

TOP SECRET SENSITIVE

EXCLUSIVE

EYES ONLY

HAK
HAIG
HOWE

1972 OCT 27 AM 2 46 LORD

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TOP SECRET SENSITIVE 210500Z OCT 72 VIA CAS CHANNELS (BUNKER)
FROM: AMBASSADOR BUNKER SAIGON 0238 IMMEDIATE
TO: THE WHITE HOUSE, EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY FOR HENRY A. KISSINGER
REF: WHS 2298

1. I HAD PLANNED TO SEND THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE YESTERDAY AND HAD DICTATED MOST OF WHEN IT WAS OVERTAKEN BY OTHER DEVELOPMENTS. I AM SENDING IT ALONG, HOWEVER, FOR THE RECORD.
2. I APPRECIATE REFTTEL WHICH IS MOST HELPFUL. I MET WITH THIEU YESTERDAY MORNING AND GAVE HIM THE VIETNAMESE LANGUAGE TEXT OF THE PROPOSAL AS OF OCTOBER 17 TOGETHER WITH OUR REVISION OF ARTICLES 7 AND 8, WHICH I STRESSED AGAIN HAD BEEN ACCEPTED BY THE DRV.
3. I SAID THAT YOU HAD INFORMED ME THAT IF HANOI AGREES, YOU PLAN TO MEET AGAIN IN PARIS DURING THE WEEK OF OCTOBER 29 AND THAT YOU WILL DO YOUR UTMOST TO GET HANOI'S ACCEPTANCE OF AS MANY AS POSSIBLE OF THE MODIFICATIONS THAT HE HAD PROPOSED. WE UNDERSTOOD THAT FROM HIS POINT OF VIEW THE MOST IMPORTANT OF THESE WERE:
 - OBSERVANCE OF THE DMZ IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE 1954 GENEVA AGREEMENTS.
 - THE WITHDRAWAL OF NORTH VIETNAMESE TROOPS.
 - CHANGE IN THE WORDING OF ARTICLE 9 CONCERNING THE COMPOSITION OF THE NATIONAL COUNCIL OF RECONCILIATION AND CONCORD, INCLUDING THE PHRASE "ADMINISTRATIVE STRUCTURE". I EXPLAINED AGAIN IN ENGLISH THIS PHRASE DIMINISHED THE IMPORTANCE OF THE NCRC, BUT WE UNDERSTOOD THAT IT GAVE HIM PROBLEMS IN VIETNAMESE.
4. I COMPLIMENTED THIEU ON THE MODERATION AND REASONABLENESS OF HIS SPEECH TUESDAY NIGHT AND HIS AVOIDANCE OF ANY APPEARANCE OF CONFRONTATION WITH US. I THEN SAID THAT IN THE PERIOD IMMEDIATELY AHEAD, IT IS ESSENTIAL TO MAINTAIN A POSTURE OF FLEXIBILITY AND TO AVOID GETTING FIXED IN ANY RIGID POSITIONS. WE ARE OPPOSED, OF COURSE, TO THE IMPOSITION OF ANY COALITION GOVERNMENT, BUT EXCEPT FOR THIS WE SHOULD MAINTAIN A NEGOTIATING POSITION ON OTHER POINTS.

State Dept. review completed

MORI/CDF C03317550

5. I REFERRED TO INTELLIGENCE WE HAD BOTH RECEIVED ON THE ENEMY'S PREPARATION FOR A CEASE-FIRE AND THIEU SAID THAT HE HAD ALSO BEEN WORKING INTENSIVELY ON HIS OWN PLANS. HE HAS GIVEN INSTRUCTIONS THAT A SPECIAL SPEED UP CAMPAIGN IN PREPARATION FOR CEASE-FIRE MUST BE INITIATED SIMILAR TO THE ACCELERATED PACIFICATION CAMPAIGN AFTER TET 1968 AND HAS PERSONALLY GIVEN INSTRUCTIONS TO CORPS COMMANDERS, TO ALL PROVINCE CHIEFS, THE NATIONAL POLICE, THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY AND THE POLITICAL WARFARE DEPARTMENT CONCERNING ITS IMPLEMENTATION.

6. THIEU SAID THAT THE ENEMY HAD DIVIDED HIS CEASE-FIRE PREPARATIONS INTO TWO PHASES. PHASE 1 WHICH CONTINUES UNTIL THE DAY OF CEASE-FIRE PROVIDES FOR THE BREAKDOWN OF FORCES INTO SMALL UNITS EQUIPPED WITH MORTARS IN AN EFFORT TO ATTACK AND OCCUPY HAMLETS AND VILLAGES. PHASE 2 WILL EXTEND FROM THE TIME OF CEASE-FIRE UNTIL THE DAY CONTROL PROVISIONS ARE ESTABLISHED, A PERIOD WHICH THE ENEMY REFERS TO AS THE "HALF DARK, HALF LIGHT" PERIOD DURING WHICH THE STRUGGLE WILL CONTINUE.

7. THIEU SAID THAT EVEN IF A CEASE-FIRE IS PROCLAIMED, VIGILANCE MUST BE MAINTAINED. ONE OF THE MAJOR PROBLEMS IS TO PREVENT DISRUPTION OF THE ARMY. THIS HAD HAPPENED IN 1954 WHEN THE ARMY SIMPLY DISINTEGRATED AND TROOPS LEFT FOR HOME. IF THE ARMY, HE SAID, IS VIGILANT AND CALM, THE PEOPLE WILL REMAIN CALM.

8. I SAID THAT IT WAS VERY IMPORTANT THAT HE AND I KEEP IN CLOSE TOUCH FROM NOW ON AND HE AGREED THAT WE SHOULD DO SO. AS SUGGESTED IN YOUR MESSAGE, I SHALL TRY TO SEE HIM EVERY OTHER DAY; IN FACT, I HAD ALREADY PLANNED TO DO SO WHEN YOUR MESSAGE ARRIVED. I SHALL CONTINUE TO DEVELOP THE POINTS MADE IN REFTEL. I AM AWARE OF THE BALANCE THAT IT IS NECESSARY TO MAINTAIN UNTIL NOVEMBER 7 AND WILL BE GUIDED ACCORDINGLY.

9. WARM REGARDS.

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