


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DPMO, DOS, OSD,
DOE, NSS reviews
completed.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

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July 1, 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT'S FILES

SUBJECT: Meeting Between President, Dr. Kissinger
and General Haig, Thursday, July 1, Oval
Office

At the outset of the meeting a discussion was held with respect to the public statements the U.S. Government would make on the Seven Points tabled by the NLF at Paris that day. The President instructed General Haig to insure that our official position included a reiteration of his determination that no compromise solution would be accepted that would be tantamount to turning over 17 million South Vietnamese to Communist rule.

The President next turned to Dr. Kissinger's proposals for discussion with representatives of the People's Republic of China during his forthcoming side visit to Peking. The President stated that the communique resulting from the visit should not include names and that in his view the President noted that the position which Dr. Kissinger proposed to take was not strong enough, that it was far too forthcoming and that he wished him not to indicate a willingness to abandon much of our support for Taiwan until it was necessary to do so.

The President emphasized that the issue of "one China vs two Chinas" should be mentioned only once in the conversation rather than threaded throughout it as in the present text. He stated that with respect to United Nations representation Dr. Kissinger should specifically ask for the Chinese viewpoint. Concerning the section on Vietnam the President suggested that it be reduced in length and tightened considerably.

The President stated that during the discussions he felt it was important for Dr. Kissinger to emphasize more clearly to the Chinese the threat of Japan's future orientation. He pointed out that Dr. Kissinger should

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state that the Chinese must recognize that a number of nations are concerned about Asia, particularly the role of Japan in the event the United States leaves. In the case of Japan it is obvious that they have both the ability, resources, and know-how to rebuild their military in a precipitous fashion and that a total disengagement of the United States or a misapplication of forces in the area could result in a resurgent Japanese bellicosity with considerable danger for all.

The President stated that he wanted a somewhat heavier emphasis on the Soviet threat. Dr. Kissinger replied that this issue would have to be handled gingerly and that the Chinese might report what was said to the Soviets. The President agreed but stated that the way to handle this was to refer to facts rather than U. S. interpretation of these facts. For example he should tell the Chinese that we note that there are more Soviet divisions on the Chinese border than those arrayed against all of the NATO pact countries. He should refer to this as reports in the press.

The President summarized by stating that in his discussions with the Chinese Dr. Kissinger should build on three fears: (1) fears of what the President might do in the event of continued stalemate in the South Vietnam war; (2) the fear of a resurgent and militaristic Japan; and (3) the fear of the Soviet threat on their flank.

The President stated that prior to a summit certain accomplishments should be arrived at between the two governments. First, the release of all U. S. POWs held in China. Second, at least some token shipments of U. S. grain to Communist China. Third, some progress on the Vietnam war issue. Four, we might conclude, as the outcome of a summit, the establishment of a hotline between the two governments and some kind of agreement on the issue of accidental nuclear war.

Finally the President stated Dr. Kissinger should make it very clear to the Chinese that we expected them to institute a severe limit on political visitors prior to any summit with President Nixon. Following that summit visits of any kind would, of course, be authorized.

The President then returned to the subject of Taiwan and the treatment of it in the discussions with the Chinese. He told Dr. Kissinger to tone down any reference to the fact that Vice President Agnew and Secretary Laird had cancelled their trips. He emphasized that the discussions with the Chinese

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3

cannot look like a sellout of Taiwan. He instructed Dr. Kissinger not to open up with a discussion on what we've done and the fact that we will not need troops there forever, but rather to restructure that point by emphasizing that the Nixon Doctrine provides for help to those nations who help themselves and thus it will not be essential for our military presence to remain in some areas forever. The President stated that the overall statement with respect to Taiwan should be somewhat more enigmatic.

The President asked Dr. Kissinger not to mention the Truman 1950 statement with which he personally did not agree. In sum, the President asked him to review the entire discussion of the Taiwan issue so that we would not appear to be dumping on our friends and so that we would be somewhat more mysterious about our overall willingness to make concessions in this area.

With respect to future meeting places between the two governments, President Nixon stated that he preferred London where communications would be secure and where the size of the city added to the kind of security that would be necessary. He instructed Dr. Kissinger to refer to London as our first choice. Warsaw would be best for diplomatic contacts, but above all, Ottawa would be unacceptable to the President.

Again concerning Taiwan the President made the point that six thousand of our troops in Taiwan were directly related to our conduct of the war in South Vietnam so that as that issue was solved the requirement for these troops would disappear.

The President stated that the section on Korea was exceptionally well done.

The meeting concluded with a further discussion of the press treatment that would be made concerning the NLF Seven Points. All agreed that we should not get into a detailed exposition of the pros and cons of the NLF proposal, but should merely make the point that it has some positive and some clearly unacceptable aspects. Above all, it should not be rejected publicly at this time. We should emphasize, however, that the other side knows precisely how to conduct these negotiations within the established forums and that we would hope that they would pursue further discussions within such framework.

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Put in for hard
on V. Nam
play up our possible move
towards Summit

to West Ottawa

Leave out names on
Don't be so forthright
in Taiwan - unless
V. Nam too long
Put in more
Japan

POLO

V. Nam - Summit
grain or other trade
BOW in China

Summit - Busin Lib -
Shanghai -
Limit contact

Very small delegation -
Limit Press to P.V. &
Wire -
W or print then

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Limit ~~press~~
wire

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Table of Contents

POSITIONS

Scope Paper
Opening Statement
Agenda
Summit
Communiqués
Taiwan
Indochina
Great Power Relations
Communications
Trade and Travel
South Asia
Korea
U.S. Detainees in China
Toasts

POSITIONS

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SCOPE PAPER

Chinese Objectives

In agreeing to a visit by me and to a subsequent summit, the Chinese are expecting to make major political gains. They will anticipate that the PRC's prestige will increase enormously, and in effect China will become unequivocally one of the "big five"; the ROC's international position will erode very considerably; the PRC's chances of getting into the UN this year on its terms (i. e. expulsion of the ROC) will rise; and the Soviets will be presented with a new complexity in their confrontation with the Chinese. There may also be some disarray among U.S. friends and allies in Asia. The fact that the Chinese want to publicize my visit underscores their interest in deriving the maximum possible benefit from it. If my visit is surfaced, they stand to reap some of those benefits by my very presence in China quite apart from whatever happens afterwards.

It is conceivable that the Chinese may be hoping to achieve what could be considered an even more sensational gain in the psychological and ideological sense by demanding in the actual meetings that we end all our defense ^{alliances} ~~troubles~~ and get out of Asia, and spurning any further relationship if we refuse to do so. This would humiliate us and leave the

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- 2 -

Chinese standing firm on "principle" before their own people and before other militant revolutionary groups in the world. It would also put the Chinese in a good position with respect to North Vietnam and North Korea, which have shown signs of unease over "ping pong diplomacy" and the possibility of U.S. -Chinese contacts.

However, a U.S. humiliation would not appear to square with the circumstances under which they have moved toward my visit and a subsequent summit. We have assumed that they are acting in part in response to the Soviet military threat along their borders, and it would not help them to humiliate us if they want to use us in some way as a counterweight to the Soviets. A U.S. withdrawal from Asia (which Chinese propaganda has called for in years past) would not necessarily suit this purpose either, since it would leave areas of vacuum into which the Soviets could move quickly. If the Chinese are now governed more by practical considerations than by militant ideology, as seems to be the case, they might also want us around to exercise restraints on Japan, which is looming increasingly larger in Chinese eyes as a rival and potential threat. In any event, they might reason that it would be impossible for the U.S. to accept an emasculated role in Asia, and that by demanding this they would not only get a rejection but may generate enough resentment on our side to cause us to stand aside if the Soviets chose to attack them.

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- 3 -

It therefore appears likely that the Chinese, quite apart from registering the gains which will accrue to them anyway, have objectives in mind which they believe might be attainable in terms of the practical realities governing their own and U.S. options. These could include:

-- An agreement from us on reducing and eventually eliminating our forces on Taiwan. Taiwan remains an issue at the top of their list of disagreements with the U.S., but while they have spoken lately about the U.S. getting its military forces out of the area of Taiwan and the Taiwan Strait (in fact, they have actually employed the word "eventually" in this connection), they have not chosen to highlight the U.S.-ROC political relationship and might be willing to accept its continuation under present circumstances. (They would anticipate that this relationship would be impaired, though, by any U.S.-PRC agreement regarding U.S. forces.)

-- Our acknowledgement of the importance of China in world affairs, which would underscore their status among the "big five." Their position on this issue was laid out some years ago by Chen Yi, then PRC Foreign Minister, with a statement that "there are no important questions in the world today that can be settled without the participation of the PRC, particularly those affecting the Far East."

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- 4 -

-- Possibly some form of non-aggression treaty or agreement under the rubric of "peaceful coexistence" which could be employed to juxtapose the U.S. more pointedly opposite the USSR in the three-nation power equation which the Chinese seem to be devising. Such a treaty or agreement would also encourage other Asian states to look toward improving their own relations with the PRC and thus heighten Chinese influence.

(At the same time, though, an agreement along these lines while we still maintain our mutual defense treaty with the ROC might help to defuse the Taiwan Strait situation. The Chinese in effect offered us something like this in the early days of the ambassadorial-level talks but we turned it down because of the lack of specificity with respect to Taiwan. Perhaps they were trying to tell us something, and we erred by trying to make them accept something publically which they would have been willing to live with privately provided they were not forced to take a stand.)

-- Above all, affirmation of the foregoing in a summit meeting for which President Nixon will visit Peking. Not only would the President's appearance in Peking constitute spectacular proof of China's having arrived at great power status, it would also gratify the "Middle Kingdom" instincts which the Chinese leaders of today unquestionably share with their predecessors. They will treat the President's visit --

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- 5 -

and for that matter, my own -- as being in the nature of a foreign "imperialist" barbarian bringing tribute from the fringes of world society to those who are truly at the center of the true culture, and derive a great sense of personal, national, and ideological pride thereby. (We must be prepared to accept this in full confidence of our own place in history and national strength.) To gain a summit and all that it entails, the Chinese will probably be prepared to pay a price. In fact, in Imperial times those who brought tribute to Peking were customarily rewarded with gifts which exceeded the original tribute in value.

Another objective which the Chinese would of course like to gain would be a break in U.S. -ROC relations and full endorsement of the PRC as China's sole representative in the UN. However, as indicated above, they may be realistic enough to accept less and accept tacitly a continued U.S. relationship with the ROC for the sake of achieving the other elements on their list.

My Objectives

My purpose in general terms will be to get the point across to the Chinese that we will indeed expect them to pay a price for what they expect to achieve, particularly the summit, and to work out the parameters of the quid pro quo.

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TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

- 6 -

Within this framework, I will want:

-- Indications firm enough to be taken as assurances that the Chinese will use their influence on the North Vietnamese to move them toward a peaceful and acceptable settlement of the Vietnam war.

-- A Sino-U.S. modus vivendi on the Taiwan situation which will permit our relations with Peking to develop while we at the same time retain our diplomatic ties and mutual defense treaty with the ROC.

-- Continuation of Sino-U.S. relations in some format amounting to direct contacts in which matters of mutual interest can be discussed, e.g. arms control, expanded trade and travel, reduction of tensions in East and Southeast Asia, etc. This could include sending a U.S. representative to Peking to work out details of a summit.

-- An appreciation by the Chinese of how they view the Soviet role in world affairs and how this relates to Soviet military capabilities.

In return, I will wish to suggest to them that we will be responsive to their main items of concern and that we will be prepared to go to the summit. My overall strategy is outlined below.

Strategy

To the extent possible, I should let them take the lead in laying out the subjects which they want to discuss. This will give me the

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- 7 -

chance to sense the atmosphere in which they are prepared to operate, and to judge from their tone how far they are prepared to go. They may wish on their own to take the initiative -- in their exchanges of letters with us and in the last two contacts at Warsaw they appeared anxious to set forth their position -- but if they do not do so, I can draw them out by citing the fact that issues do indeed exist between us and asking them for their views on those issues.

Although they may refer first to the desirability of a summit, they almost certainly will bring up Taiwan as the first order of substantive business. This would give me the opportunity to lay out a positive approach to the Taiwan issue which hopefully they will regard as being sufficiently responsive to their desires to allow the discussions to proceed to other matters. (See forthcoming separate paper on Taiwan.) Assuming that their other major objectives are as outlined above, I should be able to deal with them in a similarly positive fashion, for example, giving an affirmative answer on some form of non-aggression agreement. My technique should be to emphasize the areas which I believe we have in common, and to play down the differences, leaving them unstated so long as the Chinese do not press me too hard. Too much on the record may force them into taking difficult stands. And if pressed, my line should be "yes, provided that," rather than "no, unless." Over the years,

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- 8 -

they have grown tired of the latter approach in our dealings with them, and something more upbeat is required. (We grew rather tired of their past hard-line approach, too, but we can afford to overlook this.)

As part of my effort to establish the right climate, I could take the opportunity when it presents itself to assure the Chinese that we accept China as a great power with a legitimate role to play in international and particularly Asia affairs, that we bear them no hostility either as a government or as a people, that we are not concerned with internal systems but rather with the state of our interrelationships on the international scene, and that we believe their contributions are vital to the attainment of world peace. I could cite our unilateral steps on the questions of broadening trade and travel between our countries as evidence of our sincerity. A point to which I might refer as an historian is the uniqueness of China in the world today, in which the government, the people, and the culture are the direct lineal successors of the government, people and culture of 3000 years ago.

Opening Statement

Once a positive and businesslike climate is established, I can address the issue of a summit conference -- not before. I could take the line that we are prepared to go through with a summit, and welcome it, provided that the circumstances are favorable to its being held and to achieving a favorable outcome. Our desideratum for favorable

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- 9 -

circumstances would be that the North Vietnamese are not conducting major military operations against our forces and allied forces in Vietnam; it would be impossible for the President of the U.S. to visit the PRC, which is a close ally of the DRV, if the converse were the case. Moreover, as a follow-on [I] could add that the U.S. military presence in East and Southeast Asia, regarding which the Chinese certainly have an interest, is contingent upon the state of play in the Vietnam war. [I] should infer that helping to wind down the war would suit Chinese interests, and that they should move in this direction. Other issues can be dealt with as appears appropriate. The Chinese will probably want to talk about Japan (see forthcoming separate paper on Japan). [I] I am [] familiar with the subjects of travel and trade.

We cannot of course predict the order in which the Chinese raise any of the points of particular interest to them and to us, but the various elements in [our] strategy can be adjusted to suit their initiatives.

