

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

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INFORMATION

November 26, 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR: BRENT SCOWCROFT  
FROM: ROBERT B. PLOWDEN, JR. *RBP*  
SUBJECT: Senior Review Group Meeting on MAAG  
Requirements: Monday, November 29, 1976,  
3:00 p.m.

Purpose of This Meeting

To determine what structure should be proposed to perform security assistance functions in Fiscal Year 1978.

The following issues are in contention and should be addressed:

1. What MAAG-type organizations should be proposed for retention in Latin America?
2. In countries such as Ethiopia, Spain, and Turkey, where there is disagreement only as to the number of personnel to be assigned to the MAAG-type organization (Defense Field Office), what number of personnel should be proposed?
3. In what form should an amendment be proposed which would permit continued Defense Attache Office participation in security assistance functions? Should a general repeal of the current restriction be requested, or should authorization be requested for specified countries?
4. Should the security assistance organization in Jordan be an augmentation to the Defense Attache Office, or a separate Defense Field Office?

NSS, DOS, DIA, OSD  
reviews completed.

XGDS of E.O. 11652 by authority  
of Brent Scowcroft; Exemption  
Category Section 5(B)(2) and (3).

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5. Should legislation be requested which would permit, without specific congressional approval, assignment to each U.S. diplomatic mission of up to six (instead of the current three) military personnel to perform security assistance functions?

#### Background

The International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act of 1976 required a reduction to 34 MAAGs by September 30, 1976; in addition, the Act requires specific congressional authorization for MAAGs existing after September 30, 1977. The reduction has been completed, and the study on MAAG requirements prepared by the Interdepartmental Group for Political-Military Affairs in response to NSSM 243 has resulted in four options for MAAG presence after September 30, 1977.

The agencies involved in this review were Defense, State, OMB, CIA, and ACDA, and their study comments are at Tabs B through F, respectively. Defense and State recommended specific options in their study comments, while CIA and ACDA comments were generally supportive of these options. In addition, the NSC Staff and OMB have recommended third and fourth options based on their evaluation of the study comment options. Before addressing the differences in the four options, some elements of commonality should be mentioned.

#### Common Positions

Each of the four options recommends that security assistance functions be performed by Foreign Service Officers in countries with the very smallest programs; by Defense Attache Offices (DAOs) in some countries; by the newly-established, three-person Offices of Defense Cooperation (ODCs) in most countries (ODCs do not require specific congressional approval); and by congressionally-approved, MAAG-type organizations -- Defense Field Offices (DEFOs) -- with reduced staffing and functions in countries where U.S. foreign policy interests necessitate a group of more than three members of the U.S. Armed Forces.

There is also general agreement on three particular aspects of the MAAG issue:

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- Three former MAAGs -- Iran, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia -- will be designated ODCs, with personnel in excess of those three funded under FMS contracts. These contracts have not yet been signed, so Defense has included those country figures in its alternative, while State and OMB, assuming the contracts will be signed, have not included the excess personnel or costs in their alternatives.
- It will be necessary to rely on temporary duty teams of experts to perform security assistance on one-time bases as manpower levels in MAAG-type organizations are reduced.
- The law (which now prohibits use of DAOs for security assistance functions) should be amended to allow DAOs to continue performing security assistance functions in countries where political sensitivities are paramount or manpower savings are effected by not establishing separate ODCs. (As discussed below, the NSC Staff option recommends that DAO augmentation be requested only in those countries where manpower savings are effected.) The provision of the law which prohibits DAO involvement resulted in part from the efforts of a House International Relations Committee staff member who had served in a DAO while on active duty, and who thought that security assistance functions he had to perform detracted from performance of his intelligence functions. While such an allegation may have been true in his case and isolated others, the proposed change to the law is supported by all agencies involved, including strong support from the CIA and JCS.

Aside from these broad areas of agreement, distinct positions have emerged on the number of MAAG-type organizations/DEFOs to be retained, the manning levels needed in various countries, and the costs involved to support the recommended positions. A summary of the key features of the four options is at Tab G.

#### Defense Option

The Defense option recommends that 31 MAAG-type organizations be retained in FY 1978. While the Defense proposal substantially reduces manpower in many cases and represents some cost reduction from the FY 1977 program cost, the proposal represents a reduction of only three MAAG-type organizations from the 34 authorized for FY 1977.

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Fourteen of the 31 organizations proposed are the traditional Latin American military groups, which, quoting Defense, are recommended for continuation to "perform the traditional role of representation and essential security assistance functions on an as-required basis." Because the clear intent of the law is to authorize only those personnel performing "essential security assistance functions," the traditional representation argument will carry little weight absent more compelling evidence of need. To request approval of 31 MAAG-type organizations, therefore, even with some reductions in manpower, quite probably would be regarded as unresponsive by Congress and might lead to enactment of more restrictive legislation.

State Option

The State option proposes the retention of 20 DEFOs in FY 1978, although for reasons discussed below, the proposed cost and total number of personnel are virtually identical to the Defense proposal's figures. State proposes retaining four of the 14 Latin American military groups as DEFOs, but offers somewhat more convincing reasons for the four than Defense did for the 14: Panama, because of the on-going negotiations leading to a new defense relationship; Brazil, because of its geo-political importance; Argentina, because of the need to not appear as unduly favoring Brazil; and Bolivia, through FY 1978 only, because of our undertaking for a military modernization there.

In some countries where State and Defense agree on the need for a DEFO, State has proposed a higher number of personnel, primarily military, to staff the DEFOs than has Defense: e.g., Ethiopia (59 as compared to 34); Spain (42 as compared to 30); and Turkey (127 as compared to 97). In each of these instances, Defense has requested the number of people it deems necessary to perform the essential security assistance functions, while State appears to be requesting additional personnel for "traditional representation" purposes. For this reason, the Defense position appears more acceptable because it better comports with legislative intent.

The State alternative also recommends that legislation be proposed which seeks the authority to assign up to six, rather than three, military personnel to ODCs without congressional approval. Because an amendment already will be required to allow DAOs to perform security assistance functions, there is small chance that Congress will accept two simultaneous revisions to its recently enacted law.

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NSC Staff Option

The NSC Staff option recommends combining the best features of the Defense and State options. It proposes retention of the 20 DEFOs recommended by State, plus one DEFO in Jordan (where State has requested a DAO augmentation of 10 military members, a request which I believe would seriously harm chances for legislative relief from the current DAO restriction, because it was Congress' intent to identify and specifically authorize large security assistance operations such as this). To disguise a DEFO by integrating it into a large DAO clearly would subvert the legislative intent. In addition, it proposes acceptance of the lower Defense figures for those DEFOs where Defense and State disagree only as to numbers. Essentially, this proposal accepts the State option insofar as Latin America is concerned, and the lower Defense personnel figures in countries such as Ethiopia, Spain, and Turkey. The result of this combination is a proposal which provides for that number of missions and personnel needed to perform essential security assistance functions, a result totally consonant with legislative intent.

