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MEMORANDUM

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INFORMATION

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE

August 20, 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

FROM: HENRY A. KISSINGER HK

SUBJECT: CIA Analysis of China in 1980-85, and in the Year 2000

At Tab A is a CIA study of political, military, and economic trends in the People's Republic of China intended to estimate what the country will look like in the following decade, and at the turn of the century. While some of the conclusions reached by this type of "futurology" inevitably are controversial, it is a thoughtful analysis based on our current information about the country. Given the importance of China for our foreign policy, I have summarized the major conclusions of the study and forward it to you as of possible interest.

The analysis reaches the following conclusions:

-- China's major security problem for the rest of the century will remain the Soviet Union. Probabilities for a Soviet nuclear strike against the PRC in the coming decade do not seem very high, perhaps no more than one chance in five. By the end of the century the PRC will have developed a formidable strategic deterrent force based on a combina[tion] of land based missiles and nuclear submarines.

MORI/CDF C02859476 pages 1-2

-- While China will probably remain a revolutionary Communist adversary of the United States, threatening U.S. interests in many places, its primary enemy will remain the USSR, even if Moscow and Peking achieve a limited accommodation. It is believed that despite ideological pretentions and national interests which conflict with the U.S. in many areas, Chinese leaders are likely to continue to deal with the U.S. and other non-Communist countries in a constructive manner when they consider this to be of advantage for China. China's interests in dealing with the U.S. will include using us to offset Soviet efforts to encircle or threaten the PRC, gaining access to advanced technology, and seeking to manage areas of conflict with us through diplomatic activity.

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-- China's economic prospects depend on success in controlling population growth and stimulating greater food production. It is anticipated that by 1985 PRC industrial production will have doubled, and the food/population problem will ease as the turn of the century approaches. At the same time, in overall economic strength China will remain a big, poor nation whose aggregate economic strength will trail far behind that of the U.S. and USSR. The country will still not have caught up with Japan and western Europe by the year 2000.

-- In internal politics, the study anticipates that after the death of Chairman Mao and Premier Chou En-lai, leadership is most likely to pass to a collective dominated by career Communist Party men. The possibility of a military dictatorship is not ruled out, however. It is assumed that Mao's successors will continue to invoke his "thought" as a basis for legitimating their own rule, although as time passes the distance between the Chairman's revolutionary ideas and the practical necessities of running the largest nation-state in the world will probably produce a diluted form of Maoism. The study does assume, however, that China will continue to be more puritanical and combative than almost all the other Communist states of Europe and Asia.

-- Additional elements of the study that you may find of interest include a detailed presentation of the balance of forces on the Sino-Soviet border (on page 21),

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China in 1980-85 and in the Year 2000

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"You have to contemplate what is called a prolonged period, in terms of 10 years at the very least, or even the entire balance of 40 years of the 20th century. If we are given the 40 years, the world situation will have been greatly changed by the end of the century."

—Mao Tse-tung, 1959.

"You must all bring up some successors . . . Everyone must prearrange his successors. One must have three lines of successors . . . What is needed are determined people who are young, have little (i.e., not too much) education, a firm stand, and the political experience to take over the work."

—Mao Tse-tung, 1964.

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
OFFICE OF POLITICAL RESEARCH

July 1974

CHINA IN 1980-85 AND IN THE YEAR 2000

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CHINA IN 1980-85 AND IN THE YEAR 2000

PRINCIPAL JUDGMENTS

Neither in the period 1980-85 nor even by the year 2000 will China be a superpower in the class of the US or the USSR. But, barring Soviet attack, China will have become a great power, probably the greatest in East Asia.

The most menacing contingency for China is that of a Soviet military attack. Soviet leaders may be seriously tempted, but the chances of either a Soviet invasion or a Soviet nuclear strike in the decade ahead (through 1985) seem to us to be not very high, perhaps no more than one in five. Furthermore, a Soviet attack will probably be increasingly discouraged, in the period 1985-2000, by the growth of Chinese strategic power.

Another threat to Chinese development will be instability in the top leadership. Peking is already in another period of purges and uncertainty, and a still more serious situation will probably follow the anticipated departure of both Mao and Chou in the next few years, as divergent groups compete for position. After a period—possibly prolonged—of post-Mao or post-Chou instability, the intense nationalism of the leaders of all groups will probably enable a "collective" Party leadership, even as it changes composition, to pursue a coherent and constructive set of policies—although with continuing periodic "course corrections" to left or right.