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OPENING STATEMENT

Premier Zhou En-Lai

President Nixon has asked me to convey to you his personal regards.

He looks forward with warm anticipation to meeting with the leaders of the People's Republic of China. He has sent me on this journey to see whether China and the United States, together, can build towards peace in the Pacific and peace in the world.

He has asked that the mission be secret so that we can talk unencumbered by bureaucracy, free of the past and with great latitude

[For me it is a rich experience to be here in your country. As a historian, I have long admired the Chinese culture, traditions and people. As a student of revolution, I respect the dedication and accomplishments of those who lead your nation today.]

I find this meeting a moving occasion, an unprecedented moment in history. This is the first time that American and Chinese leaders are talking on a basis where each country recognizes the other as equal. In our earlier contacts we were a new and developing country in contrast to the long sweep of Chinese history, culture and power. From the middle of the last century to the middle of this one your country has been subject to dominance from foreign powers. Today, after many vicissitudes, achievements and our separate evolutions, we come together again, on a fresh foundation of equality and mutual respect. We are both turning a new page in our histories.

still
We meet today separated by a vast gulf of suspicion. We have had no meaningful contact for most of a generation. Your critical public statements and interpretations of history are, of course, well known to

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us. (You undoubtedly suspect our motives) On our side there ^{have been} ~~are~~ similar
~~suspicions.~~ *expressions*

It serves no purpose to ignore these facts. I do not intend to do so, or to use the conventional language of diplomacy. As Marxists, protestations of good faith will not impress you. As revolutionaries, expressions of friendly sentiments will not charm you. And as Chinese, clever formulations will not fool you. [We have too much respect for you to believe otherwise.]

[During these past decades you endured the tribulations of the Long March. You surmounted what seemed like hopeless obstacles to establish your system. You have steered your country through twenty-two turbulent years. And you have maintained your positions in conflict against major powers.]

During this same period my country has carried global responsibilities flowing from the Second World War. We shed the historic isolationism fed by our ocean-bound geography. Faced with the vacuums of the post-war world, we ventured forth with characteristic, perhaps excessive exuberance into international affairs, shouldering broad tasks of security and development. We have placed men on the moon. And we have grappled with our own domestic problems, both those spawned by industrial progress and those that are the legacy of our mixed heritage.]

For 2 decades,
Thus China and America have pursued their separate paths, so diverse and hardly touching. Yet here we are today, brought together by global trends. [Clearly we will find the guarantee of each other's actions not

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-3-

in words, but in events; not in honeyed declarations but in the objective situation we jointly confront.] Reality has brought us together. Reality will shape our future.

[How then do we seize this moment? How can we take advantage of the first authoritative encounter between our two governments to begin to cooperate across the historical gulf?

This is a rare moment in history - a time when two peoples and nations can come together with all possibilities lying open before them. ^{for their mutual benefit with the benefit of mankind} For we meet as men with high authority, insulated from outside glare. [Unencumbered by formal diplomatic discourse and free from the consciousness and pressures of other countries, the Prime Minister and I can speak with complete frankness.] And we meet as representatives of countries whose very separation in the past gives us as clean a slate for the future as ever happens in relations among peoples.

Perhaps never again -- as never before -- will American and Chinese officials have the same opportunities that we have today.

[This is why we have emphasized our desire that these initial talks be secret. For we have here the chance to set in motion a new evolution.]

Let me briefly state our general approach towards you.

We acknowledge that China, because of its achievements, size, tradition and strength, must participate on the basis of equality in all matters affecting the peace of Asia and the peace of the world. It is in our national interest, and the world's interest, that you play your appropriate role in shaping international arrangements that affect you. For only then will you have a stake in them, and only then will they last.

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-4-

This reflects the general philosophy of President Nixon's foreign policy which is designed to take account of new realities. [Indeed, international affairs are undergoing fundamental change. The basic world conditions that shaped our foreign policy -- and that of other countries -- since World War II have been transformed. We are moving to reflect these new realities.]

The United States emerged from the Second World War in a unique position. Shielded by the oceans from the fields of conflict, we alone among the major powers were relatively unscathed. Our enemies lay prostrate, our allies ^{well} severely weakened by the ravages of war. Only the U.S. had the strength and the resources to help others rebuild shattered economies and to shore them up against pressures towards hegemony, some of which you as well have come to know.

We thus moved away from a long history of self-containment and plunged with zeal and idealism into worldwide responsibilities. We provided the bulk of both the plans and the resources for security and development around the globe. Our military strength was overwhelming. And we perceived our potential adversaries as a monolithic bloc with central direction.

[We were not setting out to establish our own hegemonies but rather to deal with the objective realities of the post-war world. You no doubt have fundamentally different interpretations of our motives during those post-war years. But events have proved that the issues were more complex, the threats more real than may have been realized -- a fact which perhaps you, too, can now appreciate.]

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Today, two and a half decades after the war there are new realities. Other countries have gained strength and self-confidence. The economic power of the war's defeated has shown immense growth, posing fresh political and in time perhaps even security implications for their neighbors and others. Scores of new nations have been born, are struggling with their economic and social problems, and are acting with proud autonomy upon the world stage. As the military potential of other nuclear countries has developed, they have been free to shift their conventional forces to other theaters. The time has long passed when one nation could purport to speak for all Communist countries. And among the American people there is a growing belief that others should do more to shape their own destinies.

These new patterns have both changed the nature of the problems we faced twenty years ago and produced a fresh community of interests with you as well as others. As new centers of power have emerged, we are no longer the only ones concerned about the possible ambitions of other countries. ~~And as~~ nations have become increasingly autonomous, we can deal with them more easily on the basis of mutual responsibility and mutual interest.

[In the light of these changed conditions, President Nixon has set out to fashion a new American approach. The ^{Growing} strength of others allow us to reduce our role and others to enlarge their scope. ^{self-confidence}] And the diversity of communist voices means that we will deal with individual communist nations, whether in Eastern Europe or Eastern Asia, on the basis of concrete issues and a willingness to improve relations.

It would be a profound miscalculation, however, to believe that America will cease playing a major international role. We are prepared to take new realities into account, but the President has shown that he is willing to take very painful decisions in order to defend our interests. We will continue to be engaged when events threaten our security. And our traditional concern ~~for others~~ ^{to ease suffering & contribute to progress} will continue to propel us into development assistance. The abundance of our resources and the scope of our technology inevitably ^{will continue to} ~~have~~ a crucial impact on the world. This is not a matter of ~~pure~~ unilateral decision. Indeed it is not really decisions at all but ^{a fact of life & what is not in our interest alone} ~~realities.~~ ^{And anyone dealing with us must recognize these realities.}

For us to remove our presence unrealistically would unleash unpredictable and dangerous currents in the world. [This prospect is particularly acute in Asia where there is now a new constellation of forces.] Indiscriminate American withdrawal [from this region] would create temptations for others that you would not welcome any more than we.

[Thus while we adjust our role, we shall see to it that we do not create new vacuums. We shall strike a new balance in our responsibilities and negotiate concretely to remove causes of tensions -- seeking fresh opportunities for a more peaceful Asia and a more peaceful world.]

I have described our perspectives on the international scene and our place in it in order to sketch the realities of the world picture as we see it and to suggest that these realities could foster closer relations between China and the United States. We believe that for America to maintain a responsible global posture can serve your interests and that our joint task is to harmonize our policies wherever we can.

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You, of course, have your own views on the world which will guide your policies. It appears to us that ^{AN IMPROVEMENT OF RELATIONS} cooperation between us would serve mutual aims. Your concerns about being surrounded in a hostile world can be eased by better relations with us. And our policy will be less rigid if we need not view you as a permanent enemy.

We realize, ^{of course} in any event, that there are deep ideological differences between us. Our views on each other's systems are very plain. There is no sense in pretending that these differences do not exist. ~~Indeed we can only make progress if we acknowledge them and work within a framework of mutual respect.~~

You are dedicated to the belief that your concepts will prevail. We have our own convictions about the future.

The essential question for our relations is whether both countries are willing to let history judge which vision is correct while in the interval seeking to cooperate on matters of common concern, ^{on the basis of mutual respect + equality + for the benefit of all mankind}

(It is to this end that President Nixon, since the beginning of his Administration, has directed a series of steps designed to reestablish contact. We do not believe that such steps ^{of themselves} will resolve the differences between us. Nevertheless we have considered them important as concrete indications of our willingness to deal with you on a practical basis. ^{p 10}

Let me, then, make a few ^{more} practical observations about our relations which I will be prepared to expand as our talks proceed. We are aware ^{because it will not be the same} that your concerns ^{all} include ^{about} great power relations, such as the Soviet Union and Japan. Let me say now, that we will not collude with other countries against you. Of course, I recognize that you may believe that the ^{either allies or opponents}

public statement

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

-8-

objective consequences of our acts will bring about collusion, no matter what we say. But we will consciously strive to avoid this.

Kit ~~Our attitude is not based on generosity or good nature but rather~~
~~hardheaded practicality.~~ [The most short-sighted policy is that which constantly seeks petty tactical advantages at the expense of others. Moreover,] confronted by a number of potential opponents, we see no sense in turning against the one with which we have the least conflicting interests. Indeed, given our analysis of the long-term evolution] we prefer a strong and developing China. It poses no threat to any essential U.S. interest. It is no accident that our two countries have such a long history of friendship.

To make my thoughts concrete, President Nixon has authorized me to tell you that the United States will not take major steps which affect your interests without discussing them with you and taking account of your views. I hope while I am here to arrange for a channel which will enable us to communicate directly and secretly. I am prepared to set up communications comparable to those that link us to other major centers of decision.

5- Pinner
unfulfilled *Today* I am ready to explain our intentions in the Strategic Arms *2 PM*
 Limitation Talks and other arms control issues if you wish. I would welcome your thoughts on the recent Soviet proposal for a five power conference on nuclear weapons -- as I told you in advance of this meeting, we have delayed our official response so that we could hear your position. We are prepared to initiate with you immediately talks designed to reduce the danger of accidental war and to fix the responsibility for those not accidental. We are also prepared, if you should wish, to return to an

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idea first advanced by you, Mr. Prime Minister, on Oct 27, 1955,
renouncing the use of force in the relations between our countries.

In short, the President has sent me here to begin a realistic dialogue.
Let me review for you a few principles which will govern our dealings with
your country. to P 11

First, in discussing these matters I will be absolutely candid with you. I want to ensure that
even if we disagree it will be in full knowledge of one another's views.
Therefore I will try to explain exactly our intentions. I believe that we
must tell one another with complete openness and directness how we analyze
situations, what we see as our objectives, and what we intend to do. Our
views will certainly differ on many issues, but each country will at least
understand why the other is acting as it is. Since I am not sure what is
on your mind, I hope you will feel free to ask me questions about our
policies. We will only be able to overcome years of isolation and suspicion
if we speak plainly and to the point.

Second, you can rely on what I tell you. Speaking on behalf of the
President, any commitment I make will be carried out.

Third, we need a continuing direct channel between you and the White
House. This channel should not be vulnerable to developments in a third
country, but rather under the control of our two nations. As I will explain
later, completely confidential communications would allow us to define for
each other our basic principles, agree on general courses of action, and
set the stage for implementation in other forums.

Fourth, we are prepared to discuss with you any issues that concern
you as a great power, whether or not they are of a primarily bilateral
nature. We will take into account your viewpoint on all such questions
and give you frank explanations of our actions.]

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Premier
Mr. Prime Minister, I see two principal purposes for our meetings today and tomorrow. First, *to make the visit the success we want it to be* we can lay the groundwork for a more constructive relationship between our countries by discussing major issues which affect our bilateral relations, our mutual concerns in Asia, and our positions as nations with global interests. Among the topics I believe we should cover are:

- ① Taiwan, which we know is your principal concern in your relations with us. *solidify your, Mr. Premier, have defended*
- ② -- Indochina, currently the major area of conflict and tension in Asia. *ASIA removal of US Armed forces from Taiwan + the Taiwan Strait*
- ③ -- Major power relations, such as with the USSR and Japan, which, of course, will centrally affect the future development of Asia and the world. *I am prepared to*
- ④ -- The explosive situation in the South Asian subcontinent, which involves many outside countries. *less your views + I discuss the matter privately*
- ⑤ -- Arms control issues, both multilateral and bilateral. *← 49*
- Korea, another problem directly affecting several nations.
- ⑥ -- Various bilateral issues, such as communications between our two countries, trade and travel. *especially a demand not articulable & explicit, in 3rd + completely under the control of one 2 nations*
- Any other topics which you may wish to raise.

Secondly, we should work out satisfactory understandings concerning a visit to China by President Nixon. *a visit which he intends to make to which he looks forward* I am ready to treat all questions *such a meeting* relating to a ~~summit~~, including its nature, time, and other details; the

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the subjects to be discussed: the possible outcome
after my return to the US
material
← P 9-9

manner in which the meeting should be prepared; and the possibility of a public announcement ~~this summer.~~

Mr. Premier

Both our countries face a challenging task as we move to formalize these initial contacts. Our actions must take account of third powers with whom we have delicate relations -- it is in neither of our interests to inflame such relations. And our actions must reflect our basic tenets -- we can neither play a responsible world role nor build a lasting bilateral relationship if we abandon essential principles.

Premier
Mr. ~~Prime Minister~~, I look forward to our conversations with ~~keen~~ anticipation and ~~an~~ *been* awareness of the responsibilities we share. Many visitors have come to this beautiful and, to us, mysterious land. All have departed with new perspectives. A few have left behind some modest contributions.

I come to you with an open mind and an open heart. And when I leave, perhaps we shall have sown the seeds from which will grow peace *between our countries* in this region, peace on this planet.

peace

Thank you, ~~Mr. Prime Minister.~~
Premier Hon. En - Lin

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AGENDA FOR MEETING

Opening Statements - outline general approach, philosophy, and major items to be discussed

(I will suggest that each side make its opening statement without engaging in rebuttals and then adjourn. This would give us a feel for their approach before we get into specific issues. After reflecting on the respective statements, we would meet again and discuss in detail the major issues, probably consisting of those listed below.)

Summit Meeting - various modalities of summit including possible announcement after preliminary meeting (scenario and draft communique), sending of Bruce, and general nature of summit (date, duration, places, agenda, logistics)

Taiwan - the status of the island, our position, reduction of U.S. forces, and UN representation

Indo-China - the present situation, direction of U.S. policy, our responsibilities as a great power, Chinese interests in a responsible outcome and the need for constructive Chinese influence

Great Power Relations - general philosophy, Japan, the Soviet Union, our willingness to discuss issues that concern China (e.g., SALT, MBFR), and our request for their views

on the Soviet Union's five-power conference on
nuclear weapons

Arms Control - general approach, issues of common concern,
possible areas for bilateral exploration

Communications - secure channels for the future without third
country involvement, diplomatic contacts, hot line

Other Bilateral Issues - trade, travel, Americans held in China, etc.