In addition, the NSC Staff option recommends that continued DAO participation in security assistance operations be requested only in those countries where personnel or cost savings are effected by not establishing separate ODCs. Defense, State, and OMB recommend continued DAO security assistance participation in some countries where personnel or cost savings are not effected, but where "political sensitivities are paramount." The legislative history of the Act, however, is quite clear in its intent that security assistance organizations be used only for performance of essential security assistance functions, and not for "representative" or "politically sensitive" purposes. A proposed amendment requesting continued DAO security assistance participation in as few countries as possible, and then only where personnel and cost savings are effected, would appear to have the greatest chance of success in Congress.

OMB Option

The OMB option recommends retention of 14 DEFOs in FY 1978. From the list of 20 on which Defense, State, and the NSC Staff agree, it further recommends terminating MAAGs in Panama, Liberia, Tunisia, Pakistan, the Philippines, and Japan. No reason for this recommendation is given,

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other than OMB's unsupported conclusion that "programs and functions in those countries do not warrant more than three military personnel." Considering the political sensitivities involved in our relationships with these countries and the fact that the NSC Staff option results in significant reductions from FY 1977 MAAG totals, I believe that the NSC Staff option will satisfy the congressional desire for phasing down the MAAG presence, while avoiding the repercussions which OMB's precipitous cuts would occasion. In addition, keeping in mind that a proposal similar to this now must be made to Congress each year, the NSC Staff option leaves the most flexibility for future years.

#### Approach at the Meeting

Your talking points for the meeting are at Tab A. I suggest that you open the meeting by underscoring the fact that the International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act marks a new day insofar as MAAGs are concerned, and attempts to maintain the status quo almost certainly will meet with congressional disapproval. Also, while there has been a considerable degree of agency agreement on this topic, a number of contentious issues require resolution prior to formulation and submission of the FY 1978 budget request for MAAG-type organizations.

Specifically, in view of the considerations and agency positions detailed above, you will want to:

- Determine which countries in Latin America should retain MAAG-type organizations.
- Determine what number of personnel should be proposed for assignment to Defense Field Offices in those countries (such as Ethiopia, Spain, and Turkey) where there is general agreement on the need for a DEFO, but differing views on the number of personnel needed to perform security assistance functions.
- Discuss the form in which an amendment should be proposed which would permit continued Defense Attache Office participation in security assistance functions in FY 1978.
- Decide whether the security assistance organization in Jordan should be a DEFO or a DAO augmented by 10 members of the military.

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- Discuss the desirability of requesting an increase from three to six in the number of military personnel which can be assigned, without prior congressional approval, to the Chief of each U.S. diplomatic mission to perform security assistance functions.
  
- Indicate that you will discuss with the President these and other points raised at the meeting and that a Presidential decision memorandum will be forthcoming.

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Tab A

TALKING POINTS

General

- As you are aware, the International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act of 1976 required a reduction to 34 MAAGs by September 30, 1976; in addition, the Act requires specific congressional authorization for MAAGs existing after September 30, 1977.
- The mandated reduction has been accomplished, and our purpose today is to decide a number of contentious issues concerning our MAAG posture for FY 1978. The President decided to postpone a decision on this subject pending the outcome of this meeting, but since this is a budget as well as a policy issue, the decision must be made shortly.
- At the outset, two new terms developed by the interdepartmental study should be understood by all. Defense Field Offices -- acronym DEFO -- will be the title for those current MAAGs proposed for retention in FY 1978. Office of Defense Cooperation -- ODC -- will be the title for the three-member security assistance organizations which may be assigned to each diplomatic mission without prior congressional approval.
- It also should be noted that the agency positions to which I will refer are those which were advanced in formal agency comments to the interdepartmental study and not those advanced in the study itself.

Latin America

- I note that Defense has recommended retention of all MAAGs currently operating in Latin America, while State recommends retention of organizations only in Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, and Panama. Is this still the Defense position?
- The Defense rationale for this continued presence in Latin America cites the need to have these organizations perform "the traditional role of representation and essential security assistance functions on an as-required basis." Because the new Act's clear intent is

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to authorize only those organizations performing essential security assistance functions. It appears that the traditional representation argument will carry little weight absent more compelling evidence of need.

- Jim (Lynn), I notice your proposal also recommends termination of the MAAG in Panama? Would you not agree that we should retain such a presence there because of our on-going negotiations leading to a new defense relationship?

Other Countries

- There are a number of countries such as Ethiopia, Spain, and Turkey where there is agreement on the need for a DEFO, but disagreement on the number of personnel to be assigned to the DEFO.
- I would think that the lower figures recommended by Defense would be the figures we should propose, since Defense is charged with administration of the security assistance program in each of the countries in issue.

Defense Attache Offices

- There is general agreement on the desirability of continuing DAO participation in security assistance operations, but I think we need to address the form in which an amendment to the currently restrictive law should be presented.
- Realizing that Congress is reluctant to repeal outright provisions of recently-enacted laws, I am inclined to believe we instead should identify those countries in which continued DAO participation actually is necessary, and specifically request a waiver for those countries.
- Also, I believe that the argument which will be most persuasive on the Hill is that continued DAO participation will result in personnel and cost savings in the countries specified. For this reason, I am skeptical about citing "paramount political sensitivities" in some countries as a reason for seeking an amendment to the current law, a law which clearly is designed to authorize personnel only to perform security assistance functions.

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Jordan

- I believe the proposal to continue the significant augmentation of the DAO in Jordan to perform security assistance functions would seriously jeopardize our chances for obtaining relief from the current DAO restriction.
  
- In essence, we are disguising a DEFO in a greatly augmented DAO. Congress' intent in passing the current Act was to identify and specifically authorize large security assistance operations such as this. Augmenting the DAO would appear to subvert this legislative intent, even though "paramount political sensitivities" in Jordan point toward retention of the current practice.

Six-person Offices of Defense Cooperation

- While this appears to be an attractive alternative in a number of countries, particularly Latin America, I would think that this request may harm chances for obtaining relief on the DAO restriction.

Decisions

- I will discuss with the President the points raised here today, and a Presidential decision memorandum should be forthcoming soon. The personnel and cost figures will be those contained in the President's FY 1978 budget request.

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**THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE**  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301

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**MEMORANDUM FOR THE ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS**

**SUBJECT: NSSM 243, MAAG Requirements Study (C)**

This memorandum answers your staff memorandum of 19 October 1976 which requested formal agency views on the MAAG Requirements Study prepared by the Interdepartmental Group for Political Military Affairs in response to NSSM 243 (Atch 3).

We have reviewed the Study and discern varying degrees of attractiveness in the alternatives presented. Alternative 1, for example, would maintain the current MAAG structure as a projection of U.S. influence and power overseas, reinforcing U.S. interest and capabilities in countries with little or no other U.S. presence. However, this alternative does not reflect the realities associated with the legislative history of the International Security Assistance and Arms Control Act of 1976. On the other hand, Alternative 5, which would be within legislative restraints, does not provide sufficient personnel to manage effectively the security assistance program in many countries.

