

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON.

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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: U.S.

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State
General Alexander M. Haig, Jr., Commander in
Chief, US Forces, Europe
Helmut Sonnenfeldt, Counselor of the
Department of State
Peter W. Rodman, National Security Council Staff
(Notetaker) *pur*

U.K.

James Callaghan, Secretary of State
for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs
Alan Campbell, Deputy Under Secretary

France

Jean Sauvagnargues, Minister of Foreign Affairs
Francois deLaboulaye, Political Director

F. R. G.

Hans-Dietrich Genscher, Vice Chancellor and
Minister of Foreign Affairs
Guenther van Well, Political Director
Dr. Heinz Weber, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
(Interpreter)

MORI/CDF
C01075091

DATE AND TIME: Friday, December 12, 1975
3:30 - 5:40 p.m.

PLACE: American Ambassador's Residence
Brussels

SUBJECTS: East-West Relations (European Communist Parties);
Angola; Spain; Yugoslavia; Cyprus; Italy

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CLASSIFIED BY Henry A. Kissinger
EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION
SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652
EXEMPTION CATEGORY 5(b)(3)
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Kissinger: We have a rather full agenda. The Political Directors have been meeting and we have to discuss: Soviet relations (or East-West relations); Spain; Yugoslavia; Angola; Italy; Cyprus; Portugal; and the Northern Flank.

Is there any particular order you would like to discuss these?

van Well: In that order.

Kissinger: East-West relations first?

van Well: Yes.

East-West Relations (European Communist Parties)

Kissinger: On East-West relations, I outlined our thinking at the restricted meeting [of the North Atlantic Council]. Would my colleagues like to express a view?

Callaghan: I think the reading we haven't yet had is the reaction of the Soviet Union to the other European Communist Parties who seem to be declaring their independence to a certain extent. To what extent, if any, will this affect Soviet policy? We didn't cover this aspect in the NATO discussions. I have no particular information on it. Jean, what about France?

Sauvagnargues: The French Communist Party has shown some independence but not much. My general impression is that it didn't come out just as Brezhnev wanted. The way Helsinki came out. He seems to be running into some trouble. I'll bet there is some criticism of Helsinki in the USSR.

Kissinger: It's not easy to have a conference that creates domestic difficulties in every country. [Laughter]

deLaboulaye: Two of our experts studied this problem. They looked into the relations of the Communist Parties after Helsinki, relations of the Soviet Union to Communist Parties, and detente itself. I gave copies to my colleagues.

With respect to the relations of the Soviet Union to the Communist Parties in the West, a discussion seems to be taking place in Russia regarding what advantage the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and

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the Communist Parties can make of the so-called crisis of capitalism. They can't agree. Their press indicates this. Also there is a doctrinal difference on whether they should accept alliances with left-wing parties. This too came out in their specialized press.

Kissinger: Did the Chinese give you a lecture on this?

Sauvagnargues: Yes. It was part of the aggressive Soviet policy. They are partly right. It is not consistent with detente.

Kissinger: To us the Chinese expressed opposition to all the European Communist Parties without distinction. They consider revisionism just a Soviet tactic. They showed uncompromising opposition to any alliance.

Callaghan: Can't we make use of this to play on with the Italian Communist Party, to force them to declare their independence or not? Or would it backfire? If they are not dancing to Moscow's tune, we can't get Moscow to control them in our countries.

These parties will have considerable electoral appeal if they are independent of Moscow. When they say the capitalist system doesn't work, they seem to have a good case when there are six million unemployed. They may not be in government, but they could have substantial impact on government.

To the extent we can show they are not independent, it can be very useful to us electorally.

Kissinger: How do we know if they are independent?

deLaboulaye: I was with Rumor last night at dinner. He said that Berlinguer would have to be kicked out if they ever got to power. It is just a mask.

Kissinger: The acid test isn't whether they would come to power democratically; the test is whether they would allow a reversal. It is difficult for a Communist Party to admit that history can be reversed, and allow themselves to be voted out of power.

van Well: Their papers say they are for a change in power democratically.

Kissinger: Coming in?

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van Well: No, going out.

Genscher: We need some better assurance.