Other topics - Korea, South Asia, etc.

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SUMMIT

Background Considerations

Both sides clearly want a summit meeting, with the Chinese perhaps wanting one more than us.

For them it carries great prestige; stamps them as a great power; enhances their world/Asian position and thus aids their current flexible diplomacy; unnerves the Russians; stirs the Japanese domestic scene; strains US-GRC relations; and erodes the GRC's international position both in capitals and the UN. They have shown a willingness for high level meetings and in particular a US envoy to Peking since early in the Nixon Administration -- both in the Warsaw talks and consistently in the private exchanges between us. There clearly is a symbolic, psychological, political appeal in the American President's going to Peking to pay tribute to the Middle Kingdom.

The principal risks for China concern its ideological position and its relations with its allies. After years of strident anti-Americanism at home and abroad, it is somewhat anomalous to welcome an American President in Peking. For both the Chinese people and Chinese friends this takes some squaring with revolutionary, anti-imperialist fervor. China's allies, especially Hanoi and Pyongyang, will need some handholding.

For the US the advantages and disadvantages of a summit are more closely balanced. It would be an historic move -- breaking a long frozen mold; reestablishing connection with a great country, people, and culture; cutting through careful diplomatic stages to a bold personal encounter at the top; setting fully in play new great power currents; in short a spectacular step toward an era of peace. If carefully handled it should have beneficial

*Agenda
Nature
Who talks to whom
Outcome
Kind of summit.*

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-2-

impact on the Soviet Union. It could help move Hanoi and her Indochina friends toward a settlement or to abide by any one that might be reached.

There are some inevitable costs. Our relations with the GRC will be severely strained. Other allies, seeing the President travel to Peking and talking with Chinese leaders, could be excused for downgrading the Chinese threat or moving quickly to make accommodations with Peking -- this is not necessarily bad but could be premature and get out of hand. If we don't manage things properly our relations with the Soviet Union could suffer -- and we have much bigger fish to fry with them than with the Chinese for the 1970's at least.

A minor problem is the accusation that the summit can hardly be meticulously prepared and is primarily a propaganda stunt -- but this charge can be deflected by careful spadework between now and the trip; some concrete results; and the argument that we need to cut boldly through long standing communication barriers.

The very knowledge of Kissinger's trip and conversations will produce some of the above effects even without a summit.

Our Approach

We should use the Chinese desire for a summit to construct a framework for the meeting that will serve our objectives -- improving relations, relaxing tensions in Asia, getting the Chinese to influence Hanoi on an Indochina settlement, having a balanced impact on the Soviet Union, and minimizing the adverse impact on the GRC and our other allies. Our general posture should be one of appreciation for the Chinese invitation

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-3-

coupled with the firm view that the summit must be approached not as an end in itself but as a means to improve relations and contribute to Asian and world peace.

Since the Chinese are the hosts for this meeting and the contemplated Presidential visit, I should first hear what Chou has to say concerning the Chinese perspectives on the summit. He will presumably raise the subject, but if he does not offer any clarifications, I could invite them along the following lines:

"President Nixon appreciates the kind invitation of your government to visit China. He believes that such a visit and the opportunity to exchange views first hand with the leaders of the People's Republic of China should serve to improve relations between our two countries. He would also derive great personal pleasure from seeing a country whose people and culture he has long admired.

In sending me on this mission he has authorized me to reach agreement with you on the basic principles and circumstances concerning his trip. I would welcome hearing your government's views on the nature of President Nixon's visit."

In the ensuing discussion there are three basic principles I should seek to establish:

- (1) That the summit agenda consist of issues of concern to both sides -- i.e. including, but not limited to, Taiwan.
- (2) That the summit should be carefully prepared so that substantive results, and not just atmospheric, flow from the meeting.
- (3) That there cannot be major conflict in Indochina while the President is preparing for, and carrying out, his visit to China.

There must in addition be progress toward a settlement of the Vietnam

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-4-

war, and on the release of American POW's.

(4) That pre-summit atmospherics must be kept under restraint. Obviously the degree of rhetoric which each side uses against the other will have a bearing on the summit outcome, or whether it can usefully be held at all. On the Chinese side, there should be an avoidance of issuing invitations to visit China to prominent U. S. politicians, regardless of whether they are Republicans or Democrats. Principle (1) (Agenda) should not be a major problem. The Chinese will, of course, emphasize Taiwan as the key issue, as indeed they have constantly done publicly, at Warsaw, and in private exchanges. But they have been willing to discuss other issues at Warsaw and have agreed in their late May note to us that at the summit each side is free to raise its issue of principal concern (they used the singular probably because we did so, inadvertently). Also the very fact that our communications have progressed as far as they have without solution of the Taiwan problem is de facto agreement by Peking to cover a range of issues. In any private agreement or public announcement of a summit, we can expect the Chinese to highlight Taiwan to the maximum extent and in language which presumes our moving toward their demands.

Following are some of the subjects which we could suggest for a summit agenda, as well as beginning to explore them in this preliminary meeting:

- Asia in general
- Indochina
- Arms Control

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TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

-5-

- Trade
- Travel
- Cultural Exchanges
- Ongoing means of communication between our two countries

Another specific issue is the four Americans still held prisoner in China, but we should try to get Chinese action on this prior to a summit, as a response to our various gestures and a mood-setting for the President's visit, rather than having to bargain for it now or at the summit itself.

Principle (2) (Preparations) involves our suggestion of sending Ambassador Bruce or some other high level envoy to Peking in the autumn to do spadework. This serves two purposes for us: (a) to make sure that a good foundation is in fact laid for a productive summit and (b) to stretch out the time until a summit, so that it occurs after other events we have in mind and gives us a longer period during which China (and her allies) have to mind their behavior.

The Chinese might push for an earlier summit since they probably see it as a relatively unalloyed plus for their purposes. Their notes to us have suggested that the President could come to Peking with minimum preparations (it was we who suggested the Kissinger advance trip) and stated that arrangements could be handled through President Yahya since they had no substantive significance.

Thus we may have to build a good case for delay of the summit until next spring and an advance mission by a Presidential envoy. Our goal in this meeting should be agreement that our two countries, shortly after

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Kissinger's return to Washington, would make an announcement along the lines of one of the communiques (attached separately).

Principle (3) (Indochina) means we want China to influence Hanoi and its friends toward a negotiated settlement and abiding by whatever agreements are reached. In addition, there must be a favorable resolution of the POW issue. This Indochina-summit link is probably better handled in the context of discussions on Indochina (see separate paper) rather than in conversation on the summit per se.

Principle (4) (Pre-Summit Restraint) requires something of a Chinese moratorium on anti-US propaganda, and avoidance of arranging visits to China by prominent US politicians of either party (this would certainly detract from the impact of the summit itself). We will try to avoid actions which would be likely to generate a Chinese reaction.

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MODALITIES OF A SUMMIT CONFERENCE

Prior Preparations

There should be agreement on the sending of a US delegation to Peking to work out with PRC representatives all of the pertinent details of a summit conference. This agreement should be formalized by means of signatures of US and PRC representatives in a place such as Warsaw or London on a document in the nature of an Agreed Minute (Tab A), which would set forth in an annex the provisions under which the US delegation would be sent and received (Tab B). Once in Peking the delegation would want to address the following subjects in connection with the summit:

1. Duration of the Summit

In general, the meeting should be businesslike, and as brief as possible commensurate with the need to cover all items on the agenda. Five days should be sufficient, and allow adequate time for formal receptions, dinners, lunches, and some local sightseeing. Additional time might strain the reception facilities, and give an unwarranted impression of difficulties in the negotiations.

2. Timing of the Summit

The timing should not be unrelated to other matters of international importance such as relations with the USSR. In addition, from the US standpoint it would be most desirable to meet following the UN vote on Chinese representation, so that the voting would not be colored by the meeting. This would suggest the early spring of 1972, possibly April.

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-2-

Adjustments might be made to meet special PRC requirements, however.

3. Location of the Summit

Presumably, Peking will be the site of the summit.

4. Agenda

The agenda items should be those on which agreement can be quickly reached, and our respective positions might thus be worked out beforehand so that few if any substantive issues would remain to be settled. We would be prepared to deal with issues of importance to the Chinese, namely Taiwan, and we would expect that they would be willing in turn to deal with ours, e.g., maintaining the peace in East and Southeast Asia.

5. Status of the US Delegation

If the meeting is held in Peking, we would want full diplomatic immunity and secure communications. The provisions of the Annex to the Agreed Minute cited above would serve as a basis for our position. (We would of course offer the same provisions to the Chinese if Washington becomes the site.)

6. Size of the US Delegation

Our delegation should be kept small. We would need to know something in advance of the housing and other housekeeping facilities which the Chinese have available so as to be able to determine what its actual size should be.

7. Press

Very few newsmen should accompany our delegation, and we would select who from the US press would be included. Arrangements for extra

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TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

-3-

communications, press briefings, TV and radio hookups, etc., would be required. (We would of course not be able to control news coverage from the Chinese side but could suggest a small number of press people similar to our own.)

8. Security

Advance consultations between U. S. and PRC security officials would be required. Ideally, our advance delegation should include a security representative.

9. Joint Communique

Presumably the Chinese would want to issue a joint communique following the summit. We would have no objection to this, but would wish to bring a draft of what we would desire in it to lay alongside what the Chinese would want.

10. Follow-up Travel

Again assuming the summit is held in Peking, some additional sightseeing after the meeting might be desirable. We would want to limit such travel to one other Chinese city such as Shanghai.

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A

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AGREED MINUTE

The United States of America and the People's Republic of China, recognizing the importance of according the delegation to be sent on _____ by the United States of America to the People's Republic of China the privileges and immunities necessary to ensure the efficient performance of the functions of this delegation;

Agree that the delegation shall be sent and received in accordance with the arrangements set forth in the Annex to this Agreed Minute.

For the
United State of America:

For the
People's Republic of China

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B

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ANNEX

1. The delegation of the United States of America which will be sent to the Peoples Republic of China for discussions on matters of mutual interest shall be sent and received in accordance with the following provisions:
2. Subject to the provisions of paragraphs 3, 4, and 5, the USG may freely appoint the members of the delegation after having given to the PRC all necessary information concerning the size and composition of the delegation and in particular the names and designations of the persons it intends to appoint. The PRC may decline to accept a delegation of a size that is not considered by it to be reasonable, having regard to circumstances and conditions in the PRC and to the needs of the delegation. It may also, without giving reasons, decline to accept any person as a member of the delegation.
3. All members of the delegation shall be nationals of the United States.

SECRET/NODIS

SECRET/NODIS

- 2 -

4. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC or such other organ as may be agreed, shall be notified, in advance of:

(a) the composition of the delegation and any subsequent changes therein; and

(b) the arrival and final departure of members of the delegation and the termination of their functions with the mission.

5. The PRC may, at any time and without having to explain its decision, notify the USG that any member of the delegation is persona non grata. In any such case, the USG shall recall the person concerned and the PRC shall facilitate his immediate departure. A person may be declared non grata before arriving in the territory of the PRC.

6(a) The head of the delegation is authorized to act on behalf of the delegation and to address communications to the PRC. The PRC shall address communications concerning the delegation to the head of the delegation.

SECRET/NODIS

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- 3 -

(b) However, a member of the delegation may be authorized by the USG or by the head of the delegation either to substitute for the head of the delegation or to perform particular acts on behalf of the mission.

7. All official business with the PRC entrusted to the delegation by the USG shall be conducted with or through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs or with such other organ of the PRC as may be agreed.

8. The delegation shall carry out its functions in Peking or at such other location as may be agreed.

9. The delegation shall have the right to use the flag and emblem of the United States on the premises occupied by the delegation, and on its means of transport when used on official business.

10. The PRC, at the request of the delegation, shall accord to the delegation the facilities required for the performance of its functions.

11. The PRC shall assist the delegation, if it so requests, in procuring the necessary premises and obtaining suitable accommodation for its members.

SECRET/NODIS

SECRET/NODIS

- 4 -

12 (a) The premises where the delegation is established shall be inviolable. The agents of the PRC may not enter the said premises, except with the consent of the head of the delegation. Such consent may be assumed in case of fire or other disaster that seriously endangers public safety, and only in the event that it has not been possible to obtain the express consent of the head of the delegation.

(b) The PRC is under a special duty to take all appropriate steps to protect the premises of the delegation against any intrusion or damage and to prevent any disturbance of the peace of the delegation or impairment of its dignity.

(c) The premises of the delegation, their furnishings, other property used in the operation of the delegation and its means of transport shall be immune from search, requisition, attachment or execution.

13. The archives and documents of the delegation shall be inviolable at all times and wherever they may be. They should, when necessary, bear visible external marks of identification.

14. Subject to its laws and regulations concerning zones, entry into which is prohibited or regulated for reasons of national security, the PRC shall ensure to all members of the

SECRET/NODIS

SECRET/NODIS

- 5 -

delegation such freedom of movement and travel in its territory as is necessary for the performance of the functions of the delegation.

15(a) The PRC shall assure free communication on the part of the delegation for all official purposes.

In communicating with the USG, its diplomatic missions and its consular posts or with sections of the same delegation, wherever situated, the delegation may employ all appropriate means, including couriers and messages in code or cipher.

(b) The official correspondence of the delegation shall be inviolable. Official correspondence means all correspondence relating to the delegation and its functions.

(c) The bag of the delegation shall not be opened or detained.

(d) The packages constituting the bag of the delegation must bear visible external marks of their character and may contain only documents or articles intended for the official use of the delegation.

(e) Each courier of the delegation, who shall be provided with an official document indicating his status and

SECRET/NODIS

SECRET/NODIS

- 6 -

the number of packages constituting the bag, shall be protected by the PRC in the performance of his functions. He shall enjoy personal inviolability and shall not be liable to any form of arrest or detention.

16. The persons of the members of the delegation shall be inviolable. They shall not be liable to any form of arrest or detention. The PRC shall treat them with due respect and shall take all appropriate steps to prevent any attack on their persons, freedom or dignity.

17(a). The private accommodation of the members of the delegation shall enjoy the same inviolability and protection as the premises of the delegation.

(b) Their papers, their correspondence, and their property shall likewise enjoy inviolability.