Alternatives 2, 3 and 4, which are more flexible in their approaches, have a high degree of commonality and have been used by DOD as the basis for developing a concept which incorporates the best features of these three alternatives. The new alternative, which we propose, can be justified to the Congress as it reduces manpower and costs. At the same time, this alternative would preserve military relationships provided by the MAAG-type organizations and would not restrict the President's options to meet current, realistic security and foreign policy requirements.

Recommend that the concept at Attachment 1 be forwarded through the Senior Review Group to the President for his consideration/approval and eventual submission to the Congress in the form of proposed legislation (Atch 2). In the meantime, we will continue to coordinate with the Department of State to determine the direction of MAAG-type organizations, their titles and to refine personnel requirements, functions, terms of reference, funding and other procedures required to implement and justify our proposed alternative.

*H. P. Cheney*

Attachments 3  
a/s

Classified by Director, Policy Plans and NSC Affairs

SUBJECT TO GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652, AUTOMATICALLY DOWNGRADED ON 31 DEC 84.  
AT No Objection to Declassification in Part 2013/08/15 : LOC-HAK-307-2-3-5

Upon removal of attachments this document becomes

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*Attachment 1*

Attachment  
DOD Proposal

Description: Eliminate all Military Assistance Advisory Groups and establish Defense Field Offices (DEFO) in countries where major security assistance delivery programs are on-going. Representation to Latin America countries is a special situation and will require the continued operation of Military Groups which will perform the traditional role of representation and essential security assistance functions on an as required basis. In countries where the security assistance function can be performed by three military personnel or less, a separate Office of Defense Cooperation will be established. In other countries where there is only a limited security assistance program or circumstances indicate, we will ask Congress for authorization to allow the DAO to handle security assistance responsibilities. Foreign Service Officers will handle security assistance in countries with the very smallest programs if legislative relief cannot be obtained.

Concept of Operation:

a. In developed countries where the major security assistance function is focused on acquisition of equipment and services, the MAAG will be replaced with a DEFO that is specifically structured to meet individual country needs. In these countries, (currently Japan and Taiwan) the new activity would not have advisory or training functions and would be staffed with only the requisite numbers of contract, fiscal and logistics personnel. The primary function of the activity would be to serve as a conduit for information on FMS actions to include technical matters, payment and follow-on actions.

b. In developing countries, the DEFO will, in addition, manage and monitor delivery programs and assist in the integration of equipment as required. Advisory or training functions would be met primarily by periodic survey/planning teams, Mobile Training Teams (MTTs), Technical Assistance Field Teams (TAFTs) or Technical Assistance Teams (TATs) when requested by the country concerned and the Department of State. However, the concept is flexible enough to permit DEFOs to perform training and advisory functions as may be required. DEFOs or ODCs, as appropriate, would coordinate and supervise the advisory and training functions provided by transitory teams. The teams would be supported by funds made available through the MAP appropriation or by FMS procedures. Military Groups for Latin American countries are categorized separately due to their special relationship with host countries.

In countries where there is a type of Defense Cooperation Agreement (DCA), either in effect or under consideration by the Congress, the security assistance management organization has specific functions associated with the agreement or US forces in the host country. Approval should, therefore, be sought in legislation to have the DEFOs in these countries approved for the duration of the agreement.

Projected Organizational Manning and Funding Requirements

- Developed countries with Defense Field Offices 2
- Developing countries with Defense Field Offices 14

- DCA Countries with Defense Field Offices	4
- Countries with Military Groups	14
- Countries with Offices of Defense Cooperation	12
- Countries where DAOs perform security assistance functions	23
- Personnel requirements (estimated FY 78) (US Military-780; US civilian-120; and local civilian-284)	1184
- USG funding FY 78	\$50.4M

#### Requirements for Implementation

Congressional authorization to establish and sustain operation of Defense Field Offices; to continue the operation of Latin American Groups; and to permit designated DAOs to perform security assistance functions.

#### Advantages

- Provides a lower profile for security assistance personnel.
- Changes the name of MAAGs to a title more in line with functions performed.
- Demonstrates a willingness to change MAAG organization and functions with no open-ended commitments.
- Provides both in-country and TDY flexibility by establishing a minimal essential base of personnel that can be augmented by MTTs and TAFTs as required.
- Reduces the number of uniformed service personnel required to perform security assistance functions and enhances reimbursement possibilities.
- Provides for continuing Latin American military mission agreements.
- Retains organization, functions and procedures for assignment and control of DOD personnel in security assistance positions in foreign nations.
- Permits use of DAOs in performance of security assistance functions in selected countries with resultant savings in manpower and operating costs.

#### Disadvantages

- Could have a short-term impact on host country perceptions of US interests.
- Requires completely new legislation authorizing DEF0s/MILGps.

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- Fewer US military personnel with detailed knowledge of recipient countries' problems and military personnel.
- Requires relief from legislative constraints on use of DAOs in accomplishment of security assistance functions.

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## FY 78 Manning and Funding Estimate

	Personnel			Total	Cost
	Military	US Civilian	Local Civilian		US Cost
<b>1. <u>Defense Field Offices (DEFOs)</u></b>					
<b>A. <u>Highly Developed Countries</u></b>					
Taiwan	15	5	2	22	932.5
Japan	7	5	5	17	630.2
<b>B. <u>Developing Countries</u></b>					
Korea	117	30	43	190	4,990.0
Indonesia	33	3	16	52	1,950.0
Thailand	40	7	15	62	1,959.1
Iran <u>1/2/</u>	5	2	1	8	341.0
Kuwait <u>2/</u>	9	0	0	9	430.6
Morocco	14	2	2	18	822.2
Pakistan	7	0	3	10	470.0
Saudi Arabia <u>2/</u>	80	2	10	92	3,884.1
Tunisia	6	1	2	9	342.7
Portugal	12	4	9	25	597.9
Ethiopia	21	3	10	34	1,408.8
Liberia	6	0	2	8	910.4
Zaire	10	0	3	13	772.1
Jordan	10	2	5	17	675.0
<b>C. <u>Defense Cooperation Agreement Countries</u></b>					
Greece	29	7	16	52	1,771.7
Philippines	37	9	6	52	1,955.7
Spain	18	4	8	30	1,028.8
Turkey	55	12	30	97	3,054.5
<b>2. <u>Military Groups</u></b>					
Argentina	20	0	9	29	956.3
Bolivia	22	2	8	32	1,184.5
Brazil	38	6	26	70	2,512.6
Chile	12	0	6	18	756.1
Colombia	18	1	6	25	863.2
Dom Rep	8	0	2	10	418.9
Ecuador	8	1	2	11	299.5
El Salvador	8	0	3	11	463.3
Guatemala	9	0	3	12	519.4
Honduras	8	0	3	11	334.9
Nicaragua	10	0	2	12	401.4
Panama	13	1	1	15	461.8
Peru	7	0	4	11	362.3
Venezuela	19	0	4	23	1,412.9



