

TC NK 128123  
5985  
THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

TOP SECRET

December 10, 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

SUBJECT: Key Intelligence Questions for FY 1974

The list of Key Intelligence Questions is a valuable step in identifying the needs of senior policymakers and developing appropriate responses from the intelligence agencies. While the list is quite comprehensive, some additions designed to round out coverage of certain areas are attached to this memorandum.

Considering the complexity of the topics, I urge that continuous coordination be maintained with the NSC Staff as studies are prepared.

MORI/CDF C05141311

  
Henry A. Kissinger

Attachment

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ON-FILE NSC RELEASE INSTRUCTIONS APPLY

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Key Intelligence Questions for FY 1974

General Additions

- What are the risks of nuclear proliferation?
- . What capabilities are possessed by other nations to develop nuclear weapons?
- . By what means -- both overtly and covertly -- could this capability be exercised? What probability is there of detecting such activity?
- . What are the intentions of these nations regarding developing nuclear weapons? What factors internally and externally influence their decisions?

USSR and Eastern Europe

Pl #1 Soviet Political Dynamics

add: How are major defense decisions made in the Soviet Union? What is the impact of major organizational entities and functions on Soviet preparations for and perceptions of issues such as SALT, MBFR, the Middle East and PRC relationships?

In making decisions concerning the Soviet force structure, what constraints restrict the options from which Soviet policy makers may chose? (eg. Technological constraints, Organizational limitations, Doctrinal limits, Political or Bureaucratic restrictions.)

Pl #2 Soviet ICBM Systems

add: What is the role of major industrial and military organizations in Soviet ICBM programs? In what manner may these affect the future evolution of the ICBM force?

What are Soviet capabilities to execute first strike options against PRC strategic forces?

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P2 #4 Soviet Long Range Aviation

add: Why do the Soviets continue to maintain a heavy bomber force?

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P2 #6 Warsaw Pact - NATO Balance

add: What insights can be gained into Soviet doctrine, weapons and tactics in Central Europe based upon experiences in the October 1973 Middle East War?

P3 #7 Soviet Strategic Defensive Systems

add: (Reference third item) Soviet development of laser or other non-missile weapons

What is the affect of mobile air defense systems (eg. SA-6, ZPU-23) on Soviet capability to defend against U.S. heavy bombers?

What is the capability of Soviet ABM systems against PRC strategic systems?

P3 #8 (addition as a key topic) General Assessment of the Soviet View of Detente

Considering present Soviet military, political and economic activity, what are the alternative views of detente that the Soviets may have? What evidence supports this analysis?

How has the Soviet's view of detente, and their intentions toward it, been affected by recent events in the Middle East? By the growing strategic strength of the PRC?

How does detente relate to developments in Soviet Strategic Systems?

The PRC

P5 #5 PRC Nuclear Weapons Program

add: Doctrine for use.

P4 #4 PRC Strategic Offensive Forces

add: Strategic Warning and Command and Control capabilities

Latin America

P6 #2 Cuban Policies and Programs

add: Consideration of Cuban policy directions with particular reference to any changes.

P6 #3 Leadership in Key Countries (add Peru to list of key countries.)

P6 #4 Inter-American Regional Organizations (The present question is not a key one. It might be more useful to look at other organizations, especially the subregional groups such as the Andean Pact. Also, what are the possibilities for effective coordination among the Caribbean states? )

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P6 #5 Capabilities and intentions of Terrorist Groups.

add: The interplay and coordination among Terrorist groups in Uruguay, Argentina, Chile and other nations.

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P6 #7 (Addition as key topic) Chile

- Continuous attention to Chile -- political trends, opposition elements, and relations with neighboring countries.

Southeast Asia

P7 #1 Political and Military Prospects

add: What are the capabilities of NVN to launch and sustain an offensive? Upon what factors do they most depend -- eg. food stuffs, weapons, and ammunition -- and how will these constrain their activities?

What are the factors in NVN and the GVN which affect decisions to execute offensive operations? Which of these can be subjected to influences to deter such action?

To what extent is the Khmer Communist movement in Cambodia under the control of NVN? What evidence supports different interpretations of this relationship? How did the Khmer Communists form and develop in the 1970-71 period?