18(a). The members of the delegation shall enjoy immunity from the criminal jurisdiction of the PRC.

(b) They shall also enjoy immunity from the civil and administrative jurisdiction of the PRC.

(c) The members of the delegation are not obliged to give evidence as witnesses.

SECRET/NODIS

SECRET/NODIS

- 7 -

19. The members of the delegation shall be exempt from all dues and taxes, personal or real, national, regional or municipal, except:

(a) indirect taxes of a kind which are normally incorporated in the price of goods or services;

~~(b) charges levied for specific services rendered.~~

20(a). Within the limits of such laws and regulations as it may adopt, the PRC shall permit entry of, and grant exemption from, all ~~||~~ customs duties, taxes, and related charges other than charges for storage, cartage and similar services on:

(1) articles for the official use of the delegation;

(2) articles for the personal use of the members of the delegation.

(b) The personal baggage of the members of the delegation shall be exempt from inspection, unless there are serious grounds for presuming that it contains articles not covered by the exemptions mentioned in sub-paragraph (a) of this paragraph, or articles the import or export of which is prohibited by the law or controlled by the quarantine

SECRET/NODIS

SECRET/NODIS

- 8 -

regulations of the PRC. In such cases, inspection shall be conducted only in the presence of the person concerned or of his authorized representative.

21. The USG may waive the immunity from jurisdiction of the members of the delegation; however, waiver must always be express.

22. Every member of the delegation shall enjoy the privileges and immunities to which he is entitled from the moment he enters the territory of the PRC for the purpose of performing his functions in the delegation until the moment he leaves the territory of the PRC. In respect of acts performed by a member of the delegation in the exercise of his functions, immunity shall continue to subsist thereafter.

23. In the event of the death of a member of the delegation, the PRC shall permit the withdrawal of the remains of the deceased and the movable property of the deceased, with the exception of any property acquired in the country the export of which was prohibited at the time of his death.

SECRET/NODIS

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- 9 -

24(a). The PRC shall, without delay, grant facilities to enable members of the delegation to leave whenever the USG or the head of the delegation requests their departure. The PRC shall, in case of need, place at their disposal the necessary means of transport for themselves and their property.

(b) The PRC shall grant the USG facilities for removing the archives of the delegation from the territory of the PRC.

25(a). When the functions of the delegation come to an end, the PRC shall respect and protect the premises of the delegation so long as they are assigned to it, as well as the property and archives of the delegation. The USG shall withdraw the property and archives within a reasonable period of time.

(b) The USG may entrust the custody of the property and archives of the delegation to a third State acceptable to the PRC.

26(a). Without prejudice to their privileges and immunities, it is the duty of all members of the delegation

SECRET/NODIS

SECRET/NODIS

- 10 -

to respect the laws and regulations of the PRC. They also have a duty not to interfere in the internal affairs of the PRC.

(b) The premises of the delegation must not be used in any manner incompatible with the functions of the delegation.

7/8/71

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Agreement on a Peking Summit (with Target Date)
As a Result of HAK Trip

"Over the past two years communications have been exchanged between the Governments of the People's Republic of China and the United States of America on improving relations between the two countries. Following up these exchanges, my Assistant for National Security Affairs, Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, met with Premier Chou En-lai on Chinese soil between July 9 and 11. Their discussions dealt with basic issues of peace in Asia and peace in the world. They were conducted in a very cordial and constructive manner. As a result of their meeting the People's Republic of China has extended an invitation to me to visit Peking later this year (September) (December). I have accepted this invitation with pleasure.

"The United States Government and the Government of the People's Republic of China expect that this forthcoming meeting will help re-establish the bonds between their peoples and contribute significantly to world peace."

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TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

Agreement On a Peking Summit (with Target Date)
As a Result of HAK Trip

"Over the past two years communications have been exchanged between the Governments of the People's Republic of China and the United States of America on improving relations between the two countries. Following up these exchanges, my Assistant for National Security Affairs, Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, met with Premier Chou En-lai ^{and other senior officials PEKING} on Chinese soil between July 9 and 11. These discussions dealt with basic issues ^{of peace in Asia} ~~between the two countries~~ ^{peace in the world. They} and were conducted in a very cordial and constructive manner.

~~As a result of their meeting the People's Republic of China has~~ ^{At the end of the meeting, Premier Chou En-lai stated} ~~extended an invitation to me to visit Peking~~ ^{the People's Republic of China} ~~early next year.~~ ^{with Spring} I have accepted this invitation with pleasure. I have designated Ambassador David Bruce as my special representative to travel to Peking this autumn (shortly) for the purpose of looking into the conditions of my visit and working out detailed arrangements with appropriate officials of the People's Republic of China.]

and invitation on behalf of Chairman Mao for Pres. Nixon

"The United States Government and the Government of the People's Republic of China expect that these meetings will contribute significantly to peace in Asia and peace in the world."

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Agreement on a Peking Summit (with Target Date)
as a Result of HAK Trip

"Over the past two years communications have been exchanged between the Governments of the People's Republic of China and the United States of America on improving relations between the two countries. Following up these exchanges, my Assistant for National Security Affairs, Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, met with Premier Chou En-lai on Chinese soil between July 9 and 11. As a result of their meeting the People's Republic of China has extended an invitation to me to visit Peking in the course of the next year (late this year). I have accepted this invitation with pleasure. I have designated Ambassador David Bruce as my special representative to travel to Peking this autumn (shortly) for the purpose of looking into the conditions of my visit and working out detailed arrangements with appropriate officials of the People's Republic of China.

"The United States Government and the Government of the People's Republic of China agree that contacts of this nature will contribute significantly to ~~Asian and world peace.~~ *peace in Asia & peace in the world.*"

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Agreement on a Peking Summit (with Target Date)
as a Result of High-Level Contacts

"Over the past two years communications have been exchanged between the governments of the People's Republic of China and the United States of America on improving relations between the two countries. Following up these exchanges, recent high-level contacts occurred between representatives of the two governments in the course of which it was agreed that further such contacts would contribute significantly to Asian and world peace. Accordingly, the Government of the People's Republic of China has extended an invitation to me to visit China sometime during 1972 (later this year). I have accepted this invitation with pleasure. I will send Ambassador David Bruce as my special representative to Peking this autumn (shortly) to look into the conditions for the visit and to work out detailed arrangements for it with appropriate officials of the People's Republic of China."

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Agreement in Principle (No Date) on a Peking Summit
as a Result of High-Level Contacts

"Over the past two years communications have been exchanged between the Governments of the People's Republic of China and the United States of America on improving relations between the two countries. These exchanges were followed by recent high-level contacts in which both governments agreed that further such contacts would contribute significantly to Asian and world peace. Accordingly, the Government of the People's Republic of China has extended an invitation to me to visit China. I have accepted this invitation with pleasure. Ambassador David Bruce will go to Peking this autumn as my special representative to look into the conditions for my visit and to work out detailed arrangements for it with appropriate officials of the People's Republic of China."

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6/30/71

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Agreement to Send U. S. Envoy to Peking
(Foreshadow Possible Summit)

"Over the past two years communications have been exchanged between the Governments of the People's Republic of China and the United States of America on improving relations between the two countries. As a result of recent contacts, the governments of the United States and the People's Republic of China have agreed that it would be desirable to have a high-level exchange of views on issues of mutual concern. In the opinion of both governments, such contacts would contribute significantly to the peace of Asia and the world. Accordingly, I am sending Ambassador David Bruce as my special representative to Peking this autumn to work out detailed arrangements for such contacts with appropriate officials of the People's Republic of China."

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6/30/71

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Agreement to Send U. S. Envoy to Peking
(No Summit Foreshadowing)

"Over the past two years communications have been exchanged between the Governments of the People's Republic of China and the United States of America on improving relations between the two countries. As a result of recent high-level contacts, the governments of the United States and the People's Republic of China have agreed that it would be desirable to have a high-level exchange of views on issues of mutual concern. In the opinion of both governments, continued contacts for this purpose will contribute significantly to the peace of Asia and the world. Accordingly, I have designated Ambassador David Bruce as my special representative to visit Peking this autumn to begin discussions with Chinese officials."

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TAIWAN

My approach to the problem of Taiwan will be a "principled" one, in which I will make it plain to the Chinese that the U.S. ties with the ROC on Taiwan have been established over a long period of time, involve deep emotions as well as political considerations, and cannot be lightly set aside. Regardless of what the PRC attitude is toward Taiwan, the U.S. as a great nation simply will not sell out its friends. On the other hand, apart from Taiwan, there is no great conflict between the PRC and the U.S. national interests. I will embody this line in my opening statement on the Taiwan issue, stressing in particular the absence of conflicting national interests.

In my opening statement I will then want to outline several features in the interrelationship involving the U.S., the PRC, and Taiwan which in my opinion must figure in the resolution of the Taiwan issue:

-- We have of course noted their many statements about Taiwan and over the part that Taiwan plays in coloring their attitude toward the U.S. We have also noted their references to U.S. forces in the area of Taiwan and the Taiwan Strait. We understand fully that to the PRC, Taiwan is a part of China, and the U.S. is interfering in the internal affairs of the PRC by maintaining relations with the ROC on Taiwan, including a mutual defense treaty.

-- For their part, the Chinese should understand that the U.S. relationship with the ROC on Taiwan is something which cannot lightly be set aside. It has developed over many years, and involves strong emotional considerations as well as political considerations. The U.S. ties with the ROC on Taiwan are thus a reality with which both we and the PRC must deal. Regardless of the PRC position on Taiwan, it cannot ask us to open a relationship with it by an act

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

-2-

of unconscionable betrayal of the long-standing U.S.-ROC relationship, that is, by immediately severing all ties with the ROC.

-- We do not feel that we bear the entire responsibility for the situation now affecting the U.S., the PRC, and Taiwan. I don't want to rake over the past, and indeed my purpose is to look toward the future, but the Chinese may remember that the trend in U.S. policy before the Korean war was to avoid entanglement with the Taiwan issue. U.S. policy at that time also considered the possibility of establishing diplomatic relations with the PRC. That was our whole purpose in leaving U.S. official representatives on the China mainland.

-- All this is water over the dam.

The point which I want to emphasize is that it is the declared purpose of the Nixon Administration to disassemble the barriers to broader U.S.-PRC relations which we erected on our side as a consequence to the Korean war. In this process, the Nixon Administration is prepared to see what can be done to deal with the issue of Taiwan as a major obstacle in our path. The Chinese should know that in many respects the Nixon Administration is freer to move than any of its predecessors, since nobody can accuse the President of being soft in his responses to threats to U.S. security.

A. Reduction of U.S. Forces

-- Within the framework I have outlined, I want the Chinese to know that the U.S. is not dedicated to the concept of stationing U.S. forces in the area of Taiwan and the Taiwan Strait forever. On the contrary, we are prepared to bring about the eventual removal of all these forces.

-- The military forces we have stationed in the area of Taiwan and the Taiwan Strait are there for two purposes: to assist in the defense of Taiwan under our mutual defense treaty with the ROC and to respond to wider conflicts elsewhere in Asia. Out of about 9100 men on the island, 2250 are concerned

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

-3-

primarily with the defense of Taiwan and 6850 are there in connection with conflicts elsewhere in Asia. Some of our military units have a dual role. (A detailed description is at Tab A.)

-- As I have noted, we are prepared to reduce these forces, and eventually remove them entirely.

-- Related to our estimate of the situation in the Taiwan Strait and the winding down of the war in Indochina, we have already undertaken a number of steps to reduce our presence in the Taiwan area:

- . We have ended the Taiwan Strait Patrol.
- . We have removed a squadron of 18 KC-135 air tankers from Taiwan since mid-1970.
- . In the last three years, we have reduced the size of our military advisory group on Taiwan by 110 men in 1969, 191 men in 1970, and 99 men in 1971. This represents 20 percent of our forces identified with the defense of Taiwan.

-- I am mentioning these steps as indications of what the U.S. responses will be to changes in the actual military situation in Indochina and Taiwan. I want to emphasize that our forces will be removed as rapidly as the need for them disappears. Once peace is restored to Indochina, units on Taiwan which are there in connection with wider Asian conflicts will all be withdrawn within 18 months. We can at the same time begin phasing out our other forces on Taiwan. On the other hand, as long as hostilities go on and a threat continues to exist (including a threat in the Taiwan Strait), the requirement for U.S. forces to be stationed on Taiwan will remain.

B. The Status of Taiwan

-- As far as the question of Taiwan's relationship with the mainland of China is concerned, we regard it as one to be decided by those parties which

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

-4-

are most directly involved. The U.S. takes no position as to how this decision is to be reached. The matter certainly is not one for us to settle -- indeed, is beyond our capacity to settle -- and we are definitely not advocates of "two Chinas" or of "one China, one Taiwan."

-- We are concerned, though, over the means by which the Taiwan question is settled. We believe that the settlement should be by peaceful means and not the use of force. It is our position that the dangers of armed conflict, the possibility that such a conflict might become enlarged, and the interests of the people in the area, all require that the settlement be arrived at by peaceful means. This point relates back to what you have said about the circumstances under which U.S. forces may be removed from the area of Taiwan and the Taiwan Strait.

-- The U.S. will not interfere in any peaceful settlement with the parties directly involved may reach. We will also leave the modalities of this settlement to them. As noted, it is not the intention of the U.S. to attempt to determine the relationship between Taiwan and the mainland of China.

C. The UN Representation Issue

I will meet this issue squarely, and point out the elements of the problem which require solutions:

-- The PRC rejects any form of "two Chinas" or "one China, one Taiwan" situation, and demands that the ROC be expelled from the UN as the price of PRC entry.

-- In principle we support the participation of the PRC in international organizations, including the UN. On the other hand, we cannot necessarily do what they would prefer in backing their UN entry. We can't just support them and vote against the ROC on Taiwan. Not only would this affect the U.S. relationship with the ROC, which as I have noted is a fact of life, but

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would damage our relations with other nations which have supported us in the past and have voted for the ROC. We remain under pressure from many quarters, including American domestic opinion and many of our allies, and our hands are tied.

-- As we see it, there are two approaches: either to stick to our present policy of voting for the Important Question and against the Albanian Resolution, or trying to find some other formulation which would bridge the gap between our own requirements and those of the PRC.

-- If we follow the first course, we will eventually be defeated, and though this would solve the "no two Chinas; no one China, one Taiwan" problem, it would patently appear to the PRC as an iniquitous step in the light of our professed interest in improving U.S.-PRC relations.