Chinese Communist ideology seems certain to continue to play a critical role in shaping China's programs of political, economic, and social development. While some of the most distinctive elements in "Maoism" are likely to be softened in the interests of modernization,

NOTE: This study has been prepared from contributions by the Office of Political Research, the Office of Economic Research, the Office of Strategic Research, and the Central Reference Service of the Directorate of Intelligence, and by the Office of Weapons Intelligence and the Office of Scientific Intelligence of the Directorate of Science and Technology. The Office of Current Intelligence of the Directorate of Intelligence, the Defense Intelligence Agency, and the Bureau of Intelligence and Research of the Department of State have been consulted in the course of the preparation. The responsibility for the principal judgments of the study is entirely that of various Offices of CIA. Comment will be welcomed, addressed to Chief, Asian Communist Staff, OPR, the coordinator of the study

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Chinese ideology will continue to be more puritanical and combative than that of almost all other Communist states.

Economic prospects depend chiefly on China's degree of success in controlling population growth and stimulating greater food production. More likely than not, China will be making progress in these respects by 1980-85, and will have doubled industrial production by 1985. While everything could go wrong economically in the event of weather disasters or a military defeat, the food/population problem should be eased by the year 2000, and by that time the industrial base to support economic development should be about four times the present size. Nevertheless, in economic strength, China will still trail far behind the US and the USSR, and, probably, will still not have caught up with Japan and Western Europe.

By 1980-85, the Chinese strategic weapons force will probably include some hardened silos for ICBMs capable of reaching both the European USSR and the continental US, but the emphasis is likely to be on a combination of land-based semi-mobile systems (totaling no more than a few hundred missiles), plus, perhaps, a handful of ballistic missile submarines. As of the year 2000, even if the US and USSR have increased the gap in strategic capabilities between themselves and China, the latter's strategic nuclear forces—backed up by immense conventional defense capabilities—will constitute a formidable deterrent.

Throughout this century, Peking's foreign policy will probably continue to be shaped in large part by hatred and fear of the USSR. In the short term, China's effort will be concentrated on avoiding a war with the USSR and reducing the Soviet military presence on the border. To this end, the Chinese may make the necessary compromises to get a border settlement, without changing their view that the USSR is their main enemy.

A broader—though still limited—accommodation between the two powers will remain a possibility, especially in the longer run: movement in that direction could be induced by mutual Chinese and Soviet interest in lessening the temper of controversy. Such movement could have considerable significance for US strategic and other interests, even though such a Sino-Soviet detente would almost certainly stop far short of anything resembling the Sino-Soviet alliance of 1949-53. The Chinese will in any event continue to compete fiercely with the USSR, worldwide, probably making even more trouble for the Soviets around the world than they do now.

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Throughout this century, China will attempt to use US influence to deter the USSR from attacking China and to offset Soviet efforts to encircle or contain China. The Chinese will try to avoid direct military confrontations with the US, and are likely to support some US positions which cut across Soviet policies. In pursuing these courses, the Chinese leaders will almost certainly not become pro-American, or seriously interested in an alliance with the US. The chances will indeed be greater that the Chinese leaders will become more assertive, initiating challenges to US interests in various countries and situations. The degree of their assertiveness will depend in large part upon the Chinese leaders' assessment of the overall value of the Sino-American relationship in countering the USSR. In any event, Taiwan will be high on Peking's list of priorities and will remain a painful issue between China and the US; with the passage of time the Taiwan problem will—if still unresolved by negotiations—increasingly tempt Peking's leaders to resort to military force.

Maoist revolutionary impulses will probably sustain Chinese activism toward various developing countries through 1980-85. China's ability to exercise its power will remain greatest in East Asia—that is, in the peripheral arc of Japan and Southeast Asia. Peking's main line in Southeast Asia will probably be a combination of conventional diplomacy and subversive support of insurgency, the short-range goal being to encourage the development of a chain of benevolently neutral neighbors. With respect to Japan, Chinese leaders will almost certainly seek to encourage those forces and factors working for a "soft" Japan, rather than a hostile or nuclear-armed Japan. As of the year 2000, the Chinese will probably be the dominant power in East Asia and will be able to compete with both the US and the USSR for influence in the Middle East, Africa, and Latin America.

As for China's form of leadership, there are real possibilities of either a military dictatorship, coming after a period of high instability, or a neo-Maoist dictatorship riding in on a resurgence of fundamentalist "Maoism." The more likely leadership, however, is a "collective" dominated by Party careerists. On this view, the Party Chairman will not have Mao's degree of authority, but—somewhat like Brezhnev's present situation—will be obliged to rule by consensus. From what we know of the candidates for the leadership in both 1980-85 and 2000, these leaders will be hard, dedicated men, determined to make their China strong and influential, but ready to deal with the West when they consider this to China's interest.

