

SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL EXCHANGE PROPOSALS

General Background and Evidence of Chinese Interest:

The Chinese have already demonstrated their willingness to admit American scientists and medical doctors to the PRC. Several distinguished men in these fields have already been warmly received by Chou En-lai himself and have been permitted to travel to a variety of scientific and manufacturing institutions. It is likely that more such American visitors will be permitted, and the PRC may be willing to agree to initiate exchanges at least in those fields where they have unique contributions and experience, e. g.:

1. Medicine (acupuncture, skin grafts, reattaching severed limbs, abortion, treatment of special diseases, medical administration and "barefoot doctors")
2. Agriculture (new seeds, new strains, better use of fertilizer, denser planting).
3. Applied science (reflecting a two-way flow between university and factory).

State Dept. review completed

Following (at Tab A) are specific proposals for possible scientific and technical exchanges developed by the office of White House Science Adviser Dr. David. They include proposals in the areas of agricultural technologies (for higher crop yields), plant breeding, biochemical research (acupuncture), research on natural products (herbal medicine), population dynamics and family planning, schistosomiasis, (affecting millions of Chinese), public health and health care delivery, surgical techniques,

chemical synthesis, ecology and environment (recovery and recycling of industrial and societal wastes), marine resource utilization, earth resources sensing satellites, meteorology and computer-aided orthography handling.

If Chou En-lai shows a willingness to open scientific and technical exchanges, you may wish to propose a formal government-to-government agreement using Sections II, III, V, VI and IX of the Model Agreement (at Tab B). If he prefers an alternate vehicle, you could propose a Joint Announcement on Exchanges drawing on the text of the Draft Joint Announcement (at Tab C).

(Special care should be taken to avoid offering the Chinese aid or charity, given their deep sensitivities in dealing with a power which is vastly superior in its over-all scientific and technical capacities.)

In either instance exchanges could be negotiated between governmental or quasi-official institutions, e. g., the Chinese Academy of Sciences and our National Academy of ~~Sciences~~, or on our side by individual institutions or a non-official clearing house such as the Committee on Scholarly Communication with the PRC which is under the joint sponsorship of the National Academy of Sciences, the American Council of Learned Societies and the Social Science Research Council. In any event, the PRC will probably not negotiate or participate with any institution which has direct links with Taiwan.

A reference to the utility of scientific and technical exchanges is included in the text of our Draft Joint Communiqué.

PROPOSAL ON EARTH RESOURCES SENSING SATELLITES

That the United States of America and the People's Republic of China enter into a cooperative experimental program in the application of satellite-derived earth-sensing data for geological and hydrological prospecting and for agricultural survey purposes.

We are Prepared To:

- Make available to appropriate institutions of the People's Republic of China plans and proposed experimental programs for an American earth resources sensing satellite.
- Make available plans for construction of a direct readout earth station to receive telemetry signals from such a satellite system.

Possible Managing United States Organization:

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| If Governmental | -- The National Aeronautics and Space Administration |
| If Private | -- Through a university to be designated |

Background and Evidence of Chinese Interest:

Earth resources sensing data could be very valuable to the Chinese in the areas of natural resources, water supply, and agriculture. At one time, they were cooperating closely with the Russians in land-based geological prospecting technologies and would still have a great interest in improved techniques for locating their natural resources.

The experimental earth resources sensing satellite ERTS-A will be flown in March 1972 or shortly thereafter. It would be possible for the Chinese to construct a data collection system for direct readout of data from this satellite. Much experience will have to be gained in using ERTS data for practical purposes and the Chinese could contribute so-called "ground truth" information in a truly cooperative effort to refine the techniques involved.

Note of Caution: The Chinese have been in the past very sensitive to overflights of U. S. satellites over their territory, even when we have informed them through Warsaw of a given payload's purely scientific purpose. Referring to ERTS-A will also tell them that a U. S. earth sensing satellite will be able to survey their territory whether they like it or not. Hence, this proposal, while very attractive as an operational program, could be politically hazardous to suggest.

PROPOSAL ON SURGICAL TECHNIQUES

That the United States of America and the People's Republic of China enter into technical exchanges in areas of advanced surgical techniques. The purpose would be to exchange information on specialized techniques in order to improve surgical practices in both countries.

We are Prepared To:

- Arrange invitations for Chinese visitors to the leading hospitals and specialty surgical clinics in the United States.

Possible Managing United States Organization:

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| If Governmental | -- National Institutes of Health |
| If Private | -- Institute of Medicine of the National Academy
of Sciences |

Background and Evidence of Chinese Interest:

Fragmentary reports have reached the West that the Chinese have developed remarkable techniques for treatment of severe burn victims as well as for reattaching severed limbs. Each of these developments would reflect great credit upon the surgical teams that developed the procedures. There are conversely very probably, areas of surgical practice in the United States in which the Chinese would have special interest.

The United States could assemble some specialist teams to visit China and study the surgical procedures in question in detail.

In return the Chinese could suggest specialty surgical or clinical areas to us in which they would like to send teams to the United States.

PROPOSAL ON ECOLOGICAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL RESEARCH

That the United States of America and the People's Republic of China exchange technical information on ecological and environmental matters as a first step toward direct cooperation in achieving solutions for specific environmental problems.

We are Prepared To:

- Provide summary information on the nature and magnitude of environmental problems in the United States.
- Make available our latest information on air and water quality standards.
- Provide a collection of several hundred technical reports of the Office of Saline Water on studies related to development of water desalination technology.
- Dr. Abel Wolman, Professor of Sanitary Engineering at Johns Hopkins University, would be prepared to visit and lecture in China.

Possible Managing United States Organization:

- National Academy of Sciences

Background and Evidence of Chinese Interest

Chou En-lai has personally mentioned Chinese concern for protection of the environment and the natural ecology of the planet. The Chinese have set a remarkable example for other nations in the recovery and recycling of a wide variety of materials from industrial and societal wastes. Chinese efforts in this field could have important implications for over-all resource conservation in all countries.

Interdisciplinary teams of environmental specialists from each side would be exchanged for the purpose of identifying specific areas of common interest. Specific research teams would then be developed by each side. Air pollution, water pollution, waste recovery and recycling, and sanitary engineering would be areas of high priority.

The Chinese could learn from cooperating with the United States what kinds of environmental problems they may face in the future with increased industrialization and urban congestion. They could also draw on existing United States technology for solutions to specific problems.

The United States might learn of entirely new approaches to problems of waste handling, recycling, resource conservation and pollution control, which could be of great value and importance when applied in the United States.

PROPOSAL ON COMPUTER-AIDED ORTHOGRAPHY-HANDLING

That the United States of America and the People's Republic of China jointly undertake the development of an efficient computer-aided system for handling Chinese orthography.

Because of differences in the structure of the languages of our respective countries, American researchers have been interested in developing computer-aided techniques for easing problems of translation and dictionary work in order to facilitate communication. For example, Dr. Susumu Kuno of Harvard University has developed a computerized system for handling about 11,000 Chinese characters. The characters are drawn by an automatic plotting machine from simple straight-line segments. However, the readability of the text from his system has not been adequately tested, nor have improved character sets been investigated.

We are Prepared To:

- Exchange delegations of specialists in problems of linguistic research and computer technology to share information and develop cooperative research programs in this area.
- Provide samples of the character printouts from some of the present experimental American systems.

Possible Managing United States Institution:

- Harvard University

PROPOSAL ON EXCHANGES OF SPECIFIC DELEGATIONS
IN SCIENTIFIC AND SCHOLARLY AREAS

Following is a list of possible exchanges of delegations designed to develop contacts between our two countries in a variety of important areas. In each case we are prepared to facilitate the exchange of delegations as soon as it is convenient for organizations of the People's Republic of China concerned to do so.

1. The convening of a meeting of representatives of the National Academy of Sciences with representatives of the Chinese Academy of Sciences has been proposed in a letter from American Academy President Handler to the Chinese Academy. Such a meeting might facilitate a number of proposed scholarly and scientific exchanges. We endorse the holding of this meeting should it be convenient for the Chinese Academy of Sciences.

2. The American Museum of Natural History wishes to collaborate with Chinese anthropologists in attempting to relocate the bones of Peking Man.

3. The Oriental Institute of the University of Chicago and the Smithsonian Institution would like to join with Chinese scholars in archeological and anthropological studies in China.

4. A number of United States universities would like to invite Dr. Kuo Mo-Jo, President of the Chinese Academy of Sciences, to lecture on his work on the tortoise shell inscriptions of the Shang Dynasty.

5. United States educational groups at the elementary, secondary, and university levels would like to exchange visits with parallel groups in the People's Republic of China. Coordination in the United States would be handled by the Committee on Scholarly Communication with the People's Republic of China, a non-governmental agency jointly sponsored by the Social Science Research Council, the National Academy of Sciences, and the American Council of Learned Societies, or by the National Committee on U. S. - China Relations.

PROPOSAL ON METEOROLOGICAL RESEARCH

That the United States of America and the People's Republic of China increase the direct exchange of weather data and information between their two countries and enter into a cooperative program for analysis of data obtained from weather satellites.

We are Prepared To:

- Provide plans for constructing telemetry receiving equipment as well as transmitting schedules for the TIROS and NIMBUS weather research satellites.
- Provide additional NIMBUS-source weather data as well as detailed information on the NIMBUS satellite system.

Possible Managing United States Organization:

If Governmental -- The National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration

If Private -- A United States university yet to be designated

Background and Evidence of Chinese Interest

The U. S. now has access to some Chinese weather data transmitted by radio in the internationally recognized SMO code. China's heavy dependence on agriculture indicates their need for the best possible weather information and their provision of this data via the WMO system even during difficult political times in China confirms this interest.

The Chinese might construct simply APT ground equipment for obtaining direct readout of cloud cover data from U. S. weather satellites of the TIROS operational system as well as some channels from the NIMBUS series of experimental satellites. Collaboration with the US. would aim at refined interpretation and use of this data. Strong Chinese theoretical competence could yield valuable contributions in this area.

Note: It is possible that the Chinese have already built their own APT receivers without telling us, from information available in the literature.

The U. S. has developed tentative plans to move its Operation Storm Fury program (a study of the effects of seeding hurricanes) to the Pacific Ocean, where the greater incidence of seedable typhoons, as compared to Atlantic hurricanes, offers a chance of increased opportunities to conduct experiments. An early plan called for proposals by the U. S. to the Philippines, Taiwan, and Japan to cooperate with us in this experimental effort.

There is a finite danger that seeding a storm may increase its

intensity rather than decrease it. Furthermore, a large number of Pacific origin typhoons eventually strike the Chinese mainland, suggesting that any such program could not be carried out without prior consultation, or perhaps even some cooperation, with the Chinese.

Not only is this subject complicated by involvement with Taiwan, but within the last days, Japan has allegedly protested against any experimentation of this kind by the U.S. in the Pacific area. In conclusion, the fate of the U.S. proposal to move Storm Fury to the Pacific looks very uncertain; but in any case, if it should be moved, some consultation and maybe even an offer of cooperation with China would have to be considered.

Background and Evidence of Chinese Interest:

A vital problem for the Chinese is the efficient handling of their complicated system of orthography. They have reportedly made some progress in developing a Chinese typewriter, as well as a telegraphic means of transmitting their language characters, although details are unknown in the West. It can be assured, however, that further improvements in systems for handling Chinese orthography would be of great value to them.

American scientists have been applying sophisticated computerized techniques to the problems of handling symbol systems with large numbers of individual characters, such as complicated mathematical equations and Chinese orthography. Challenging research problems are encountered at the man-machine interface and in producing a final result that is graphically meaningful.

The Chinese should have ideas and practical knowledge which would be most valuable to the American scientists and technologists in their research and development of these computerized systems. If these systems were useful to the Chinese, this would be an excellent introduction for them to American computer equipment and techniques.

We would enable the Chinese to avoid the efforts and costs of research work in developing prototype systems for the computerized handling of Chinese orthography. This would be accomplished by inviting Chinese scientists to work at American universities and institutions, which have already developed prototype systems. The Chinese would benefit

from actual experience in using and evaluating these systems and would then be better able to produce their own versions. The Americans would benefit from the comments and criticisms of actual potential users of the products of their research and development.

Note: Computers and automatic plotters of a certain capacity are presently embargoed for sale to China. However, the objective of this proposal is to help the Chinese in eliminating costly exploratory research and evaluation; the Chinese could then produce their own special purpose systems.

PROPOSAL ON RESEARCH IN THE MARINE SCIENCES

That the United States and China commence a program of technical information exchanges in the multi-disciplinary area of marine sciences for the purpose of developing cooperation in finding better methods of utilizing marine resources.

We are Prepared To:

- Encourage the three major American West Coast oceanographic institutions--Scripps, Oregon State, and the University of Washington--to host a delegation of Chinese oceanographers and marine scientists for discussion of areas of common interest.

Possible Managing United States Organization:

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|---------------|--|
| If Government | -- The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration |
| If Private | -- (1) The National Academy of Sciences
(2) Scripps Institution of Oceanography |

Background and Evidence of Chinese Interest

It is apparent that with their long coastline the Chinese have a deep interest in the development of their marine resources. Their fish catch, for example, exceeds that of the U.S., and they are actively pursuing the search for oil on their continental shelf. They are reportedly embarking on a significant shipbuilding program, and they operate several research institutes working in the marine sciences.

Scripps Oceanographic Institution in the U.S. has been sending its publications to the Amoy Oceanographic Institute for some time, although there has been no reciprocal gesture by the Chinese. This means, however, there is at least some knowledge base in China of U.S. work in this area.

U.S. marine science work is high quality and broad in coverage. An excellent itinerary could be prepared for a visiting Chinese delegation to this country. On the basis of exchanges of delegations, it might be possible to identify specific areas of common interest for closer cooperation.

PROPOSAL ON CHEMICAL SYNTHESIS

That the United States and China enter into exchanges of technical information and direct research collaboration in chemical synthesis in order to develop new synthetic methods for natural products such as steroids and hormones and other complex biologically active compounds.

We are Prepared To:

- Provide appropriate institutions of the People's Republic of China with a listing of biographic and bibliographic information about United States researchers in the field of chemical synthesis, on the basis of which individuals or groups could be identified in order to arrange for contacts and mutual exchanges of delegations.

Possible Managing United States Organization:

- National Academy of Sciences
- American Chemical Society

Background and Evidence of Chinese Interest

In the early 1960's the Chinese shared with the West Germans the distinction of synthesizing insulin for the first time. Little is presently known in the West of the activities of the group in Shanghai which accomplished this feat. It is apparent, however, that the Chinese had made a strong effort in biochemistry at that time and that their protein synthesis work was at a high level of competence. This group had close contacts with Westerners before the Cultural Revolution and it is possible that they would welcome a re-establishment of contacts with Americans at this time.