Near East and Persian Gulf

P8 #3 Stability of Persian Gulf Area

(The Horn of Africa -- Ethiopia and Somalia -- should be considered and integral part of any analysis of the Persian Gulf area.)

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MEMORANDUM

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

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November 29, 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: SECRETARY KISSINGER  
FROM: GEORGE PICKETT  
SUBJECT: The DCI's List of Key Intelligence Questions for FY 1974

The DCI has sent to you and other members of the NSCIC a list of key intelligence questions (KIQ) for comments (Tab B). This is his perception of the "substantive matters . . . of greatest importance to the top level consumers" through June 1974. When replies have been received, he intends to use the KIQ:

- to task intelligence agencies
- to evaluate their responses
- to provide the President an evaluation of the community's performance in responding in the National Intelligence Program Recommendations in late 1974.

The list of questions has mixed value.

- Substantively, the questions are too generalized to constitute specific guidance. However, a more specific list would be too voluminous and would not alleviate the principal problem -- the preparation of significantly improved analyses. The NSC Staff has suggested additions to the list to insure major topics have been identified. Colby's National Intelligence Officers will have to coordinate continuously with the NSC Staff as studies are prepared to insure critical areas are covered.
- Bureaucratically, the KIQ is a technique by Colby:
  - (a) To obtain guidance from the NSCIC.
  - (b) To use that guidance to assert a leadership role over the intelligence agencies by tasking them and evaluating them according to it.

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These are worthwhile objectives. The NSCIC has not issued guidance since its inception two years ago. Considering the demands on policymakers, intelligence should be taking the initiative to ascertain their needs rather than wait passively to be asked. Colby could also be helped in asserting his leadership role as DCI by an NSCIC tasking. However, the KIQ is the easiest step in this process of tailoring products to consumer needs. Colby will encounter his greatest problems later this year when he tries to task the agencies and when he tries to have improved products prepared.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you sign the memorandum at Tab A to Colby which:

- (a) Approves the technique of the KIQ;
- (b) Provides some specific comments on the list;
- (c) Asks him to coordinate continuously with the NSC Staff as studies are prepared.

I have discussed these issues and recommendations with the NSC Staff and with the action officer on Colby's staff. There are no major disagreements with them.

Don Stukel concurs.

Attachments  
Tabs A and B

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THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE TS 205229/73/1

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

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30 October 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: National Security Council  
Intelligence Committee

SUBJECT: Key Intelligence Questions for FY 1974

1. Attached is my list of priority national intelligence subjects and related key intelligence questions for FY 1974. This list represents those substantive matters which I consider to be of greatest importance to the top level consumers of national intelligence.

2. I intend to use this listing, as amended by any comments NSCIC members may make, as a basis for tasking the collection and analytical assets of the intelligence community during the remainder of FY 1974. The results will be used as a major indicator in assessing the performance of the intelligence community during the balance of the fiscal year. It is therefore important that the subjects and questions be truly responsive to the important needs of the NSC. I request, therefore, that NSCIC members, in reviewing this package and forming any comments, base their judgments on their needs as consumers of intelligence.

3. I intend to provide the USIB agencies with specific guidelines as to how the responses to the key intelligence questions will be framed. Each response will have five parts:

First, inclusion of the subject in regular agency collection and analytical work on a priority basis, the results appearing in regular production output;

Second, a brief summation of important community judgments on the topic as contained in recent intelligence publications, with a highlighting of agreements and disagreements and the uncertainties underlying the judgments;

Third, an identification of important collection or analytical gaps;

CLASSIFIED BY <u>DCI</u>
EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION
SCHEDULE OF E. O. 11652, EXEMPTION CATEGORY:
§ 5B(1), <u>(2)</u> , (3) or (4) (circle one or more)
AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED ON
<u>Impossible to Determine</u>
(unless impossible, insert date or event)

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
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Fourth, a proposed collection and analytical strategy to fill the gaps, in specified time frames;

Fifth, a recapitulation and evaluation after FY 1974 of the performance of the community and the individual agencies in responding to these subjects and questions. The conclusions therefrom will be included in the resource allocation and evaluation process at the time of my National Intelligence Program Recommendations to the President in November 1974.

