



THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

THM:Dfb
CJCS Memo M-44-73
2 May 1973

REFER TO DOE

DOS REVIEWED 16-Jul-2010: NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION

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JCS REVIEWED 14-Jul-2010: NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION

MEMORANDUM FOR DOCTOR KISSINGER

JCS REVIEWED 14-Jul-2010: REFER TO DOS

Subj: SALT

DOE REVIEWED 15-Sep-2010: NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION

- Encl: (1) Approach to SALT Phase II
 (2) Summary of JCS Approach to SALT Phase II
 (3) CJCS Concept and Approach to SALT

Henry,

I was speaking to the Air War College in Montgomery yesterday afternoon and, consequently, did not have an opportunity to review in advance the memorandum forwarded to you by Bill CLEMENTS which states the DOD position on SALT.

As you know, I agree with this general approach. I do have some minor modifications which are set forth in Enclosure (1).

In addition, I am attaching two other papers which I hope will prove useful:

- a. A very brief summary of the guidelines used by the JCS in recommending the preferred approach to SALT II; and
- b. An expansion of the paper I previously submitted to you which represents my own thoughts and which I hope will be useful in your forthcoming visit to Moscow.

Good luck and hurry back!

T. H. MOORER
Admiral, U. S. Navy

P.S. I have included a second copy of the above three papers which you may wish to pass to the President if you consider that it would be helpful.

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MEMORANDUM FOR DOCTOR KISSINGER

Subj: Approach for SALT Phase TWO

1. During the Verification Panel meeting on 30 April, Mr. CLEMENTS and I discussed a sequential four-step proposal which we believe should form the basis of instructions to the US SALT Delegation for the remainder of the second session of SALT Phase TWO.
2. The four-step proposal would be presented as a three-step package to the Soviet side, but the United States would insist that each step would be thoroughly discussed and agreed upon before deliberations were initiated on succeeding steps. Briefly summarized, the four steps are:
 - a. Step 1. Achieve agreement in principle on equal aggregate totals in central systems for each side with a sub-limit on MLBMs. Full freedom-to-mix should be permitted among heavy bombers and launchers for SLBMs, MLBMs, and light ICBMs. Equal sub-limits should be negotiated for the two sides of 313 modern large ballistic missiles.
 - b. Step 2. Indicate that the United States is prepared to enter deliberations that would lead to agreement on phased reductions of central strategic systems over time, with first phase reductions down to about the 2200 level sometime prior to the expiration of the Interim Agreement (1977) before proceeding to subsequent reduction phases. Completion of this step would be followed by negotiations aimed at step-by-step reductions over an agreed period of time.
 - c. Step 3. A two-tiered approach as follows:
 - (1) Indicate to the USSR a willingness on the part of the United States to mutually ban development of air mobile ICBMs and/or long-range ASMs (greater than 1500NM in range) provided that the Soviet side will agree not to MRV/MIRV their MLBMs. MRV/MIRV deployment on light ICBM and sea-based systems would not be constrained.
 - (2) After serious negotiations on the proposal in paragraph 2c(1) above and if agreement cannot be reached, indicate to the USSR a willingness on the part of the United

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
States to halt the MINUTEMAN III MIRV program at the 550 level provided that the Soviet side will agree not to MRV/MIRV their MLBMs and constrain deployment of MRV/MIRVs on light ICBMs at the 550 level. (The light ICBM MIRV constraint is very risky since it cannot be verified with any degree of confidence). MRV/MIRV deployment on sea-based systems would not be constrained.

d. Step 4. Indicate to the USSR, at the appropriate time, that the United States will be prepared to address FBS following satisfactory agreement on Steps 1, 2, and 3. At that time, the US delegation should be authorized to put forth a rebuttal explaining in detail why forward-based systems cannot be negotiated in the SALT context. Until then, the Delegation should be instructed to concentrate on negotiating equal aggregates on central systems and to avoid any discussion of non-central systems.

3. As indicated above, it is imperative that each of these steps be negotiated sequentially. It is preferable that the Soviets agree to reducing down to the 2200 level before proceeding on to Step 3. However, should the Soviets refuse to agree to equal aggregates except at the 2500 level, the United States still has certain options to achieve equality in launchers above the number currently deployed. For example, we could retain the POLARIS submarines and B-52s, take B-52s out of mothballs, and build more B-1s and TRIDENTs. The point is that it is much more important to achieve agreement on equal aggregates of central systems, even at the 2500 level, than it is to accept an agreement which is asymmetrically in favor of the Soviets in numbers of launchers.