The first step in establishing contact could be an exchange of delegations. The United States could assemble a highly distinguished team consisting of such investigators as: Robert Merrifield of Rockefeller University (polypeptide synthesis); and William S. Johnson and Paul Berg, both of Stanford, to visit Chinese laboratories, to meet their scientists and to assess the potential of collaborative programs. As to these initial exploratory visits, invitations for exchange of individual researchers could be issued promptly.

The Chinese would stand to benefit greatly from a United States invitation to visit the best United States institutions and groups working in chemical synthesis of natural compounds. The Chinese could familiarize themselves with the latest and most advanced tools of the synthetic chemist, which abound in this country, but are likely in very

short supply in China, such as mass spectrometers, nuclear magnetic resonance spectrometers, spectrophotometers, etc.

PROPOSAL ON AGRICULTURAL TECHNOLOGIES

That the United States and the People's Republic of China enter into cooperation in agricultural technology directed toward the improvement of existing practices in both countries and the achievement of higher crop yields.

We are Prepared To:

- Exchange delegations of researchers in the field of agronomy to explore possibilities for cooperative research.
- Supply literature and technical information on United States agricultural techniques in crop areas of interest to researchers in agronomy from the People's Republic of China. Such crops might include soybeans and other oil seeds, sorghums, wheat rice, etc.
- Provide from our collections, inocula (samples) of various recently isolated strains of nitrogen fixing bacteria for application to legume stocks in order to increase their nitrogen fixing capacity.

Possible Managing United States Organizations:

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| If Governmental | -- United States Department of Agriculture |
| If Private | -- (1) National Plant Food Institute (for fertilizers) |
| | (2) University of Illinois (for agricultural technologies) |

Background and Evidence of Chinese Interest

2

Chinese progress in solving their food problem has been considerable. Several-fold increases of yields for some crops have been achieved in the last 20 years. Recent visitors to China have reported the awareness and pride of the peasants in these accomplishments. However, recorded average yields are still below those obtained for the same crops in the U.S. Even Chou En-lai has spoken to visitors of China's interest in U.S. agricultural technologies. Agriculture will continue to be a top Chinese priority for many years.

The Chinese have accomplishments to show in the hygienic use of organic fertilizers. This subject could have important implications for the United States. Hence, it is a field in which the Chinese could make a specific technical contribution to U.S. knowledge. The U.S. would welcome an invitation to send a group of fertilizer specialists to China. A cooperative program could develop in the preparation and application of these fertilizers to specific crops. Trade relations may subsequently develop in this area.

The U.S. is interested in arranging visits for Chinese specialists to leading U.S. universities, laboratories, field stations, and farms, where important advances in agricultural technologies are represented. Specific itineraries could be arranged for observing U.S. production, storage and marketing techniques for crops such as soybeans, wheat, corn, rice or others, as the Chinese may select. The purpose of the visits would be to exchange information and identify interests which could be developed into cooperative programs.

PROPOSAL ON PLANT BREEDING

That the United States of America and the People's Republic of China undertake mutual collection and exchange of plant germ plasm, designed to lead to cooperative development of new strains of useful plant organisms for both nations.

We are Prepared To:

- Exchange delegations of researchers in the area of plant breeding.
- Supply seed samples (germ plasm) of our most recently developed strains of soybeans and other oilseed crops, sorghums, wheat and rice. Some 10-15 different samples could be provided.

Possible Managing United States Organization:

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|-----------------|------------------------------------|
| If Governmental | -- U. S. Department of Agriculture |
| If Private | -- University of Illinois |

Background and Evidence of Chinese Interest

The secret of the Green Revolution has been the application of plant breeding techniques to the development of new strains of wheat and rice with desirable yield, hardiness, and disease resistance characteristics, making possible great increases in crop yields. It is reported that the Chinese have been active and successful in these areas. However, access to American germ plasm pools would increase greatly the source materials from which they might draw for crossing experiments and further study.

China is also believed to be the primary or secondary center of origin of a number of important plant species, including soybeans, sorghums, waxey corn, leafy vegetables, peaches, apples, pears, certain citrus fruits, ornamentals known for their resistance to cold, and Camptopoca--a plant which yields an extract now being investigated by NIH as a possible anti-cancer drug.

Strong interest in specific Chinese plants now exists among U. S. plant breeders and geneticists. Small germ plasm exploration and collection teams would welcome a chance to visit China in each of the plant areas mentioned above. Cooperative programs and long-lasting contacts would develop from the experiments with the germ plasm obtained in China. Dr. Fred Hough of Rutgers University would be ready to begin experiments with unique apple strains indigenous to northeast China.

Initial contacts in this field would be made through a U.S. invitation to a team of Chinese plant geneticists and plant breeders to visit U.S. universities and research laboratories working in this field. We hope that from these contacts and conversations will develop additional visits, exchanges of seeds (germ plasm) and the kind of communication which will lead to joint plant breeding programs.

PROPOSAL ON BIOMEDICAL RESEARCH

That the United States of America and the People's Republic of China enter into research cooperation to investigate the scientific principles underlying the remarkable phenomenon of acupuncture as a technique for anesthesia and medical treatment.

We are Prepared To:

- Exchange delegations of medical specialists to explore the universally-noted Chinese developments in the use of acupuncture as a technique for anesthesia and medical treatment.
- Encourage cooperative research by medical scientists from our two countries into the varied effects of the acupuncture technique, and its causes.

Possible Managing United States Organization:

- If Governmental -- National Institutes of Health
- If Private -- (1) Federation of American Societies for
 Experimental Biology
- (2) Institute of Medicine of the National
 Academy of Sciences

Background and Evidence of Chinese Interest

2

The Chinese use extensively this traditional form of medicine in connection with modern surgery. It is a technique based on the insertion of thin needles into the body. Recent Western visitors have looked at acupuncture closely enough to conclude it is neither a hoax nor hypnosis and that it represents a physiological phenomenon, whose scientific basis is not understood. The Chinese seem proud of their successes in this field and have shown them to many Western visitors. Furthermore, it is reported that many research institutes throughout China are currently investigating the scientific basis of acupuncture.

A cooperative program together with U.S. medical researchers would give the Chinese access to a wide range of sophisticated electronic and biomedical instrumentation, which their more limited resources would likely not provide. The Chinese would bring invaluable clinical experience with the procedure to the cooperative venture. This combination of capabilities brought to bear on the problem would give a high probability of early success. Furthermore, resulting joint publications of U.S. and Chinese investigators could be an important symbol of a new U.S. -China relationship.

A first step toward establishing the program would be to seek an invitation for a multi-disciplinary team of U.S. specialists in pain physiology, anesthesia, and experimental pathology, along with biochemists, internists, and psychiatrists to spend at least one month in China examining the acupuncture procedure in detail. Contact would

also be made with the research institutes in China working to understand the scientific basis. A return visit to the U. S. by a Chinese group could provide the occasion for consideration of a joint research plan, perhaps at a U. S. -Chinese Bilateral Seminar on Acupuncture.

The Chinese will be exposed to the most modern, highly instrumented approaches to research, which should be of great interest to them.

The U. S. may discover important new physiological principles in this ancient form of Chinese medicine.

PROPOSAL ON RESEARCH ON NATURAL PRODUCTS

That the United States of America and the People's Republic of China undertake a program of information exchanges and cooperative research in the field of herbal medicine in order to isolate and identify the active principles and their modes of action.

We are Prepared To:

- Assemble an interdisciplinary team of medical and chemical specialists, including biological chemists (e. g. , E. P. Kennedy of Harvard), pharmacologists (J. Burns of Hoffman-LaRoche), and experimental pathologists (Louis Thomas of Yale), and immunologists (F. J. Dixon of Scripps Clinic), to exchange information in the area of research on natural medical products.

Possible Managing United States Organization:

- The Institute of Medicine of the National Academy of Sciences
- Federation of American Societies for Experimental Biology

Background and Evidence of Chinese Interest:

In talking with Western visitors, the Chinese have shown great pride in the successes of their traditional Chinese medicine, which utilizes many exotic preparations from indigenous herbs. However, the scientific underpinnings of these traditional techniques are yet to be elucidated. Active principles and their chemical structures may be completely unknown. Chinese interest in both the scientific and the practical aspects of medicine would suggest this to be an attractive area for cooperative work.

The first step would have to be a visit to China by a multi-disciplinary U. S. team to examine in detail the kinds of materials in use, their plant origins and their mode of application. Subsequently, a Chinese delegation could visit a series of U. S. laboratories specializing in analysis, testing, and synthesis of pharmaceutical materials. Such a visit would provide an opportunity for the Chinese to update their knowledge of modern laboratory equipment. If they chose to move ahead with a cooperative program, access to such instruments for use in the U. S. could be assured. If the program were successful, joint U. S. - Chinese teams could work on extraction, preparation, separation, analysis, structure determination and testing. There might even be opportunities for joint commercial exploitation of active materials, if any were identified as therapeutically useful.

PROPOSAL ON RESEARCH EXCHANGE IN THE AREA OF
POPULATION DYNAMICS AND FAMILY PLANNING

That the United States of America and the People's Republic of China enter into technical information exchanges and joint research cooperation in the area of population dynamics and family planning in order to find new techniques for fertility control and means of applying them.

We are Prepared To:

- Exchange delegations of qualified medical specialists in the areas of population dynamics and family planning.
- Provide experimental samples of contraceptive agents in use in the United States, such as pills, intrauterine devices (IUD's), and full clinical data on their use.
- Provide full information on United States research on prostaglandins as possible contraceptive agents.
- Provide research information on newly discovered brain hormones, which appear to function as agents interfering with the menstrual cycle and, hence, have potential as a new chemical means of fertility control.

Possible Managing United States Organization:

- Institute of Medicine of the National Academy of Sciences
- Center for Population Studies of Harvard (Dr. Roger Revelle)
- Population Council, New York (Dr. Sheldon Segal)

Background and Evidence of Chinese Interest

Population control is a high priority program in China. The birth rate has been lowered significantly in the past 20 years, and the Chinese tell Western visitors that they expect it to drop further in the future. Many methods of contraception are in use. Because research on fertility control is also a high priority program in the U.S., as well as a pivotal program for development aid activities throughout the world, it is likely that the Chinese would welcome contacts with the U.S. workers in this field.

The Chinese may have unique clinical experience applicable in the U.S. The Chinese will likely be very interested in contact with U.S. institutions doing basic research work on fertility control.

Note of Caution: Any implication that the U.S. is seeking to reduce the population of China through the subterfuge of research programs should be avoided in presenting this proposal.

PROPOSAL ON SCHISTOSOMIASIS RESEARCH

That the United States of America and the People's Republic of China enter into a cooperative research program directed to understanding, treating, and eventual eradication of the widespread parasitic disease, schistosomiasis.

We are Prepared To:

- Provide samples of experimental drugs with full test data obtained to date in the area of research on Schistosomiasis.
- Exchange information and reprints of research results concerning schistosomiasis immunology and test procedures for identifying the presence of the disease.

Possible Managing United States Organization:

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|-----------------|---|
| If Governmental | -- National Institutes of Health |
| If Private | -- Institute of Medicine of the National Academy
of Sciences |

Background and Evidence of Chinese Interest

The parasitic disease, schistosomiasis, affects millions of people throughout the world by producing chronic debility and eventual death. At one time, one of the great centers of pandemic infection was the Yangtse River Valley in China. It is reported that through a conventional, labor-intensive snail eradication program, China has greatly improved this situation. Reports have also been received of the existence of a Chinese treatment for sufferers from the disease. In the West, no safe and effective drug is known for treating infected individuals. Estimates of victims of the disease in China extend up to 100 million people. Mao himself has written a poem describing the cirulence of the disease. Although schistosomiasis is not a problem in the United States, research on the disease has been under-way for some years, both because of the extent of the infection in tropical areas abroad and because of its unique immunological and biochemical characteristics.

Little currently is known in the West about the present extent and nature of the infection in China. Any program would have to begin with an exchange of specialist teams. The U. S. approach would be novel in that we would include representatives of the fields of molecular biology and genetics, which have not traditionally been involved in research on parasitic diseases. We would propose Nobel Prize winner, Joshua Lederberg, as U. S. delegation leader. We believe that the area

of parasitic disease may be ripe for unique contributions from the newer biomedical disciplines. This would provide for the Chinese, with their strong biomedical tradition and an unknown level of competence in molecular biology, a chance to make contact with one of the fastest-moving and exciting scientific fields in America.

There have also been recent reports from Johns Hopkins University and the Squibb Pharmaceutical Company that a newly-developed anti-schistosome drug shows some promise and could perhaps be made available for clinical testing.

Note of Caution: Any implication should be avoided that the U. S. is seeking to use Chinese subjects as "guinea pigs" for chemical testing.

A Chinese team visiting the U. S. could be the beginning of an exchange of individual researchers between the U. S. and Chinese laboratories. The Chinese could also provide information on the effectiveness of their brute-force snail eradication program.

At a later time these contacts could be expanded into other areas of parasitic disease.

Note of Caution: One complicating factor in the area of schistosomiasis is that a very fruitful cooperative research program has been underway with Japan for some 6 years, as part of a broader medical cooperation activity directed toward diseases of third countries in Asia. Attention might be given to the possibility of making the U. S. - Japan program into a trilateral effort to include China or, alternatively,

starting a separate program with the Chinese independent of the on-going U. S. -Japan activity. It would seem both scientifically and politically undesirable to appear to be downgrading the U. S. -Japanese cooperation in any way or to be dumping the Japanese in favor of the Chinese.

PROPOSAL ON PUBLIC HEALTH AND HEALTH CARE DELIVERY

That the United States of America and the People's Republic of China enter into technical information exchange in the areas of public health and the delivery of health care.

We are Prepared To:

- Arrange for exchange visits of delegations of medical specialists in the fields of public health and health care delivery systems.
- Extend an invitation to a delegation from the People's Republic of China to participate in the Michigan symposium on Public Health in May 1972.

Possible Managing United States Organization:

- Institute of Medicine of the National Academy of Sciences

Background and Evidence of Chinese Interest

This country shares with China the problems of delivering medical care to remote areas, of organizing emergency care facilities, of encouraging patients to seek medical aid early in the course of an illness, and of conserving scarce resources of medically-trained manpower by effectively training and utilizing para-medical personnel. Fragmentary reports suggest that the Chinese have made great achievements in this area, including unique and effective organization of their hospital system, although detailed knowledge is lacking. It appears from reports of Western visitors that the Chinese are pleased and proud to show their achievements in these areas.

A multi-disciplinary team of U.S. specialists should spend a month or more in China. The University of Michigan's Dr. Lin Tsung Yi (a native-born Taiwanese) could play an important role in such a mission (assuming no political complications with his origin). He is already organizing a symposium to be held in Michigan in May 1972, on the subject of Public Health in China. Another who could play a leading role is Dr. Kerr White of Johns Hopkins University, a world renowned specialist in health care delivery.