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	Personnel			Total	Cost
	Military	US Civilian	Local Civilian		US Cost

3. Offices of Defense Cooperation (ODCs)

Belgium	3	1	1	5	191.5
Denmark	3	1	1	5	191.5
France	3	1	1	5	216.5
Netherlands	3	1	1	5	191.5
Norway	3	1	1	5	191.5
India	2	1	2	5	206.5
Costa Rica	2	0	1	3	106.7
Yemen	3	0	1	4	191.0
Paraguay	3	0	1	4	186.5
Uruguay	3	0	1	4	186.5
Germany	3	2	5	10	306.5
Italy	3	2	1	6	201.5

4. Defense Attache Offices

✓Afghanistan 4/	0(0)	0(0)	0(0)	0(0)	0 (0)
Australia 3/	3(3)	0(1)	0(0)	3(4)	124.9(166.5)
Austria 3/	2(3)	0(1)	0(0)	2(4)	88.2(176.5)
Burma 4/	0(0)	0(0)	0(0)	0(0)	0 (0)
✓Egypt 3/	3(3)	1(1)	0(0)	4(4)	196.0(196.0)
Finland 4/	0(0)	0(0)	0(0)	0(0)	0 (0)
✓Ghana 4/	0(0)	0(0)	0(0)	0(0)	0 (0)
✓Haiti 3/	1(2)	0(0)	0(1)	1(3)	58.3(140.0)
✓Israel 4/	0(0)	0(0)	0(0)	0(0)	0 (0)
✓Lebanon 3/	0(3)	0(0)	0(1)	0(4)	0 (191.0)
✓Malaysia 3/	1(3)	0(1)	0(1)	1(5)	33.3(166.5)
Mali 4/	0(0)	0(0)	0(0)	0(0)	0 (0)
Mexico 3/	1(2)	0(0)	0(1)	1(3)	39.4(118.3)
Nepal 4/	0(0)	0(0)	0(0)	0(0)	0 (0)
New Zealand 4/	0(0)	0(0)	0(0)	0(0)	0 (0)
✓Nigeria 3/	1(2)	0(1)	0(1)	1(4)	38.4(153.5)
Senegal 4/	0(0)	0(0)	0(0)	0(0)	0 (0)
✓Singapore 3/	1(3)	0(1)	0(0)	1(4)	41.7(166.7)
Sri Lanka 4/	0(0)	0(0)	0(0)	0(0)	0 (0)
Sweden 4/	0(0)	0(0)	0(0)	0(0)	0 (0)
Switzerland 4/	0(0)	0(0)	0(0)	0(0)	0 (0)
✓United Kingdom 3/	2(3)	0(1)	0(1)	2(5)	76.6(191.5)
✓Yugoslavia 4/	0(0)	0(0)	0(0)	0(0)	0 (0)
Hq Admin Cost					7,500.0
<b>Total</b>	<b>780</b>	<b>120</b>	<b>284</b>	<b>1184</b>	<b>50,438.9</b>

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- 1/ The majority of the spaces are paid out of reimbursable FMS expenses. Total 190 military, 19 US civilian and 39 local civilian.
- 2/ DEF0s may be replaced with ODCs if adequate level of reimbursement can be obtained from host country.
- 3/ The numbers of personnel and costs shown outside parentheses reflect the augmentation to DAO and associated operating costs and would be applicable if legislative relief on the use of DAOs in the performance of security assistance functions is obtained. Personnel levels and costs shown in parentheses would apply if legislative relief cannot be obtained and ODCs must be established.
- 4/ In the event legislative relief on the use of DAOs in the performance of security assistance functions is not obtained, the security assistance function will be transferred from the DAO to Foreign Service Officers on Embassy staffs.

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*Atschi*

A JOINT RESOLUTION

TO AUTHORIZE MILITARY ASSISTANCE ADVISORY GROUPS, MILITARY MISSIONS, AND OTHER ORGANIZATIONS OF UNITED STATES MILITARY PERSONNEL PERFORMING SIMILAR MILITARY ADVISORY FUNCTIONS UNDER THE FOREIGN ASSISTANCE ACT OF 1961, AS AMENDED, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES.

Whereas section 515(b)(1) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended (hereinafter referred to as the "Act"), provides that, after September 30, 1977, "no military assistance advisory group, military mission, or other organization of United States military personnel performing similar military advisory functions under this Act may operate in a foreign country unless specifically authorized by the Congress"; and

Whereas section 515(b)(1) of the Act applies only to military assistance advisory groups, military missions, and similar organizations whose services are not directly and fully reimbursed under the Arms Export Control Act by foreign countries pursuant to foreign military sales cases expressly providing for such reimbursable services: Now, therefore, be it

Resolved, by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, that organizations of United States military personnel performing security assistance, liaison, and equipment delivery functions, whose services are not directly and fully reimbursed under the Arms Export Control Act, are hereby authorized to operate in the following countries during the period beginning October 1, 1977 and ending September 30, 1980:

Latin American Military Groups in Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Ecuador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama, Peru, Venezuela; and

Defense Field Offices in Ethiopia, Greece, Indonesia, Iran, Japan, Jordan, Korea, Kuwait, Liberia, Morocco, Pakistan, Philippines, Portugal, Saudi Arabia, Spain, Taiwan, Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey, and Zaire: Provided, That such Offices in Greece, Spain, Turkey and the

Philippines are authorized to operate during the period October 1, 1977 and ending on the respective dates of expiration of the treaties, or executive agreements approved by the Congress, with those respective countries pursuant to which security assistance is provided.

Sec. 2. Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the performance of security assistance, liaison and equipment delivery functions by Defense Attaches during the period beginning October 1, 1977 and ending September 30, 1980 in countries not designated in section 1 of this Joint Resolution is hereby authorized at each diplomatic mission where the President shall determine it to be appropriate.

Sec. 3. Section 43(b) of the Arms Export Control Act is amended, effective October 1, 1977, by striking out the period at the end of the subsection and inserting the following in lieu thereof: ", except for the administrative expenses of any mission or group which are directly and fully charged to, and reimbursed from amounts received for, sales of services under section 21."

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Tab C



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

November 2, 1976

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MEMORANDUM FOR MR. BRENT SCOWCROFT  
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: NSSM 243: MAAG Requirement Study

We have been asked by Miss Davis' memorandum of October 19, to give our views on the study prepared in response to NSSM 243, which presents five options for restructuring and staffing of MAAG-type organization for security assistance functions.

The Department endorses Option 4, as modified in the attachment. This option is a product of the views of our ambassadors, regional assistant secretaries, and other senior Department officials. We feel that Options 1 and 3 envision greater personnel resources for security assistance functions than are necessary. Moreover, these options are too close to the status quo and would be unacceptable to Congress. Option 5 is an extreme reduction in staffing that would damage political relationships and necessary operations. Option 2 does not address the desirability of having DAOs or Embassy Foreign Service Officers perform security assistance functions. It also overstates the need to continue military programs in Latin America.