4. I believe that the approach outlined above is the maximum initiative that can be taken without undue risk. Further, it:

- a. Reflects the firm US resolve with regard to non-central systems;
- b. Incorporates equal aggregates and will, therefore, protect our standing with third countries, our allies and our adversaries;
- c. Provides for essential equivalence from a military as well as political image point of view;
- d. Maintains our flexibility to structure our forces to adapt to future uncertainties;
- e. Helps maintain a strong US technological base by permitting full freedom to modernize US strategic forces.



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SUMMARY OF JCS APPROACH TO SALT TWO

A. KEY OBJECTIVES

1. Deter Soviets and potential aggressors from initiating nuclear warfare.

-- Soviet NCA, when they look at opposing force, must conclude that any attack cannot succeed.

2. Treaty must appear in the eyes of the public, Congress and Third Parties as not placing the United States in a position of inferiority.

a. Criteria for Permanent Agreement:

(1) Simple, uncomplicated and easily understood;

(2) Flexible, with minimal limitations on application of technology or force modernization;

(3) No complex, unverifiable trade-offs;

(4) Verifiable by national technical means;

(5) Parallel with an active program of safeguards (assurances);

(6) Permit undiminished US capability to meet commitments to its Allies and its alliances.

b. Essential Equivalence -- Guidelines:

(1) Equal aggregates of central strategic systems;

(2) Appropriate provisions for freedom-to-mix;

(3) Capability to adjust forces to cope with changing technology and third-country threats;

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(4) Permit both sides to choose their own approach to design of forces and overall force composition.

B. DISCUSSION

1. The United States should not proposed any arms control measure during negotiations that we would not be willing to accept in a permanent agreement.

2. Arms control agreement must, as a minimum, preserve and enhance security of the United States without regard to political or negotiating implications:

3. Must maintain, in any arms control agreement, the capability to respond to technological advances/surprises.

4. Uncertainty in the mind of the National Command Authority as to his chances of preventing unacceptance damage to his own Country in the event he preempts is a stabilizing factor.

5. In formulating arms control proposals, the United States should not get involved in trading FORCES for MIRV LIMITS.

a. Although we can demonstrate equivalence on paper, we would be far apart in other aspects;

b. Restraint on FORCES is more difficult to offset and recover from than a restraint on MIRV;

(1) Difficult to get funds to deploy.

(2) There is a long period (on the order of five years) in which we could not have the capability to deploy equivalent forces to offset MIRVs.

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(3) Cheating more easily undertaken in framework of MIRV constraints.

6. The United States should not conclude an Arms Control Agreement which permits the other side to achieve or maintain a certain ceiling but does not permit the United States the right to exercise the same option.

7. Must be strong militarily, as well as give the appearance of strength.

a. In nuclear war, the difference between ZERO and FEW nuclear weapons is greater than that between FEW and MANY nuclear weapons.

-- Not a linear relationship.

b. Soviets have a strong political blackmail lever in absence of US strength.

8. It is naïve to expect the Soviets to deny to themselves the advantage of MIRV technology or to dismantle their MLBMs without exacting an unacceptable price from the United States.

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Subj: CJCS Concept and Approach to SALT

Negotiating Essentials. No great power can accept inferiority in an arms control agreement. No great power can be expected to negotiate with another great power in disregard of security requirements arising from its relations with third powers or from treaty commitments. Not only must security arrangements between great powers afford each power equivalence in absolute terms, but the arrangements must appear equal to third states, and thus contribute to--not detract from--international stability. Because the US and USSR are preeminent in military power, this is particularly important in agreements between them.

Negotiating Background. The present nuclear force structure of both countries was shaped by decisions made in the 1960's. The US, on the one hand, exploited technology, developing many, small MIRVs. This was done in the context of an ABM environment--numerous warheads for penetration capability--and in the context of a triad of ICBMs, heavy bombers, and SLBMs. The USSR, on the other hand, initially opted for large-yield warheads and powerful rockets to transport them. Given that strategic parity evolved from these different beginnings, and that there are still major differences in the forces of the two powers, it is not practical to seek an agreement assuming a homogeneous base. This would require disruptive restructuring of force characteristics and force posture. Rather, negotiations for a realistic, permanent treaty--based on equality--must allow for the basic differences from which we proceed--providing for evolutionary changes, not requiring abrupt displacements.

Role of Strategic Forces. The primary purpose of these strategic forces is mutual deterrence from conflict. Deterrence is best preserved by a measure of uncertainty--uncertainty as to the reliability and vulnerability of the other side's forces, the efficiency and survivability of his command and control apparatus, and the will and intentions of the decision-making leadership. If, in the leader's mind, there is a gnawing fear that his preemptive attack will most likely result in an unacceptable damage to his own country, then deterrence is achieved and stability exists. Thus, the role of strategic forces is an interaction of several concepts and conditions: vulnerability and survivability, uncertainty and risk, deterrence and stability.