-- Other formulations, however, would also carry with them the disadvantage of offending the PRC since they would not automatically require the expulsion of the ROC on Taiwan. Although it could be made clear as a part of the vote that it would not prejudice the eventual resolution of the status of Taiwan by the parties concerned, we assume that the PRC position on the expulsion of the ROC from the UN remains firm.

-- This leaves us with no recourse except to ask the PRC what it thinks about the UN issue. I recognize that this is an unorthodox course, but obviously we will want to take the Chinese point of view into account along with our other requirements and commitments in determining our eventual stand on Chinese representation. As I have previously indicated, the outcome may not be what they would prefer, but at least we will have given consideration to their views.

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US MILITARY PRESENCE ON TAIWAN^{1/2/}

Service	Category 1 Support and Defense of Taiwan	Category 2 SEAsia Support and Other WESTPAC Missions	Total
USA	210	965	1175
USAF	1454	5733	7187
USMC	17	-	17
USN	<u>564</u>	<u>169</u>	<u>733</u>
Totals	2245	6867	9112

- 1/ Detailed Service Breakout in Tabs 1 thru 4.
- 2/ Figures are current authorized strengths.

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Tab 1

USA	Defense of Taiwan	SEAsia and Other PACOM Missions	Dual Functions
Army Materiel Cmd TMA		14	No
Hq USA, Taiwan	11		No
MAAG, China	142		No
STRATCOM			Yes
Long Line Bn		395	Yes
Signal Group		81	Yes
Operational Bn		163	Yes
PSYOP Group		3	Yes
Taiwan Defense Cmd	57		No
USA Security Agency		260	Yes
Det 1		14	Yes
Det 2		13	Yes
Det 3		11	Yes
500th Mil Intelligence Gp		11	Yes
Totals	210	965	

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Tab 2

USAF	Defense of Taiwan	SEAsia and Other PACOM Missions	Dual Func- tions
405TFW, Det		18	Yes
2128 Comm Sq		100	Yes
Combat Support Units		622	Yes
5 TAC Control Gp	50		No
Radar Sites	75		No
327 Air Div	148		No
Supporting Units	441		No
6987 Security Gp		806	Yes
Supporting Units		29	Yes
314th TAW & Supporting Units		<u>4898</u>	Yes
Totals	1454	5733	

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Tab 3

USMC	Defense of Taiwan	SEAsia and Other PACOM Missions	Dual Func- tion
MAAG	12		No
Taiwan Def Cmd	<u>.5</u>		No
Total	17	0	

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Tab 4

USN	Defense of Taiwan	SEAsia and Other WESTPAC Mission	Dual Func- tions
Taiwan Def Cmd	86		No
Special Sec Gp	14		Yes
Hdqtrs, Support Activity	221		No
Navy Exch & Comm	65		No
USN Hospital	109		No
Navy Courier Serv Det		8	Yes
Mil Sealift Cmd Office		6	Yes
Naval Invest Svc Off Reps	5		No
Naval Air Facility Naha, Det T		25	Yes
Cmdr, 7th Flt		14	Yes
Security Grp Activity		114	Yes
Medical Research Unit 2	25		Yes
Naval Attache		2	No
MAAG China	<u>39</u>		No
Totals	564	169	

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US MILITARY PRESENCE ON TAIWAN

(Annex to NSSM 106 - China Policy)

1. Total US Military Personnel:

The current total authorized US military strength on Taiwan is 8,877. Breakdown of Service totals are as follows:

	<u>USAF</u>	<u>ARMY</u>	<u>NAVY</u>	<u>MC</u>
USASTRATCOM		639		
314th TAW	1,173			
Det 1, 405th TFW	18			
327th AD	148			
Combat Support Group	4,753			
Other*	<u>913</u>	<u>476</u>	<u>733</u>	<u>24</u>
Totals	7,005	1,115	733	24

* Includes COMUSTDC (192), MAAG (293), Intelligence and other activities

2. Intelligence Functions:

Although a separate study is being made by the intelligence community on the effects of possible changes in the size and missions of US intelligence activities on Taiwan, the following basic factors must be noted here: (1) the composition of these activities are almost totally military and the number of US military personnel involved is a significant portion of the total US military strength on Taiwan; (2) these activities primarily serve essential national and regional strategic requirements as well as local defense requirements.

3. US Taiwan Defense Command (COMUSTDC):

The current authorized US military strength is 192. COMUSTDC provides the planning and control responsibilities of a functioning, in-place head-

TOP SECRET

quarters charged with contingency responsibilities involving the operational control of ground, sea, and air forces of two nations under the Mutual Defense Treaty when so directed. This involves the following, among other, responsibilities: (a) bilateral TDC/GRC planning, to include major and minor exercises, (b) unilateral US planning, (c) coordinate joint US military intelligence activities on Taiwan, and (d) negotiate with GRC to provide support of US forces as may be required under base rights agreements and the Mutual Defense Treaty.

COMUSTDC was established as a subordinate unified commander in September 1958. This resulted from the requirement of Commander, Seventh Fleet (who was assigned the mission for the defense of Taiwan upon the outbreak of the Korean War) to establish a headquarters ashore in Taiwan to effectively discharge this mission.

4. Military Assistance Advisory Group, Republic of China: Responsibilities and Functions (MAAG, China):

The present MAAG China authorized military strength of 293 reflects reductions of 69.4% since 1 July 1961 and 64.0% since the Tonkin Gulf incident in 1964. Of even greater importance are the very heavy annual net reductions of the past three years: FY 69 - 15.9%; FY 70 - 32.8%; FY 71 - 25.3%.

MAAG, China functions are set forth in Appendix 1. Although these functions are technically diverse, some of which stem from US legal requirements, the central objectives include: (a) development of Military Assistance (Grant Aid/FMS) plans and programs; (b) provision of appropriate guidance on doctrine, planning, programming, and advisory and technical assistance to the GRC in the organization, equipping and training of its military forces; and (c) assure

host country compliance with pertinent bilateral agreements relating to Military Assistance.

It must be noted that many highly technical and critical areas remain outside of current GRC capabilities, especially in the areas of air defense, naval operations, supply, maintenance and other logistic areas.

MAAG, China was established shortly after the outbreak of the Korean War.

5. The US Army Strategic Communications Command (USASTRATCOM - Taiwan):

This command has total authorized strength of 639 military personnel. The USASTRATCOM Long Lines Battalion with its subordinate components provides, operates, and maintains inter-island long haul, point-to-point strategic communications systems to include allocated circuits as well as common-user services; provides, operates, and maintains USA Strategic Communications Systems/Defense Communications System facilities to include a major relay station, receiver and transmitter facilities, associated key links, inter-island radio relay system consisting of radio relay equipment and outside plant wire facilities, and to provide allocated circuits and common-user services as required for all US military and other authorized US agencies on Taiwan. It manages communications-electronics (C-E) resources to support US military and other government activities as directed by CG, USASTRATCOM-PAC; and it provides post, camp, and station operational C-E support to all US Government agencies located within the Taipei-Taiwan area to include: Communications Center Operations, Dial Central Exchange Telephone Operation, Telephone Installation and Repair, outside Plant Cable and Wire Support. Hence, in summary, this command not only provides the above cited local

TOP SECRET

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services on Taiwan but is a key link in the strategic communications systems inter-connecting all of East Asia.

Strategic communications facilities were initially established on Taiwan shortly after the outbreak of the Korean War, continually improved and consolidated, and formally designated as USASTRATCOM - Taiwan in October 1968.

6. US Air Force 314th Tactical Airlift Wing (314 TAW):

This command with its four assigned tactical airlift squadrons of C-130E aircraft based at Ching Chuan Kang Air Base, has a total authorized strength of 1,173.

In execution of its mission, this unit utilizes C-130E aircraft to provide theater airlift support for PACOM forces which includes tactical air resupply, special operations and air evacuation. It is required to support all major CINCPAC OPlans. One CINCPAC plan and the Joint US-ROC ROCHESTER plan provide for PACOM theater forces to defend Taiwan, while other CINCPAC OPlans provide for defense of Korea and other areas in Asia.

Taiwan provides an optimum geographic location for readiness posture to provide airlift support to US forces and allies in Northeast Asia or Southeast Asia, an important element of the Nixon Doctrine. This includes peacetime logistic and airlift support of all major CINCPAC OPlans.

The 314th TAW was established on Taiwan in January 1966.

7. US Air Force Detachment 1, 405th Tactical Fighter Wing (Det 1, 405th TFW):

This unit is located at Tainan with 4 to 6 F-4 aircraft and an authorized strength of 18 US military personnel.

This unit support US national defense by covering Single Integrated Operations Plan (SIOP) targets. The unit also has the mission of participating

TOP SECRET

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in Pacific Command theater defense of Taiwan as required by a CINCPAC OPlan. Since the shoot-down of an EC-121 over the China Sea, the detachment was assigned another mission which is maintaining fighter aircraft on alert status at such times as required to protect US peacetime reconnaissance aircraft operating in the area. This mission is in support of US strategic interests rather than merely the defense of Taiwan, as the reconnaissance aircraft collect information for which there are national intelligence requirements.

For range to 405 Det 1 TFW SIOP targets from other US bases in the Far East is too great to allow these missions to be accomplished by tactical fighter aircraft without air refueling (and there are no tanker aircraft located on or near Taiwan and, in a war situation, all tankers would be dedicated to SAC).

This detachment was established on Taiwan in January 1955 as a 5th Air Force Detachment, acquiring its present designation in April 1961.

8. US Air Force 327th Air Division (327th AD):

This unit is based at Taipei Air Station with an authorized US military strength of 148 personnel and consists of a small headquarters which currently commands only two operational aircraft units -- the 314th TAW and a detachment of the 405th TFW. Its mission includes preparations for commanding greatly increased forces in the event of contingency operations on Taiwan. The manning of this unit is currently so low that any further reduction could make it incapable of accomplishing its mission.

This unit was established in Taiwan in January 1955 under another designation.

TOP SECRET

9 Other US Military Units:

a. US Air Force: The Air Force Combat Support Group headquarters units, which, with their associated supply, civil engineering, security police, transportation and Services squadrons and hospital or dispensary functions, provide required housekeeping support to units based at Ching Chuan Kang Air Base, Shu Lin Kou Air Station, Tainan Air Base and Taipei Air Station, total an authorized military strength of approximately 4,753 personnel. These units exist only to support the Air Force units previously described. Their importance and the impact of reduction or removal of these units is the same as for the supported unit. Additionally, there are also 913 in TDC, MAAG and Intelligence functions.

b. US Army: The total US Army authorized military strength on Taiwan is 1,115 personnel, with over one-half the total in the STRATCOM Group and the remainder functioning in MAAG, TDC and Security (Intelligence) capacities and logistics missions.

c. US Navy and Marine Corps: The total US Navy and Marine Corps authorized strength on Taiwan is 733 personnel of which over one-third the total serve in MAAG, TDC and Security (Intelligence) capacities and almost all the remainder in local and theater support missions. The largest of these units are Headquarters, Support Activity (221), US Navy Hospital (109) and Navy Exchanges and Commissaries (65) which include support for the official US community.

Appendix: Responsibilities and Functions of MAAG, China

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(C) Responsibilities and Functions

a. Under the military command of CINCPAC, the Chief of the MAAG will:

(1) Make recommendations to CINCPAC, concerning Military Assistance (Grant Aid/FMS) to the GRC.

(2) Develop Military Assistance (Grant Aid/FMS) plans and programs in cooperation with the Chief of the US Diplomatic Mission and other elements of the Country Team, and submit them to CINCPAC.

(3) Observe and report on the utilization of material furnished and personnel trained at the expense of the United States.

(4) Assure host country compliance with pertinent bilateral agreements relating to declaration and release of excess Military Assistance Program property, and provide timely instruction to host country on disposition of such property in accordance with DOD directives.

(5) Provide appropriate advisory services and technical assistance to the GRC on military assistance, including training assistance and, within guidelines provided by higher authority, encourage the sale of US-produced military equipment to the GRC, and provide guidance on planning and programming for future FMS to meet valid country requirements.

(6) Administer FMS transactions in accordance with current instructions.

(7) Make recommendations to CINCPAC concerning off-shore procurement of military assistance material or services.

(8) Provide appropriate guidance on doctrine, planning, and programming, and advisory and technical assistance to the GRC in

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the organization, equipping and training of military forces in order to develop and maintain self-sufficiency programs in support of the Armed Forces.

(9) Work directly with the military departments and appropriate military area commands in arranging for receipt and transfer of military assistance material, training, and services in the Republic of China.

(10) Provide liaison with GRC with respect to weapons production and residual off-shore procurement matters.

(11) Provide, as appropriate, advisory services and technical assistance to the GRC armed forces with respect to production of munitions and ordnance, vehicles, clothing, rations, rubber products, batteries, and topographic maps.

(12) When appropriate, act as channel of communication for the DDR&E regarding research and development matters between the United States and the GRC. Act as channel of communication for the Assistant Secretary of Defense (I&L) regarding production and other logistic matters between the United States and the GRC. CINCPAC shall be kept informed of all such communications.

(13) Provide liaison with the GRC with respect to any other military assistance requirements or logistic matters of the DOD and perform such other functions as may be required under foreign assistance legislation.

b. In discharging these responsibilities, the Chief of the MAAG will be guided by the policies and procedures set forth in the Military Assistance Manual, Annex J to the Joint Strategic Objectives Plan, applicable Department of Defense directives and Instructions, and such other directives as may be issued by appropriate authority.

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c. The release of classified US military information of any nature to representatives of the GRC will be in accordance with appropriate documents authorizing disclosure of information to foreign governments or with approval of CINCPAC. In the event GRC authorities request military advice or information of a strategic nature from the MAAG, such requests will be referred to CINCPAC. US War Plans will not be divulged to foreign nationals without the specific authority of CINCPAC. CINCPAC will be advised by the Chief of the MAAG of any action taken by GRC authorities as a result of receiving strategic advice from the United States or from any other source, if such is known. CINCPAC will, in turn, keep the Joint Chiefs of Staff advised, as appropriate.

d. No member of the MAAG will assume any duty as a result of which he will be responsible to the GRC.

