

WASHINGTON

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE

February 25, 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY

DOS, OSD Reviews
Completed

FROM: Helmut Sonnenfeldt

SUBJECT: February 20 Quadripartite Political
Directors Meeting

We met from 3:30-10:30 p.m. at the ERG's guest house on the Venusberg outside Bonn. Two of General Haig's officers joined us for the discussion of Yugoslavia. Lothar Lahn, Genscher's senior man on African affairs, joined us for a discussion of Angola, Rhodesia, and the Spanish Sahara. Conversation during and after dinner focused on the Tindemans Report, next steps in the "construction of Europe," and the US/European relationship.

We made progress on Yugoslavia. The Germans and British expressed considerable apprehension at the possibility of new Angolas in Rhodesia or the Sahara. Our discussion on US/European relations helped ensure against any new European initiatives in this area not consistent with our own views or interests.

Yugoslavia: Haig's staff confirmed the military feasibility and desirability of reinforcing Greek and Turkish Thrace in certain contingencies, to force the Soviets to divert troops from any invasion of Yugoslavia to mask the Bulgarian border. Key questions were the attitude of Turkey and Greece, and the availability of US or French troops. Haig's staff also stated that in their view the Soviets would not derive any military advantage from using Austrian territory for an invasion of Yugoslavia, and thus would be unlikely to invade Austria, as part of a Yugoslav scenario, for military reasons.

The military have now pretty much answered the Political Directors' questions on issues which they are competent. The next steps require political decisions.

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE

2

My colleagues would like to begin probing the Greeks, Turks, Italians and Yugoslavs on their intentions. They suggest that we take advantage of official visits by senior French, UK, US or FRG military officers to these countries to begin sounding out the heads of their military establishments on their plans and attitudes in the event of certain Yugoslav contingencies. Such visits occur regularly, and informal inquiries of this sort could, I think, be handled quietly. We will pursue this subject at our next meeting, and perhaps have some specific proposals to put to you and your colleagues for decision at your May meeting.

It is also evident that the UK, FRG and French military will have to become involved at some point, on a limited basis, if we are to make any meaningful plans involving troop movements, at least of their troops. The French are not yet ready to participate at a military level, but have no objection if the FRG or the UK (but not both, as this would isolate the French) designate an officer to work with our own. We may pursue this at our next meeting.

DeLaboulaye stated that he was under specific instructions from Giscard to explore contingencies involving the possible use of French troops. He noted that if a crisis over Yugoslavia arose in such a way as to split the French left, his government's freedom of action would be vastly increased. This means putting the onus clearly on the Soviets, and makes any preemptive moves on our part more difficult.

Haig is becoming concerned that these discussions not get out ahead of DOD's and the NSC's own planning for Yugoslavia. I will be seeing him when he returns early next month, and we will discuss this problem. It may at some point also be useful for you to have a session with Rumsfeld on the subject.

Angola: Based on my colleagues' remarks, it appears that France, having broken EC ranks on the issue of recognition, is also going to be odd man out on the question of relations. The UK and FRG, having taken the plunge and recognized, now wish to hurry to establish relations, in order, they hope, to exercise a moderating influence on Luanda. DeLaboulaye insists that this is a

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE

3

race France will not enter, and maintains that his government will take a very reserved attitude on the establishment of diplomatic relations.

I encouraged my colleagues to be as forthcoming as possible on aid for Zaire and Zambia, outlining what we saw as the priority needs. The UK, according to Campbell, will try to find some additional money for Zambia. The FRG will increase its aid to Zambia, and, in a more limited way, for Zaire. DeLaboulaye was noncommittal on aid. The EC ministers will be discussing the Angolan situation this week, and may eventually come up with some Community money for Zaire and Zambia as well. Both the FRG and the UK are inclined to hold out at least the hope of aid to Angola as well, to "give the MPLA an alternative."