Kissinger: It is almost inconceivable that in power they won't seek to bring about such political change that they couldn't be voted out.

van Well: The essence of that Conference was that they would accept democratic change.

Kissinger: To the extent one can trust the Chinese view, they claim the Spanish Communist Party is more independent of Moscow than the French or Italian.

deLaboulaye: The Soviet Union themselves know that a Communist Party in government isn't compatible with detente.

Kissinger: They may realize that if one gets in, the right wing parties in the US and Europe will use it against detente.

Genscher: There is not one single Western Communist Party that has given up its final objective. They still want the dictatorship of the proletariat. That is the decisive point. The danger is they become more attractive to the voters. It is easier for us to accept orthodox parties than parties that give the appearance of being independent. They become more popular the more independent they become. The Italian Communist Party has one objective, to become independent.

Rumor was afraid that if there was a discussion of Italy's internal affairs here, it would have a dangerous effect on the Socialists. In other words, he sees a Popular Front as possible.

There is no problem in Germany and in Britain.

Callaghan: Except that it weakens the alliance if it happens elsewhere. My point is we should recognize they are still the true enemy and not let them increase their appeal. Although the nuisance value is more from these little parties that worm into the trade unions, the Communists are in fact less trouble to deal with. But we shouldn't be deceived.

Sonnenfeldt: No matter how much they are trouble for Moscow, their rise in our countries will affect the whole discussion of security issues and domestic priorities, and this will affect the balance of power over the long run.

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van Well: The question is whether to cultivate them or to expose them and challenge their pretensions. They might be pushed even more to prove their independence.

Callaghan: We've got to recognize that they are the real enemy, even if they are more independent. Secondly, presentationally, we should try to make them appear as not independent, to make them try harder to prove their independence.

Kissinger: The problem is, if we stress their independence, we create the impression that that's the only obstacle. I agree with your first point: they're the real enemy, partly for Sonnenfeldt's reason and partly because it would weaken support for the Alliance in America.

Genscher: The problem would still be the same even if a party completely independent of Moscow -- like Albania -- came into power.

Callaghan: Where does this discussion lead to? Do we want them more independent or less independent?

van Well: We have to confront them on both counts: as part of the international Communist movement and on their commitment to parliamentary democracy.

Sonnenfeldt: Make them prove their loyalty to democracy for 20 years, and then see.

Kissinger: But we don't want to encourage our intellectuals to try a dialogue with them.

Genscher: It's not just the intellectuals. The Church, too, and other groups.

Callaghan: We are strong enough intellectually to handle it; that's why we are for detente. But not the trade unions. I find it very hard to talk to the trade unions on this.

Kissinger: I don't know if contacts with Soviet groups are as bad as what the Italian Communists are doing in the U. S., making themselves respectable. To the extent they become accepted in the U. S., they can use this in Italy to prove their respectability. The Soviet groups are so clumsy.

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van Well: Refusal of contact means we ignore them.

Kissinger: What do we gain by talking with them?

van Well: We should confront them, challenge them. Especially labor groups.

Kissinger: You mean the ILO?

van Well: Yes.

Kissinger: That's domestic politics. That was the price we had to pay to George Meany to avoid cutting off all UN funds.

Callaghan: My labour friends asked me to raise this. I wasn't going to.

Kissinger: Our objective is to use the next two years while we're in it to get reforms so we can stay.

Callaghan: Let me know what reforms you want and our people will help.

The Soviet Union constantly is making approaches, and other East Europeans, saying: "Why can't we have a dialogue?"

Genscher: It does make a difference with the Western trade unions whether they cooperate with the Communists in their own countries or whether they have contact with East Europeans. Our unions have contacts everywhere in Eastern Europe but are free of Communist influence at home.

Kissinger: The problem is people like Mitterand or the Italians deliberately seeking high-level contacts in the U. S. and using that at home to prove they can conduct a pro-Western policy. That will lend to reduction of concern with security and an undermining of the Alliance.

Genscher: I didn't make myself clear.

Kissinger: I understand your point.

I'm getting under pressure for blocking contacts with Italian Communists, and also some of your left wing people, Jean.

Back to the Soviet Union. The consensus of the Political Directors seemed to be that they would continue even after Brezhnev, and this age group, to conduct the same policy.