Source: CINCPAC Ser 0467, 24 April 1967, CONFIDENTIAL, Subj: Terms of Reference; forwarding of

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HEADQUARTERS SUPPORT ACTIVITY, TAIPEI
REPUBLIC OF CHINA
EOA 75 APO
SAN FRANCISCO 96363

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7 April 1977

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To: Distribution List

Subj: Population Report

Ref: (a) COMUSMPCD CAI 5310.1 (CONCAL)

Encls: (1) Area Population Report
(2) Quarterly Population Report

1. In accordance with reference (a), enclosures (1) and (2) are forwarded for your information.

[Signature]
S. A. STANFORD
By direction

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- 5 CINMAG, TAIWAN
- 9 AMERICAN EMBASSY (ATTN: CONSULAR/POLITICAL/ADMIN)
- 1 CTF 76 (COMUSMPCD SEVENTHFLT)
- 3 COMR 327TH AIR DIVISION (327 AD DMT ATTN: CAPT MORTON)
- 1 CO USA STRATEGIC SIG CP
- 1 CO MAREU-2
- 2 AD USDAO
- 3 COMR 6211TH ABG APO 96360
- 3 COMR 6987TH SG APO 96360
- 3 COMR 6217TH COMBT SUP GP APO 96319
- 3 OIC SJA, 112 MAAG
- 1 COMR DO 49 CBT, TAS
- 1 OIC SJA, TAS
- 2 ARMY & AIR FORCE MOTION PICTURE SERVICE, PACIFIC
- 2 COMR TAIWAN DIST, USAF PAC POSTAL & COURIER RDN APO 96363
- 2 OIC COMMISSARY STORE, TAIPEI
- 1 OIC HSA DET 3
- 1 OIC HSA DET 5
- 1 COMUSMPCD
- 1 AMERICAN-RED CROSS OFFICE, TAIPEI
- 1 AMERICAN-RED CROSS OFFICE, APO 96360
- 1 AMERICAN-RED CROSS OFFICE, APO 96319
- 1 MR. HAROLD E. COE, JR (OASD (CA)) (DP) PERMACON, WASHINGTON, D. C. 20310

- 1 ALL HSA DEPTS
- 1 7TH PSYOPS GP TAIWAN DET
- 1 ICER BOM (SUPPLY & FISCAL)

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AREA POPULATION REPORT
AS OF 31 MAR 1974

LOCATION	ARMY			NAVY			AIR FORCE			MARINES			CIVILIANS			TOTALS		
	MIL	FAM	DEPN	MIL	FAM	DEPN	MIL	FAM	DEPN	MIL	FAM	DEPN	PRIN	FAM	DEPN	PRIN	FAM	DEPN
TAIPEI	580	311	829	514	357	924	815	532	1313	14	8	24	299	374	1126	2034	1652	4219
ANKOU	216	92	161	169	30	71	835	305	868				2			1263	427	1700
SHANGHAI													22	1	2	22	1	4
TAICHUNG H. C. K.	26	12	33	32	21	48	4335	469	607				67	24	115	4459	556	1001
HAI-TI																		
ATMAN	31	14	30	42	21	53	657	352	875				34	30	67	764	417	1051
TAIHSIUNG HOYING	74	9	22	62	42	115	7	3	7	9	9	26	12	6	14	166	69	221
TINGYUNG							15	13	42				3	2	2	19	15	44
CHSU	3			1														
CHENG	1			1														
TAIHLIAO							6											
TOTALS	990	450	1024	845	451	1211	6674	1674	3912	23	17	30	434	467	1227	8956	3047	1440

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ENCLOSURE (1)

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AS OF 31 MARCH 1971

ORGANIZATION	ARMY			NAVY			AIR FORCE			MARINES			CIVILIANS			TOTAL		
	MIL	FAM	DEPN	MIL	FAM	DEPN	MIL	FAM	DEPN	MIL	FAM	DEPN	PRIN	FAM	DEPN	PRIN	FAM	DEPN
USDAO	50	30	31	85	65	151	27	27	75	4	4	13	5	5	8	172	131	323
MAAG	133	106	351	21	14	34	96	85	254	3	3	8	41	26	76	294	234	703
USATC													120	89	293	120	89	293
USA STRATEGIC SIG GP	452	185	436				1	1	4				10	8	33	453	193	475
USDAO	9	1	2										2	1	2	5	2	4
AMER EMBASSY	1	1	3	2	2	7	6	6	23	7	1	3	84	197	603	100	207	639
U.S. NAVAL HOSPITAL				108	56	151										108	56	151
U.S. NISOR TAIPEI				4	4	15										7	7	25
AMER RED CROSS													3	3	10	7	7	25
AMER RED CROSS													5	1	2	5	1	4
AMEMB-2	1	1	3	26	22	71	1	1	4				9	6	15	37	30	95
6214TH ABZ							576	293	708				25	25	56	542	329	761
6217TH COMST SUP GP							4261	444	751				11	9	12	4272	453	763
6214TH AB SQ							127	232	607							127	232	607
6214TH COMB GP							312	246	518				3	2	4	315	248	521
6214TH COMB GP	16	11	33										50	44	102	66	55	131
6214TH SQ	273	92	161				331	304	864				2			1092	396	1021
USAFPOS TAIWAN DISTRICT, APO SAN FRANCISCO 96263							69	19	59							69	19	59
USD AUBET OFFICE TAIWAN													5	5	24	5	5	24
USPC				4	3	7										4	3	7
AREA COORDINATING	76	10	24	74	47	129	25	14	44	9	9	26	15	8	16	199	83	239
TAOHSIUNG																		
USDAO				520	236	642							44	38	82	564	374	721
TOTAL	990	458	1034	845	451	1211	6074	1874	3912	23	17	50	434	467	1327	5955	3047	7354

- NOTE 1: MAAG includes: (U.S. ARMY FORCES TAIWAN., U.S. ARMY ELECTRONICS COMMAND TAIWAN RESIDENCY., 7TH PSIOPS GP)
- NOTE 2: AMERICAN EMBASSY includes: (USIS, AGRICULTURE, DEFENSE ATTACHE OFFICE, AID/VIETNAM SUPPORT GROUP, AID, EMBASSY, CHINESE LANGUAGE AND AREA SCHOOL)
- NOTE 3: HSA includes: (NSCA (TDC & LINKO)), COMMISSARY STORE., COMSERVETHFLA DET "A", NAVCURSER., DET 3., NAF NANA., (NET)
- NOTE 4: 6214TH ABZ includes: (6214TH USAF DISP., 6214TH ABZ., 6214TH ABS., DET 1, 405TH FIGHTER WING)
- NOTE 5: 6217TH COMST SUP GP includes: (6217 USAF HOSP., FORMS., 345 TIS., 345 TAS., 776 TAS., 2139 COMB SQ., DET 23., 1ST USAF WD., DET 8, 6 AERIAL PORT SQ., 6217 SUPPLY SQ., 314 AMS., 314 FIS., 314 GMS., 6217 CES., 6217 APS., 6217 SVS SQ., 6217 TRANS SQ., DET 4319 USAF AUD GEN CP., 9245 FLD TAG DOR., OLB, 502 AERO EVAC SQ., OLA DET 1, 69 MIL AIRLIFT SP GP., DET 1902, OBY., USAFPC OL 1304)
- NOTE 6: 6215TH ABS includes: (327TH AIR DIVISION., DET 51., DET 23 and OLA DET 5 ALL OF 1ST REMEMBER WING., AFB PROGRAMS CENTER, PG, DET 1., USAF RE IDENT AUDITOR., OLA, 1ST REMEMBER WING., DET 3., AIRPORT, GEN LIGHTING UNIT)

No Objection to Declassification in Part 2013/08/02 : LOC-HAK-464-6-1-9

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

INDOCHINA

Mr. Prime Minister, I want to speak briefly and candidly about the conflict in Indochina. The President has asked me to make our position absolutely clear to you.

We would like to end the war in Vietnam. That can be done soon through negotiations and a fixed deadline of withdrawal. If there is no settlement, the war will go on. American withdrawals will continue gradually but not completely. The Vietnamese will pursue the struggle.

The choice between these two routes is of crucial importance, not only for the direct participants but for all countries who are concerned with the future of this region. A negotiated settlement would lend the lengthy suffering of the Indochinese people and remove a constant source of tension and possible misunderstanding between major powers. On the other hand, a gradual winding down of the conflict will mean prolonged suffering and some difficult decisions that we are prepared, however, regretfully, to take. No end will be in sight. In the absence of a negotiated settlement we have already demonstrated that we will do whatever is required to pursue our limited course. Such actions have not and will not be directed at you but we recognize their unfortunate tendency to impair our relations.

Between these two routes our strong preference for a negotiated settlement is clear. We want to end this war now. But we will not purchase its ending at the price of our humiliation. As a nation with global

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Gen Mao quote re
betraying allies

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interests we must relate Indochina to our broader concerns. ~~We cannot simply act on the principles of North Vietnam whose sole objective is the outcome in one small corner of the world.~~ ^{AND THE US!} We must take account of the impact of our actions on our international position and our domestic structure.

The North Vietnamese and the NLF bring a sharply different perspective to the conflict. For them it is the only foreign policy problem. They are heroic people who have fought with courage for many years. We sense that they are suspicious of a negotiated settlement. We sense that they fear losing at the conference table what they have been struggling for on the battlefield. Indeed they act as if they are more afraid of being deceived than defeated.

Objective conditions different. Especially with PRC

But we too have learned a lesson from the past. We think that a settlement must meet the concerns of both sides if it is to endure. And we are realistic about the future. We recognize that after our forces leave we will be 10,000 miles away and the North Vietnamese will still be at hand in Indochina.

We thus have every incentive to find a solution to the conflict which Hanoi and the NLF will have an interest in maintaining. For if they do not have a stake in the agreements, the peace will break down and war will once again erupt.

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

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This then is the framework for the negotiations that we have been deadlocked in Paris. On May 31 we made a proposal to the North Vietnamese with which you are no doubt familiar. We offered to set a date for the removal of all American forces as part of a settlement that includes a cease-fire throughout Indochina, a halt to further infiltration of outside forces into any countries of Indochina, international supervision, respect for the Geneva Accords, and the release of all prisoners.

On June 26 the North Vietnamese responded with their own proposal that contains both positive and negative elements.

We must now see whether we can bridge the gaps between these proposals. There are several military issues on which the North Vietnamese *connected with withdrawal* will press for maximum advantage in a settlement. This we understand. Although negotiations on them will be difficult, we believe they can be resolved.

However, on the fundamental question of the political future of South Vietnam, Hanoi's position to date is flatly unacceptable. *There are 2 aspects:* (They have *Hanoi* demanded that in addition to withdrawing all our forces from Vietnam we overthrow the existing government in Saigon by withdrawing all economic and other support.

(2) It refuses a ceasefire for all of Indo-China
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY
offering it only for our forces + only for S.W.

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

-4-

This we cannot do. This we will not do.

The North Vietnamese ^{political} demand is inconsistent with their own basic view of realities in South Vietnam. They claim that the present government is a phantom one, propped up only by the presence of American troops. We have offered to removed all of our forces by a fixed date and make peace a process that would test the validity of their charge. Yet they require more. They insist that we do their political work for them even while they maintain that our withdrawal by itself should accomplish the same end.

The North Vietnamese demand is unrealistic as well. By insisting that we replace the present South Vietnamese government they guarantee that the conflict will continue. Yet the longer the war goes on and our withdrawals proceed, the less influence we will have in Saigon and the less impact we will have on a political settlement, although of course some of our forces will remain.

→ When I leave your country I will proceed to Paris for my next secret meeting with the North Vietnamese. On July 12 I will present a specific proposal to Le Duc Tho and Xuan Thuy that is designed to break this political impasse. The North Vietnamese response may very well decide whether we are to take the route of early peace or that of prolonged struggle. ~~AT THE END~~ WE SHALL SEEK TO DETERMINE

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PROPAGANDA

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On behalf of President Nixon I want to assure the Prime Minister solemnly that the United States is prepared to make a settlement that will truly leave the political evolution of Vietnam to the Vietnamese alone.

We are ready to withdraw all of our forces by a fixed date and let objective realities shape the political future.

As the President has consistently declared, we believe the following principles should govern a fair political settlement in South Vietnam:

- A political solution must reflect the will of the South Vietnamese people and allow them to determine their future without outside interference.
- A fair political solution should reflect the existing relationship of political forces within South Vietnam.
- We will abide by the outcome of the political process agreed upon.

But I must emphasize with equal seriousness that the United States will never agree to ~~predetermine the political future of South Vietnam or~~ make a dishonorable peace.

If the Vietnamese people themselves decide to change the present government, we shall accept ~~this~~ ^{it}. But we will not make that decision for them.

The June 26 North Vietnamese proposal says that we should "stop supporting" the present South Vietnamese. If this means a continuation of their previous demand, THAT WE OVERTHROW THE SAIGON GOVT, then no negotiated settlement is possible. If this could mean that Hanoi is willing to settle on total U. S. withdrawals,

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We want a decent interval. Your love our assurance

once we give a chance

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

-6-

a ceasefire
political evolution, and a guaranteed international status for South Vietnam, then there is a good chance for peace.

Mr. Prime Minister, it is not for us to tell you what specific role your country should play in this situation. You know yourselves the restraints which the continuation of this conflict places on the improvement of our relations, particularly as they involve our top leaders. The President's policy is meeting your broader concerns with regard to our involvement. Our declining forces do not threaten your territory or your ally, and it is evident that we seek no permanent military bases which could form the bridgehead for future military deployment for us. We are willing to guarantee this flatly *either alone or together with you.*

It should be clear that prolonged warfare is in no one's interest. Surely not for the Indochinese people, who have already suffered too much. And surely not for our two countries which cannot wish to see conflicts continued in Southeast Asia which draw in other powers, or which result in vacuums inviting to others. Indeed, a continuation, even more an intensification of the war can threaten the improvement in the relations between our two countries which I am here to discuss.

I would welcome your observations on ways in which our common interest in ending the conflict could find a common expression.

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6/21/71

REVIEW OF U.S. AND PRC VIEWS ON OTHER GREAT POWERS

One feature of my conversations should be a review with the PRC of our respective views regarding "other great powers." I might open this by citing the desirability, at this first mutual contact, of seeing how each of us looks at great power relationships in the Pacific for the purpose of determining where our differences and similarities lie. In this way we can arrive at some understanding of future trends in our relationship. I could note that to all practical purposes the powers that really count in a regional sense are the U.S., China, the USSR, and Japan despite Japan's lack of nuclear weapons -- the UK and France are in reality peripheral. Thus I would like to focus the discussions on Japan and the USSR.

A. Japan

In dealing with Japan, I will need to respond to a consistent PRC propaganda theme that a "revival of Japanese militarism" is taking place "at the instigation of the American imperialists." This theme clearly represents Chinese sensitivity to the rapid growth of Japan's economic power and political influence, and even without the ingredient of military power the Chinese undoubtedly see in Japan a serious rival for the position of being the leading Asian nation. The Chinese may themselves bring up Japan, either in standard propaganda terms or

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- 2 -

possibly in a less polemical way which refers to the U.S. -Japan Mutual Defense Treaty as being directed against China.