Option 4 seems preferable as it sets forth a simplified concept of security assistance operations which, we believe, will have the greatest appeal to Congress. It reduces the number of MAAG-type units from 34 to 20, the number of security assistance military personnel from 1263 to 682, and total costs from about \$54 million to \$46.7 million. The concept is a comprehensible one, calling for the submission to Congress for approval of proposals to maintain 20

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MAAG-type units (Defense Field Offices - DEFOS) on the grounds that they are essential in terms of our political relationships or our military position in the countries concerned.

In 26 other countries we would establish three-man (or smaller), military Offices of Defense Cooperation (ODCs) which, under the new authority of Section 515 of the Foreign Assistance Act, as amended, do not require further Congressional authorization. Included in this group would be all but four countries in Latin America where we feel the military groups have outlived their utility and where we can expect Congressional criticism. We would retain military groups (DEFOS) in Panama because of the on-going negotiations leading to a new defense relationship, in Brazil because of its political importance, in Argentina because of the need to maintain a balance with Brazil, and in Bolivia, through FY 1978 only, because of our undertaking for a military modernization program there.

Also included in the three-man ODC group are the OPEC countries where the governments will finance virtually all security assistance personnel under FMS sales cases. Three-man units in those countries would not require Congressional approval, but the military presence, including host-government funded Technical Assistance Field Teams (TAFTs) there, would be reported to Congress periodically and notification of the FMS cases over \$25 million in value would be furnished to Congress as required by law.

Finally, we propose to ask Congress to approve DAO participation in security assistance in the case of 13 countries where, because of important political sensitivities or for reasons of manpower savings, the DAOs now handle security assistance and are preferable to ODCs. Elsewhere (12 countries) Embassy FSOs would handle the responsibility.


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I suggest that the NSC Staff approve the new concept for ex-MAAG structures along the lines of Option 4, direct DOD to send survey teams to the large DEFOs to assure austere staffing and request the Senior Review Group to resolve remaining differences between agencies so that a proposal, possibly with options, may be presented to the President for his approval. In the interim, the NSSM Working Group can continue to work on such matters as Terms of Reference, functions, and financing.

In recommending the foregoing position, the Department also recommends that we seek legislation to authorize the assignment of up to six, rather than three, military personnel to the ODCs where there is a clear need to do so. The Department believes that the present ceiling of three personnel is too restrictive and inflexible. The possibility of enlarging those units to six members would enable us better to conduct our operational requirements and meet our political responsibilities. If the measure were adopted by Congress, the size of at least some ODCs would increase. Some of the smaller DEFOs would also become ODCs, thereby reducing the number of MAAG-type groups for which Congressional authorization is needed.

  
C. Arthur Borg  
Executive Secretary

Attachment:

Modified Version of Option 4.

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OPTION 4. FY 1978 MANNING AND FUNDING ESTIMATE  
 (Revised October 22, 1976)

(FY 1977 Military Staffing Authorization,  
 where different, in parenthesis.)

	Personnel			Total	Cost
	Military	US Civilian	Local Civilian		US Cost
<u>1. Defense Field Offices</u> (DEFOs)					
Taiwan	15 (30)	5	2	22	932.5
Japan	7	5	5	17	630.2
Korea	117 (155)	30	43	190	4,990.0
Indonesia	33 (54)	3	16	52	1,950.0
Thailand	40 (117)	7	15	62	1,959.0
Morocco	17 (19)	2	2	21	928.0
Pakistan	8 (9)	0	3	11	550.0
Tunisia	6 (9)	1	2	9	342.7
Portugal	12 (14)	4	9	25	597.9
Ethiopia	46	3	10	59	2,868.0
Liberia	9	0	2	11	974.0
Zaire	10	0	3	13	772.1
Greece	29	7	16	52	1,771.7
Philippines	37	9	6	52	1,955.0
Spain	30	4	8	42	1,650.0
Turkey	85	12	30	127	4,450.0
Argentina	20 (22)	0	9	29	956.3
Bolivia	22 (29)	2	8	32	1,184.5
Brazil	33 (31)	6	26	65	2,420.0
Panama	13	1	1	15	461.8
<u>2. Offices of Defense Cooperation</u> (ODCs)					
Austria	2	0	0	2	63.3
Belgium	3	1	1	5	191.5
Denmark	3	1	1	5	191.5
France	3	1	1	5	216.5

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	Personnel			Total	Cost
	Military	US Civilian	Local Civilian		US Cost
Germany	3	2	5	10	306.5
Italy	3	2	1	6	201.5
Netherlands	3	1	1	5	191.5
Norway	3	1	1	5	191.5
India	2	1	2	5	206.5
Iran <u>1/</u>	3	2	1	6	160.0
Kuwait <u>1/</u>	3	0	0	3	296.2
Saudi Arabia <u>1/</u>	3	2	10	15	186.0
Australia	3	1	0	4	166.5
Chile	3 (15)	0	6	9	223.0
Colombia	3 (21)	1	6	10	232.3
Dominican Rep.	3 (8)	0	2	5	181.0
El Salvador	3 (10)	0	3	6	179.0
Guatemala	3 (12)	0	3	6	173.0
Honduras	3 (11)	0	3	6	185.0
Nicaragua	3 (11)	0	2	5	176.0
Costa Rica	2	0	1	3	106.7
Paraguay	3	0	1	4	186.5
Peru	3 (7)	0	4	7	212.3
Uruguay	3	0	1	4	186.5
Ecuador	3 (8)	1	2	6	191.5
Venezuela	3 (19)	0	4	7	282.3

### 3. Defense Attache Offices <sup>2/</sup> (DAOs)

(Figures represent personnel required to augment existing DAO staff for security assistance functions.)

Afghanistan	0	0	0	0	0
Nigeria	1	1	1	3	120.0
Yemen	2	0	1	3	191.0
Israel	0	0	0	0	0

1/ In Iran, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia all security assistance personnel, except 3 military in each country, are to be funded by the host country.

2/ Should Congress refuse to permit DAOs to exercise security assistance functions, ODCs will be established or the functions may be shifted to Foreign Service Officers. An exception must be made for Jordan: If Congress will not permit the DAO to perform security assistance tasks, provision must be made for the establishment of a ten-man DEFO. Congress should be forewarned of this fall-back position.

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	Personnel			Total	Cost
	Military	US Civilian	Local Civilian		US Cost
Singapore	1	1	0	2	75.0
Egypt	0	0	0	0	0
Ghana	0	0	0	0	0
Haiti	1	0	0	1	58.3
Lebanon	0	0	0	0	0
Malaysia	1	0	0	1	49.2
Yugoslavia	0	0	0	0	0
United Kingdom	2	1	0	3	120.6
Jordan	10	2	5	17	618.3
Hqs. Admin. Cost					8,000.0
<b>TOTAL</b>	<u>682</u>	<u>123</u>	<u>280</u>	<u>1,176</u>	<u>46,714.2</u>

Subject to Ambassadors' concurrence, Foreign Service Officers on Embassy staffs will perform security assistance functions, assisted on occasion by TDY DOD personnel: Gabon, Cameroon, Burma, New Zealand, Nepal, Senegal, Mexico, Sweden, Switzerland, Finland, Kenya (The GOK pays for an F-5 Technical Assistance Field Team), and Sri Lanka.