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deLaboulaye: Yes, but there will be temptation, such as Portugal and Angola.

Angola

Kissinger: Why are they in Angola?

Campbell: They thought it was an easy one to win.

deLaboulaye: It is important geographically.

Sauvagnargues: It is very disturbing though, because it's an aggressive move.

Campbell: Because they thought it was an easy one to win quickly.

Kissinger: They have sent several airlifts.

Sonnenfeldt: You saw that one ship with MIG-21s didn't unload them.

Kissinger: But there are some in Algeria.

deLaboulaye: And in Congo-Brazzaville.

Kissinger: Between March and August, they've sent in 12,000 tons.

Callaghan: You've been rough with Dobrynin.

Kissinger: Dobrynin's explanation, for what it's worth, is that in March they started because of fear of the Chinese. We weren't doing anything then. Because my African bureau didn't tell me anything. Between March and June, they made the MPLA from the third largest group into the largest group. At this point we encouraged Zaire to turn its equipment over to the FNLA, and also give support to UNITA. The purpose was to prevent the MPLA from dominating the country on Independence Day and establishing a claim to legitimacy. This we achieved. We didn't work with South Africa.

So on Independence Day the Soviet Union could have done it both ways: They could have sought a negotiation. But they immediately brought in Cuban troops.

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Callaghan: They brought them?

Kissinger: They came on Soviet airplanes.

Sauvagnargues: Cuban troops?

Kissinger: Not units, but troops. Our estimate in July was that 500 trained people could have taken over the country. Our intelligence people pleaded to send 500. We couldn't. But in Zambia and Zaire we're training people. We've put in \$35 million and we've now approved another \$35 million. But it's a lousy way to do it, through intelligence channels. We haven't put anything like the arms the Soviets have put in.

Callaghan: I'm inclined to think the 2,000 Cubans are an asset to us.

Kissinger: It's more like 5,000.

Callaghan: That can't be permanent. Our public stance should be what we talked about yesterday: Our fingerprints shouldn't be on it. But it's politically disastrous for the Soviets to be seen taking over a country.

Sauvagnargues: It is very dangerous for the morale in the surrounding countries. It would certainly undermine the morale of all the adjoining countries.

The President sent an emissary to Houphouet and also to Kaunda.

Kissinger: Many of them are pleading for us to do more.

Sauvagnargues: Yes, the Africans are really interventionists. And they don't think OAU can do it.

Callaghan: They are interventionists as long as they're not branded with the Mark of Cain. I've known Kaunda for 25 years since we were students together. He's for it but he won't say it publicly. South Africa is the fly in the ointment.

Kissinger: There is no question about that.

Callaghan: How can you do it without leaving fingerprints?

Kissinger: The last thing we need in the U. S. is a new foreign involvement. Our opponents haven't decided whether to charge us with starting a new Vietnam or for selling out to the Russians. Probably they will do both.
[Laughter]

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I'm disturbed at the Soviets operating 8,000 miles away, in an area where they have marginal national interests. We sent a note which gave them the opportunity to back away. They replied, "How could they tell a legitimate government how to deal with an insurgent movement?" Ten years ago the Soviet Government would have been inhibited by the U. S. capacity to intervene -- which is logistically much greater. They must realize our inhibition is such that we can't match their arms through secret channels.

Sauvagnargues: Yes.

Kissinger: If we did it overtly, we could break their back.

This is what worries me. It hurts us too in China. Our briefing papers said we should ask the Chinese for help. They agreed to help through Zaire.

Sauvagnargues: Really?

Kissinger: Yes. This must be kept secret.

For a superpower to plead with them to help . . . They must think, "If they can't help in Luanda, how can they help in Mukden?" They'll send in some equipment and some moral support. And they're very concerned about Angola. Mao raised it.

Sauvagnargues: Will the MPLA take over?

Kissinger: In two months, if the present rate of reinforcement continues, our people think MPLA can take over.

The President made it clear to Dobrynin. I've made it clear. They say we should make a political proposal and in that context they would be prepared to consider military things.

Sauvagnargues: I'm very worried that Algeria is doing this. Because they're very upset about the Sahara.

deLaboulaye: There are airlifts to Angola landing in Algeria, flying over Yugoslavia. Because the big Antonovs can't go all the way. The Yugoslavs asked us about it. I wonder if we couldn't say a word in Belgrade about this.