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INTRODUCTORY NOTES

LIMITATIONS ON THE EXERCISE

Most "futurologists" disclaim any ability to *predict*, because the larger the time-frame of the projections, the greater the contingencies. Even doctrinaires like Mao do not proceed blindly toward immutable objectives, but are constantly monitoring and periodically adjusting. Even then, they cannot altogether control their own societies, and they cannot be sure what policies will be adopted by other governments—policies to which they will be forced to respond. One of the best of the academic specialists on China (Robert Scalapino) has said: "The big questions that relate to China's future remain unanswered, and, more than that, unanswerable."

China has not, however, proved to be totally unpredictable. When the People's Republic of China (PRC) was proclaimed 25 years ago, US observers were able, by examining the structure of power and Mao's declared intentions, to forecast correctly that there was no prospect for the overthrow of the regime, that Mao would continue to dominate the Party, that he would construct a thoroughgoing totalitarian state, that he would conduct ruthless collectivization and security campaigns, that Peking would give important material support to Communist movements in Southeast Asia, and that China would be a voluntary and reliable ally of the USSR in the short term but would reject satellite status and might well break with the USSR eventually. It should be noted that, within this generally accurate picture, virtually all observers failed to foresee how sharply the Chinese would depart from the Soviet model and how soon the break would come. And nobody foresaw such critical specific events as the various challenges to Mao by other leaders, or such extreme ventures as the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution.

It is harder now to make long-range predictions about China. The assumption of the present exercise is that the well-known senior leaders—Mao and Chou En-lai in particular— will have left the scene. Not only are we poorly informed about the policy preferences and interrelationships of younger leaders, but we have already moved into another period of leadership instability and of uncertainty as to which of the current leaders—old and young—will survive. Moreover, the world as a whole is more complex than it was in 1949.

Nevertheless, the effort to make probability judgments must be undertaken. Those presented in this speculative projection are made with fair confidence, in the belief that they will give at least some sense of the future Chinese scene.

CHINESE FEELINGS ABOUT THE FUTURE

Even in pre-Communist China, there was a strong sense among Chinese—and among foreign observers too—that China would always be there, that it would persist as a nation-state in a meaningful way. It had the largest population: however many millions might die, millions like them would replace them. It had a great civilization, with splendid achievements. Its people were of high intelligence, hard-working, cheerful in adversity, and of great endurance. The country could be essentially self-sufficient if necessary. And it could survive any foreseeable military attack or occupation.

The Chinese Communists have taken care to give the Chinese people pride in their accomplishments and confidence in their future. The leaders believe, and the younger generation tends to believe, that China will be a great power again, to which other

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states will again defer; that China will be the "moral" leader of the world, and will have great political influence; that its population can be controlled, and will remain an asset politically ("one-fourth of mankind") as well as economically and militarily; that China will have an impressive economic growth rate, not just one step ahead of the population; and that China will eventually be a military superpower, in the same league with the US and the USSR, although with a different combination of strengths and weaknesses.

Thus the Chinese leaders of today, and the young people who will rise to be leaders, see the China of 1980-85 and 2000 as a strong and stable state, with high morale: lean, hard, serious, purposeful. The Chinese leadership—the "revolutionary successors"—will still be dedicated to essentially revolutionary goals. The Party will have been strengthened by its periodic "struggles" against "revisionist" backsliders.[1]

The Chinese see the US and the USSR, of 1980-85 and 2000, as still being stronger powers than China but as declining relatively to China, and most of the rest of the world as being in bad shape. Although the USSR is seen as "revisionist," bureaucratic, materialist, corrupt and "degenerate," a "paper tiger" in the long term, the Chinese do not doubt that—barring nuclear war with the US—the USSR will be strong and stable, a powerful foe, in the short term. Similarly, while the US (and the West as a whole) is also seen as a "paper tiger" in the long term, unable to deal successfully with its mounting domestic problems and increasing external challenges, the US will remain a "real tiger" in the short-term—long enough, the Chinese hope, to be used strategically to counter the threat from the USSR. The Chinese see Japan as an economic rival which could become a formidable military threat if it were to decide to use its economic and technological resources to that end; but they regard such a decision as unlikely, and they believe that good relations with Japan can probably be established.

Elsewhere in the world, population trends alone will put much of Asia, Africa, and Latin America in exploitable turmoil, with large-scale starvation, rioting, rebellion, and the overthrow of governments. A "unified" (totalitarian) China can move into some of these situations, supporting new leaders or their competitors (if promising, and pro-Chinese). In general, the outlook is for convulsive change in much of the world, change from which China will benefit.

[1]Not all Party members believe this, but those who expect to be the winners in such "struggles" tend to believe it.

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THE SHAPE OF CHINA'S FUTURE

IDEOLOGY

Communist ideology ("Marxism-Leninism—Mao Tse-tung Thought," as Peking puts it) is certain to continue to play a critical role in shaping China's programs of political, economic and social development. As a Communist society, it must have an ideology to provide unity, momentum, and a sense of national and individual purpose. Ideology will continue to perform the indispensable function of justifying the monopoly of political power exercised by the Party over the people. It will also continue to be the rationale of policy, and the language in which both arguments about policy and struggles for power are conducted.