The U.S. would host an appropriate Chinese delegation, providing them an opportunity during their visit to concentrate on subjects in the health or medical areas of highest priority and interest to China. It is possible that additional projects of cooperation could grow from these

exchanges, in such areas as automated diagnostic techniques and training and use of paramedical personnel.

The Chinese would very likely get favorable publicity in the West about the effectiveness of their innovations in these areas.

The U. S. might acquire very useful information for potential application to U. S. problems.

ANNEX ON SCIENTIFIC EXCHANGES

General Comments:

In preparing the previous action proposals, the Office of the President's Science Adviser has assumed, in accord with your staff's instructions, that programs would be carried out largely in a non-governmental framework. In several areas such as agriculture, medicine, and ecology, the proposals could be broadened to include activities of appropriate United States Government agencies as well.

Impinging on all of these suggestions is the paucity of current available information about science and technology in the People's Republic of China. For the most part these proposals are based on crude estimates of the nature and level of activity in China. The kind of relationship most frequently suggested is an initial exchange of delegations in order to acquire detailed information on both sides. It is assumed that these exchanges would be the basis for more specific proposals for direct cooperation and regularized exchanges of information or materials and individual research workers in connection with specific cooperative projects.

Each of these proposals represents an area where both the United States and the People's Republic of China would stand to benefit from an exchange. Most are in the fields where the Chinese appear to have unique accomplishments, of which they appear proud

and which they appear willing and pleased to show to foreign visitors. The specific suggestions are based in part on expressions of interest coming to us spontaneously from individuals and United States institutions. The proposals were developed by our staff without discussions with the possible participating institutions, because of the White House desire to minimize speculation relating to the President's visit. However, I am confident that the institutions and the individuals indicated in the proposals (or their equivalents) will be available to participate in accepted exchanges.

General Mechanism for Management of These Programs:

The most straightforward mechanism for management of a broad and continuing program of exchanges would require the designation of central, coordinating institutions in the United States and in the People's Republic of China. These bodies should have broad professional competence, and they should possess staff with contacts throughout the academic, professional, scientific, and technical communities.

The National Academy of Sciences (NAS) is well qualified to play this role on the United States side. In addition to the Academy's 13 years of experience in managing analogous exchanges with the USSR, the NAS Committee on Scholarly Communication with the People's Republic of China has been for the past 5 years the focal point of interest in the United States scholarly community in matters related to possible exchanges with the People's Republic of China.

One possible problem arises from past and continuing association of the NAS with Taiwan. The NAS position is that it has fostered cooperation with the Academia Sinica on Taiwan and will continue to do so, since its role is to further contacts among scholars throughout the world, independent of political considerations.

It has been apparent in reviewing the invitations which the Chinese have already extended to American scientists that they also lack information on our institutions and our scientific personnel. The existence of a central institution in the United States to arrange delegation visits in various disciplines and to find the most appropriate and talented people to participate would be a substantial service to the Chinese. If for some reason, the Chinese feel the NAS is unacceptable as a central manager on the United States side, it would be possible to develop the proposed programs through individual private institutions. However, we would still expect the NAS and its Committee on PRC Communication to remain in close contact with all activities and to provide advice and counsel to these independent institutions.

If it is desired to begin with a few ad-hoc exchanges in specific areas, I will be willing to assume responsibility for operations using the staff of the Office of Science and Technology.

An obvious candidate for central management on the Chinese side is the Chinese Academy of Sciences.

Recommendation:

We recommend that in conversations with the People's Republic of China about exchanges, either before or during the President's visit, that the non-governmental nature of the NAS be stressed and that its competence and positive attitude toward exchanges with the People's Republic of China be emphasized.

Funding of Exchanges:

The source of most funding for formalized scientific exchanges of Americans with other nations is the United States Government. Regardless of what may be initially done with the People's Republic of China through private channels, the United States Government will eventually have to enter the picture if United States-Chinese exchanges are to achieve any significant magnitude. I have made provisional arrangements for an initial commitment of \$200,000 from the National Science Foundation (NSF), which could be made available for such exchanges during the remainder of FY 1972. At a maximum of \$2000 per person, this would send some 100 Americans to China (in perhaps 15-20 different delegations) before the end of FY 1972. If the demand should be greater, we believe that additional monies could be diverted from other programs at NSF.

For FY 1973, John Richardson in State's Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs (CU) is planning provisionally to request \$1 million for exchanges with the People's Republic of China. NSF's allocation

could also be increased in FY 1973. In the health area it also seems certain the HEW's Fogarty Center would be willing and able to support some level of exchange if they were asked. It is also likely that the U. S. Department of Agriculture would be willing to cover some costs of exchanges with the Chinese in their areas of interest.

One mechanism of funding could involve a grant by NSF or State/CU to the NAS, which would then manage the exchanges in consultation with the Government. We would plan to monitor these exchanges closely.

A strong case should be made in favor of Federal funding on the U. S. side of these exchanges. If, however, there is no acceptable alternative to private sources, we believe that the Ford Foundation might be willing to finance such opportunities to the extent of several hundred thousand dollars a year. We have not explored this formally with Mac Bundy or others at Ford, but would be willing to do so if you judged it desirable.

A second possible source of private funding is the Rockefeller Foundation with its long and remarkable history of deep involvement with China, particularly in areas of medicine and health. With post-war Rockefeller activities stressing development, parasitic diseases and the Green Revolution, all of which are of interest to China, it would be desirable at some stage to ascertain Rockefeller's attitude toward

future activities with China, as well as their acceptability to the Chinese at this time. We have taken no initiative in this direction and would not do so unless you request us to.

Conditions of Exchanges and of Financing:

We have suggested a balanced program in which there would be exchanges of delegations in both directions. If the Chinese are less able to come to the United States, we would not object to an imbalance in the exchanges in favor of more Americans going to China, especially in the early stages of the program. This could be explained by noting that the Chinese have continued to receive and read our journals in recent years, while the cessation of publication of their journals since the Cultural Revolution has created a dearth of information in the United States about their science and technology. Even when publications were available, the language barrier has been a significant hindrance to information flow.

With regard to payment of expenses, the sending country should pay the international travel costs of its delegations going abroad. The sending country might also cover the local per diem and local travel costs of its delegations in the receiving country. However, we would favor "no currency drain" exchanges, where the receiving nation pays the costs of hosting the visitors. If NSF, State/CU, or private U.S. funding is used, there will be no difficulty in financing exchanges on this basis. For certain Government agencies, however, appropriated

funds cannot be used to pay costs of foreign visitors in any way.

Summary:

Important questions to be answered include:

1. Whether U.S. Government funding of exchanges is acceptable.
2. Whether the National Academy of Sciences would be an acceptable institution for centralized management of exchanges on the U.S. side.
3. Whether U.S. Government scientists employed by U.S. Government technical agencies would be acceptable as members of visiting delegations, provided they traveled as representatives of the NAS for the purpose of the specific exchange in question.
4. Whether the Chinese will designate a central institution to manage the exchanges on their side and, if so, what it will be.
5. Whether the receiving country would have a veto over delegation members proposed by the other side.

CULTURAL EXCHANGES (INCLUDING YOUTH AND SPORTS GROUPS)

Background and Evidence of Chinese Interest

Over the past decade Peking has maintained that Sino - U. S. cultural exchanges were a "peripheral" matter to be disposed of only after the "major issues" -- resolution of the Taiwan problem, and the establishment of U. S. - PRC diplomatic relations -- were resolved. In view of developments of the past six months, however, Peking may now be willing to discuss cultural exchange, including youth and sports, which the PRC would hope to exploit politically on a variety of external fronts.

Moderate PRC leaders may have problems justifying a Sino - U. S. cultural exchange agreement to the Cultural Revolution radicals, but this possibility should not deter us from tabling proposals in this area.

A formal official exchange agreement incorporating cultural affairs could be modeled on the January 27, 1957 agreement between the U. S. and the USSR. A draft agreement is included as the first proposal. We have tailored the wording of the agreement to take account of significant differences between the USSR and the PRC. Sections II, IV, VII and IX of the draft agreement deal with cultural matters, including youth and sports.

Apart from political considerations, Peking may however prefer to stall on formal official cultural exchanges because:

1. It can already select from a wide variety of talented private American individuals and groups who are either applying for entry to the PRC or seeking entry of PRC counterparts to the U. S.

2. It may suspect that a formal cultural exchange agreement would be exploited by the USG to "penetrate" PRC institutions and groups.

3. It may fear that such an agreement would be exploited by its "revisionist" adversaries -- especially the USSR -- to undermine the PRC's militant revolutionary image abroad.

If the PRC proves unwilling to negotiate a government-to-government agreement on cultural or other exchanges, we could suggest as an alternative the release of a joint announcement at the conclusion of the President's visit stating that the two sides had agreed to encourage exchanges, the specific details of which would be negotiated by appropriate organizations in the two countries: e. g., for cultural, youth, and sports matters on the U. S. side, the National Committee on U. S. - China Relations, and/or youth and athletic federations; on the PRC side, the Chinese People's Association Friendship with Foreign Countries, the Cultural Group under the State Council, as well as youth and sports federations.

A mild endorsement of cultural as well as scientific, technical
is
and educational exchanges/included in the text of our draft Joint
Communique.

Following is a group of suggested proposals in the fields of
sports, music , art, zoological exchanges, and radio-TV-motion
pictures. The first is a general agreement between the governments
of the People's Republic of China and the United States of America for
Cultural, Technical, and Educational Exchanges in the years 1972-
1973. If non-governmental arrangements are preferred, a series of
specific proposals to be administered by non-governmental agencies
follows the proposed government-to-government agreement.

In selecting and suggesting implementation in these various fields,
the following guidelines have been applied:

-- Include those U. S. forms with which the Chinese audience
have some familiarity or which are likely to elicit an empathetic response
from Chinese audiences.

-- Exclude U. S. political commentaries to which the PRC is likely
to take strong exception, and try to persuade PRC authorities to exclude
contemporary Chinese cultural presentations which are blatantly propa-
gandistic and therefore likely to invite only derision from American
audiences.

-- Exclude U. S. presentations which in their political or social criticism of the U. S. scene easily lend themselves to PRC propaganda exploitation against the U. S.

-- In the absence of a formal, official exchange agreement, the relative roles assumed by the Department of State's Bureau of Cultural Affairs on the one hand and the professional associations and the National Committee on U. S. - China Relations on the other would have to be decided in light of PRC sensitivity to U. S. Government participation in the exchanges. We would not, however, want to allow the PRC to exclude U. S. Government from a role in implementing the exchanges, the better to manipulate professional associations and the National Committee.

DRAFT GOVERNMENTAL AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE UNITED
STATES OF AMERICA AND THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA
FOR EXCHANGES IN CULTURAL, SCIENTIFIC, TECHNICAL, AND
EDUCATIONAL AREAS DURING THE YEARS 1972-1973

In order to promote closer understanding between our two peoples, we propose that our governments negotiate an agreement for exchanges of a cultural, scientific, technical, and educational nature for the years 1972-1973.

A draft governmental agreement, to be finally negotiated between the President of the United States and the Premier of the People's Republic of China, or their appointed agents, is attached to this proposal.

Such an agreement would be administered on the United States side by the Department of State and the United States Information Agency, unless other agencies are specified in the agreement.

Model for Cultural, Scientific, Technical, and
Educational Exchange Agreement

By agreement between the Governments of the United States of America and the People's Republic of China, delegations headed on the United States side by _____ and on the People's Republic side by _____ conducted negotiations in _____ from _____ to _____, with regard to cultural, scientific, technical, and educational exchanges between the United States of America and the People's Republic of China. As a result of these negotiations, which have been carried on in a spirit of mutual understanding, the United States and the People's Republic have agreed to provide for the specific exchanges which are set forth in the following Sections during 1972 and 1973 in the belief that these exchanges will contribute significantly to the betterment of relations between the two countries, thereby contributing to a lessening of international tensions.

SECTION I

General

(1) The visits and exchanges enumerated in the following Sections are not intended to be exclusive of others which may be arranged by agreement of the two countries.

(2) The exchanges provided for in the following Sections shall be subject to the Constitution and applicable laws and regulations in force

in the respective countries. It is understood that both parties will use their best efforts to have these exchanges effected in accordance with the following Sections.

SECTION II

Exchanges of Radio and Television Broadcasts and Motion Picture Films

(1) Both parties will provide for an exchange of radio and television broadcasts on the subjects of science, technology, industry, agriculture, education, public health, and sports.

(2) Both parties will provide for an exchange of 10 documentary films in accordance with a list to be mutually agreed upon by the two parties.

(3) Both parties will provide for an exchange of samples of equipment for sound-recording and telecasting and their technical specifications.

SECTION III

Exchange of Groups of Specialists in Industry, Agriculture and Medicine

(1) Both parties agree to provide for an exchange of delegates in 1972 in the field of industry. (Specifics to be negotiated.)

(2) Both sides will provide for the exchange of delegations of specialists in agriculture. (Specifics to be negotiated.)

(3) Both parties agree to provide for the exchange of _____ medical delegations. (Numbers and fields to be specified in negotiation.)

SECTION IV

Visits by Representatives of Cultural, Civic, Youth and Student Groups

(1) For the purpose of establishing contacts, exchanging experiences and becoming more familiar with the public cultural life of both countries, the Chinese side will arrange to invite to the People's Republic of China during 1972 groups of American writers, composers, painters and sculptors and performing artists. The United States side reciprocally will arrange to invite similar Chinese groups to visit the United States.

(2) Both parties will provide for the exchange in 1972-1973 of delegations of representatives of youth and delegations of women in various professions.

SECTION IV

Visits by Scientists

(1) The Academy of Sciences of the People's Republic of China and the National Academy of Sciences of the United States will on a reciprocal basis, provide for the exchange of groups or individual scientists and specialists for delivering lectures and holding seminars on various problems of science and technology.

(2) The Academy of Sciences of the People's Republic of China and the National Academy of Sciences of the United States will, on a reciprocal basis, provide for the exchange of scientific personnel and

specialists for the purpose of conducting joint studies and for specialization for a period of up to one year.

(3) The details of exchanges mentioned in paragraphs (1) and (2) will be agreed upon directly between the presidents of the Academy of Sciences of the People's Republic of China and the National Academy of Sciences of the United States.

SECTION VI

Exchange of University Delegations

(1) Both parties will provide for the exchange in 1972 of four delegations of university professors and instructors for a period of 2 to 3 weeks in the fields of natural sciences, engineering, education, and liberal arts.

(2) Further exchanges of delegations of professors and instructors of universities of the United States of America and the People's Republic of China shall be decided upon as appropriate by both parties.

SECTION VII

Exchange of Individual Athletes and Athletic Teams

Both parties will provide for an exchange of individual athletes and athletic teams and in 1972-1973 will provide for the holding of the following contests in the United States and in the People's Republic of China.

(1) Basketball games between representative men's and women's teams to be held in the People's Republic of China in 1972.

(2) Basketball games between representative men's and women's teams to be held in the United States in 1973.