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Our analysis, too, was that it was due to their estimate you wouldn't react.

Kissinger: That's what worries me. They might have started with the crude reason that China had Mozambique and they had to have Angola. We could have tolerated a dominant MPLA, even with some modest covert support from the Soviet Union.

deLaboulaye: They must calculate it wouldn't hurt detente, and third, the possibility of getting bases on the Atlantic coast.

Kissinger: I agree with Jean that the key is the effect on the Africans. I agree they're nationalists and there won't be permanent gains. But now they must feel they have to deal with the Soviet Union for whatever objectives they have. They'll go the other way if we can stop it.

We've put in another tranche of \$35 million. The next tranche puts us over \$100 million and that's not a covert operation.

Callaghan: They gain either way. If the U. S. is linked with South Africa, that gives the Soviet Union a ready made case.

Kissinger: We'll kick them out if we can strengthen UNITA. We didn't bring them in -- but we didn't kick them out because they're the one stiffening element.

Callaghan: We could all talk to them.

Kissinger: Could we do this in a coordinated way? We can find money more easily than people. We need trained people who can provide communications. We'd be delighted to kick the South Africans out.

Callaghan: That's the sine qua non of success.

Kissinger: That's right.

Callaghan: Kenya needs arms very badly now. They have British officers but they are asking us for arms. It's a long way away. But they're the most reliable country there. Kenyatta would do it.

Kissinger: He'd do it.

Sauvagnargues: The Cubans are the problem.

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Callaghan: I regard them as an asset.

Kissinger: They're an asset if they don't win! From Dobrynin's behavior, I think they share our assessment that they'll win. It will affect detente in America because it will be used by the very people who accuse us of another Vietnam.

Sonnenfeldt: 90 percent of your questions at the press conference were on Angola.

Callaghan: We'd all better think about it.

Sauvagnargues: And stay in contact with the Political Directors.

Kissinger: I agree their tendency will be to continue detente. But this shows they will take opportunities.

Callaghan: Allen [Campbell], let's get an analysis and exchange it. We should have another quick meeting.

Sauvagnargues: We should talk to them: Mobutu, Cameroun, Ahidjo.

Kissinger: We can do it too, but we should tell them the same things.

Callaghan: Can we share our assessments first? I can talk to Kaunda. I can ask him who he wants to win.

Kissinger: He wants UNITA to win and he's letting us use Zambia to supply UNITA. Can you meet between Christmas and New Years?

Sauvagnargues: I have to talk to the President. I'm not directly responsible for these matters, but I'm aware of them. I believe he shares your view.

Kissinger: Yes, that's true. We talked at Rambouillet.

Genscher: We should talk and agree on the addressees.

Kissinger: Quickly, so they don't start panicking.

Sauvagnargues: They are panicking. We can see it in the Security Council.

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Callaghan: It won't help as long as the Cubans and the South Africans are there.

Kissinger: I think the Soviet strategy is to get a preponderance of force on the MPLA and then go for a political solution.

Sonnenfeldt: This matter of overflights has to be considered seriously. It's particularly the Francophone countries.

Sauvagnargues: But Boumedienne is unhappy about Sahara. He thinks he is being encircled.

Callaghan: If the Cubans were out, could they [the MPLA] use the equipment?

Kissinger: They [the Soviets] have sent in sophisticated equipment that we didn't think the MPLA could handle.

Jean is right. We have to talk to these frightened states right away. After they plead with us, if they don't hear from us, they may think the game is up.

Campbell: Our close relations aren't with the contiguous countries.

Kissinger: We were impressed by that Kinshasa ceremony when our Deputy Assistant Secretary, who is not a tiger, was approached by several of them.

deLaboulaye: Savimbi is thinking of getting in touch again with the MPLA because of difficulties.

Campbell: There was an approach, Mr. Secretary of State [Callaghan], ages ago, for the shipping of arms through Zambia. We did help, but a long time ago.

Sauvagnargues. How about a UN operation like the one in 1962?

Kissinger: With Christmas approaching, we have to get something done. We should aim for the next two weeks.

A few words about Spain. Then possibly Yugoslavia.