Vulnerability. Vulnerability is closely related to deterrence and stability. There is an argument to the effect that a vulnerable ICBM force is destabilizing, namely: The temptation to preempt the other's ICBMs keeps both sides in a trigger-happy, launch-on-warning posture. Such an argument would have some merit in the case of nuclear great powers whose strategic offensive forces were wholly vulnerable. But there occurs a fallacy when this logic is applied to the US and USSR. The force structure of both sides is based on a triad of potentially vulnerable,

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moderately vulnerable, and almost invulnerable elements. Vulnerability for any weapon system varies as its status or employment changes. From a defender's viewpoint, even a massive strike against his most vulnerable element could not disarm him; it would probably lead, however, to a catastrophic series of retaliations. Hence, a reasoned counter-argument can be made that in such a situation, the vulnerable or so-called "destabilizing" elements add to--rather than detract from--stability.

Deterrence. Vulnerability is part of the deterrence equation. The more vulnerable one is, the more he is deterred. Both the US and the USSR are acutely aware of the potentially catastrophic consequences involved in an attack, or possibly even the rumor of attack, on the other's ICBMs. The vulnerability thus constitutes a dilemma. Either side might consider launching a "first strike" or "preemptive strike" against the other's ICBMs if they were perceived as vulnerable.* The attacker would logically expend a great majority of his own ICBM force in doing so. This strike would reduce the ICBM component of both sides--through expenditure and destruction--but the less vulnerable forces of both sides would still be available to strike urban-industrial targets. This dilemma is fraught with great uncertainty and risk, and thus both sides are deterred.

Stability. Vulnerability in turn is also a part of the world stability equation. If the strategic forces of both nuclear great powers were wholly vulnerable, then the trigger-happy, unstable situation would exist. Hence, too much vulnerability is destabilizing. On the other hand, if the strategic forces of both great powers were completely invulnerable, then there could arise the danger of overconfidence--à la Maginot. Overconfidence, coupled with ambition, might increase the temptation for, adventurism and opportunism. The threshold for conventional crises could be raised, even unintentionally, to an uncontrollable level. This would be even more serious in those crises involving great power allies or clients--or even neutrals--equipped with nuclear weapons. Too little vulnerability, then, could be destabilizing as well. It appears that something between the two extremes would create more stability. Where there is a moderate risk level and uncertainty in the strategic interface between the great powers, there will be a stronger tendency to give trouble a wide berth.

* The term "first strike" or "preemptive strike" is often misinterpreted. Both the US and USSR have a "first strike" capability, since this is simply a matter of decision. For example, the decision to execute Task Alfa of the SIOP constitutes a "first strike" against Soviet strategic forces. This, in effect, amounts to a "counter-force capability" since such a strike would result in some limitations on the nuclear capability of the USSR. The real issue is whether or not one side develops a "disarming capability"--the means of destroying a large majority of the other's strategic offensive forces.

They cannot in-urge themselves in small-scale confrontations; nor can they countenance third party confrontations within their respective spheres. Therefore, some vulnerability in one element of the triad is not necessarily a bad thing; it is likely to foster more effective overall international stability than in the case where all elements were invulnerable.

The Need for a Viable Treaty. If a SAL treaty is to promote international stability through deterrence it must provide not only for the present, but it must also accommodate to the pressures of future technological progress and changing international relations. These are dynamic phenomena. If the treaty is static, it will be doomed by its own inflexibility. The powers concerned would inevitably find it more convenient to work outside the treaty framework rather than inside, in order to protect their interests. For the present, of course, we must ensure that US military force levels and posture are sufficient to deter, and, in the unhappy event deterrence fails, to terminate hostilities under terms acceptable to the US. For a quarter century, the US enjoyed overwhelming strategic superiority. This advantage was not abused. During the current nuclear parity, both the US and USSR are behaving responsibly and stability continues. But were the Russians to achieve a significant lead, there is no assurance that they would behave with the same restraint practiced by the US when superior. The US cannot permit the USSR to achieve superiority, either within or outside of treaty provisions. The deterrence must be maintained. It is impossible to second-guess how many warheads arriving with certainty on target would be needed to deter the Russians--a hundred, a score, perhaps as few as a dozen. What might deter them in one set of circumstances, at one point in time, might not in others. Whatever that illusive number be, any additional warheads will make little difference. What is needed, then, is a force level substantial enough to convince the USSR that a number unacceptable to them--whatever the time and situation--would surely survive, penetrate, and detonate on target. A SAL treaty must account, first and foremost, for this immediate need. But also, it must be flexible enough to survive the changes we know the future will bring.