4. It will be obvious that the questions do not encompass the entire spectrum of intelligence needs. Some matters of continuing importance (e.g., strategic warning of hostilities involving the United States) are not included in this listing. These will be reflected in the comprehensive listing of U.S. Foreign Intelligence Priorities in DCID 1/2 currently being considered by the USIB. The purpose of the attachment is rather to identify the subjects on which intelligence inputs are now or shortly will become of highest interest to policy levels of our government. It is an attempt to anticipate the needs of policymakers. The focus is entirely on the world environment during the balance of this fiscal year. Our longer range interests, and the improvement of intelligence capabilities to cope with such, are separate even though related matters.

5. I would appreciate receiving by 22 November comments concerning the key questions and any additions, deletions, or re-wording you consider would improve the listing.



W. E. Colby

Attachment  
TS 205229/73, Cy

Copy to:  
Chmn and Members, NSCIC  
Chmn, PFIAB  
USIB Principals

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KEY INTELLIGENCE QUESTIONS FOR FY 1974

USSR AND EASTERN EUROPE


U.S. collection and analytical efforts against Soviet strategic capabilities must focus on the early phases of Soviet military R&D and on Soviet planning. At issue is the degree of progress the Soviets intend to make within the constraints of the SAL agreements, and whether they intend to comply with them. Soviet perceptions of the U.S. as a strategic competitor will help to shape Soviet decisions in this area.

The challenge to the intelligence community in supporting MBFR negotiations will be more difficult in some ways than it has been for the SAL agreements. Important elements of the Warsaw Pact's capability to fight nuclear and conventional war in Europe are imprecisely known, and changes in force and equipment levels will be difficult to monitor.

On the political level, the intelligence community must concentrate on several aspects of Soviet domestic and foreign policies. For the next year the key intelligence questions will be:

1. Soviet Political Dynamics

- Factions, factors and policy differences in Soviet decision-making circles
- Soviet and Warsaw Pact strategic planning for political, economic and military conflict with the U.S. and Europe
- Soviet strategic planning for and consideration of Sino-Soviet relations



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4. Soviet Long Range Aviation

- Size and intended role of the Backfire force
- Soviet development of a follow-on heavy bomber

5. Soviet Naval Systems

- Soviet plans and progress toward the deployment of a full inventory of DELTA/SS-N-8 submarines, or follow-on SSBN/SLBM system
- Soviet R&D and deployment of cruise/missile systems, particularly follow-on submarine-launched systems
- Soviet R&D and deployment of advanced ASW systems
- Soviet plans for the role of their aircraft carrier and the number and rate of construction

6. Warsaw Pact - NATO Balance

- Evaluation of Warsaw Pact strengths and weaknesses, including an assessment of ground forces' combat effectiveness
- Soviet criteria for establishing adequacy of forces for military and political security
- Soviet views of major East-West military asymmetries and of ways to resolve them

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- Soviet capabilities for rapid deployment of forces from the USSR to Central Europe

**7. Soviet Strategic Defensive Systems**

- Soviet progress in ABM development--attitudes toward or plans for further ABM deployment
- Soviet development of look down/shoot down capability for interceptor aircraft
- Soviet development of laser weapons

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THE PRC

China's intentions depend greatly on the character of the post-Mao leadership. The Chinese may have already achieved an effective nuclear deterrent against the USSR and are working on a missile system which would provide a nuclear capability against the United States. These achievements imply major qualitative changes in China's strategic relationship with the two superpowers and with the Third World. The key intelligence questions concern:

1. Status of Sino-Soviet Relations


- Indications that the Chinese leadership has found Soviet pressure so great as to modify its present policies toward the USSR
- Capabilities of the forces along the border and how they are changing

2. Possible Changes in PRC Policy and/or Political and Military Leadership

- Indications and significance of possible strains among the present PRC leadership
- Identification of the leading candidates to succeed the present leadership, and their foreign policy/economic/military views

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3. Chinese Intentions and Progress Toward Leadership of the Third World



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- The status of production and deployment of the SSBN



