tracking station. He asked if it were inconceivable that we not take a stand on the racial issue, noting that the Africans had not supported us on Czechoslovakia.

Mr. Pedersen replied that Nyerere did support us at that time.

Mr. Morris noted that Option 5, like Option 1, had no bureaucratic support.

Mr. Kissinger asked why we should remove tracking stations from any country unless it was entirely in the U.S. self-interest. Why should we consider giving it up if South Africa was willing to let us stay?

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Mr. Pedersen said that the South Africans have used the existence of our tracking station as a leverage on policy in various diplomatic conversations.

Mr. Kissinger asked if we could say that we would take no stand on the racial issue and would consult our interests in other matters. Possible we cannot take this position for domestic reasons or because of the effect of African voting in the UN. He noted, however, that there appeared to be nothing between black power and white power in South Africa. Is it conceivable that we would not take a stand on the racial issue, admitting that this was not an heroic position, but would pursue our normal economic and strategic interests.

Mr. Newsom thought that Options 1 and 5 represented often-stated domestic points of view as expressed by Representative Diggs, the American Committee on Africa, and others. He thought international credibility on the racial question requires that we maintain no relations with South Africa.

Mr. Kissinger remarked that it makes sense to remove the tracking station under Option 4 but that it appears unnecessary under Option 5. He suggested Option 5 be rewritten so that it could be looked at. He thought we could discuss economic relations with the white states under Option 5 -- indeed, that we could expand economic relations with both sides if we consult U. S. interests.

Mr. Kissinger thought economic discrimination and removal of the tracking station was more punishing to the whites and Option 4 called for being tougher on the whites. He considered Option 5 a non-neutral withdrawal.

Mr. Davis thought we should make it clear that Option 3 represents the status quo.

Mr. Pedersen thought a real Option 5 would be an attempt to change South Africa by more stringent economic measures. He thought Option 4 was dissociation, while Option 5 could be interpreted as either get out of both sides or attempt to change the situation by economic pressure on the whites.

Mr. Newsom characterized this as the "Green Bay Tree" theory, but

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Mr. Morris replied that the "Green Bay Tree" theory assumes that internal change will result from economic growth.

Mr. Kissinger said he had no objection to stating a policy that actively pressures the white states. He thought a real option might be to leave political problems alone and let economic forces work themselves out. He thought the present Option 5 was almost the State Department's proposed Option 4. It would penalize South Africa most but would annoy the Africans just enough to lose any benefit. If we were to punish South Africa, he thought we should do it and get it done.

General Unger commented that he considered Option 3 as a benchmark with Options 2 and 4 giving us the spectrum. From a military point of view, our interests center in South Africa, particularly the question of port calls. He cited the 703 force reductions, particularly with regard to oilers, and said he had suggested an insert to bring strategic interests to the force. He noted that we were running out of oilers and would have to rely on other nations to oil our ships in order to permit five transits a year.

Mr. Newsom replied that they were particularly conscious of this problem and that they understood that the transits in the fall of 1970 would present real difficulties, while the February and May transits could be handled by British oilers. He thought we could include this as one of the elements in a revised Option 3 after we have developed certain moves toward black states. He noted the question of port calls was a critical issue in both the U.S. and Africa, saying that following the FDR episode State had received petitions from 35 Congressmen opposing all fleet visits to South Africa.

Mr. Ware mentioned also the overflight corridor into the Indian Ocean. Following some discussion it was agreed that there were no major overflight problems except for the Sudan but that the overflight question was another reason for maintaining a good position in South Africa.

Mr. Davis asked if we did not have an anti-submarine interest.

General Unger replied yes, with the increased appearance of the Soviets in the Indian Ocean and with increased ASW activities.

Mr. Ware mentioned also the maintenance of normal military relations, including access to military information.

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General Unger noted that these specifics would follow if the larger issues were developed.

Mr. Kissinger suggested refinement of the consequences of the options in a final paper. He asked if the specific issues were sufficiently treated under the consequences of the options or if they require special treatment.

Mr. Newsom thought they were included as illustrations of the consequences of the options.

Mr. Kissinger noted that there was a good chance that the NSC meeting on South Africa would be postponed for a week and suggested that a redraft be prepared and circulated which would refine the options along the lines of the group discussion and would indicate the most significant operational consequences. He noted that, in preparing for the NSC meeting on Latin America, we had had only general propositions and that we had refined the approach into the specific operational terms which the President prefers. The technical details of these operations could then be handled by the Under Secretaries Committee.

Mr. Ware referred to the expanded Defense Department summary which was then circulated.

Mr. Pedersen thought the Defense summary was too long and suggested it should be reworked to present a more balanced picture.

Mr. Ware replied that the summary was taken directly from the text of the paper and

Mr. Kissinger noted that the President did not mind reading.

Mr. Newsom asked if this was what Mr. Kissinger had in mind by development of the operational consequences.

Mr. Kissinger replied that we might sift the longer paper and take into account the questions that had been raised with regard to Option 5.

Mr. Lindjord asked if the summary would include as an operational consequence, for example, Rhodesian chrome sales.

Mr. Kissinger thought we could not expect to settle the Rhodesian chrome question at the NSC. He thought the President would want to look at the legal questions.

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Mr. Cargo described Option 5 as hands off on the political aspects and maintaining business as usual as U. S. interests dictate.

Mr. Pedersen commented it was not realistic to divorce ourselves politically.

Mr. Ware thought, however, that this was a policy question that should be considered.

Mr. Newsom summarized the requirements as: restate Option 1; add a new Option 3 between the present Options 2 and 3; revise Option 4; revise Option 5; and add a 6th option which would include exerting pressure on the white states.

Mr. Kissinger asked that they look again at the operational consequences of the options and thought that Mr. Acheson's proposal could be considered either as a redraft of Option 1 or as a variation of Option 2.

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