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Spain

Sauvagnargues: On Spain we don't have much to say that you don't know. The King is hamstrung by the machinery set up by Franco himself. But he seems pretty determined. He has shown more determination than I expected.

Kissinger: He hasn't shown the Bourbon capacity to self-destruction. [To Sauvagnargues:] I made an anti-French remark and you didn't react!

Genscher: We want to make the transition most easy for the King. Without Arias he would have had problems. So we shouldn't criticize him for keeping Arias.

Kissinger: He has changed most of his Cabinet.

Genscher: When I was in Spain in the spring, I talked with some of the opposition, which included the present Foreign Minister. So we have good contacts, and there can be good German-Spanish consultations.

van Well: The Minister of Interior is the former Ambassador in London.

Genscher: We should encourage them but shouldn't push them.

Callaghan: I've taken the line that we draw the line at Franco's funeral and start a new chapter. But this didn't work. I was attacked at the Party Conference. Campbell misled me. [Laughter]

We have problems. One is Gibraltar. We have no interest in Gibraltar, but if everyone here could tell him not to make remarks which stir up everyone in the UK. The remark in his Coronation speech on this was the only one which got a lot of applause!

We have a meeting of the Socialist International coming up in Copenhagen. The Dutch, the Danes, the Spanish opposition will be there.

Genscher: The Spanish socialists warmly welcomed the new government.

Callaghan: But they want all parties to be free, including the Communist Party. Juan Carlos can't do that. His right won't let him.

Kissinger: And it may not be compatible with tranquility in Spain.

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Callaghan: So I want to be prepared before I go to Copenhagen. It's the 18th of January. I would like views from everyone here.

Yugoslavia

Kissinger: Should we turn to Yugoslavia?

[Sonnenfeldt went out to bring in General Haig, who was waiting outside. They both came in.]

Campbell: In New York in September you told the Political Directors to follow up in various fields, to give more content to the relations with Yugoslavia, as a deterrent to the Soviet Union. In these we made a certain amount of progress. For example, in arranging visits, in both directions, including visits by Ministers to the regions as well as the capital. In commercial and economic relations, there was progress too. Or we are on the way to making improvements. And in the financial field -- except for one German difficulty, on access to the European Investment Bank.

In military equipment and training, the UK and France have had many orders. On training we have done rather more. On technical training.

Kissinger: We?

Campbell: The European members.

I don't think you want to discuss this now in detail, but it would be useful if you endorsed our efforts of "thickening up" our relations with Yugoslavia, and encourage your government departments to help ours. Because we stand a good chance here; this is a game we can win.

Kissinger: And to raise the political stakes against Soviet intervention.

As far as the US is concerned, we strongly endorse this and will conduct parallel efforts of our own.

We have started arms sales. We will be selling some radars, and TOW missiles.

Genscher: I've understood this hint at the European Investment Bank. I fully understand the concerns. The Budgetary Office has tried to make

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foreign policy. I'm sure we will make a positive change.

We have links of a special kind -- there are two million German tourists there, and half a million Yugoslav workers in Germany. The Minister of Interior will come. As I said in New York, I very much urge that we have contacts not only with the capital, but the states, because they will have very great influence on the future.

Callaghan: It wasn't just the Germans on the Investment Bank. The UK also had reserves, but we have just lifted it.

There are some other European issues, Henry. One is pigmeat, believe it or not. [Laughter] Perhaps Jean and Hans could look at it from a political point of view.

Also baby beef. [Laughter] Perhaps we three should look at all these.

Genscher: We are rather more progressive. We favor extending the quotas.

Kissinger: On pigmeat or baby beef? [Laughter] I think we are all agreed we will encourage intensification of contacts with the Yugoslavs. Of course, they will notice this. But wouldn't it be better if we told them what we are doing?

van Well: They have noticed it.

Kissinger: But to tell them the philosophy. So they don't think it is just a series of economic decisions.

Genscher: Minic told me he understood that.

Callaghan: We should exchange views.

Kissinger: It should be tactfully done. We don't want a pro-Western posture; they can be nonaligned. But they have to realize that sometimes in the UN they carry their nonaligned campaigns too far. We should do it case by case. For example, we should take up these Angola overflights. Because if the Soviets get too bold, it could affect them. [All the Ministers express agreement.]