Technological Considerations. It would be naive to try to use a SAL treaty to suppress technological progress in armaments; this would be tantamount to disregarding both human nature and the lessons of history. Progress, in any event, will provide the means either to modernize weapons systems openly and within the treaty framework, or the means to circumvent the treaty, leaving it to atrophy. Clandestine development might go undetected in the USSR to the point of a major breakthrough, while weapons development is a virtual open book for all to examine in the US open society--a situation which clearly favors the Soviet Union. So a SAL treaty must permit modernization. Within this context, it would be folly for the US to impose self limits in force improvements. We should not, for example, foreclose accuracy or warhead improvements. Efforts by the USSR in this area, unmatched

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by the US, could provide them with strategic superiority. Once the Russians perceived that they alone could preempt, they would be in a position to dictate their terms--political, economic, and otherwise. In a related area, we should not overly concern ourselves with the Soviet SS-9. Its great throw-weight notwithstanding, the SS-9's most important feature is its fixed-site nature. Evidence suggests the USSR is seriously considering mobile systems. To pay a significant negotiating price in order to limit the SS-9--a missile the USSR could replace with a less vulnerable system--would be shortsighted. On the other hand, we should be very much concerned with making sure we are allowed to have or do anything the Soviet side has or does, whether it be large ICBMs or mobile ICBMs. With advances in technology, the more capable and/or less vulnerable systems of today may become the less capable and/or more vulnerable systems of the out years. For all of these reasons, it is very important that a SAL treaty permit full freedom to mix between elements of the triad. Freedom to mix is an essential feature if we are to maintain the treaty as a living, useful instrument. If the treaty permits modernization and full freedom to mix, chances are much greater that the parties will work and live within the treaty, trying to enhance its value as a stabilizing influence, and not seek extratreaty outlets for technological progress. Such a treaty could provide controlled uncertainty--good for deterrence--as opposed to the lack of control likely to emerge from circumvention and abrogation.

International Considerations. Not only must the treaty consider technological changes, but it must also provide for international changes. We must ensure through the agreement that our international military/political posture is nothing less than equal to that of our adversaries, as seen in clear simple terms by other countries. Failing that, US influence--political, economic, and cultural--would quickly diminish as third world states gravitated toward those they perceived as taking our place. Our declaratory policy must complement this. We would do harm to our image as a great power if we declared openly what we would or would not do under certain conditions. We should not, for example, state or imply that we would never preempt under any conditions. There should always be some room for doubt or uncertainty abroad as to how we might react in a crises. Finally, we must hedge against the advent of other states as potential nuclear adversaries. The Soviet Union is already very worried about China's nuclear capability, and it is only a matter of a few years until China will pose a threat to the US. If Japan, Germany, Israel, or India develop nuclear weapons, there is no guarantee the result would work in our favor. The SAL treaty must not be so restrictive that either the US or the USSR finds itself in extremis with respect to third parties because of bilateral commitments.

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The Need for a Simple Treaty. Those leaders finding themselves with the high responsibility of deciding whether to use or not to use strategic nuclear forces will make such a decision based on broad strategic, tactical and political factors. Under high tension, and the press of time, they will not order an attack based on a detailed technical analysis of the physical characteristics and capabilities of a weapons system in a certain scenario. Thus, it reasonably follows that we should not base such weighty negotiations on a highly sophisticated formula and complex relationships that only the scientific expert thoroughly understands and which are only valid under a preconceived scenario.

Types of Forces to be Included in a Treaty. What we agree to must be simple. Each country has an inventory of significantly capable nuclear delivery vehicles, designed for the requirements as seen by the individual country concerned. In broad terms, the Soviet Union has 2500 delivery vehicles; the US has about 2200. The forthcoming negotiations should seek to reach a common equal aggregate limitation of delivery vehicles which includes ICBMs, SLBMs and bombers, at some level within this 2200-2500 range. Each country also has certain less capable nuclear forces of secondary importance. They are in most cases multi-purpose and dual-capable, impacting only peripherally on the all-important issue of strategic nuclear deterrence. Introduction of secondary systems into the negotiations would cloud the issues and jeopardize chances of success in the matters of primary concern. Moreover, negotiations dealing with secondary systems could lead to unwise restrictions on the freedom of action with respect to third states for both sides. Finally, restrictions on such forces would seem completely unwarranted, in light of the experience of nearly three decades of reasonable world stability, fostered by an apparently effective power balance. Hence, we should not yield to the Soviet pressures to include the secondary systems on the same basis as the primary, central systems.

Conclusion. Keeping the treaty simple would provide flexibility and a capability to deal with a large variety of situations as time goes on. Equivalence of equal aggregates would facilitate justification of the treaty before the Congress and to third countries. Equivalence would ensure a symmetry of rights and options: The USSR must not be permitted to have or do anything with respect to strategic forces that the US would not be permitted to have or do. Freedom to mix would preserve the viability and usefulness of the treaty over time. This approach--equal aggregates and freedom to mix--would be a far easier base from which to effect negotiations leading to reductions in the future.