(Other events to be specified.)

The details of these exchanges of athletes and athletic teams as well as financial arrangements for these exchanges shall be discussed between appropriate American and Chinese sports organizations.

SECTION VIII

Development of Tourism

Both parties will promote the development of tourism.

SECTION IX

Exchange of Exhibits and Publications

(1) Both sides agree in principle on the usefulness of exhibits as an effective means of developing mutual understanding between the peoples of the United States and the People's Republic. Toward this end both sides will provide for an exchange of exhibits on the peaceful uses of atomic energy in 1972.

(2) Both parties will promote the further development of exchange of publications and various works in the field of science and technology between scientific institutions and societies and between individual scientists and specialists.

(3) Provisions will be made for the Central Scientific Medical Library of the Ministry of Health of the People's Republic of China and corresponding medical libraries in the United States to exchange medical journals.

(4) Both parties agree to the exchange of exhibits of animals from their respective zoos.

SECTION X

Establishment of Direct Air Flights

Both parties agree in principle to establish on the basis of reciprocity direct air flights between the United States and the People's Republic. Negotiations on terms and conditions satisfactory to both parties will be conducted by appropriate representatives of each Government at a mutually convenient date to be determined later.

SECTION XI

Entry into Force

The present agreement shall enter into force on the date it is signed. IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned, duly authorized, have signed the present agreement and have affixed their seals thereto

DONE, in duplicate, in the English and Chinese languages,
both equally authentic, at _____ this _____
day of _____, one thousand nine hundred seventy-one.

FOR THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA:

FOR THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA:

PROPOSAL ON SPORTS EXCHANGES

That the United States of America and the People's Republic of China agree to exchanges in sports for competitive matches, exhibition matches, or solo exhibitions in one or more of the following sports on each side: on the United States side, tennis, basketball, and ice skating; and on the Chinese side, ping pong, gymnastics, and soccer.

We are prepared to:

-- Arrange invitations for competitive or exhibition matches or solo exhibitions in the United States by the Chinese teams or groups beginning as soon as is convenient on the Chinese side.

Possible Managing United States Organizations:

If governmental, the Bureau of Cultural Affairs of the Department of State.

If private, the national sports associations in each of these fields, assisted by the National Committee on United States-China Relations.

PROPOSAL ON MUSICAL AND BALLET/DANCE
EXCHANGES

That the United States and the People's Republic of China agree to exchanges in music, ballet, and the dance, selecting from the following: on the United States side, vocalists or piano or violin soloists, a string quartet, a chamber orchestra, a symphony orchestra (the Philadelphia Orchestra has expressed interest), a classical ballet troupe, or a modern dance troupe; and on the Chinese side, vocalists, or piano or violin soloists, a classical Chinese musical ensemble, a classical Chinese orchestra or symphony orchestra, a Peking opera troupe, or a classical Chinese dance troupe.

We are prepared to:

-- Arrange invitations for appearances of any of the above Chinese artistic soloists or groups as soon as is convenient.

Possible Managing United States Organizations:

If governmental, the Bureau of Cultural Affairs of the Department of State.

If private, the National Committee on United States-China Relations or some other appropriate group.

PROPOSAL FOR EXCHANGES IN RADIO-TV-MOTION PICTURES

That the United States and the People's Republic of China agree to exchanges of radio and television broadcasts on science, technology, industry, agriculture, education, public health, and sports, and to exchange 10 documentary films each (the broadcasts and films to be agreed upon subsequently between the two sides).

We are prepared to:

-- Facilitate technical arrangements for broadcast exchanges and for film viewing in the United States.

Possible Managing United States Organizations:

If governmental, the United States Information Agency.

If private, the National Association of Broadcasters and the Motion Picture Association of America, with the assistance of the National Committee on United States-China Relations.

PROPOSAL FOR EXCHANGES IN THE VISUAL ARTS

That the United States and the People's Republic of China agree to exchanges in the visual arts which would include one or more of the following subject areas: on the United States side, exhibitions of paintings, sculpture, or photography, or lecture exhibitions by artists as individuals or in small groups (3-6 persons); and on the Chinese side, exhibitions of paintings, porcelains, ivory or lacquer carvings or bronzes, or lecture exhibitions by artists as individuals or in small groups (3-6 persons).

We are prepared to:

-- Arrange exhibitions and lectures at appropriate places throughout the United States as soon as is convenient for the Chinese side.

Possible Managing United States Organizations:

If governmental, the Cultural Affairs Bureau of the Department of State.

If private, the National Committee on United States - China Relations or some other appropriate group.

PROPOSAL ON ZOOLOGICAL EXCHANGES

That the United States and the People's Republic of China agree to zoological exchanges either through temporary exchange or reciprocal purchase of animals or through exhibitions of animals, or both.

We are prepared to:

-- Facilitate the exchange or reciprocal purchase of animals on the part of the United States zoological institutions, or arrange for exhibitions by Chinese zoological institutions at appropriate places in the United States.

Possible Managing United States Organizations:

If governmental, the National Zoological Park or the Smithsonian Institution.

If private, the National Committee on United States-China Relations or some other appropriate group.

ACADEMIC AND SCHOLARLY EXCHANGES

General Background and Evidence of Chinese Interest:

The academic area is one of considerable sensitivity to the Chinese leadership. Where we have our problems with the "new left," they are bugged about the "bourgeois right." The Cultural Revolution began by dismantling the university system which had been built up during the first two decades of Party rule; and the Chinese are just in the process of rebuilding along "Maoist" lines their entire educational system. Mao himself has long had a personal allergy to the traditionally elitist and anti-physical labor orientation of China's intellectuals; and in 1957 many Western-trained Chinese intellectuals criticized the CCP, thus undercutting Mao's policy of letting a "hundred flowers bloom and a hundred schools of thought contend." Hence it is not certain how much receptivity the Chinese leadership will display to exchanges of an academic nature which will strengthen the foreign ties and "bourgeois" orientation of their intellectuals.

To the degree that they are interested in strengthening their base of scientific and technical manpower for purposes of economic development, however, or wish to broaden their understanding of, and access to, our country, they may be receptive to exchanges in the academic area. Moreover, as the Chinese see the "revolutionary intellectuals" of a society as the social class most receptive to their ideological appeal, they may attempt to cultivate supporters in our country through academic exchanges.

Following is a series of proposals for exchanges of an academic or scholarly nature which are designed to draw out the Chinese in areas where we anticipate they would be interested in acquiring information or contacts in American society. These proposals are intended to encourage them to develop ties with "responsible" organizations or institutions, and in relatively non-sensitive subject areas.

PROPOSAL FOR EXCHANGES OF SCHOLARLY AND
SCIENTIFIC JOURNALS AND PUBLICATIONS

In order to facilitate the exchange of scientific and scholarly information between the People's Republic of China and the United States, we propose that discussions be initiated between appropriate scholarly and scientific bodies of our respective countries to agree upon lists of journals or other publications in those areas where both sides desire exchanges.

- On the American side, we suggest that the Committee on Scholarly Communication with the People's Republic of China, a non-governmental organization jointly sponsored by the National Academy of Sciences, the Social Science Research Council, and the American Council of Learned Societies, is the most appropriate representative body to conduct such discussions.
- We propose that as early as is convenient, a responsible organization or organizations of the People's Republic of China constitute a delegation to visit the United States to begin discussions on exchanges of such journals and other publications with the Committee on Scholarly Communication with the People's Republic of China.

PROPOSAL ON EXCHANGES OF ACADEMIC DELEGATIONS

In order to develop contacts between the United States and the People's Republic of China in areas of scholarly and scientific research, and to facilitate the exchange of information between our two countries, we propose that discussions be initiated between appropriate academic bodies on both sides in order to arrange for the exchange of academic delegations in a variety of fields. Ecology, agricultural research, the marine sciences, linguistics, historiography, economic^S, and education are among the academic areas in which we hope that contacts might develop.

-- On the American side, we suggest that the Committee on Scholarly Communication with the People's Republic of China, a non-governmental organization jointly sponsored by the National Academy of Sciences, the Social Science Research Council, and the American Council of Learned Societies, is the most appropriate representative body to conduct such discussions.

-- We propose that as early as is convenient, a responsible organization or organizations of the People's Republic of China constitute a delegation to visit the United States to begin discussions on exchanges of academic delegations with the Committee on Scholarly Communication with the People's Republic of China.

PROPOSAL TO HAVE ACADEMIC RESEARCHERS FROM
THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA CONDUCT RESEARCH
IN THE UNITED STATES IN THEIR AREAS OF SPECIALIZATION

In order to develop contacts between the United States and the People's Republic of China in areas of scholarly and scientific research, we propose that interested organizations of the People's Republic of China identify individuals or groups of academic researchers in scholarly or scientific subjects who would like to conduct research work in the United States in their areas of specialization for periods of time up to one year.

-- On the American side, in order to conduct discussions to arrange for such researchers from the PRC to work for certain periods at academic or scientific institutions in our country, it is suggested that the most appropriate organization to make such arrangements is the Committee on Scholarly Communication with the People's Republic of China, a non-governmental organization sponsored jointly by the National Academy of Sciences, the Social Science Research Council, and the American Academy of Learned Societies.

-- We propose that as early as is convenient, responsible organizations of the People's Republic of China contact the Committee on Scholarly Communication with the People's Republic of China to begin discussions which would enable researchers from China to spend periods of time doing work

**in their subjects of specialization at appropriate academic
institutions in the United States.**

PROPOSAL TO HAVE GROUPS OF STUDENTS CONDUCT
LANGUAGE STUDY ON A RECIPROCAL BASIS IN OUR
RESPECTIVE COUNTRIES

In order to deepen mutual understanding between our two countries, it is proposed that student groups of up to fifteen (15) students each from the People's Republic of China and the United States of America be exchanged in order to conduct study of our two countries' respective languages for periods of up to three years in duration.

-- On the American side, in order to conduct discussions to arrange for such language student exchanges, it is suggested that the most appropriate organization to make such arrangements is the Committee on Scholarly Communication with the People's Republic of China, a non-governmental organization sponsored jointly by the National Academy of Sciences, the Social Science Research Council, and the American Academy of Learned Societies.

-- We propose that as early as is convenient, responsible organizations of the People's Republic of China contact the Committee on Scholarly Communication with the People's Republic of China to begin discussions which would facilitate such student exchanges.

JOURNALISM

Background and Evidence of Chinese Interest:

The problem of reciprocity is particularly relevant to proposals for exchange of journalists. To date the Chinese have shown considerable sophistication in selecting a small number of American journalists for controlled, limited-time access to their country. By this approach they have skillfully maximized impact on public opinion in the United States in a manner favorable to their immediate interests of admission to the U.N. and an easing of tensions with the Administration in preparation for the President's visit.

To date the Chinese have shown no interest in sending their journalists to the U. S. Their eventual admission to the U. N. , and expanding role in world affairs, however, may now incline them to want their news media stationed in this country on a permanent basis.

Further, evidence indicates that their interest in journalistic access to this country will be shaped to a substantial degree by their intelligence-gathering and propaganda requirements. The Chinese domestic press has shown very little interest in reporting on the American scene. Peking seems to use press material on the U. S. largely in its propaganda to "third world" audiences.

Given these general considerations, following are two proposals on exchanges of representatives of our news media, one of a temporary and one of a permanent nature. The proposals are structured on the basis

of full reciprocity. It is suggested that we initially propose the permanent exchange of media representatives, with the temporary exchange a fall back position.

PROPOSAL ON EXCHANGES OF PUBLIC MEDIA BUREAUS

That the United States of America and the People's Republic of China facilitate the establishment of permanent representatives of their respective news media in the two countries by no later than the end of June of 1972.

We propose that the New China News Agency and other news media of the People's Republic of China send representatives to the United States to establish permanent offices on a pattern reciprocal with the establishment of facilities for American news media in the People's Republic of China.

- Because of differences in the organization of public news media in our respective countries, and in order to facilitate the growth of relations between our two countries on the basis of full equality, we propose that equal numbers of newsmen be permitted to reside in our respective countries. As an initial figure, we propose that ten (10) journalists or other media representatives from each side be permitted to reside in the other country.
- Because of the varied types of news media in the United States, we propose that the total of American newsmen permitted to reside in the People's Republic of China include

representatives of the two major American "wire services" (United Press International, and the Associated Press) and some combination of representatives of the major radio and television networks (American Broadcasting Company, Columbia Broadcasting Station, National Broadcasting Company), the major national daily papers (New York Times, Washington Post, etc.) and news magazines (Time, Newsweek, etc.). We are prepared to welcome a similarly diverse group of media representatives from the People's Republic of China.

-- We propose that media representatives of our two countries be permitted roughly equivalent sites of residence; that is, establishment of American media facilities in Peking would be equivalent to Chinese facilities in Washington, with a similar arrangement between Shanghai and New York, Canton and San Francisco. Additional siting arrangements would be considered through further discussions between representatives of the two governments.

-- We propose that equivalent travel opportunities be permitted for media representatives of our two countries. For our part, we are prepared to facilitate unrestricted travel by media representatives of the People's Republic of China throughout the United States.

-- We propose that visa applications from newsmen of our two countries be processed through our respective embassies at Ottawa, Canada.

General Comments

In designing this proposal for the permanent exchange of media representatives, the problems encountered by American journalists in the Soviet Union have heightened our concern about the Chinese trying indirectly to control the quality of news reporting from their country by playing competing papers on wire services off against each other. Their most powerful lever is to grant visas only to those journalists who write material "friendly" to their position, thus inhibiting newsmen in China from writing critical material, or encouraging a journal seeking access to tailor its material to official PRC visa requirements.

We assume that the Chinese authorities will never surrender their authority to pick and choose among journalists in granting visas. Thus, while the above mentioned problem is not dealt with directly in this proposal, a diversity of American media representatives in the PRC, and our own ability to control visas for Chinese newsmen in the United States, gives us some degree of protection. Ultimately, however, open journalism in both countries requires a degree of trust and mutual confidence not now present in the relations between our two countries.

PROPOSAL ON TEMPORARY EXCHANGES OF NEWSMEN:

That the People's Republic of China and the United States of America encourage the exchange of representatives of their respective news media for visits of approximately one month.

We are prepared to:

- grant visas to media representatives from the People's Republic of China through the American Embassy in Ottawa, Canada on a pattern roughly equivalent to that now established by your government in its admission of American journalists for tours of approximately one month to various parts of China. We are prepared to see such visits by journalists from the People's Republic of China begin at any time.

We hope that such temporary exchanges of newsmen will soon lead to the establishment of permanent facilities in our respective countries for representation of our various news media on a fully equivalent basis.