My suggested position is as follows:

-- It definitely is not a U.S. policy to attempt to revive Japanese militarism or to compel Japan to rearm. We ourselves have many uncertainties in our relations with Japan, and can foresee Japanese rearmament and development of an independent nuclear capability as one course which Japan may possibly take. Japanese leaders tell us that based on popular anti-war sentiment it would be political suicide for them to try to rearm. We do not doubt their sincerity, but as Marxist dialecticians the Chinese should understand that the objective conditions which exist today may not prevail and that changes may take place later.

-- The objective situation in Japan is that it undeniably has the highly-developed infrastructure and the industrial and technological base to rearm and to advance rapidly into nuclear weaponry and advanced delivery systems. It is a fact of life too, that the Japanese are a vital, intelligent, and industrious people who have fully recovered from the defeat they suffered in World War II and have regained their traditional sense of national purpose and pride. Moreover, unlike the U.S. and the PRC which are self-contained continental powers, Japan is an island

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- 3 -

nation which must develop active external interests in order to survive. These circumstances combine to give an outward thrust to Japanese actions. The crucial point here is not so much whether the Japanese want to rearm, but whether they have the capacity. They have this capacity. And regardless of the course Japan takes, it is going to be a major factor in Far Eastern affairs, as well as the affairs of the world as a whole.

-- Paradoxically as it may seem to the Chinese, the U. S. security relationship with Japan has the effect of containing Japan rather than the reverse. Although in this relationship, the Japanese are assuming responsibility for the defense of the home islands, they look to the U. S. to provide a strategic deterrence and to maintain a balance of power in Asia. Thus the U. S. military presence, combined with anti-war sentiment in Japan and a popular desire to avoid heavy defense expenditures, maintains the status quo.

-- The Chinese should be aware of one thing, though: if there is any single factor which would push the Japanese into rearming rapidly, developing their own nuclear weapons, and taking radical new foreign policy departures, it would be the removal of the U. S. as a balancing force in Asian affairs. As matters now stand the Japanese do not feel threatened, and consider that their security is assured. If they felt that a threat existed and that their security needs were not being met,

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- 4 -

however, the pressures in Japan for rearmament and for an independent nuclear capability would increase enormously. The Japanese would of course have the alternative of seeking accommodations with potential opponents, but our experiences with them as tough and ruthless enemies in World War II lead us to discount this alternative. China's own historical experiences in dealing with Japan should reinforce the thought that the Japanese would turn into a real force to be reckoned with militarily if the restraints on them were removed.

-- We and the PRC should accordingly recognize that we have a common interest in assuring that Japanese policy does not strike off in new, unpredictable, and perhaps dangerous directions.

B. The Soviet Union

The Chinese should be introduced to the concept that, at the same time we are working to reopen our relations with them, our efforts to get negotiations with the Soviets will proceed on a parallel course. They should, in fact, have no trouble on this score, since they themselves are continuing to maintain state-to-state relations with the Soviets as a matter of national interest. But we must make the point that what we are doing with the Soviets does not undercut Chinese interests, nor is it anti-China collusion.

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-5-

My position would be:

-- The national interest of the U.S. dictates that as we open contacts with the PRC we continue our efforts to engage the USSR in negotiations on several key issues. In truth, there is much for us to talk to the Soviets about, given the many areas where our interests overlap, the varied relationships which have developed between us historically over the years, and our respective size and importance in world affairs. Above all, the military elements in the relationship, involving as they do weapons of mass destruction, impel us to seek areas of agreement with the USSR.

-- Our approach to the Soviet Union is similar to the one we envisage with the PRC. We acknowledge our differences, realize they will not be solved by superficial gestures and seek to make progress on the basis of mutual self-interest.

-- Our approaches to the USSR are not directed against China and should not be regarded as U.S. -USSR collusion at China's expense. We intend to live up fully to the thoughts expressed to the Chinese in our message of May 22 to them concerning the SALT announcement.

-- The President has also made clear on many occasions that we do not wish to exploit or fuel any Sino-Soviet disputes. We have important interests with both countries and hope to move forward in our relations

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talk up 8
-6-
SALT
5-Power
Hot line
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with both. Our policies and conduct will reflect these principles.

-- Further to illustrate our position, I am prepared to outline for them briefly the objectives we have in mind for the SALT talks and to explain where this matter now stands. Similarly, if the Chinese are interested, I am prepared to give a brief review of the issues and negotiations involved in Berlin and MBFR.

-- In return, we would welcome anything which they would care to tell us about their reaction to the Soviet proposal for five-power nuclear disarmament talks. How do they intend to respond to this proposal? I want to make it clear to the Chinese that we have delayed our own response until we heard their views.

-- The Chinese might be interested in the evolution of our relations with the Soviet Union under this Administration. Last summer and fall we believe the Soviets were testing our will. In the Middle East they greatly increased their military presence and abetted violations of the ceasefire. In the Caribbean they stepped up their activities and stretched the limits of understandings we have. In Berlin there was some harassment. And they seemed bent on trying to relax tensions with the Western European countries while maintaining a tough stance against us to protect their ideological position.

India
1-
Admitted

-- We took some appropriate and firm actions in each of these areas and since then our relations have shown improvement. Negotiations have

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-7-

progressed in certain areas, like SALT and Berlin. We hope that we can make continued progress based on the realization that it is dangerous in a nuclear world to constantly press for tactical gains and that it is preferable to focus on broader issues and long-term progress.

-- We would of course be willing to follow up any further thoughts they might have on this aspect of our discussions of great power relationships. This could refer in general terms to our respective policies, or to information of a more concrete nature which either side might wish to bring to the attention of the other, now or in the future.

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6/22/71

COMMUNICATIONS

Security of Dept

In my opening statement I will cite the subject of ongoing communications as being one which I will want to discuss. In picking up the specifics of this subject later on, I will want to tell the Chinese that now the U. S. and the PRC have established contact, I believe it would be highly desirable for us to open and maintain a communications link for the future through which both sides could put forward matters of the most sensitive nature. To be effective, this link should not be dependent on intermediate centers that are vulnerable to local political circumstances over which we can have no control. The link should also be rapid, and fully reliable so that there would be no restraints on each of us explaining our thinking to the other's satisfaction. Moreover, we would want our communications to be handled in such a way as to avoid diplomatic or bureaucratic complexities. All of this, in my opinion, requires that the existing channel be superceded by a new link which would bring the White House directly into communications with the highest authorities in Peking.

I would then offer a number of suggestions:

-- First, setting up a "hot line," that is, a rapid and direct means of communication between the White House and Peking. This would be similar to the direct links which we have established with a number of other countries (e. g., the USSR), and can be used to avert misunderstandings in emergency situations.

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- 2 -

-- Second, working out an arrangement for a continuing top-level White House-Peking contacts for the purpose of addressing the basic principles in our relationship; dealing with sensitive issues; laying down a scenario for detailed discussions at the diplomatic level once understandings are reached on the broader issues; and clarifying possible misunderstandings in other channels.

I envisage that this contact would be for the most part carried out by exchanges of messages through an appropriate Embassy where such exchanges could be accomplished in a secure manner. I have in mind Paris, ^{or} London, ~~Ottawa~~, but would be prepared to consider any other site which the Chinese may suggest as being convenient for them. In addition, I believe that it might be necessary occasionally to have personal contact.

-- Third, establishing a place where the diplomatic-level discussions to which I have referred might be held and where additional matters of a more routine nature but of mutual interest could be brought forward. This need not be Ottawa, Paris, or London but some other center such as Warsaw which could serve in both symbolic and practical terms as a point of contact.

After setting forth my proposals, I would want to stress that I would personally handle the matter of maintaining high-level communications (second point above) and that nobody else would know of them

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

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- 3 -

except the President. In the event that a personal contact appeared advisable, I would be prepared to visit one of the three sites I have suggested on short notice. I would prefer Paris and particularly London over Ottawa, since I have never visited Ottawa and consider that there might be security problems there in view of the great attention it is now receiving from Americans who are interested in dealing with the PRC.

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7/1/71

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

Re:

Laird said
present title makes
us responsible
for accidental launches
by 3rd countries.

So do paras 2 & 3
of the text. Don't see
how this can be avoided
in view of nature &
purpose of agreement. Hs.

DRAFT
May 28, 1971

[MEASURES FOR REDUCING THE RISK OF NUCLEAR WAR ARISING FROM ACCIDENTAL OR UNAUTHORIZED USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS OR UNEXPLAINED NUCLEAR INCIDENTS]¹

[MEASURES TO REDUCE THE RISK OF NUCLEAR WAR BETWEEN THE USA AND THE USSR INCLUDING MEASURES FOR GUARDING AGAINST UNAUTHORIZED OR ACCIDENTAL USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS]²

The United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, hereinafter referred to as the Parties:

Taking into account the devastating consequences that nuclear war would have for all mankind, and recognizing the need to exert every effort to avert the risk of the outbreak of such a war, including

measures to guard against accidental or unauthorized use of nuclear weapons;

Believing that agreement on measures for reducing the risk of outbreak of nuclear war serves the interest of strengthening international peace and security, and is in no way contrary to the interests of any other country;

[Bearing in mind that, owing to the nature of this problem, continued efforts are also needed in the future to seek ways of reducing the aforementioned risk;]³

-
1. Title proposed by the US side.
 2. Title proposed by the Soviet side.
 3. Paragraph proposed by the Soviet side.

Have agreed as follows:

1. Each Party undertakes to maintain, and to improve as it deems necessary, its existing organizational and technical arrangements to guard against the accidental or unauthorized use of nuclear weapons under its control.

2. The Parties undertake to notify each other immediately in the event of detection by missile warning systems of unidentified objects, or in the event of signs of interference with these systems or with related communications facilities, if such occurrences could create a risk of outbreak of nuclear war between the two countries.

3. The Parties undertake to notify each other immediately in the event of an unauthorized, accidental or any other unexplained incident involving a possible detonation of a nuclear weapon which could create a risk of outbreak of nuclear war. In the event of such an incident the Party whose nuclear weapon is involved will immediately make every effort to take necessary measures to render harmless or destroy such weapon without its causing damage.

4. The Parties undertake to notify each other in advance of any planned missile launches if such launches are to be made to beyond national territories in the direction of the other side.

[5. In other situations involving the possibility of accidental or unauthorized use of nuclear weapons, each Party may provide

such information is warranted in the interest of fulfilling the purposes of this agreement.]⁴

[5. Each Party undertakes to act in all other situations involving nuclear weapons in such a manner as to reduce the possibility of its actions being misinterpreted by the other side. Each Party may inform the other side or request information when, in its view, this is warranted by the interests of averting the risk of outbreak of nuclear war.]⁵

6. For the purpose of transmission of urgent information, notifications and requests for information in situations requiring prompt clarification, the Parties shall make primary use of the Washington-Moscow Direct Communications Link.

For transmission of other information, notifications and requests for information, the Parties, at their own discretion, may use any communications facilities, including diplomatic channels, depending on the degree of urgency.

7. The Parties undertake to hold consultations, as mutually agreed, to consider questions relating to implementation of the provisions of this agreement, and to discuss possible amendments

4. Paragraph proposed by the US side.

5. Paragraph proposed by the Soviet side.

of nuclear war.]⁶

[8. The agreement is of unlimited duration.]⁷

**The US side reserves its position as to whether an agreement based on this document would be separate from or integral with an agreement limiting strategic armaments. **

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6. Wording proposed by the Soviet side.
 7. Paragraph proposed by the Soviet side.

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

TRADE AND TRAVEL

The Chinese to date have not responded at all to the President's June 10 list of items we have put on general license for export to the PRC, and have yet to send anyone to the U. S. in response to our offer to expedite the issuance of visas to groups or individuals wishing to visit. They have indicated privately that they wish to keep their relationship with the U. S. on a "people to people" basis, and are probably still considering how to react to our relaxations without implying a government-to-government relationship. Nevertheless, the absence of Peking commentary on the general license list suggests that they are not rejecting trade out of hand, while on travel they have admitted American newsmen and scientists and have replied affirmatively to an invitation from the American Table Tennis Association to send their team to the U. S. Things are moving, albeit only slightly, and I will attempt to stimulate further motion if at all possible.

-- As I said in my opening statement, our removal of restrictions on trade and travel does not eliminate the fundamental issues in U. S. relations with the PRC, but nevertheless is important as an indication of the direction in which we, for our part, wish to go. The President is determined to remove our share of the barriers which were erected between the U. S. and the PRC as a consequence of the Korean War.

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-- On trade, considering the fact that there has been no direct trade whatsoever between our two countries for almost 21 years, we consider the list of items we have put on general license for export to the PRC to be very broad. Additional items will be added from time to time as a matter of routine. In the meantime, I hope the Chinese will appreciate the fact that items not on the general license list may be considered for special export licenses. In 1969, fully one-half of U. S. trade with the Soviet Union was via such special licenses, and in 1970, one-third.

-- Admittedly, there is now a discrepancy between our lists of items for general license to the USSR and to the PRC, with the PRC list amounting to about 75% of the Soviet list. Frankly speaking, this was done to bring our bureaucracy along in opening direct trade between the U. S. and the PRC. There are some conservative elements in it which wanted to restrict this trade severely, and we were obliged to act in a manner calculated to minimize their objections. Now that the way has been cleared for direct trade, however we foresee no particular problem in bringing the PRC list up to the Soviet level. This would add such items as navigation and telecommunications equipment, railway locomotives, copper and copper alloys, semifabricated aluminum, road-building and earth-moving equipment, and agricultural machines with automatic transmissions. (A fuller list is at Tab A.)

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-- I will not try to be a salesman for U. S. products. The point that I wish to make is that we see no reason why direct trade between the U. S. and the PRC should not take place, and under the same general circumstances which prevail in our trade with the USSR and Eastern Europe.

-- On travel, the President and I have been pleased to see that Americans are beginning to visit China in relatively large numbers. Unlike the position taken by previous Administrations, this Administration hopes that as many Americans as possible will be able to visit the PRC, since this will contribute greatly to our understanding of one another.

-- Similarly, we hope that the Chinese will find it possible to respond in kind. As the President announced on April 14, we will expedite the issuance of visas to individuals and groups from the PRC who want to come to the U. S. They may be sure that they will be welcome, and will be able to see whatever parts of the U. S. that may interest them.

-- One area in which cultural exchanges might be both easily arranged and mutually beneficial is in the field of science. We have noted with interest that the People's Republic of China has already invited three American scientists to visit China. On our side, we understand that the U. S. National Academy of Science -- which, incidentally, is a wholly private body having no formal ties with the U. S. Government -- has been communicating with Dr. Kuo Mo-jo (pronounced Gwoh Mow Row) of the Academy of Sciences of the People's Republic of

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China on the subject of exchanging visits by scientists of both countries. We have no problem in the Chinese wishing to keep such exchanges on a non-governmental basis, and are certain that private sponsorship and support can be found for Chinese scientists wishing to come to the U.S.

-- The President also announced on April 14 that he is contemplating additional steps in the trade and travel field to broaden communications between the Chinese and American peoples. I do not believe it necessary to enumerate these steps here, but simply want to state that we are in earnest about removing the barriers to such communication.

(Note: The previous steps which have been taken by the Administration to adjust our trade and travel regulations are at Tab B.)

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ITEMS AVAILABLE TO THE USSR UNDER GENERAL
LICENSE BUT EXCLUDED FROM THE CHINA LIST

Certain petroleum and petroleum products, such as crude petroleum; certain gasoline blending agents; kerosene; distillate and residual oils.

Natural and manufactured gas, including liquified petroleum gas (L.P.G.).

Mercury, niobium, and tantalum.

Copper and copper alloys, unwrought and semifabricated.

Aluminum, semifabricated.

Certain pipe and welding rods.

Agricultural machines with automatic transmissions.

Road-building and earth moving equipment: cranes, shovels, scrapers, diggers, certain paving equipment, non-military tractors over 125 HP.

Railway equipment: locomotives, locomotive wheels and axles, tracks, controllers, and signal equipment.

Passenger cars with four-wheel drive.

Propellers, for watercraft and aircraft.

Steam boilers and certain internal combustion engines.

Certain electrical and electronic items including certain navigation and telecommunications equipment, radar, signal generators, radiation measuring devices, certain tubes, certain measuring and testing devices, certain specialized laboratory instruments, certain X-ray equipment.

Certain photographic equipment including cameras, lenses, film, papers, and processing equipment.

Toluene, crude.

Certain specialized chemicals including strontianite, strontium carbonate, pyrographite, certain synthetic films, boric acid esters, difluorethane, boron compounds, tantalum and niobium compounds, and others.

Containers for liquified gas transport.

Automatic welding machines for pipe over 19".

Paramilitary items: aqua guns, police billies, blackjacks, air pistols, air rifles, compressed air and gas-charged rifles, swords, daggers, wooden gun stock blanks.

CONFIDENTIAL

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TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE

SOUTH ASIA

1. South Asia is an area where the U. S. is pursuing no special geo-political interests of its own. (This is unlike both the Soviets and the Chinese whose positions in South Asia are each developed against the other.)

2. The U. S. interest in India and Pakistan is essentially a developmental one. In our view, the long-term peace and stability of the world will in some way be influenced by whether the fifth of the world's people there can play a constructive role in the world instead of sapping the world's resources.

3. The U. S. had a treaty relationship with Pakistan in the past -- still theoretically in effect but hardly practically -- that was directed at the USSR. It was not and is not directed at China.

4. To make these statements is not to say that the U. S. has no interest in the continued independence of the South Asian nations. The U. S. could not countenance aggression against them. Nor is the U. S. helping in their development to build them for aggression against China.

5. In the present situation the principal U. S. interests are in decreasing tension and in providing humanitarian assistance. A war would not help the people of East Pakistan, West Pakistan or India. It would create a new drain on Asian capacity to build for the future.

(One problem in making this case is that the Chinese would probably be pleased to see India weakened and possibly would be pleased to see radical elements come to the surface in East Pakistan, although that would present them with a difficult choice in their relations with West Pakistan.)

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India and Pakistan

The fact that I will have visited these two countries prior to going to Peking gives me an opportunity to lay out the U. S. approach to relations with these countries.

-- In the U. S. opinion, there would be nothing more tragic than the outbreak of a new India-Pakistan conflict. Hundreds of thousands of lives have already been lost since 1948 due to the fighting which has occurred between these two countries. In addition, their continuing confrontation turns governmental attention away from pressing economic and political problems, and makes more difficult the task of meeting the needs of millions of people.

-- Therefore, we not only do not wish to see an India-Pakistan war, we will take active steps to discourage one.

-- U. S. policy also aims at preventing further polarization in India-Pakistan relations. We give economic assistance to both and try to provide military aid to Pakistan in such a way as to meet clear-cut defense needs without encouraging military operations against India. Our military assistance to India ceased some time ago, although India continues to receive arms aid from the USSR. We, of course, can do nothing about this.

-- It is not the policy of the U. S. to stir up anti-Chinese sentiment in India. What we want to see is rather a general reduction in tensions throughout the subcontinent, in which negotiations can take the place of

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- 2 -

military force in the settlement of disputes. We don't want to play anyone off against anyone else -- this would run contrary to the Nixon Doctrine and add to the dangers of a major world conflict.

-- Toward Pakistan, we recognize that this country has enormous problems, and believe that it is in the interests of the international community to assist Pakistan in grappling with its difficulties. We are aware that the Chinese have been assisting Pakistan, and we, too, will do what we can to help.

-- We don't see any millennium approaching in the subcontinent. The way ahead for both countries will be extremely arduous even under the best of circumstances. Therefore, the best path for third parties is to avoid actions which would impede whatever prospects there may be to stabilize conditions.

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Korea

Chou En-Lai reportedly told Japanese visitors to Peking recently that the single greatest threat to Asian peace was Korea. Chinese propaganda charges the "U. S. imperialism is doing its utmost to strengthen and enlarge the puppet troops of the Pak Chong-hui clique, carrying out incessant military provocations against the DPRK, and waiting for an opportunity to unleash a new war of aggression." The Chinese also link "Japanese militarism" with their description of events in Korea. Part of the Chinese line may be pro-forma rhetorical support for the DPRK, but part may also reflect Chinese sensitivities to a potential threat to their security.

If the Chinese refer to Korea in something like the above terms, or in the event that you believe a statement of our position would be desirable, I might note that:

-- There is legitimate concern in the ROK over DPRK intentions. The ROKs are aware of Kim Il-song's dictum of October 1967 that Korea should be unified by force, and have been confronted with a whole series of provocations since, including large-scale troop landings in 1967 and a North Korean attempt to assassinate President Park.

-- The ROKs are fully aware, too, of the magnitude of the North Korean military buildup, which includes some of the most advanced types of weapons, e. g. MIG 21s and guided missile patrol boats. ROK strength is not comparable, especially in sophisticated weaponry.

-- When faced with the North Korean buildup, the ROKs of course want to modernize their forces. Recalling the events of June 1950, we agree. An imbalance of power may very easily invite an effort to exploit it militarily. But the ROK forces are essentially defensive in nature. *egard*

-- The way to defuse the Korean situation is for both the U. S. and the PRC to urge restraints on their respective allies. We have, in fact, made it plain to the ROKs that a "march to the North" would not be looked upon with favor by us. We ourselves have also acted responsibly and with restraint in response to the most blatant anti-U. S. actions by the North Koreans.

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-- It certainly is not in the interests of the U.S. to see another war develop in Korea. All concerned parties should be aware, though, that we have a mutual defense treaty with the ROK and that this treaty will be honored in the event of an attack on South Korea.

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6/28/71

Americans Detained in China

Of the four Americans whom the Chinese have told us they hold, two -- Downey and Fecteau -- are accused (legitimately) of being U.S. intelligence agents, and two -- Smith and Flynn -- are pilots shot down over Chinese territory during the Vietnam war. Being strong on principle, the Chinese may find it difficult to release Downey and Fecteau at all (or in the case of Fecteau, until his 20 year sentence is up). They would similarly probably not wish to release Smith and Flynn in advance of the time Hanoi releases the Vietnam POWs. Nevertheless, they may be willing to act favorably in the interests of improving their image before the American people if a formula can be found in which they are not put on the spot and principle will be served.

My suggested position is as follows:

- The Chinese may know that the question of the Americans detained in Communist China was raised recently before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and public interest in this issue may rise.
- I appreciate the complexities of the issue, and the strong feelings over it which exist on the PRC side,
- There are also strong feelings in the U.S. over the issue, and, of course, the question of each side's nationals being

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-2-

detained by the other side was one of the initial agenda items of our ambassadorial-level talks.

-- I am not suggesting any particular course of action to the Chinese, nor do I wish to bore them by bringing up any of the cliches which we have used in the past to deal with the issue of the detained Americans. All I want to say is that if there is any action on the U.S. part which might enter into this equation as a matter which could influence the PRC's position, I would like to know what it is.

-- As I have said elsewhere, what President Nixon is now trying to do is to disassemble on our side the barriers which have been erected between us for so many years. He is not committed to maintaining old positions, and certainly would want to consider taking whatever courses might be appropriate in working out a solution to this problem.

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AMERICANS DETAINED BY THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA

The Chinese have over the years informed us at Geneva or Warsaw that they were detaining a number of Americans, some on legal charges which the Chinese made known to us, and others against whom no charges have been reported. There are now four individuals in this category:

1. John T. Downey A Department of the Army civilian whom we believed was lost on a flight from Korea to Japan in 1952, until in November 1954 the PRC announced that he, along with another American who was on the same flight, has been sentenced for espionage and was given a life sentence. Downey was arrested by the PRC on November 29, 1952.
2. Richard G. Fecteau On the same flight as Downey. The PRC informed us in February 1955 at Geneva that Fecteau had been sentenced to 20 years.
3. Major Philip E. Smith, USAF Held since September 20, 1965, when his F-104 came down on Hainan after his navigational equipment malfunctioned over the South China Sea. The Chinese have preferred no charges, and we term him simply "a prisoner."
4. Lt. Robert J. Flynn, USN Held since August 21, 1967, when his A-6 inadvertently strayed over Kwangsi, where it was shot down. As in Smith's case, the Chinese have preferred no charges, and we call Flynn "a prisoner."

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Major Philip E. Smith

Date and place of birth: [redacted] in Roodhouse, Ill.

(b)(6)

Education: Major Smith was graduated from Roodhouse Community High School June 1952, and has completed two years (60 semester hours) at the University of Illinois.

Military Service:

Major Smith entered the Air Force November 16, 1954 and went into Aviation Cadets (Officer Training). He was commissioned June 29, 1957, and was promoted three times: 1st Lt., December 29, 1958; Captain, October 1, 1962; and Major, June 20, 1967 (after his capture). He is a regular career officer.

Major Smith has been assigned to Germany, France, and George Air Force Base, California.

Marital Status:

Wife: [redacted] (In late 1970 his wife obtained a divorce and remarried. She now is living in Georgia. It is not known whether Major Smith knows of the divorce.)

(b)(6)

Children:

[redacted]

(b)(6)

Relatives:

His father is dead and his mother is living, as presumably are his four brothers and one sister. His brother [redacted] and his mother are the primary next of kin.

(b)(6)

Lt. Robert J. Flynn

Date and place of birth: [redacted] in Houston, Minn.

(b)(6)

Education: Graduated from Houston, Minnesota High School, and attended the University of Minnesota for two years.

Military Service:

Lt. Flynn enlisted in the Navy July 9, 1958. He was an enlisted man until commissioned an ensign June 19, 1960.

Lt. Flynn's military experience included flight training, and all of his operational experience has been in attack squadrons. His last attack squadron was VA 42 at Oceana, Va. He was flying an A-6 at Oceana. He was a bombardier in an A-6 which was shot down over Kwangsi Province. This flight was from the aircraft carrier "Constellation."

The highest award Lt. Flynn has received is the Distinguished Flying Cross.

Marital Status:

Wife: [redacted] (living in Colorado Springs, Colo.)

(b)(6)

Children:

[redacted]

(b)(6)

6/28/71

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TOAST - LUNCHEON

Premier Chou, distinguished members of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China:

It is with the utmost pleasure that I find myself here in your mysterious and great country. I believe that we all can regard this meeting as an historic one -- the first occasion in which representatives of our two countries have ever met under such circumstances, and with the opportunity before us of opening a new phase in the relationship between the United States of America and the People's Republic of China. I personally am keenly aware of the responsibility with which I have been charged by President Nixon for initiating discussions with you on this relationship, and I assure you that I intend to carry out my responsibility constructively, seriously, and in a spirit of sincerity and cooperation. Now let me offer a toast to you, Mr. Premier, and to your distinguished colleagues, with the hope that our talks will make progress.

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6/28/71

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLYTOAST - LUNCHEON

Premier Chou, distinguished members of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China:

It is with the utmost pleasure that I find myself here in this ancient capital of your great country. I believe that we all can regard this meeting as an historic one -- the first occasion in which representatives of our two countries have ever met under such circumstances, and with the opportunity before us of opening a new phase in the relationship between the United States of America and the People's Republic of China. I personally am keenly aware of the responsibility with which I have been charged by President Nixon for initiating discussions with you on this relationship, and I assure you that I intend to carry out my responsibility constructively, seriously, and in a spirit of sincerity and cooperation. Now let me offer a toast to you, Mr. Premier, and to your distinguished colleagues, with the hope that our talks will make progress.

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6/28/71

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TOAST - DINNER

Premier Chou, distinguished members of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs:

I wish to express my great appreciation to you for the warm hospitality which you have offered to me and to the members of my staff in these unusual and unquestionably highly significant circumstances. More importantly, let me on behalf of President Nixon extend thanks for your contributions to the progress we have made in our talks. While we have not reached agreement on every issue, I believe that the differences between us have indeed narrowed.

I believe, too, that we now have a better understanding of each other's position and can see clearly the areas in which further progress in improving our relationship can be made despite the differences which remain between us. We have both approached our talks in what I would describe as an atmosphere of equality and mutual benefit, and in this same spirit I am sure that the arrangements for President Nixon to visit your country will be successfully completed.

Gentlemen, you know from the tenor of our talks that I am not someone who favors the use of empty rhetoric and flowery phrases. Therefore, you can be sure that I am totally sincere in saying that I

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-2-

have found our discussions not only extremely fruitful, but in a personal sense a moving and memorable experience. As an historian, I can take particular pleasure in playing some small part in what may well be one of the most important episodes in history -- the opening of a new stage of friendship in the relations between the Chinese and American peoples, and the setting aside of the climate of hostility and suspicion which has kept our nations and peoples apart for so many years.

So, speaking both on President Nixon's and my own behalf, let me propose a toast to Chairman Mao Tsetung, Vice Chairman Lin Piao, and to you, Mr. Premier. May the relationships between our countries and peoples continue to grow and prosper.

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