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LATIN AMERICA


The improvement of our understanding of Latin American political dynamics and their effect on U.S. interests is of high importance during FY 74. While Communist-sponsored insurgent/terrorist activities continue to be a threat to U.S. interests in some countries, the preponderant force working against U.S. interests in most countries is the emergence of highly nationalistic governments. Because of the highly personal nature of these governments, an in-depth understanding of governmental leaders is of prime importance. Various nationalistic governments will often act in concert in regional organizations and new alignments impacting on U.S. interests are likely to develop. In the coming year the key intelligence questions will be:



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2. Cuban Policies and Programs

- Cuban internal weaknesses
- Cuban subversion in Latin America



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4. Inter-American Regional Organization

- Alignments likely to develop in the OAS over specific issues

5. Capabilities and Intentions of Terrorist Groups

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SOUTHEAST ASIA

The challenge of ongoing insurgencies or the threat of latent insurgent movements is being faced by all Southeast Asia nations. The defeat of local governments, particularly those of South Vietnam, [redacted] could have serious impact upon U.S. interests. In the coming year, the key intelligence questions will concern:

25X6

1. Political and Military Prospects

- Intentions of North Vietnamese or other Communist forces concerning major military action in Indochina during FY 74
- Signs of any significant erosion in the position of the Saigon government
- Foreign policy or internal developments of Southeast Asia countries affecting the short-term and long-term prospects for U.S. military bases in countries like Thailand and the Philippines

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EUROPE AND NATO

The cohesion of the NATO alliance in the face of recent Soviet initiatives for detente in Europe requires fresh examination by the U.S. intelligence community. Prospects for post-Tito Yugoslavia are also of considerable interest. In the coming year the key intelligence questions will concern:

1. Western Europe

- Likelihood of major leadership changes in near term in major countries
- Attitudes of government leaders in key West European countries toward the U.S. leadership role in NATO
- Leadership attitudes toward the organization of and commitment to European defense, including burden sharing, CSCE, MBFR, and the impact of SAL

2. Yugoslavia

- Likelihood of major internal changes in near term
- Trends in foreign policies, especially toward USSR

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**NARCOTICS**

25X6

1. **Narcotics Traffic**

- Identification of the major narcotics producers/traffickers and their principal collaborators; their vulnerabilities to prosecution, exposure and disruption of their networks
- Location of their laboratories and storage facilities
- Methods, routes and timing of the movement of narcotics destined for the United States

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ECONOMICS

A. Economic Developments Affecting U.S. National Security.  
U.S. dependence on other countries' mineral resources, especially petroleum, is rapidly increasing. Incomes of oil-producing states are rising, and their ability to exert pressure on the U.S. and other Western powers by controlling oil supplies is mounting. There is, however, a rising world demand for U.S. grains and oilseeds. Moreover, the Soviet Union is seeking to make up for deficiencies in its economy; in so doing it is engaging in increased economic exchanges with the United States. The key questions related to the foregoing are:

1. The Oil Problem

- Changes which are likely to occur in oil producers' policies or negotiating positions that may affect the output, export, or price of oil
- Prospective major long- or short-term deals being negotiated between the OECD countries, especially France and Japan, with the oil-producing countries
- The degree of involvement of the Soviet Union in Middle East oil matters
- The composition of monetary reserves of the oil-producing countries and movements from one currency to another, particularly the sale of dollars on European currencies markets

2. Soviet Economic Capabilities and Vulnerabilities

- The extent to which the USSR can cover its requirements for grain, oilseeds, and sugar from domestic production in the 1974 crop year
- Soviet needs for imported technology to sustain economic growth and successes in obtaining that technology

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- Size and economic potential of USSR's mineral and petroleum deposits, especially the extent of the "proved" reserves at Tyumen and Yakutsk, and Soviet efforts, if any, to play off Tokyo and Washington re development of their fossil fuels.
- The effect of the USSR's balance-of-payments position on its ability to trade with the West
- Constraints placed on economic policy by military programs

3. Worldwide Crop Prospects

- Information required for making forecasts of output of key food grains, feed grains, and meals--especially wheat, corn, rice, and soybeans

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