LIFE, JULY 30, 1971

by EDGAR SNOW

Many are the answers and speculations offered to explain why President Nixon sought and accepted an invitation to Peking, but why were the Chinese responsive? Is it forgotten in Peking that Nixon built his early career on witch-hunting and climbed to the Senate and vice-presidency on the backs of "appeasers in the State Department" who sold China to Russia? Why should Mao Tse-tung, with a fierce domestic purge safely behind him, seeing America's Vietnam venture a shambles and believing its political and economic position to be in serious trouble abroad and at home, accept a belated olive branch? And if Nixon is not going to China just to eat shark fins, what may his hosts serve as side dishes—and what may they expect in return?

The question about Nixon has been partly answered for us by Chairman Mao in my earlier report. He told me that Nixon, who represented the monopoly capitalists, should be welcomed simply because at present the problems between China and the U.S. would have to be solved with him. In the dialectical pattern of his thought Mao has often said that good can come out of bad and that bad people can be made good—by experience and right teaching. Yes, he said to me, he preferred men like Nixon to social democrats and revisionists, those who professed to be one thing but in power behaved quite otherwise.

Nixon might be deceitful, he went on, but perhaps a little bit less so than some others. Nixon resorted to tough tactics but he also used some soft tactics. Yes, Nixon could just get on a plane and come. It would not matter whether the talks would be successful. If he were willing to come, the chairman would be willing to talk to him and it would be all right. It would be all right, whether or not they quarreled, or whether Nixon came as a tourist or as President. He believed they would not quarrel. But of course he would offer criticism of Nixon. The hosts would also make self-criticism and talk about their own mistakes and shortcomings—for instance, their production level was lower than that of the United States.

What has happened since January 1965 to change Mao's mind? At that time I asked the chairman if there was any message I might deliver to President Johnson, and his answer was *Pu-shi* (No!) and nothing more. Even so, Mao said then that one possible solution to the Vietnam conflict still was a new Geneva conference to end the fighting and guarantee Indochina's independence. That message reached the State Department, but the "option" was almost immediately closed out by Johnson's bombing of North Vietnam.

In an unprecedented gesture toward an American, Mao had author Snow at his side last year as he reviewed the October Day parade.

In that 1965 interview Mao had made it clear enough that he did not expect the Americans to desist until they had learned, the hard way, that they could not impose their political will on revolutionary Vietnam by military violence.

The Chinese believe that the lesson of Vietnam, and no mere change of Presidents, is what made it possible for Mao in 1970 to speak differently about Nixon. "Experience" had made Nixon relatively "good." Other major changes had also altered their view: antiwar resistance inside the United States; the formation of an alliance linking Hanoi, the VC and resistance forces in Cambodia and Laos, unilaterally backed by Peking. And there had been changes inside China itself, including the sobering growth of nuclear missiles and delivery capacity.

Theoretically, the Chinese believe, Nixon had various options along the way and did make use of them as tactical threats for a time—as in Cambodia and Laos. But the end was near. Once the decision was taken to get out of Vietnam, clearly a U.S. understanding with China became imperative. The President had not only to safeguard his rear against possible destruction by a China-backed North Vietnam offensive, but also to cope with domestic and world political repercussions of withdrawal.

That was the general view in 1970 from the Heavenly Peace Gate, but preparations continued

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In the summer of 1969, the Nixon administration had publicly urged an easing of tensions with China; later that year it had stopped the Taiwan Straits patrols and the Chinese took note, of course. The administration also proposed to resume the suspended Warsaw talks at any mutually agreeable time or place. In January 1970 preliminary Sino-American talks opened in Warsaw. They were immediately suspended after the Cambodian invasion. But Nixon went ahead, carried out a stage-by-stage elimination of trade embargoes against China, and lifted travel bans between the two countries. Early this spring a presidential commission advocated a U.N. seat for mainland China, for the first time officially calling it the People's Republic. Peking leaders remained suspicious—especially of a double-cross play between Moscow and Washington.

By late autumn of 1970 several urgent and authentically documented inquiries reaching China had indicated that the President wished to know whether he or his representative would be received in Peking. An indirect answer was contained in an interview given to me by Chou En-lai in November when he said that Sino-American conversations could be opened but only if the Americans demonstrated a "serious" desire to negotiate. To the initiated, "serious" meant, first of all, a realistic attempt to work out a program to deal with the Taiwan problem. As Mao and Chou see it, that was and is the key to all other Asian settlements. Evidently sufficient assurances were forthcoming. When Chou En-lai led my wife and me to stand beside Chairman Mao's side last October, and to be photographed at the anniversary parade, no American had ever been so noticed. Nothing China's leaders do publicly is without purpose. Discerning people realized that something new was happening. Then came the Ping Pong gesture. Chairman Mao had talked to me in December, and after the Ping Pong gesture I was able to report that he would welcome Mr. Nixon or his personal representative to Peking. A new horizon was already in sight.

My LIFE article was translated and widely circulated in China among political and army leaders. They could not, therefore, have been much astonished by the recent Peking-Washington joint announcement. Though China's press may carry only a few lines, the whole subject today is undoubtedly being cautiously discussed and explained down to the commune level. Only one thing may have surprised the Chinese: Mr. Kissinger's success in keeping his visit secret. Experience with American diplomats during World War II had convinced Chinese leaders that Americans could not keep secrets.

...aware not only of the international impact of Mr. Nixon's plans, but also of the domestic effects and side benefits to his present and future political career. Discussing Nixon's possible visit to China, the chairman casually remarked that the presidential election would be in 1972, would it not? Therefore, he added, Mr. Nixon might send an envoy first, but was not himself likely to come to Peking before early 1972.

By 1970 China had passed through the ordeal of a great purge, much time had been lost in domestic construction, and many fences had to be mended or newly built to end China's international isolation. The period of internal tension was largely over. Now, if there was a chance to recover Taiwan—Mao's last national goal of unification—and for China to be accepted as an equal in recognition of her great size, achievements and potential, why not look at it? Nothing in Mao's thought or teaching ever called for a war against the U.S. or for a war of foreign conquest, and nothing in Mao's ideology places any faith in nuclear bombs. The burden of building bombs and counterattack silos is very heavy indeed and likely to become more so; China has more than once called for their total abolition.

Very high among the reasons why Sino-American rapprochement interests China is to improve her strategic position in dealing with Russia. With America off the Asian continent, the danger of a Soviet-American gang-up dispelled and a seat of her own in the U.N., Peking's maneuvering power would obviously be enhanced.

Did Mr. Kissinger understand, then, that China was ready to talk from a position of strength, not weakness? China's leaders respect Kissinger. They know him through their own intelligence system and through his writing. Discussing him with an old friend and close comrade-in-politics of Premier Chou one evening in Peking, I was struck by his frank delight at the prospect of crossing verbal swords with such a worthy adversary. "Kissinger?" he said. "There is a man who knows the language of both worlds—his own and ours. He is the first American we have seen in his position. With him it should be possible to talk."

The immediate issues examined at the meeting between Chou and Kissinger—and the agenda ahead—are very concrete and could scarcely have been anything very new to either side. As the Chinese see it, solutions would involve these turning-point decisions for Nixon: (1) seating the People's Republic in the United Nations and the return of Taiwan to mainland sovereignty, (2) total U.S. withdrawal from Vietnam and arrangements for an international conference to guarantee Indochina's independence, and for a negotiated Hanoi-Saigon settlement which would preserve

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some shell of the American-made regime, at least for a decent interval, and (3) the establishment of formal Sino-American diplomatic relations. On all these matters, some rough negotiable script had to be brought back to Nixon to enable him to accept Premier Chou's invitation.

China's formula for Taiwan has always been negotiable whenever American leaders so wished. As repeatedly defined, it requires two steps: first, that the U.S. and China jointly declare their intention to settle all disputes between them, including the Taiwan dispute, by peaceful negotiation. Second, that the U.S. recognize Taiwan as an inalienable part of the Chinese People's Republic and agree to withdraw its armed forces from Taiwan and the Taiwan Straits. Specific steps on how and when to withdraw would be matters for subsequent discussion.*

China contends that the dispute with the U.S. over Taiwan is an international question whereas her interrupted civil war with Chiang Kai-shek is a strictly internal question. Once American agreement to withdraw from Taiwan is conceded in principle, many terms would have to be defined. Peking is likely to be found reasonable in both the procedures for the dissolution of the American position and in dealing with Taiwan itself—perhaps even granting a degree of autonomy to Chiang Kai-shek if he should wish to remain governor there for his lifetime.

China will never publicly renounce what it considers its ultimate sovereign right to recover Taiwan by force if necessary. However, there is now a likelihood that a non-military solution will be worked out by the Nationalists and the Communist Chinese themselves. The opening of serious Sino-American talks may have already provoked renewed covert conversations between Taiwan and Peking in a search for the possible terms of assimilation. That is no doubt one of Nixon's hopes. Mao Tse-tung has pointed out to me that peaceful assimilation of Taiwan is his aim—reminding me of several cases in the Chinese civil war when other provinces acceded without fighting.

Nixon has now declared his readiness to see China seated in the U.N. But he also wishes to retain a seat there for the Taiwan regime. China will not enter the U.N. on that condition. Whether the U.N. members themselves seat Peking and simply drop Taiwan, or whether Taiwan withdraws its delegation in protest, the Chinese believe that Taiwan cannot long function in the U.N. once a majority of its members cease to recognize it.

A settlement in Taiwan obviously cannot be a case-fire agreement and withdrawal in Vietnam, nor can the latter await the former. Nothing less than total evacuation of all foreign forces from Vietnam will satisfy Peking's Hanoi allies, as indicated by protests already coming from Hanoi and warnings to Peking against Nixon's perfidy. Peking cannot permit Russia to exploit differences of this nature, and it has surely been made clear to Kissinger that no Geneva conference solution can be advanced by China that does not have the full support of Hanoi and the NLF.

Such are the regional issues that must be settled before any across-the-board *détente* can be reached in East Asia and the broader Pacific. To define China's less immediate but parallel aspirations on a global scale is beyond the scope of this report, but that they include continued support for revolutionary struggle—"in the interest of China and the whole world," to quote the new party constitution—is obvious.

On his visit to Peking the President would be entering a nation with which his country has no diplomatic relations and one in which the real chief of state holds no executive office. Meet the party chairman Nixon certainly would, but in all probability Chou would do most of the negotiating.

What sort of man will the President see in Chou En-lai? Chou is clearly one of the world's ablest negotiators. Handsome and exuding charisma, he is, now in his 73rd year, tireless. In August 1967, Chou negotiated his way out of his most perilous moment in the Cultural Revolution. Though idolized by youth, he was, for more than two days and nights, surrounded in his offices in the Great Hall by half a million ultra-leftist Red Guards. Their leaders—some later arrested as counter-revolutionaries—were seeking to seize the files of the Central Committee—and Chou himself. Mao and Lin Piao were both absent. By talking to small groups, day and night, Chou gradually persuaded the masses—so Chou called them in talking to me—to disperse. It was only following that incident that Lin Piao brought thousands of troops into the capital, and the disarming and breakup of the Red Guards began in earnest—with heavy casualties.

Kissinger is said to have spent 20 of his 49 hours in Peking talking to the premier. That is nothing extraordinary. One of several interview-conversations I had with him lasted from the dinner table one evening until six the next morning. I was exhausted, he seemingly as fresh as ever. "I must let you get some sleep," I mumbled.

He threw back his head and laughed. "I've already had my sleep," he said. "Now I'm going to work." His night's rest had been a catnap before dinner.

Chou told me that he had taken one vacation

Cpower, he has been a zestful worker in pursuit of national and revolutionary power politics. Chou's affable manner masks viscera of tough and supple alloys; he is a master of policy implementation with an infinite capacity for detail. His personal contacts are innumerable. He combines an administrative efficiency hard to reconcile with his ubiquity. His self-effacing dedication makes him Mao's indispensable alter ego.

Symbiosis is perhaps the best word to describe their relationship. Very different in working style and personality, Mao and Chou complement each other as a tandem based on 37 years of trust and interdependence. Chou was never a mandarin but his grandfather was, and he confesses to a feudal background, although he spent 20 years in peasant surroundings as a guerrilla. Mao is a peasant-born intellectual genius to whose intuitive and experienced knowledge of the people Chou habitually defers.

Mao is an activist, a prime mover, an originator and master of strategy achieved by alternating surprise, tension and easement. He distrusts long periods of stability and is never satisfied with the pace of change, but he is practical and capable of great patience in achieving a goal by stages.

Chou welcomes the detailed execution of a plan—which bores Mao—and the more complex the problem the better. Chou quickly cuts to the heart of matters, drops the impractical, dissimulates when necessary, and never gambles—without four aces. Chou works best when the revolutionary pendulum has swung to a point of stability. He is a builder, not a poet.

In talks I have had with China's two great men it usually is Chou who meticulously answers the main questions and Mao who listens, adds a few words of caution or elucidation, and enlarges the broad and dialectical view. Chou attends countless large banquets, apparently with relish. Mao

detests feasts and prefers small groups. Chou is an cooked in the hotly seasoned Hunan style. Both men drink very little, and each is highly disciplined in his own style. In negotiating with President Nixon, Chou will probably do the nitty-gritty work, in close collaboration with Mao behind the scenes. But the final decisions will be Mao's.

Whatever the Chinese may think of Nixon's motives, he has earned their appreciation by the courtesy of coming to see them, thereby according prestige to Mao Tse-tung and *amour-propre* to the whole people. Vassal kings of the past brought tributes to Peking, but never before the head of the world's most powerful nation. The gesture in itself may go far to assuage the rancor and resentment accumulated during the past two decades. There is some risk that the gesture could be misinterpreted to the Americans' disadvantage, but more likely it will be accepted with full grace and improve chances of mutual accommodation.

The millennium seems distant and the immediate prospect is for the toughest kind of adjustment and struggle. China must satisfy Korea and Vietnam, and the U.S. cannot jettison Japan. The danger is that Americans may imagine that the Chinese are giving up Communism—and Mao's world view—to become nice agrarian democrats. A more realistic world is indeed in sight. But popular illusions that it will consist of a sweet mix of ideologies, or an end to China's faith in revolutionary means, could only serve to deepen the abyss again when disillusionment occurs. A world without change by revolutions—a world in which China's closest friends would not be revolutionary states—is inconceivable to Peking. But a world of relative peace between states is as necessary to China as to America. To hope for more is to court disenchantment.

A warning from Taiwan: 'Nixon will be disappointed'

In Taiwan, news of President Nixon's trip evoked anger and dismay. The reaction of Liu Yuan (right), an electronics worker in Taipei, was typical: "This is a bad business. The Red Chinese foreign policy is masked in smiles, but they plan to defeat the U.S. The more eager Nixon is to make friends with the Communists, the more he will be disappointed. The free world will lose confidence in him and our brethren on the mainland will lose hope." Since their expulsion from the mainland in 1949, Chiang Kai-shek's Nationalists, with U.S. support, have ruled Taiwan and claimed to be the only legal government of China.

A CONVERSATION WITH MAO TSE-TUNG

by EDGAR SNOW

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Mr. Snow, author of *Red Star over China* and a number of other books, has known Mao since 1936. He recently returned from a six-month stay in Communist China.