Rhodesia: My British and German colleagues feel that the Soviets and Cubans will try to avoid a confrontation with South Africa in Southern Angola and Namibia, and will instead turn elsewhere for their next intervention. Campbell felt that Rhodesia was probably their next target, and Lahn agreed. The UK Government plainly has visions of being called upon to defend Rhodesia (still British territory of some sort) from a full-scale Soviet backed Cuban invasion enjoying the enthusiastic support of most of Africa. The Cubans would, however, have to get to Rhodesia through either Mozambique or Zambia, both of which have reasons to think twice before permitting any large scale Soviet-Cuban involvement. Thus, current British expressions of concern, while not unfounded, may be somewhat overstated in an effort to frighten Smith and to persuade the US and others to join in encouraging him to be reasonable.

Sahara: Lahn gave us a very alarming picture of the Saharan situation, most of it apparently drawn from Moroccan sources. He cited information to the effect that the Algerians were receiving 12 planeloads of Soviet arms per week, and had been promised (along with the Libyans) \$12 billion in Soviet arms aid over five years.

The French are also concerned, but rather more relaxed. DeLaboulaye said their information was that the Soviet arms deliveries to Algeria had been discontinued. (We believe, I am told, that much of these arms may have been sent on

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE

4

to Angola in any case.) He noted that the Arabs have a tendency to lie, and to dream. The \$12 billion arms deal sounded very much like a "Quaddafi figure." According to deLaboulaye, France's Algerian contacts were urging France to find some way to bail Boumediene out of his Saharan dilemma. The French believed that Algerian troops did participate in the recent clash with the Moroccans and did effect great damage. But the fact that the Algerians denied their involvement, withdrew their troops and welcomed the visit of an Arab League mediating mission indicated that Algeria was still not set on war.

I have asked INR to review the situation in Algeria and particularly the level of Soviet (and Soviet client state) advisers and equipment. I have also asked Atherton to keep in close touch with the Europeans, particularly the French, on the issue.

The Tindemans Report: I asked whether the US should expect any European proposals affecting its relations with Europe growing out of the Tindemans Report. Campbell replied that as no one had the heart to turn down Tindemans proposals in their entirety, this was one area in which something was likely to be done. Van Well indicated his government's support for a proposal which would have the foreign minister of the country holding the EC presidency come to the US once during his six-month term of office, accompanied by the member of the EC Commission charged with external affairs, to formally consult with the US Secretary of State. DeLaboulaye opposed this idea, and Campbell was not enthusiastic, although I suspect both their heads of state may be won over if Schmidt decides to push it. As European thinking evolves, your colleagues may wish to raise this issue with you, perhaps in May.

I noted that in fact the last several foreign ministers holding the presidency had met with you at least once during their terms. I said that while I could see no particular problem in formalizing this arrangement, or in adding someone like Soames to the foreign ministers delegation, neither did I see any great advantage. Our main interest, I emphasized, was to ensure that European and US policies evolved harmoniously. We were not dissatisfied with present arrangements, and while we were always open to new European initiatives, we would respond to them based on how they contributed to this process of harmonization.

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE

5

My European colleagues then proceeded on a wide-ranging debate on the rest of Tindemans Report, and the general process of European unification. Delaboulaye opened with a classic Cartesian critique of the report -- it lacked a central focus, a unifying principle. Most seriously, it sought to simultaneously strengthen two competing executives -- the Council and the Commission -- rather than unequivocally choosing one over the other. Campbell's defense of Tindemans was just as typically Anglo Saxon -- let's move forward where we can, putting these unresolvable matters of principle aside.

This discussion of the Tindemans Report offered an amusing and useful insight into the current dynamics of European decision making. More importantly, gave us an opportunity to put across our view that how the Europeans organize themselves in their relations with the United States is a subject of mutual interest, on which we should be consulted from the first. Finally, it illustrated how these quadripartite talks have come to offer the British, French and Germans the opportunity not only to consult with the US, but also to consult among themselves on purely European issues, out of hearing of the other Europeans.

We agreed to meet at least one more time before your meeting with your three colleagues in May. We are tentatively scheduled to meet in late March, probably in London.

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE