HAMPLE VIA COMPANY CONTRACTOR AND

JUL DEVICE

21 July 1970

25X1 ACTIONS TAKEN TO IMPROVE 1. (U) A US Air Force C-47 has been assigned to the 25X1 25X1 on a permanent basis and is in place at Phnom Penh as of 20 July 1970. 2. (TS/HVCCO) CINCPAC reports that authority was granted to COMUSMACTHAI to release photographs and initial and supplementary photo interpretation reports from tactical 25X1 3. (TS/HVCCO) The 10-day test targeted against Communist communications in Cambodia and utilizing BENCH ROYAL C-130 25X1 assets was initiated on 21 July 1970. 4. (TS) A three day liaison visit by a representative of MACV J-2 to was made during the period 25X1 11-18 July 1970 to coordinate matters of mutual intelligence interest and to by COMUSMACV. 25X1 25X1 5. (S) **RVNAF** Special Security Technical Branch has deployed tactical intercept teams into Cambodia. These teams are operating with their parent ARVN divisions in the Fishhook area and at Chiphu and Kompong Speu. DIA, NGA, ARMY, NSA, reviews completed. ON-FILE NSC RELEASE INSTRUCTIONS APPLY Attachment 4

INFORMATION

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TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE CONTAINS CODEWORD

MEMORANDUM FOR:

THE PRESIDENT

FROM:

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HENRY A. KISSINGER

SUBJECT:

The Military Situation in Cambodia

Attached at Tab A is a DIA appraisal of the current military situation in Cambodia. Its major points are:

- -- Cambodian forces are having little success in their operations northeast of Phnom Penh.
- -- The multi-battalion Cambodian force which began attempts to respen Route 6 to Kompong Thom on September 7, 1970, remains stalled and seems unlikely to press on to its original objective, Kompong Thom.
- -- On December 5, three government battalions were routed by the Communists in the most serious setback yet.

- Recent Communist moves have isolated the town of Kompong Cham on Route 7.

The outlook is that without outside assistance, Cambodian forces along Route 6 appear to have little prospect for success in their mission. Moreover, the enemy threat to that force has increased and there is a danger that the column will be subject to piecemeal attack.

> -- It is likewise doubtful that Cambodian forces by themselves can reopen Route 7 so long as enemy forces remain in the area.

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE CONTAINS CODEWORD

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Enemy forces west of Kompong Cham total about 3,800 men compared to Cambodian forces of some 27,000-28,000 men. East of Kompong Cham, the Communists have some 11,400 men whereas the Cambodian Government has only one 400-man commando battalion.

I have spoken to Admiral Moorer about this situation and expressed my concern that after repeated efforts we have been unable to get accurate intelligence until the situation has deteriorated. He states that one of the factors which have enabled the enemy to build up in recent weeks is the very poor weather conditions which have limited effective air operations.

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TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE CONTAINS CODEWORD

9 DECEMBER 1970



Cambodian Situation in the Vicinity of Routes 6 and 7



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CAMBODIAN SITUATION IN THE VICINITY OF ROUTES 6 AND 7

Cambodian forces are having little success in their operations northeast of Phnom Penh where the enemy continues heavy pressures.

The multi-battalion FANK force, which departed Skoun on 7 September 1970 to reopen Route 6 to Kompong Thom, remains stalled in the general Tang Kauk area. There is no indication that this force will press on to its objective.

The most serious loss to FANK forces occurred on 5 December when three government battalions near Peam Chikang (south of Route 7) were routed in a Communist attack. Initial reports placed FANK casualties at 100 KIA and 100 WIA, but subsequent information suggests that government casualties were far higher.

The movement of enemy forces into the Peam Chikang area virtually completes the isolation of Kompong Cham. Until now, the government has been able to resupply the city by river convoys. The enemy's presence in the Peam Chikang-Mekong area permits him to disrupt what was a relatively secure supply route to the city.

The commander of FANK forces in Kompong Cham is concentrating on defense of the city and shows no disposition to move his forces westward in an attempt to reopen Route 7. This yields the initiative to the enemy and gives the VC/NVA the option of shifting forces and significantly increasing the existing threat to government units in the Skoun-Tang Kauk area.

Outlook

Without outside assistance the FANK forces in the general Tang Kauk area appear to have little prospect of success in their mission. It is considered unlikely that this force will attempt to press on to Kompong Thom, its objective, or that it will be successful if it does so. At the same time, the Communist threat to this force has increased, and the danger that the column will suffer a serious defeat is always present

It is likewise doubtful that government forces by themselves can reopen Route 7 and maintain their line of communications between Skoun-Kompong Cham so long as present VC/NVA

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forces remain in that area, i.e., the area bounded by Route 7 on the north, the Mekong River on the south, and Skoun and Kompong Cham.

Status of Routes 6 and 7

Route 6 is closed between Phnom Penh and Skoun due to the enemy presence at Bateay. Route 6 is also closed between Tang Kauk and Kompong Thom due to the enemy presence and destroyed bridges.

Route 7 (Krek to Skoun) is a one lane road, part of which is bituminous surfaced and part gravel. The road is in fair to good condition, but a damaged bridge 2.5 miles east of Tonle Bet is impassable. Bypass possibilities include repairing the latter or constructing a pontoon bridge. Alternate roads to bypass the damaged bridge are unsatisfactory, and cross-country movement is impossible. At least seven other bridges have been damaged on this section of Route 7, but bypass bridges or repair of the damaged ones allow traffic. A major obstacle to through traffic is the Mekong River. Passage on the river has been accomplished in the past by the use of 40-ton, diesel-powered, ferry craft. Elements of three VC/NVA regiments are in the vicinity of Route 7 between Skoun and Kompong Cham.

Status of Kompong Cham Airfield

The Kompong Cham Airfield is located 3.5 miles northnorthwest of the city and is constructed of asphalt. The runway is 131 feet wide and 3,900 feet long. Elevation of the airfield is 148 feet.

operated by Air America were using the airfield.

25X1

Order of Battle

West of Kompong Cham

The VC/NVA concentration in the Route 7 area of northern Kompong Cham Province includes three regimental headquarters plus their nine battalions, two independent battalions, and their headquarters personnel for a total strength of 3,800 men.

Cambodian forces within the triangle bounded by Phaav, Tang Kauk and Kompong Cham number 49 battalions and some 27,000 to 28,000 personnel. They are concentrated in the following areas:

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5,600 9 bns Phaav 4,700 8 bns Skoun 6,200-7,200 Tang Kauk-Prakham 13 bns 4,800 9 bns Prey Totung Kg Cham Airfield 700 2 bns Kg Cham 5,100 8 bns 49 27,100-28,100 Total

East of Kompong Cham

The VC/NVA concentration from Tonle Bet east along Route 7 to the RVN border is characterized by four general groupings. First, the 9th VC Division with its 95C and 271st Regiments (13 battalions, 3,690 men) are in the general area of the Chup Rubber Plantation. Immediately to the east is the 7th NVA Division with its 141st, 165th, and 209th Regiments (16 battalions, 4,980). The 96th and 208th Regiments of the 69th Artillery Command Gp and two independent battalions (8 battalions, 1,880 men) are disposed in the Fishhook area. Northeast of this area is the headquarters of the 5th VC Division (2 battalions, 850 men). These forces total 39 battalions and 11,400 men.

The only Cambodian unit east of Kompong Cham is the 400-man Commando Battalion last reported at Tonle Bet. (TOP SECRET UMBRA)

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