During a five-hour discourse with me in Peking on Dec. 18 last year, Chairman Mao Tse-tung expressed some of his views on Sino-American, Sino-Russian and other problems of foreign relations as well as on the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution and its aftermath.

The chairman criticized the ritualism of the Mao "personality cult," explained why it had been a necessary nuisance during the Cultural Revolution and forecast its gradual modification. He said that the government of the People's Republic would shortly admit to China some visitors representative of a broad spectrum of American political and press opinion from the right, the middle and the left. He spoke in favor of opening conversations with American officials at the highest level, including Mr. Nixon. He expressed admiration for American achievements in production, science, technology and universal education and said that he held great hopes for the American people as a potential force for good in the world.

Chairman Mao emphasized that he did not wish to be interviewed. What we had was a conversation. Only recently I was able to confirm, however, that he would not object to publication of certain of his comments without the use of direct quotation. During most of our talk, notes were taken by Nancy T'ang, American-born daughter of T'ang

Ming-chao. (Mr. T'ang was editor of the *Overseas Chinese Daily* in New York City until 1949. Since then he has served in China as a leader of cultural and political relations with foreign countries.) One other person was present—a Chinese woman secretary. It was interesting that neither of the young women wore a Mao badge: this was the only occasion on which I met an official when the badge was not on display.

I recorded our dialogue from memory immediately afterward and also was given a copy of Miss T'ang's notes.

Chairman Mao's residence in Peking lies in the southwestern corner of the former Forbidden City, surrounded by vermilion walls and not far from the T'ien-an Men, or Heavenly Peace Gate, where he reviews the October anniversary parade. Behind these high walls, topped by glistening yellow tiles, the old imperial regime also housed its officials. Today members of the Politburo live and work here in close proximity to the chairman and Premier Chou En-lai. One enters through the West Gate, flanked by two armed guards. Circling around an empty wooded drive, one quickly comes to a one-story dwelling of modest size, built in traditional style.

At the entrance one is greeted by two unarmed officers, who wear no insignia of rank. "They are generals," confides Nancy T'ang. How

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does she know? They disappear when the chairman meets me at the door of his study. I apologize for keeping him waiting. I had been asleep when summoned without advance notice.

It was early morning. We had breakfast together and talked until about one o'clock. He was slightly indisposed with a cold and he wondered out loud what doctors were good for: they could not even prevent a simple disease like colds, which cost so much lost time. I mentioned Dr. Linus Pauling—he had heard of him—and his advocacy of large doses of ascorbic acid as a cold panacea. I offered to send him some. He said he would try it. If it helped I would get the credit. If it poisoned him I would not be blamed.

Mao's large study was completely lined with shelves filled by hundreds of Chinese books, with a sprinkling of foreign volumes. From many of them dangled slips of paper used as annotated bookmarks. The large desk was piled high with journals and scripts. It was a working writer's shop. Through the wide windows one could catch a glimpse of garden where the chairman is said to grow his own vegetables and experiment with crops. It is not a "private plot"; it belongs to the state. Perhaps he needs the output, since he is said to have taken a recent cut of 20% in his subsistence "wages."

We discussed my account of our last talk, in January 1965, in which I had reported his acknowledgement that there was indeed a "cult of personality" in China—and moreover there was reason for one. Some people had criticized me for writing about that.

So, he said, what if I had written about a "cult of personality" in China? There was such a thing. Why not write about it? It was a fact . . . those officials who had opposed my return to China in 1967 and 1968 had belonged to an ultraleftist group which had seized the foreign ministry for a time, but they were all cleared out long ago. At the time of our 1965 colloquy, Mao continued, a great deal of power—over propaganda work within the provincial and local party committees, and especially within the Peking Municipal Party Committee—had been out of his control. That was why he had then stated that there was need for more personality cult, in order to stimulate the masses to dismantle the anti-Mao party bureaucracy.

Of course the personality cult had been overdone. Today, things were different. It was hard, the chairman said, for people to overcome the habits of 3,000 years of emperor-worshipping tradition. The so-called "Four Greats"—those epithets applied to Mao himself: "Great Teacher, Great Leader, Great Supreme Commander, Great Helmsman"—what a nuisance. They would all be eliminated sooner or later. Only the word "teacher" would be retained—that is, simply schoolteacher. Mao had always been a schoolteacher and still was one. He was a primary schoolteacher in Changsha even before he was a Communist. All the rest of the titles would be declined.

"I often wonder," I said, "whether those who shout Mao the loudest and wave the most banners are not—as some say—waving the Red Flag in order to defeat the Red Flag."

Mao nodded. He said such people fell into three categories. The first were sincere people. The second were those who drifted with the tide—they conformed because everyone else shouted "Long live." The third category were hypocrites. I was right not to be taken in by such stuff.

I remember," I said, "that just before you entered Peking in 1949 the Central Committee adopted a resolution—reportedly at your suggestion—which forbade naming streets, cities or places for anybody."

Yes, he said, they had avoided that; but other forms of worship had emerged. There were so many slogans. Pictures and plaster statues. The Red Guard had insisted that if you didn't have those things around, you were being anti-Mao. In the past few years there had been need for some personality cult. Now there was no such need and there should be a cooling down.

But after all, he went on, did not the Americans have their own personality cult? How could the governor of each state, how could each President and each Cabinet member, get along without some people to worship them? There was always the desire to be worshiped and the desire to worship. Could you, he asked me, be happy if no one read your books and articles? There was bound to be some worship of the individual and that applied to me too.

Chairman Mao has obviously pondered very much over this phenomenon—the human need for and to worship, about gods and God. On earlier visits he had discussed it at length. Now, at 76, he was in general good health but once again he said that he would “soon be going to see God.” It was inevitable; everyone eventually had to see God.

“Voltaire wrote that if there were no God it would be necessary for man to invent one,” I said. “If he had expressed himself as an outright atheist it might have cost him his head, in those times.”

Mao agreed that many people had lost their heads for saying much less.

“We have made some progress since then,” I said. “And man has been able to change God’s views on a number of things. One of them is birth control; about that, there is a great change here in China compared with five or 10 years ago.”

No, he said. I had been taken in! In the countryside a woman still wanted to have boy children. If the first and second were girls, she would make another try. If the third one came and was still a girl, the mother would try again. Pretty soon there would be nine of them; the mother was already 45 or so, and she would finally decide to leave it at that. The attitude must be changed but it was taking time. Perhaps the same thing was true in the United States?

“China is ahead in that respect,” I said. “A women’s liberation movement in the United States is making some impact, however. American women were the first to achieve the vote and they are now learning how to use it.”

At this point we were interrupted by the arrival of some glasses of *mao t’ai*, a fiery rice liquor made in Kweichow Province. We drank a toast. To my mortification the chairman noticed that I had omitted to toast the ladies present. How could I have done so? I had not yet accepted women as equals.

It was not possible, said the chairman, to achieve complete equality between men and women at present. But between Chinese and Americans there need be no prejudices. There could be mutual respect and equality. He said he placed high hopes on the peoples of the two countries.

If the Soviet Union wouldn’t do [point the way], then he would place his hopes on the American people. The United States alone had a population of more than 200 million. Industrial production was already higher than in any other country and education was universal. He would be happy to see a party emerge there to lead a revolution, although he was not expecting that in the near future.

In the meantime, he said, the foreign ministry was studying the matter of admitting Americans from the left, middle and right to visit China. Should rightists like Nixon, who represented the monopoly capitalists, be permitted to come? He should be welcomed because, Mao explained, at present the problems between China and the U.S.A. would have to be solved with Nixon. Mao would be happy to talk with him, either as a tourist or as President.

I, unfortunately, could not represent the United States, he said; I was not a monopoly capitalist. Could I settle the Taiwan question? Why continue such a stalemate? Chiang Kai-shek had not died yet. But what had Taiwan to do with Nixon? That question was created by Truman and Acheson.

It may be relevant to mention—and this is not a part of my talk with Chairman Mao—that foreign diplomats in Peking were aware last year that messages were being delivered from Washington to the Chinese government by certain go-betweens. The purport of such communications was to assure Chinese leaders of Mr. Nixon’s “new outlook” on Asia. Nixon was firmly determined, it was said, to withdraw from Vietnam as speedily as possible, to seek a negotiated international guarantee of the independence of Southeast Asia, to end the impasse in Sino-American relations by clearing up the Taiwan question and to bring the People’s Republic into the United Nations and into diplomatic relations with the United States.

Two important Frenchmen were in China in 1970. The first was André Bettencourt, the minister of planning, the second was Maurice Couve de Murville, premier under De Gaulle’s regime. M. Couve de Murville completed arrangements for a visit to China by General de Gaulle which was to have occurred this year. It was to Gen-

eral de Gaulle, I was authoritatively informed, that Mr. Nixon had first confided his intention to seek a genuine *détente* with China. Some people had anticipated that De Gaulle, during his visit, would play a key role in promoting serious Sino-American conversations. Death ruled otherwise. Chairman Mao's tribute to the general, sent to Mme. de Gaulle, was the only eulogy which he is known to have offered for any non-Communist statesman since Roosevelt died.

Meanwhile, other diplomats had been active. The head of one European mission in Peking, who had already made one trip to see President Nixon, returned to Washington last December. He bypassed the State Department to confer at the White House, and was back in China in January. From another and unimpeachable diplomatic source I learned, not long before my departure, from Peking in February, that the White House had once more conveyed a message asking how a personal representative of the President would be received in the Chinese capital for conversations with the highest Chinese leaders. About the same time, I was enigmatically told by a senior Chinese diplomat who had formerly maintained quite the opposite, "Nixon is getting out of Vietnam."

I must once more stress that none of the above background information was provided to me by Mao Tse-tung.

As we talked, the chairman recalled to me once again that it was the Japanese militarists who had taught revolution to the Chinese people. Thanks to their invasion, they had provoked the Chinese people to fight and had helped bring Chinese socialism to power.

I mentioned how Prince Sihanouk had told me a few days before that "Nixon is the best agent for Mao Tse-tung. The more he bombs Cambodia, the more Communists he makes. He is their best ammunition carrier," said the prince. Yes, Mao agreed. He liked that kind of help.

I reminded him that when I had spoken to him two months before, during the October Day parade at T'ien-an Men Square, he had told me that he was "not satisfied with the present situation." I asked him to explain what he meant.

He replied that there were two things of which he highly disapproved during the Cultural Revolution. One was lying. Someone, while saying that the struggle should be carried out by reasoning, not by coercion or force, actually gave the other fellow a kick under the table and then drew back his leg. When the person kicked asked,

"Why did you kick me?" the first person said, "I didn't kick you. Don't you see my foot is still here?" That, Mao said, is lying. Later the conflict during the Cultural Revolution developed into war between factions—first with spears, then rifles, then mortars. When foreigners reported that China was in great chaos, they were not telling lies. It had been true. Fighting was going on. (I was told by Premier Chou on another occasion that the army suffered thousands of casualties before it took up arms to suppress factional struggles.)

The other thing the chairman was most unhappy about was the maltreatment of "captives"—party members and others removed from power and subjected to reeducation. The old practice of the Liberation Army—freeing captives and giving them fares to go home, which resulted in many enemy soldiers being moved to volunteer and join their ranks—had often been ignored. Maltreatment of captives now had slowed the rebuilding and transformation of the party.

If one did not speak the truth, Mao concluded, how could he gain the confidence of others? Who would trust one? The same applied between friends.

"Are the Russians afraid of China?" I asked.

Some people said so, he replied, but why should they be? China's atom bomb was only this size (Mao raised his little finger), while Russia's bomb was that size (he raised his thumb). Together the Russian and American bombs were (putting two thumbs together) that size. What could a little finger do against two thumbs?

"But from the long-range view, Do the Russians fear China?"

It was said that they were a bit afraid, he answered. Even when there are a few mice in a person's room the person could become frightened, fearful that the mice might eat up his sweets. For instance, the Russians were upset because China was building air raid shelters. But if the Chinese got into their shelters, how could they attack others?

As for ideology, who had fired the first shot? The Russians had called the Chinese dogmatists and then the Chinese had called them revisionists. China had published their criticisms, but the Russians had not dared publish China's. Then they had sent some Cubans and later Romanians to ask the Chinese to cease open polemics. That would not do, Mao said. The polemics would have to be carried on for 10,000 years if necessary. Then Kosygin himself had

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come. After their talk Mao had told him that he would take off 1,000 years but no more.

The Russians looked down on the Chinese and also looked down on the people of many countries, he said. They thought that they only had to speak the word and all people would listen and obey. They did not believe that there were people who would not do so and that one of them was his humble self. Although Sino-Russian ideological differences were now irreconcilable—as demonstrated by their contradictory policies in Cambodia—they could eventually settle their problems as between states.

Referring once again to the United States, Chairman Mao said that China should learn from the way America developed, by decentralizing and spreading responsibility and wealth among the 50 states. A central government could not do everything. China must depend upon regional and local initiatives. It would not do (spreading his hands) to leave everything up to him.

As he courteously escorted me to the door, he said he was not a complicated man, but really very simple. He was, he said, only a lone monk walking the world with a leaky umbrella.

As a result of this and other informal conversations, I believe that in future Sino-American talks, Chairman Mao will surely adhere to the basic principles which have guided China in all her foreign policies, her ideological and world view as well as her regional policies. On the other hand, I also believe that, following an easing of international tensions, China will seek to cooperate with all friendly states, and all friendly people within hostile states, who welcome her full participation in world affairs. ■

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US - PRC EXCHANGES

In your opening statement you address the desirability of discussing some subsidiary questions such as US - PRC exchanges. You note we fully recognize that the PRC considers these as "side" issues, but point out that we do not intend to use them as diversions and fully expect to deal with fundamental issues. You explain, though, that progress on lesser questions would help to make movement possible on crucial questions -- it would show detractors on both sides that the goal of normal relations is an attainable one, lead to a better climate for making progress on the larger issues, and indicate that no conditions were being attached to progress in relations. This last would be very desirable for us.

The Chinese for their part are likely to be quite reserved on the subject of exchanges, unless they are sufficiently reassured about the U.S. stand on major issues such as Taiwan. But even so, pending the establishment of diplomatic relations they will probably hold off on any government-to-government agreement, preferring to adhere to a "people-to-people" formula. They may not yet be ready to engage in exchanges with the U.S. in which large numbers of Chinese would travel to the U.S. - their ping pong team has yet to arrive. You should nevertheless offer them a government agreement but be prepared to fall back on something less

formal such as a reference in the joint communique to each side's taking steps to facilitate exchanges.

There is another possible problem in working out exchanges. The Chinese have a few "non-governmental" organizations set up to handle exchanges, for example the Chinese Academy of Sciences and the Chinese People's Institute for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries, which have over the years acted as clearing houses for exchange matters. We have only one non- (or quasi-) governmental organization, the National Academy of Sciences, equipped to deal with this matter. There are other bodies, such as the National Committee on United States Relations with China, which would like to get into the clearing-house business on exchanges, which might be a good idea except for the possibility that many other groups might take umbrage if we seem to be working through a chosen instrument.

These problems are manageable. The Chinese are likely to be at least somewhat responsive -- your conversation with Marshall Yeh Chien-ying suggests that the prospect of exchanges both titillates and worries them -- and if you can provide them with some specific suggestions they may be prepared to follow through by the time of the President's visit.

At Tabs A through D are a series of specific proposals in the fields of scientific and technical exchanges, cultural exchanges, academic exchanges, and exchanges, /journalistic exchanges, respectively. At Tab E is

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a draft government-to-government agreement on exchanges, and at Tab F is language covering governmental facilitation of non-governmental exchanges. The proposals are designed in such a way that the specifics may be separated from the background and passed to the Chinese for their consideration. Each one is based on some evidence of Chinese interest, and you are not simply firing shots in the dark.

Your talking points proceed as follows:

- I have mentioned the desirability from the U.S. standpoint of having something tangible to point to as an outcome of the President's visit. (You might wish here to review these considerations.) These would also apply to the PRC.
- Of course, exchanges would be most easily handled in the United States if they could be carried out through a government-to-government agreement. If this would be of interest to the PRC, I have some suggested wording for such an agreement.
- However, if the PRC prefers to handle the matter on a non-governmental basis through private or people's organizations, that would be acceptable. In such a case we might carry a reference to this effect in the joint communique. I also have some suggested wording with me, which we could either look at now, or defer until a drafting session for the joint communique.

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-- As representative examples of what might be accomplished in the area of exchanges, I have brought a number of specific proposals in the fields of science and technology, cultural and exchanges, academic exchanges, / exchanges of journalists.

-- I will read some of these to you. And later, if you prefer, I will make the papers available to you for your consideration.

-- How would you like to proceed? We might go over these proposals now, or break and reassemble later.

-- Let me say a word on organizations which might handle exchanges.

Our National Science Foundation is prepared to deal directly with the Chinese Academy of Sciences, but there are many more groups in the U.S. which would like to become involved. If you prefer, we can pass the names of such organizations to you as they make themselves known to us. These would be entirely non-governmental. If you would prefer to make your own arrangements, we would have no objection.

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**Model for Cultural, Technical, and
Educational Exchange Agreement**

By agreement between the Governments of the United States of America and the People's Republic of China, delegations headed on the United States side by _____ and on the People's Republic side by _____ conducted negotiations in _____ from _____ to _____, with regard to cultural, technical, and educational exchanges between the United States of America and the People's Republic of China. As a result of these negotiations, which have been carried on in a spirit of mutual understanding, the United States and the People's Republic have agreed to provide for the specific exchanges which are set forth in the following Sections during 1972 and 1973 in the belief that these exchanges will contribute significantly to the betterment of relations between the two countries, thereby contributing to a lessening of international tensions.

SECTION I

General

(1) The visits and exchanges enumerated in the following Sections are not intended to be exclusive of others which may be arranged by agreement of the two countries.

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(2) The exchanges provided for in the following Sections shall be subject to the Constitution and applicable laws and regulations in force in the respective countries. It is understood that both parties will use their best efforts to have these exchanges effected in accordance with the following Sections.

SECTION II

Exchanges of Radio and Television Broadcasts and Motion Picture Films

(1) Both parties will provide for an exchange of radio and television broadcasts on the subjects of science, technology, industry, agriculture, education, public health, and sports.

(2) Both parties will provide for an exchange of 10 documentary films in accordance with a list to be mutually agreed upon by the two parties.

(3) Both parties will provide for an exchange of samples of equipment for sound-recording and telecasting and their technical specifications.

SECTION III

Exchange of Groups of Specialists in Industry, Agriculture and Medicine

(1) Both parties agree to provide for an exchange of delegates in 1972 in the field of industry. (Specifics to be negotiated)

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(2) Both sides will provide for the exchange of delegations of specialists in agriculture. (Specifics to be negotiated)

(3) Both parties agree to provide for the exchange of _____ medical delegations. (Numbers and fields to be specified in negotiation)

SECTION IV

Visits by Representatives of Cultural, Civic, Youth and Student Groups

(1) For the purpose of establishing contacts, exchanging experiences and becoming more familiar with the public and cultural life of both countries, the Chinese side will arrange to invite to the People's Republic of China during 1972 groups of American writers (5-6 persons), composers (5-6 persons), painters and sculptors (3-4 persons) and performing artists (5-6 persons). The United States side reciprocally will arrange to invite similar Chinese groups to visit the United States.

(2) Both parties will provide for the exchange in 1972-1973 of delegations of representatives of youth and delegations of women in various professions.

SECTION V

Visits by Scientists

(1) The Academy of Sciences of the People's Republic of China and the National Academy of Sciences of the United States

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will on a reciprocal basis, provide for the exchange of groups or individual scientists and specialists for delivering lectures and holding seminars on various problems of science and technology.

(2) The Academy of Sciences of the People's Republic of China and the National Academy of Sciences of the United States will, on a reciprocal basis, provide for the exchange of scientific personnel and specialists for the purpose of conducting joint studies and for specialization for a period of up to one year.

(3) The details of exchanges mentioned in paragraphs (1) and (2) will be agreed upon directly between the presidents of the Academy of Sciences of the People's Republic of China and the National Academy of Sciences of the United States.

SECTION VI

Exchange of University Delegations

(1) Both parties will provide for the exchange in 1972 of four delegations of university professors and instructors for a period of 2 to 3 weeks in the fields of natural sciences, engineering education, and liberal arts.

(2) Further exchanges of delegations of professors and instructors of universities of the United States of America and the People's Republic of China shall be decided upon as appropriate by both parties.

SECTION VII

Exchange of Individual Athletes and Athletic Teams

Both parties will provide for an exchange of individual athletes and athletic teams and in 1972-1973 will provide for the holding of the following contests in the United States and in the People's Republic of China.

(1) Basketball games between representative men's and women's teams to be held in the People's Republic of China in 1972.

(2) Basketball games between representative men's and women's teams to be held in the United States in 1973.

(Other events to be specified)

The details of these exchanges of athletes and athletic teams as well as financial arrangements for these exchanges shall be discussed between appropriate American and Chinese sports organizations.

SECTION VIII

Development of Tourism

Both parties will promote the development of tourism.

SECTION IX

Exchange of Exhibits and Publications

(1) Both sides agree in principle on the usefulness of exhibits as an effective means of developing mutual under-

standing between the peoples of the United States and the People's Republic. Toward this end both sides will provide for an exchange of exhibits on the peaceful uses of atomic energy in 1972.

(2) Both parties will promote the further development of exchange of publications and various works in the field of science and technology between scientific institutions and societies and between individual scientists and specialists.

(3) Provisions will be made for the Central Scientific Medical Library of the Ministry of Health of the People's Republic of China and corresponding medical libraries in the United States to exchange medical journals.

SECTION X

Establishment of Direct Air Flights

Both parties agree in principle to establish on the basis of reciprocity direct air flights between the United States and the People's Republic. Negotiations on terms and conditions satisfactory to both parties will be conducted by appropriate representatives of each Government at a mutually convenient date to be determined later.

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SECTION XI

Entry into Force

The present agreement shall enter into force on the date it is signed. IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned, duly authorized, have signed the present agreement and have affixed their seals thereto

DONE, in duplicate, in the English and Chinese languages, both equally authentic, at _____ this _____ day of _____, one thousand nine hundred seventy-one.

FOR THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA:

FOR THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA

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Draft Joint Announcement on Exchanges

During the discussions between President Nixon and Premier Chou En-lai, the two sides agreed that cultural, scientific, technical and educational exchanges would contribute significantly to the betterment of relations between the two countries, thereby contributing to a lessening of international tension. The two governments will therefore encourage, and provide assistance to, appropriate organizations in their respective countries to arrange such exchanges.

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October 11, 1971

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U.S. POSITION ON OCEANS REGIME

Existing US Oceans Policy

In his statement of May 23, 1970 the President proposed the following Law of the Sea arrangements:

- Territorial Sea - a maximum of 12 miles;
- Straits - a new right of free transit through international straits to compensate for the fact that the 12 mile territorial sea would bring many key straits (including Gibraltar) under national jurisdiction;
- Seabeds/Mineral Resources - dividing the ocean floor into three zones:
 1. national jurisdiction out to the 200 meter depth line;
 2. beyond this point to the edge of the continental margin (which is not precisely defined) the coastal state would, under agreed rules, act as Trustee for the international community;
 3. beyond the continental margin, full control by an international regime;
- Fisheries - some accommodation of the coastal state interests by giving them carefully defined preferential rights to fisheries resources beyond the 12 mile limit.
- Pollution - international agreement on controls on pollution caused by seabeds exploitation.
- Scientific Research - maximum freedom for scientific research.

Negotiating Situation

The proposal on territorial seas and international straits is of prime importance to US security. It was primarily to secure those interests that we got into the whole Law of the Sea operation. We do, however, have room for maneuver on seabeds, fisheries, pollution and research issues.

The underlying negotiating problem is that very few countries care much about "freedom of navigation", but very many want to maximize their claim to fisheries and seabeds resources. Thus, our security interests are threatened

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by a trend toward extensive unilateral territorial sea claims. It is not practical to resist these claims simply by military defense of our customary rights. We hope, instead, to hold the territorial sea line through the achievement of an international agreement on the oceans, hopefully to be nailed down at a Law of the Sea Conference in 1973.

Our initial strategy was to create a majority interest in narrow territorial seas by promising extensive revenues for LDC development from the international trusteeship zone beyond the 12 mile limit and the international regime for the deep ocean floor. These revenues were intended as the quid pro quo for agreement on narrow territorial seas and a new right of free transit through international straits.

Earlier this year, it became clear that this strategy was not working. Neither landlocked nor coastal states were rallying to the banner. In the meantime, Latin American States (Brazil, Ecuador, Peru and Chile) were actively espousing a 200 mile territorial sea and were seeking -- with considerable success -- to cast the issue in terms of Developed versus Developing Countries. From afar, Communist China lent moral support to our antagonists, announcing sympathy for their efforts, without itself adopting an explicit territorial sea position. (The PRC has made extensive claims to seabeds under the East and South China Seas, which conflict with similar claims of Taiwan, Japan, the Philippines and South Vietnam. The areas involved are on the Continental Shelf as defined by international convention.)

Our thinking has now shifted. It is clear that the crucial group for a successful conference are the coastal states as a class rather than a combination of landlocked states and LDCs. The coastal states share a clear interest in as much control as they can get over the mineral and fish resources off their coasts. If this interest could be satisfied without a wide territorial sea, then most coastal states might be willing to accommodate us on our security interests (12 mile territorial sea and free straits passage). On the other hand, too great a satisfaction of the coastal states interest -- for example, an exclusive resources zone -- is self-defeating, for it could endanger our major objective of military mobility and free navigation. So our current strategy is to indicate willingness to accommodate coastal state desires for greater control over resources, but limited through internationally agreed standards, including machinery for compulsory settlement of disputes.

At last summer's preparatory committee meeting, we found sentiment beginning to move our way on separating the issues of sovereignty from control over resources. Brazil, whose position on a 200 mile sea remained

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adamant, shows signs of beginning to feel lonely. As of now, things look good for a 12 mile territorial sea, uncertain on an acceptable mix of coastal state/international controls over the offshore resources, and depressing on free transit through straits. (Spain is engaged in a diplomatic offensive against it, and other straits countries (e. g. Italy) have difficulties with it.)

It is by no means yet clear that there will be a Law of the Sea Conference in 1973 -- much less a successful one. We do, however, have the advantage of good working relations with the Soviets, who share our basic objectives. As a distant water fishing state, however, the Soviets are worried that our attitude on fisheries may be too favorable to coastal states. (The UK and Japan share that worry.)

There is considerable sentiment for making the LOS Conference universal, thus including the PRC. Some of the hard-line Latin states have hopes of using that issue to abort the whole Law of the Sea exercise, if necessary.

LOS matters will be discussed at the UN this fall and in another preparatory conference next spring.

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PRC Views on Law of the Sea and Related Issues

We have very little up-to-date information on Communist China's law of the sea position.

On several occasions in the past year, the PRC has voiced sympathy for efforts of Latin American states to obtain a 200 mile territorial sea, but these statements seem intended to contribute to the "anti-imperialist" cause rather than to stake out a legal position. The PRC still claims a 12-mile territorial sea for itself.

The People's Republic also has extensive seabeds claims in the Yellow and the East and South China seas. They have not articulated the legal rationale, but are probably basing it on rights to the continental shelf. The 1958 Continental Shelf Convention gives coastal states sovereign rights over adjacent seabeds resources out to the 200 meter depth line and to the technologically exploitable shelf area beyond. Although the PRC is not a signatory to this (or any) Geneva Convention, they could base their position on these principles which are generally accepted as customary international law.

Their claims conflict with those of other states (the ROC, Japan, Korea, South Vietnam, The Philippines) which also border on the continental shelf under the adjacent seas -- which are very shallow. The problem of where the national claims are delimited is complicated by the existence of islands whose ownership is disputed.

The Senkakus involve us at this point, although we are about to relinquish our rights under the Okinawa Reversion Treaty. We take no position on permanent ownership, which is disputed by the two Chinas and Japan.

There are also the Spratly islands in the South China Sea disputed by the two Chinas, South Vietnam, and The Philippines.

Until now, the PRC has not been pushing its seabeds claims very aggressively. But if they enter the UN, they will certainly wish to participate in the LOS negotiations, an ideal forum for more forcefully pressing their views.

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[TS-HK-#A9659]

I. What We Want and
What We Can Get

1. Pressure on the Soviet Union. We want our China policy to show Moscow that it cannot speak for all communist countries, that it is to their advantage to make agreements with us, that they must take account of possible US-PRC cooperation -- all this without overdoing the Soviet paranoia. The beneficial impact on the USSR is perhaps the single biggest plus that we get from the China initiative.

We have already achieved this. There is nothing the Chinese need do. Our interests here are congruent and we need only to continue on the path we have set out upon. Pressure on the Russians is something we obviously never explicitly point to. The facts speak for themselves. Moscow, since July 15, has already become more cooperative on many issues. Their motive -- and the objective consequence -- could be easing their Western flank to focus on their Eastern flank -- but that is China's problem, not ours.

2. Taiwan. We will want to tie down Peking to a peaceful resolution of this problem. We want also to maintain relations with an old and faithful ally, both because of principle and for our reputation as a reliable and honorable partner.

We thus have to work out some understanding with Peking which will allow enough time for the future of Taiwan to be determined peacefully -- with

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this process hopefully far enough advanced so that the diplomatic relations problem is manageable when we reach the crucial period on this issue.