I told you I'd ask Al Haig in his capacity as American Commander, and even more as a trusted friend, to look at the military contingencies. Not on an inter-allied basis but as an American exercise.

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Haig [unfolds maps and charts]: I wanted to emphasize there has been no formal NATO planning for Yugoslavia contingencies, but there was a SHAPE joint study done in the spring, with the Secretary-General. The view was that Soviet hegemony or an attempt at hegemony over Yugoslavia would affect the balance of power in the Mediterranean, and in Italy and Greece, and in the Middle East because of the enhanced naval capacity in the Mediterranean. And the links into Turkey.

We put together an analysis, with only three people, of the US and allied capabilities.

Four basic scenarios are covered here. [He passes out a spreadsheet.]

One is the status quo, as you have been discussing now -- various Soviet pressures applied now even before Tito goes. And the actions are those that could be undertaken now individually or in the NATO context.

If the Soviets get more strenuous, we would have to get more active. We should be preemptive rather than reactive. The strategic position of Yugoslavia is such that fait accomplis leave us with less flexibility to react.

I also believe that rhetoric is less impressive than movement of forces and commitment of resources.

So the first scenario is the status quo. Then the second is after Tito leaves the scene. One possibility is Soviet pressure and covert activity to exploit the situation. A second possibility is more direct military involvement but less than an overt invasion.

The third scenario is overt invasion by Soviet and bloc forces -- to exploit a civil war that's already under way, or to move in concert with Romania, or to move invading Romania too.

Kissinger: Can they invade through just Hungary and not go through Romania?

Haig: Yes.

But to invade both Romania and Yugoslavia is a tremendous imposition on their present force capability. It would denude their forces

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along the whole Western front, and would be a tremendous change in the political situation. Unless there is a mobilization, which would be picked up.

Kissinger: How long would it be?

Haig: Sixty to ninety days.

Kissinger: Before Czechoslovakia, what was it?

Haig: Sixty days.

They would do it massively, and not take any risks.

One approach is through Hungary, with 16 Soviet and bloc divisions. They would move down. If Romania were involved, it could be 13 divisions from the South, Soviet, Romanian and Bulgarian.

Sonnenfeldt: You are assuming the Romanians would march with the Soviets?

Haig: We have done it both ways.

Kissinger: It is almost inconceivable they would.

Haig: The more likely situation is if Romania were neutral and the Soviets observed their neutrality. Then there would be only the four Soviet occupation divisions.

It would take from ten days to two weeks for the Soviets to overrun the major population centers. That's a far cry from overrunning all of Yugoslavia.

Today Yugoslavia has 9 divisions, plus 20 separate brigades and 38 separate regiments, 192,000 men altogether. It is a pretty varied force structure. That itself is a logistical problem we will have to face. Ten percent of their equipment is American. Plus 2.1 million men under the "all-people's defense" concept. The regular forces would withdraw and fight a mobile defense with these irregulars, to fight in a guerrilla context.

In the status quo scenario, you might want some pronouncements affecting Yugoslavia's neutrality, if the Soviet rhetoric started to re-emphasize the Brezhnev doctrine.

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Our potential for military action is quite limited. It starts with a readiness exercise, rounding out our Reforger forces, sending reinforcements from the US -- an airborne division from the US -- and we could assemble a Naval Task Force and send it up to the Adriatic, but not going in.

Sauvagnargues: You wouldn't go in?

Haig: We could go in in peacetime. But in a war it could be a strategic trap.

Sauvagnargues: There is a submarine base?

Haig: The Yugoslavs have five submarines that are in and out of there. They have a base.

Kissinger: Your concern is land-based air.

Haig: Yes. It would take the Soviets about 24 hours to get total air supremacy. The Yugoslavs have about 250 planes; the Soviets could apply 2900 aircraft.

Kissinger: What could the Soviets think we are planning to do, with all this dancing around?

Haig: The most credible threat would be a division in the northern Italian area into Croatia, to support their independence.

Kissinger: Could the 82nd airborne division be enough?

Haig: No, but it could give a signal if combined with movement in the Mediterranean. They would think you are determined to support the forces intending to resist.

Kissinger: By in fact putting Western forces in the area.

Haig: Yes. In fact we could not put sufficient forces there to guard the whole Central front against 36 Soviet divisions.

Sonnenfeldt: Couldn't we mobilize in 60 days?

Haig: It depends on where we want to use them.

Kissinger: Where?

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Haig: Moving directly East.

Kissinger: The Central front?

Haig: Yes.

Kissinger: Or through Austria. You may have to do that. That is not a credible threat.

Haig: Unless combined with other moves.

van Well: What about pressure from Greece north?

Haig: We have looked at that option. But a movement from Italy is the easiest.

Kissinger: You are talking about a division.

Haig: Plus a Marine amphibious landing force, plus possibly two American divisions by M + 30, plus strategic reserves -- and that is what we are using, the airborne division.

We are working intensively on boosting our capability to move forces to Europe within M + 30.

You wouldn't want to put these American forces in a pocket in Yugoslavia.

Kissinger: Then we lose Yugoslavia.

Haig: Unless we preempt with a demonstration of resistance.

Kissinger: But that depends on being able to do it. The worst is to give a demonstration and be called on it.

Haig: The point Henry makes is to make moves not that shore up a newly endangered region but that show we won't accept anything.

We have the capacity to shore up the Yugoslavs logistically, with airdrops. We have logistics support available in five separate bases in Europe, which can supply 60 days worth of supplies for a 15,000 man-guerrilla force. This is with sustaining light equipment, with linguistically-trained people. We can airdrop supplies almost immediately.

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Kissinger: But the Soviets can establish air superiority in 24 hours?

Haig: 24-48 hours.

Kissinger: Can we resist that?

Haig: Yes, but we would have to have overflight rights in both France and Italy. We have aircraft in northern Italy that could go in, which would have to be replaced. This could be done in 36-72 hours.

Kissinger: Would that be a sufficient obstacle to the Soviets?

Haig: It would be not decisive militarily, but it would be a strong signal to the Soviets.

Sonnenfeldt: Could we get carriers in?

Haig: We could get carriers there quickly.

In 7-14 days they would be overrun -- the major population centers.

Sauvagnargues: What about guerrilla activity in the mountains?

Haig: That would continue.

Sauvagnargues: If the Soviets came through Hungary, nobody could stop them. But they would have to put up with the guerrilla forces.

Haig: 36 Soviet divisions. This is our estimate, and also SHAPE's estimate independently last spring. This is what it would take.

Kissinger: It would take 60 days to get ready for that.

Haig: Yes, 60 days.

Sauvagnargues: But you would know it.

Kissinger: They couldn't do it as a surprise.

Haig: It would have grave implications for the Alliance; for Italy, with a Soviet satellite on their borders; for Greece. The Third World and Peking would draw conclusions from it.

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deLaboulaye: Does this movement weaken the Soviet set-up in the northern area?

Haig: They would have to move two Carpathian divisions. If Romania is neutral. To invade Romania would denude the Central Front.

Sonnenfeldt: They might want to take the occasion to take care of Romania.

Kissinger: But if they took Yugoslavia, they would have Romania encircled and wouldn't need to take Romania.

Callaghan: Should we treat this as a local conflict or a general conflagration?

Haig: Given the stretching of the band in the last decade, and the CSCE and detente, this would have to be seen as global.

Sonnenfeldt [to Callaghan]: Could you mobilize under these circumstances?

Callaghan: That isn't something I have thought about. I don't want to duck the question, but I don't want to give a foolish answer.

Kissinger: We don't want to work ourselves into a situation where if we can't win on the whole front, we think we can do nothing. Because then we will do nothing. If non-military pressures start and we do nothing, this could escalate rapidly.

One lesson I've learned is if you escalate slowly, you look so afraid that you invite further escalation. I'm afraid it's like Angola.

Third, if we decide that Yugoslavia is that important, we can deter the Soviets either by pretending to start a general movement all along the front -- I doubt we have the political capability to do that now -- or by putting forces into northern Yugoslavia which would have a trip-wire effect, like the forces in northern Norway.

The Political Directors could study this. Al could refine his thinking, in terms of moves that could be made. In the crises we have managed, military moves always had a clear purpose, and we could have done something if needed.