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EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT  
OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20503

November 4, 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR: Colonel Robert Plowden  
Acting Director, Planning Staff  
National Security Council

FROM: *Edward G. Sanders*  
Edward G. Sanders  
Deputy Associate Director  
International Affairs Division

SUBJECT: NSSM 243: MAAG Requirement Study

We were requested to provide formal agency views on the draft response to NSSM 243 including comments and recommendations on the issues and options involved.

Official comments from the OMB representative to the IGPMA Chairman on October 14, 1976 indicated that Alternatives 1 and 5 should have been dropped. These alternatives incorporate staffing and funding levels which are not realistic in terms of the Congressional mandate (Alternative 1) or our foreign policy and program management interests (Alternative 5). It was also suggested that a bare bones alternative be developed by the Working Group. As such an alternative has not been included in the draft response, OMB is developing such an option with manning and costing estimates for 1978 and 1979. As soon as we have cost estimates for this lower option, we would like to discuss it with you prior to the OMB Director's review.

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Issue Paper  
International Security Assistance  
1978 Budget  
Issue #12: Military Assistance Advisory Groups

Background

Military assistance advisory groups, missions, and other similar security assistance units (commonly referred to as MAAGs) were originally established to assist foreign governments in their military planning, training, and the assimilation of U.S. military equipment into their forces. MAAG organizations have also served as a direct, military-to-military link between U.S. forces stationed in a foreign country and the host government. In foreign countries with military governments, the U.S. MAAG has often provided an important avenue of communication. The primary role of most MAAGs, however, is still related to U.S. military equipment and training.

Much of the military equipment which was originally given to foreign countries under the grant military assistance program (MAP) is now being sold through the foreign military sales (FMS) program either on a cash or a credit basis. This change in our military assistance program from grant to sales has been accompanied by a shift in the role of MAAGs. No longer are MAAGs involved in field-level training and advisory functions or military planning at the unit level. Training for foreign students in U.S. military schools is programmed by the MAAG's training officer. More and more of the FMS business is conducted directly between Washington and the foreign government, and the military advice from MAAGs to host governments often takes the form of high level communications concerning force planning concepts or policy issues.

With the gradual phasing out of the grant MAP program Congress has taken a closer look at MAAGs in terms of both the costs to the United States and the continued U.S. military presence abroad. As a consequence, the Arms Export Control Act of 1976 required elimination of 10 of the then existing 44 MAAGs by September 30, 1976, while allowing assignment of up to three military personnel (Office of Defense Cooperation) to the chief of the diplomatic mission to carry out security assistance functions. All remaining MAAGs are to be eliminated by September 30, 1977, except as specifically authorized by Congress. The new law also requires that administrative expenses of the FMS program incurred by U.S. Government agencies (including MAAGs) primarily for the benefit of a foreign government be reimbursed from the 2% administrative fee charged on every FMS case.

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The new law provides an opportunity to revise the organization, functions, and staffing of our military missions abroad in keeping with the changing nature of our security assistance programs. The NSSM 243 MAAG Requirement Study was initiated by the NSC staff to determine which MAAGs should be retained after FY 1977 and to develop legislative options for FY 1978 and beyond. The study recognizes that security assistance functions could be handled by foreign service officers in countries with the very smallest programs, by the Defense Attache's Office (DAO) in some countries, by the newly established Offices of Defense Cooperation (ODC) in most countries, or by a MAAG-type organization (Defense Field Offices) with reduced staffing and functions in countries where U.S. foreign policy interests necessitate a group of more than three members of the U.S. armed forces.

The Departments of State and Defense and OMB have generally agreed on three aspects of the MAAG issue:

- An increased reliance on temporary teams of experts will be necessary as manpower levels in MAAG-type organizations are reduced.
- The law should be changed to allow DAO's to continue performing security assistance functions in countries where political sensitivities are paramount or manpower savings are being effected.
- Three military missions which were previously MAAGs--Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait--could be designated ODC's with three or fewer U.S. military personnel funded out of the MAP account and the remainder of the U.S. Government personnel funded under FMS cases and separately reported to Congress.

Distinct agency positions have emerged from both the Departments of State and Defense on the number of MAAG-type organizations (Defense Field Offices-DEFOs) to be retained, the manning levels, and the costs. Both Departments have qualified their positions with suggestions that further interagency discussion is necessary. These positions and the OMB and NSC recommendations are outlined in the following chart. Attached are a table showing the MAAGs eliminated under each alternative and a detailed country-by-country table showing costs and manning levels.

#### Statement of Issue

How many military assistance advisory groups, missions, and milgroups and at what military manpower and total funding levels should be authorized for fiscal year 1978 and 1979?

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Alternatives

- #1. Seek authorization for a total of 31 MAAG-type organizations with security assistance staffing levels of 695 U.S. military personnel at an estimated total cost of \$39.0 million in FY 1978 and \$39.0 million in FY 1979. (Defense request)
- #2. Seek authorization for a total of 20 MAAG-type organizations in 1978, 19 in 1979 with security assistance staffing levels of 682 U.S. military personnel in 1978, 663 in 1979, at an estimated total cost of \$38.6 million in FY 1978 and \$37.6 million in FY 1979. (State request)
- #3. Seek authorization for a total of 21 MAAG-type organizations in 1978, 20 in 1979 with security assistance staffing levels of 608 U.S. military personnel in 1978, 586 in 1979, at an estimated total cost of \$34.8 million in FY 1978 and \$33.8 million in 1979. (NSC recommendation)
- #4. Seek authorization for a total of 14 MAAG-type organizations in 1978 and 11 in 1979, with security assistance staffing levels of 461 U.S. military personnel in 1978, 350 in 1979, at an estimated total cost of \$27.9 million in 1978 and \$23.2 million in 1979. (OMB recommendation)

Analysis

	1976/TQ Actual	1977 Budget	1978				1979			
			Alt. #1	Alt. #2	Alt. #3	Alt. #4	Alt. #1	Alt. #2	Alt. #3	Alt. #4
Number of MAAG-type organizations proposed for retention	44	33	31	20	21	14	31	19	20	11
Total Security Assistance manpower required	2,056	1,902	1,090	1,087	1,005	783	1,098	1,063	986	645
(Military Personnel)	(1,455)	(1,296)	(695)	(682)	(608)	(461)	(695)	(663)	(586)	(350)
----- (\$ in millions)										
Cost of Military Assistance Organizations (MAAGs, ODC's DAO Augmentation, etc.)	72.4	56.3	39.0	38.6	34.8	27.9	39.0	37.6	33.8	23.2
Reimbursed from 2% FMS Administrative Fee	--	36.0	29.0	29.0	26.6	21.0	29.0	28.0	25.6	17.0
Net Cost to MAP		20.3	10.0	9.6	8.2	6.9	10.0	9.6	8.2	6.2

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Alternative #1. The Department of Defense believes that 31 MAAG-type organizations should be proposed for FY 1978. Since the three MAAGs dropped (Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait) would not actually be eliminated or reduced in strength but only shifted to host country funding, the Defense proposal is a reduction in number of MAAGs in appearance only. Military manpower is substantially reduced in many cases (46% overall). Fourteen of the 31 MAAG organizations to be retained are the traditional Latin American Military Groups, which are proposed for continuation largely on the basis of historical relationships. To propose that Congress specifically authorize 31 MAAGs would clearly be regarded as unresponsive by Congress, and might provoke them to act arbitrarily.

Agency Request: Alternative #2. The Department of State proposes the retention of 20 MAAG-type organizations in FY 1978, a reduction of over one-third in the present number of MAAGs, 47% in military manpower, and 31% in costs. Based on the importance of our foreign policy interests and the size of existing milgroups and security assistance programs, State proposes retaining only four of the fourteen Latin American Milgroups--Brazil, Argentina, Panama, and Bolivia (where we have an equipment commitment only through FY 1978). All other currently operating MAAGs are proposed for retention, except Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait which are to be retained in fact but converted to host country funding. Although the State proposal would deal with Latin America in a realistic manner, the absence of any real MAAG elimination elsewhere is not in consonance with Congressional intent.

NSC Staff Recommendation. Alternative #3. NSC staff recommends combining the low options in Alternatives #1 and #2 resulting in the retention of 21 MAAG-type organizations in FY 1978, with a 53% reduction in military manpower and 38% in costs. In effect, NSC endorses the State position except in Jordan and in those countries where the Defense Department has recommended lower numbers of military personnel to perform security assistance functions. MAAGs outside of Latin America have not been eliminated.

OMB Recommendation: Alternative #4. OMB recommends the continuation of MAAGs in only those countries where major security assistance programs exist, where U.S. forces are present and a representational function is required for the MAAG, and where major U.S. foreign policy interests would be severely damaged by elimination. Application of these criteria, tempered by a two-year phase-out in some cases, results in a FY 1978 proposal of 14 MAAG organizations, with 11 remaining in FY 1979. This represents a reduction of over 50% in the number of MAAGs and in total costs from the status quo and a military manpower reduction of 64% in FY 1978. We believe this is more appropriate to the changing role of U.S. security assistance as a foreign policy tool and more likely to elicit a favorable response by the Congress.

President's Decision:

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MAAGs ELIMINATED

<u>Year</u>	<u>Alternative #1 (Defense)</u>	<u>Alternative #2 (State)</u>	<u>Alternative #3 (NSC)</u>	<u>Alternative #4 (OMB)</u>
1978	*Iran *Kuwait *Saudi Arabia	*Iran *Kuwait *Saudi Arabia Chile Colombia Dominican Republic El Salvador Guatemala Honduras Nicaragua Peru Venezuela Ecuador	*Iran *Kuwait *Saudi Arabia Chile Colombia Dominican Republic El Salvador Guatemala Honduras Nicaragua Peru Venezuela Ecuador	*Iran *Kuwait *Saudi Arabia Chile Colombia Dominican Republic El Salvador Guatemala Honduras Nicaragua Peru Venezuela Ecuador  Japan Pakistan Tunisia Liberia Philippines Panama
Military Manpower remaining	695	682	608	461
1979	None	Bolivia	Bolivia	Bolivia Ethiopia Taiwan
Military Manpower remaining	695	663	586	350

\*Converted to ODC with balance of personnel funded by host country.



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Military Assistance Advisory Groups - FY 1978

	Military				Total Costs			
	Alt. #1	Alt. #2	Alt. #3	Alt. #4	Alt. #1	Alt. #2	Alt. #3	Alt. #4
Taiwan	15	15	15	15	932.5	932.5	932.5	932.5
Japan	7	7	7	3	630.2	630.2	630.2	265.0
Korea	117	117	117	80	4,990.0	4,990.0	4,990.0	3,695.0
Indonesia	33	33	33	25	1,950.0	1,950.0	1,950.0	1,598.0
Thailand	40	40	40	30	1,959.1	1,959.0	1,959.0	1,489.0
Iran	5	3	3	3	140.0	140.0	140.0	140.0
Kuwait	9	3	3	3	296.2	296.2	296.2	296.2
Morocco	14	17	14	14	822.2	918.0	822.2	822.2
Pakistan	7	8	7	3	470.0	550.0	470.0	230.0
Saudi Arabia	80	3	3	3	186.0	186.0	186.0	186.0
Tunisia	6	6	6	3	342.7	342.7	324.7	210.0
Portugal	12	12	12	12	597.9	597.6	597.6	597.6
Ethiopia	21	46	21	21	1,408.8	2,868.0	1,408.8	1,408.8
Liberia	6	9	6	3	910.4	974.0	910.4	390.0
Zaire	10	10	10	10	772.1	772.1	772.1	772.1
Jordan	10	10	10	10	618.3	618.3	618.3	618.3
Greece	29	29	29	20	1,771.7	1,771.7	1,771.7	1,305.0
Philippines	37	37	37	3	1,955.7	1,955.0	1,955.0	282.0
Spain	18	30	18	18	1,028.8	1,650.0	1,028.8	1,028.8
Turkey	55	85	55	40	3,054.5	4,450.0	3,054.5	2,408.0
Argentina	20	20	20	15	956.3	956.3	956.3	720.0
Bolivia	22	22	22	22	1,184.5	1,184.5	1,184.5	1,184.5
Brazil	38	33	33	28	2,512.6	2,420.0	2,420.0	2,178.0
Chile	12	3	3	3	756.1	223.0	223.0	223.0
Colombia	18	3	3	3	863.2	232.3	232.3	217.0
Dominican Republic	8	3	3	3	418.9	181.0	181.0	181.0
El Salvador	8	3	3	3	463.3	179.0	179.0	179.0
Guatemala	9	3	3	3	519.4	173.0	173.0	173.0
Honduras	8	3	3	3	334.9	185.0	185.0	185.0
Nicaragua	10	3	3	3	401.4	176.0	176.0	176.0
Panama	13	13	13	3	461.8	461.8	461.8	195.0
Peru	7	3	3	3	362.3	212.3	212.3	205.0
Venezuela	19	3	3	3	1,412.9	282.3	282.3	268.0
Belgium	3	3	3	3	191.5	191.5	191.5	191.5
Denmark	3	3	3	3	191.5	191.5	191.5	191.5
France	3	3	3	3	216.5	216.5	216.5	216.5
Netherlands	3	3	3	3	191.5	191.5	191.5	191.5
Norway	3	3	3	3	191.5	191.5	191.5	191.5
India	2	2	2	2	206.5	206.5	206.5	206.5
Costa Rica	2	2	2	2	106.7	106.7	106.7	106.7
Paraguay	3	3	3	3	186.5	186.5	186.5	186.5
Uruguay	3	3	3	3	186.5	186.5	186.5	186.5
Germany	3	3	3	3	306.5	306.5	306.5	306.5
Italy	3	3	3	3	201.5	201.5	201.5	201.5
Yemen	3	2	2	1	191.0	130.0	130.0	75.0
Afghanistan	0 1/	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Australia	3	3	3	3	134.9	166.5	166.5	166.5
Austria	2	2	2	2	98.2	98.2	98.2	98.2
Burma	0	-2/	-	-	0	-	-	-
Ecuador	8	3	3	3	299.5	191.5	191.5	191.5
Egypt	3	0	0	0	196.0	0	0	0
Finland	0	-	-	-	0	-	-	-
Ghana	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Haiti	1	1	1	1	58.3	58.3	58.3	58.3
Israel	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Lebanon	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Malaysia	1	1	1	1	59.2	59.2	59.2	59.2
Mali	0	-	0	0	0	-	-	-
Mexico	1	-	0	1	59.4	-	-	59.4
Nepal	0	-	-	-	0	-	-	-
New Zealand	0	-	-	-	0	-	-	-
Nigeria	1	1	1	1	58.4	110.0	58.4	58.4
Senegal	0	-	-	-	0	-	-	-
Singapore	1	1	1	1	59.7	75.0	59.7	59.7
Sri Lanka	0	-	0	0	0	-	-	-
Sweden	0	-	0	0	0	-	-	-
Switzerland	0	-	0	0	0	-	-	-
United Kingdom	2	2	2	2	76.6	120.6	76.6	120.6
Yugoslavia	0	0	0	0	0	0	-	-
<b>Total</b>	<b>780</b>	<b>682</b>	<b>608</b>	<b>461</b>	<b>38,952.6</b>	<b>33,603.8</b>	<b>34,759.6</b>	<b>27,882.5</b>
<b>Total Security Assistance Personnel (includes military, U.S. civilian, and local civilian personnel)</b>	<b>1,090</b>	<b>1,087</b>	<b>1,005</b>	<b>783</b>				

5801

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

22 ( )

MEMORANDUM FOR: Jeanne W. Davis  
Staff Secretary  
National Security Council

FROM : B. C. Evans  
Executive Secretary

SUBJECT : CIA and Intelligence Community Staff  
Comments on MAAG Requirements Study:  
NSSM 243

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
1. The CIA stands by the original comments it made on NSSM 243 to ISA on 14 October 1976 and by the DCI's letter of 8 June 1976 to Mr. John O. Marsh, Jr., Counsellor to the President, spelling out [redacted] copies of which are attached.

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2. The Intelligence Community Staff has reviewed subject report and concurs that any of the Alternatives 2, 3, or 4 appears generally feasible for adoption. From the national intelligence perspective, Alternative 3 appears most desirable.

3. We also concur in the view that those issues identified in Section IX, paragraph 7, are worthy of further study and resolution, especially "roles of MAAGs, beyond arms transfers." The Intelligence Community, in its program of reviewing and evaluating reporting from overseas missions, has surfaced on several occasions inadequacies in the interaction of MAAGs with other components of diplomatic missions, especially Defense Attache Offices, in providing information on host country armed forces.

4. In the selection of alternatives in the reference study and in the final definition of the mission of the successor security assistance organization, it is recommended that there be:




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a. retention of some security assistance role for Defense Attache Offices in missions abroad; and

b. appropriate guidance in the terms of reference for future MAAG-type organizations, so that they participate effectively in providing overtly acquired military information to the U.S. Mission and to the Intelligence Community.



B. C. Evans

Attachments:  
As stated

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UNITED STATES ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY  
WASHINGTON

OFFICE OF  
THE DIRECTOR


October 21, 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR MRS. JEANNE DAVIS  
STAFF SECRETARY, NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

Subject: NSSM 243

In accord with your request we have reviewed the study on MAAG Requirements prepared in response to NSSM 243.

As stated in paragraph V.c. of the study, the MAAGs have an arms control function. However, that same function could be served by any of the alternatives postulated in the study. Therefore, ACDA does not recommend any particular option over the others, but urges that the present guidance to MAAGs concerning a responsible approach to arms sales be reiterated throughout any new organization that may be established.

  
A. M. Christopher  
Executive Secretary

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PROPOSED MAAG PRESENCE -- FY 1978

	<u>1976/TQ</u> <u>Actual</u>	<u>1977</u> <u>Budget</u>	<u>Defense</u>	<u>State</u>	<u>1978</u> <u>NSC</u>	<u>OMB</u>
Number of MAAG-type Organizations Proposed for Retention	44	34	31	20	21	14
Total Security Assistance Manpower Required	2056	1902	1090	1087	1005	783
Military Personnel	(1455)	(1296)	(695)	(682)	(608)	(461)
Cost of Military Assistance Organizations (millions of \$)	72.4	56.3	39.0	38.6	34.8	27.9



<u>FY 1977</u>	<u>Defense</u>	<u>State</u>	<u>NSC</u>	<u>OMB</u>
Argentina	Argentina	Argentina	Argentina	Argentina
Bolivia	Bolivia	Bolivia	Bolivia	Bolivia
Brazil	Brazil	Brazil	Brazil	Brazil
Chile	Chile	Ethiopia	Ethiopia	Ethiopia
Colombia	Colombia	Greece	Greece	Greece
Dominican Republic	Dominican Republic	Indonesia	Indonesia	Indonesia
Ecuador	Ecuador	Japan	Japan	Korea
El Salvador	El Salvador	Korea	Jordan	Morocco
Ethiopia	Ethiopia	Liberia	Korea	Portugal
Greece	Greece	Morocco	Liberia	Republic of China
Guatemala	Guatemala	Pakistan	Morocco	Spain
Honduras	Honduras	Panama	Pakistan	Thailand
Indonesia	Indonesia	Philippines	Pakistan	Turkey
Iran	Japan	Portugal	Panama	Zaire
Japan	Jordan	Republic of China	Philippines	
Korea	Korea	Spain	Portugal	
Kuwait	Liberia	Thailand	Republic of China	
Liberia	Morocco	Tunisia	Spain	
Morocco	Nicaragua	Turkey	Thailand	
Nicaragua	Pakistan	Zaire	Tunisia	
Pakistan	Panama		Turkey	
Panama	Peru		Zaire	
Peru	Philippines			
Philippines	Portugal			
Portugal	Republic of China			
Republic of China	Spain			
Saudi Arabia	Thailand			
Spain	Tunisia			
Thailand	Turkey			
Tunisia	Venezuela			
Turkey	Zaire			
Venezuela				
Zaire				