This obviously is, as it always has been, the crunch issue. Peking has indicated it can accept a reasonable time frame. If it cannot, no further progress in our relationships will be possible.

3. Impact on Hanoi. We would like constructive Chinese influence on Hanoi to make a reasonable negotiated settlement. Short of that we want their continued benevolent abstention on our efforts in Paris and willingness to see, and help guarantee, a negotiated solution to the war. We must strongly emphasize that time for this is running out and that our unilateral course will then entail risks for everyone and distort our bilateral relations.

The clear direction of our withdrawal policy, the fact that we don't threaten China with our Indochina actions, the link to our forces on Taiwan, and Chinese opposition to North Vietnamese domination of the area -- these all incline Peking to be helpful. On the other hand, the Chinese believe they let Hanoi down in 1954 and do not want to be in the position of pressuring their proletarian friends.

Just by virtue of our initiatives with Peking (and Moscow) we have achieved the objective of making Hanoi nervous about her rear area. The initial shock effect of the July announcement may have temporarily slowed the negotiating process but over the longer term our China policy should help reach a settlement and induce Hanoi to abide by it. Peking publicly has

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concentrated on our withdrawals (without setting a time limit) and largely ignored Communist political demands. The PRC may have worked a little on the North Vietnamese given the latter's bitter reaction to the President's visits.

A joint call for a negotiated settlement and for the future of Indochina to be left to the people there without outside interference would be useful.

4. Asia in General. We will want to inhibit Peking's support of revolutionary movements and any direct pressures on its neighbors. This in turn will give our Asian friends some tangible benefits from our China initiative and allow a safe reduction in U.S. forces.

In recent years, the Chinese support for revolutionaries has been largely vocal. The tremendous domestic problems for the PRC plus the reduction of our presence should encourage the PRC to mute its efforts. We should subtly, but unmistakably, press Peking on this issue. Concretely, we might be able to get into the Presidential communique some language about noninterference, neither side seeking hegemony, and no one assuming an exclusive sphere of influence.

5. Korea. We would like to ease the threat to South Korea. The Chinese may have a congruent interest in seeing tensions reduced, so as to get our forces out and keep the Japanese out. They have already pushed their North Korean ally to support the President's trip and start talking to the South Koreans. Thus our objective is to get the Chinese to restrain their ally,

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pointing out our mutual interest in a peaceful peninsula.

6. South Asia. We want to keep hostilities from breaking out, but since India is the problem and Peking has no influence with her, there is little we can get from the Chinese. Nevertheless, the PRC doesn't want a war either. A joint call against hostilities in the subcontinent might be helpful. The PRC might also be helpful in nudging Pakistan toward political realism in East Pakistan.

7. Arms Control. We want to start educating the Chinese on these questions and begin drawing her into the arms control dialogue. They show little interest, and in particular don't want to be lassoed. We should not push Peking but make it clear that we will treat it on an equal basis with Moscow. We might obtain hot line and/or accidental war agreements.

8. Release of U.S. Prisoners. We want to get them out, preferably before the President's visit; if not then as a result of it.

This should be achievable, especially for the two men related to Vietnam. Of the other two, Downey may be the most difficult case since he has a life sentence. In response to HAK's July pitch they said that sentences could be shortened for good behavior and said they would study the matter. Releasing our men would be an inexpensive, yet publicly very profitable, gesture for Peking. We should keep our requests low key for the time being -- this seems the best way to get results and means we would pay nothing for the men.

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9. Trade. We will want to start increasing our exports to the mainland so as to compete with Japan and Europe. Except for wheat, there is little prospect in the near future of substantial business. The Chinese don't seem much interested, but we should be able to get, as a result of the President's trip, some agreement to expand mutual commerce, including perhaps the sending of trade delegations for that purpose.

10. Cultural, Scientific Exchanges, etc. We want movement in these areas to demonstrate concrete progress and results from the President's trip. It would in fact help to break down the communication barriers and Chinese ignorance. In certain fields we could learn from the Chinese. The PRC believes there are side issues, suspect diversion away from knotty problems like Taiwan, and reason we want these steps for domestic political gain. However, we should make clear to them that the President cannot travel all the way to Peking and say merely that he had a discussion of long range issues. We should press hard for exchanges as a way to improve the climate for the resolution of more fundamental issues.

11. Information on China. We want to know what's going on in the mainland and what the future holds. We should learn a great deal from these trips (e.g. during HAK's interim visit we might get insights into the internal struggle), the journalists and others who are now being let in, ongoing contacts with the PRC, and possible exchange programs. It is always useful to know one's adversary. And increased communication with

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Peking should cut down the chance of misunderstandings or accidents leading to confrontation. We should pick up Chou's suggestion for periodic envoys to Peking, plus mutual exchanges and perhaps return visits by Chinese officials.

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II. What the Chinese Want and
What We Can/Should Do About It

1. Prestige. The Chinese want to take their rightful place in international affairs and deal as equals with other major powers (even while professing they are not a "great" power, have no desire to follow the mistakes of the USSR and USA in stretching their hands out, and are concerned about all countries, big and small, especially the third world).

This we have already given them in the July 15 announcement. It is generally in our interest.

2. Counter-weight to the Soviet Union. The Chinese want to relieve themselves of the threat of a two-front war, introduce new calculations in Moscow about attacking or leaning on the PRC, and perhaps make the USSR more pliable in its dealings with Peking. Specifically from us they want assurances against US-USSR collusion.

This too we have given Peking in our initiatives and clear policy of not letting Moscow be our only socialist interlocutor. We cannot, of course, favor Peking over Moscow - indeed in the near term we have much more concrete business with the Russians - but the PRC does not expect this. We can assure the Chinese that we won't deliberately collude and keep them posted on our dealings with Moscow. But they know that

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our agreements with the USSR, such as ratifying the status quo in Europe and mutual force reductions there, can have the objective consequences of collusion by freeing the Soviet hands for pressures on their eastern flank. There is nothing we can or should do about this but acknowledge to the PRC that we recognize this reality and will be sensitive to it.

3. Restraint on Japan. The Chinese are ambivalent on this issue. Because of their bitter experiences in the war, they clearly do fear a resurgence of Japanese militarism, despite the small Tokyo defense budgets and nuclear allergy. They see conflicting statements by U.S. officials, some of which suggest our encouragement of Japanese rearmament so as to take over some defense burdens we are shedding under the Nixon Doctrine. On the other hand they must understand our point that the U.S. treaty with, and umbrella for, Japan dampens down Japanese military activity, and that a precipitous U.S. withdrawal from Asia would only feed Japanese militarism. Additionally, the Chinese want to erode US-Japanese ties and play us all against each other; they have already begun by meddling in Japanese domestic politics.

Most importantly, we should not trade an old, and much more powerful, ally for a somewhat less aggressive adversary. As for preventing Japanese remilitarization, this can only be done by maintaining our influence in Asia, and this we will have to continue to make clear to Peking.

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4. Taiwan. The Chinese want Taiwan return^{ed to} its rule. They know we cannot "give" it to them, but they calculate that our initiatives will erode US-GRC ties, feed the process of undermining the GRC's international position, and generally shake up the situation in Taiwan so that it will fall into Peking's lap.

We cannot go further than to tell Peking that we will not promote a two China or Taiwan independence policy, that we will leave this problem to be worked out -- peacefully -- by the parties concerned, that we will gradually reduce our military presence on Taiwan as Vietnam winds down and tensions in Asia diminish. We cannot break relations with the GRC or jettison our mutual defense treaty.

5. Indochina. The Chinese want our forces withdrawn, and knew this was occurring when they invited the President. They don't particularly care about the political solutions and have no desire to see Hanoi dominate the region.

Our Vietnamization program is good enough for Peking. If we can make a negotiated settlement, so much the better. In that event they would want to be in on the guarantees.

6. Korea. The Chinese may want to push us toward a peace treaty, both to get the UN and US forces off the peninsula and to keep the Japanese out.

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We cannot get out in front of our Korean (or Japanese) friends on the political side. We should restrain ourselves to blessing Pyongyang-Seoul talks and whatever moves our allies want to make. We should withdraw our forces further only insofar as South Korea's strength permits it.

7. South Asia. The Chinese might want to line us up with them and Pakistan against her two big enemies, the USSR and India. However, they almost certainly don't want a subcontinent war, in which case they would have to deliver on their promises of support to Islamabad.

We cannot join the lineup on either side. We have larger fundamental interests in much bigger India than in Pakistan, and we thus must keep our influence in both places. Our overriding interest, aside from humanitarian relief, is to prevent hostilities which would put us in an agonizing position.

8. US-PRC relations. The Chinese want to "normalize" relations to the point of recognition which might take care of the Taiwan problem for them. They recognize our difficulties and are willing to wait some time.

We can indicate the general direction of our policy, but we must make clear that formal diplomatic relations with the PRC will take time and be a gradual process. We cannot speculate on how we will sort out our relations with the PRC.

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9. Entry into the U.N. This is far down Peking's list of priorities, although they may be more interested than they let on, especially because of the impact on Taiwan. The Chinese care more about the two China implications of our UN position than entry into the UN itself.

We cannot do more than we have. As a matter of principle we must fight for Taiwan's seat, while pointing out that this should have no implications for the future juridical status of Taiwan.

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ARRIVAL STATEMENT

It is with profound pleasure that I return to the People's Republic of China on behalf of President Nixon. I am here for discussions with Prime Minister Chou En-lai and other Chinese officials to make concrete arrangements for a truly historic occasion - the meeting between Chairman Mao Tse-Tung and the President of the United States.

Our two countries are turning a new page in our histories. Now after two decades of separate paths and separate achievements we come together again on a fresh foundation of equality and mutual respect. The task that faces the leaders of our nations is to begin to bridge the gulf that has separated us for a generation and restore the historic bonds of two great peoples.

President Nixon is dedicated to this objective, knowing full well that our differences are deep and that neither of us will barter away our principles.

Thus I arrive here with the determination of the American government and the friendship of the American people. In this spirit, I warmly look forward to my talks with Chinese officials.

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Toast (Beginning of Trip)

Mr. Prime Minister, and our other distinguished hosts:

I have returned to your capital with personal pleasure and anticipation; the pleasure of again seeing our gracious hosts and this capital city, the anticipation of stimulating discussion and important work.

And I return with the sense of history, a feel for the tides that have brought us together. Surely our encounter is one that none of us would have imagined would ever take place.

[Tell the Marshall's story on the way to the airport July 11.]

During these past decades you endured the tribulations of the Long March. You surmounted what seemed like hopeless obstacles to establish your system. You have steered your country through twenty-two turbulent years. And you have maintained your positions in conflict against major powers.

During this same period my country has carried global responsibilities flowing from the Second World War. We shed the historic isolationism fed by our ocean-bound geography. Faced with the vacuums of the post-war world, we ventured forth with characteristic exuberance into international affairs, shouldering broad tasks of security and development. We have placed men on the moon. And we have grappled with our own domestic problems, both those spawned by industrial progress and those that are the legacy of our mixed heritage.

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For almost a generation, China and America have pursued their separate paths, so diverse and hardly touching. Yet here we are today, brought together by global trends. Clearly we will find the guarantee of each other's actions not in words, but in events; not in honeyed declarations but in the objective situation we jointly confront.

Mr. Prime Minister, I said in July that reality brought us together and reality will shape our future.

Let us drink to that future. And let us work these coming days with a view to filling that future with peace and friendship between our two peoples.

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Toast (End of Trip)

Mr. Prime Minister, and our other distinguished hosts:

Together we have done some extremely important work during these past few days. We have laid a sound basis for the historic meeting between the leaders of the People's Republic of China and President Nixon. In the process we have built upon the promising beginnings of July and further charted our countries' courses.

For us it has been a rich personal experience as well as a momentous assignment. We have once again been impressed by your dedication, stimulated by your skill, warmed by your hospitality -- and overwhelmed by your cuisine!

My colleagues and I want to thank you for the grace and warmth which we have been received. I ask you now to join us in the celebration of the historic crossroads that lies _____ months ahead and in the hope that that event will contribute to peace in the Pacific and peace in the world.

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Possible Meeting with Mao Tse-tung

Mao Tse-tung has evidently been very much a factor in the PRC's decision to invite the President to visit Peking, as witness the Edgar Snow interview with Mao in the April 30 issue of Life (Tab A). Mao told Snow that because "at present the problems between China and the USA would have to be solved with Nixon," Mao would be happy to talk with him either as a tourist or as President.

Given the personal role of Mao, it is conceivable that the Chinese may have you meet him to underscore this personal element and to have him reiterate to you, the President's representative, that he welcomes the President's visit. Your meeting Mao would also emphasize, to both the Chinese people and world public opinion, that Mao is still very much involved in PRC affairs, a point which was made only inferentially by Mao's session with Haile Selassie.

If a meeting should take place, we would assume that Mao would not deal with matters of substance, at least in any detail. He might refer to the existence of U.S. -PRC problems, as he did in the Snow interview, but prefer to concentrate more on atmospherics. These would be important from both sides' standpoint, and in fact the chances of your seeing Mao would probably be increased if your discussions with Chou had gone well, i. e. the Chinese were convinced that we were not going to take a tough line on matters of concern to them.

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In these terms, a meeting between you and Mao would be more likely later rather than earlier. However, if the Chinese wanted to put a real stamp of approval on the President's visit by the Ultimate Authority, they could conceivably schedule the meeting early on. Domestic politics would have a bearing on the timing, and we have little information on this score which can serve as the basis for a judgment.

In any event, you would wish to avoid substantive issues but take a positive attitude toward your own mission and toward the President's visit. You would welcome this opportunity to meet with Mao (who after all is a living legend) and express the President's and your own -- good will toward Mao and his associates.

Your talking points might run as follows:

-- I am extremely grateful to have this opportunity to meet Chairman Mao and convey to him personally the personal greetings of President Nixon. The President looks forward with warm anticipation to meeting with the Chairman and seeing this great country.

-- The President has asked me to reaffirm his profound commitment to the improvements of relations between our two countries for the sake of our two peoples and for the peoples of the world. The course we have chosen has been produced by conviction and reality, not by personalities or the prospects of political gain.

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-- The President was quite touched by the welcome which the Chairman extended to him through the Chairman's interview with Edgar Snow. In this interview the Chairman spoke of problems between our two countries. The Chairman may be assured that the President will be prepared to deal with these problems frankly and in as forthcoming a manner as possible.

-- I hope that this philosophy has (already) (will) become apparent in my own discussions with PM Chou.

-- Looking at the future relationship which might develop between the U.S. and the PRC, and setting aside questions of ideological conviction, I am convinced as a historian that our two countries have a legacy of fewer issues between us than is the case with almost any other relationship China has maintained with foreign countries over the centuries.

-- I believe, in fact, that there is a tradition of friendship between the Chinese and American peoples, and I earnestly hope that this friendship can be reestablished and developed further. I hope that the President's visit, for which I have come to help make concrete arrangements, will be a major contribution to this end.

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