I've found it extremely helpful. It is a superb job, Al.

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Haig: There are detailed back-up plans.

Kissinger: This is what the Political Directors should look at.

Sonnenfeldt: How much are we denuding the Central Front and how much will we need a mobilization of German and US forces to deal with other contingencies that will arise?

Haig: I was thinking of a smaller force which wouldn't weaken the Central Front.

deLaboulaye: No weakening.

Haig: But you are talking about small stuff. An AMF -- an Ace Mobile Force -- of brigade size.

Kissinger: If we could move the 82nd Airborne before the Soviets move, that is one thing.

Haig: Exactly.

Kissinger: If you move the 82nd after they have moved 36 divisions, it is just showing impotence.

Sonnenfeldt: It would be a meatgrinder.

Kissinger: But if we are there, for the Soviets to attack an American division is significant.

Callaghan: The Political Directors therefore should study it.

Are there any other sensitive areas with the Soviets?

Genscher: The north, quite clearly. Norway.

Callaghan: Militarily this is so. But in Yugoslavia it is a Communist government and there may be some there inviting the Soviets in. That is not true in Norway.

Sauvagnargues: And Norway is in NATO.

Kissinger: So that is an attack on NATO.

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Callaghan: In this sense Yugoslavia is the most sensitive area.

Haig: It is the most dangerous we are facing.

van Well: If indeed we should be engaged in Yugoslavia, whether or not it is going to be generalized, we should strengthen ourselves all along. With alert and mobilization.

Kissinger: Without question. But if we work ourselves into a frame of mind that we have to attack through Berlin, that means we have decided to do nothing. We should reinforce the Central Front, and dare the Soviets to attack there.

Callaghan: Will all our NATO allies go along with this?

deLaboulaye: Italy will be a problem.

Haig: We wanted to do exercises in northern Italy but they were goosy with it because of their relations with Yugoslavia.

Cyprus

[A message is brought in.]

Kissinger: I just received a message: "The Greek-Turkish meeting is still going on, but the only issue is what to say to the press. Bitsios is prepared to say he is pleased with the progress being made and that they have agreed to ask UN Secretary-General Waldheim to announce the resumption of intercommunal talks on the basis of no fixed agenda, looking toward a package deal, and with discussions of three major points: bizonal federation, powers of the Federal Government, and territory. The work of the communal talks will continue in subcommittees, and experts from the Greek and Turkish governments can be invited to participate in these subcommittees."

Callaghan: That's fine. But how do we keep up the momentum here? They will all slip back. We've seen it before.

Kissinger: We should avoid going separately, because we will let them bargain between us. Could we agree we will all consult before we do anything? [All agree.]

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Italy

Let me say a word about Italy. We have been lecturing the Christian Democrats for months about the dangers of the "historic compromise" and the need for reform. But I have seen no change in their attitudes and no practical impact. If any of my colleagues have any ideas, we could coordinate. De Martino is coming to the US, but there is no sense lecturing them to cooperate if the Christian Democrats are a corpse. We are out of ideas. There are all sorts of schemes, but no one to implement them. We should discuss it again.

The second point is, the four of us should find some excuse to meet again before the next NATO meeting.

deLaboulaye: On your way back from Soviet Russia?

Kissinger: I could stop in one capital, and you could all happen to be there.

Callaghan: And why should the others come? [Laughter]

Kissinger: To see me! [Laughter]

Sonnenfeldt: We could get into a Berlin crisis.

Genscher: That is easy to do.

Kissinger: Jean could have another consumer-producer meeting.
[Laughter] That he doesn't participate in!

Callaghan: You don't see another consumer-producers Ministerial, do you, Jean?

Sauvagnargues: The Americans don't like it!

Callaghan: Can't we just get together? Or is it that that is more trouble? It's no trouble for me. But if we three meet, the Nine will go off the deep end.

Sauvagnargues: Rambouillet created such an uproar.

Kissinger: I have always on my way back from Moscow stopped in one capital.

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van Well: Why don't you brief the NATO Council, and any Ministers who want to, can come?

Callaghan: And we could sneak off.

Kissinger: Why don't we do that?

I'll be in Moscow in January. Let's do it Friday, January 23.

[The meeting ended.]

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