Mao's "thought"—Mao's personal vision of the good society and of the way to achieve it—will continue to exercise a strong influence over Chinese Communist ideology after Mao's death, but probably in an attenuated or diluted form. Serving both as the Chinese Lenin and the Chinese Stalin, Mao will almost certainly be deified and his "thought" canonized after his death. There is a chance that some successor, by the year 2000, will downgrade him in his Stalinist role, but it seems more likely that he will remain as unassailable as Lenin has been.

The most distinctive elements in Mao's "thought"—his emphasis on constant struggle ("uninterrupted revolution"), on mass movements (nationwide, e.g., the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution), and on ideological motivation and control ("thought reform")—seem likely to be reduced in importance in the interest of modernization. That is, the leaders who will probably emerge as strongest—including proteges of Mao—will want to avoid the convulsions of Mao's last years, in order to have a stable base to build on.

Mao's "thought," like Marxism-Leninism before it, is both comprehensive and flexible, so that Mao's successors can manipulate his doctrine to fit practical needs. There are elements in Mao's thought that can be used to justify any position or policy, and Mao's successors can be expected to do this, just as Mao himself has done it.

The national component is certain to remain strong in Chinese Communist ideology. The Chinese have long regarded their ideology as a "Chinese or Asian form of Marxism." Mao has credited the ancient Chinese philosopher Lao Tzu—not Hegel or Marx—with devising the "dialectical" method of analyzing problems, and has criticized many of the concepts of Marx, Lenin, and Stalin as having little relevance to China's special problems. (The post-Stalin Soviet leaders have all been dismissed as "revisionist" villains.) However, while nationalism may be a part of ideology (and often has been) and may be the most important driving force in Chinese Communism, Peking's official ideology will remain universalist in vision.

China's special problems—especially, the basic fact that it is an overpopulated, underdeveloped nation with little surplus available to improve the standard of living—tend and will tend to shape its ideology. It seems very probable that Chinese ideology will continue to be, for the rest of this century, more puritanical and combative (i.e., more "leftist") than its Soviet and East European counterparts.

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THE ECONOMY

China has the natural and human resources of a superpower. It has the world's largest hydroelectric potential, coal and iron ore resources capable of supporting a US-sized steel industry, and large deposits of oil, tin, tungsten, antimony, etc. It has a sturdy, hard-working, well-disciplined population which is unsurpassed as human raw material for an economic development process, and a hard-driving, intelligent leadership determined to make China the dominant power in Asia and, eventually, a superpower.

It also has, however, grievously high labor/land and labor/ capital ratios. Shortages of arable land and of modern industrial plant, and the pressure of population, are its chief economic problems.

The result, thus far, is that China has been widening the gap over other densely populated, less developed countries (India, Pakistan, Indonesia) but it has not been closing the gap with the high-technology economies such as those of the US, Japan, and Western Europe.

The Chinese leadership has recently made some large decisions concerning resource allocation, the consequences of which will not become clear for some years. The decisions have four major elements: purchase of huge quantities of fertilizer plant and equipment from abroad; purchase of large quantities of foreign synthetic fiber plant and equipment; initial purchases of high-yield variety seeds developed in such areas as Mexico and the Philippines; and a new willingness to purchase much of this plant and equipment on credit. Taken together, these measures imply a major shift in allocation of resources toward agricultural development.

The imported plants will begin to produce in 1976. At that time, the greatly increased availability of fertilizer should begin to lift the average annual rate of growth of grain production well above the current level. If Peking follows through in acquiring and distributing high-yield variety seeds, the rate could be still higher. Moreover, the fiber-plant program will decrease the burden, now carried by agriculture, of providing fiber for clothing. Thus by 1980 Chinese agriculture could and should be producing at rates well in excess of the 2 percent per year required to stay even with population growth. If so, the leadership will have greater scope than is now the case for allocating resources into accelerated industrial and military development.

All of this requires the assumption that current policies will be sustained through 1980—meaning, inter alia, that the eased relationship with the US and other countries will be maintained, and that domestic political campaigns will not be allowed to disrupt agricultural production. The remarkable stability in agricultural policy since 1962 suggests that there is a firm consensus on the fundamental importance of agriculture. We are less sure that a consensus exists on the magnitude of the resources now being used to attack the problem and on the means of remedy—imported equipment and technology. The present leadership is pretty clearly moving in the right direction, and the likely leaders of 1980-85 will remember the "time of troubles" of 1959-61 and will, we think, want to hold to the current direction. (Some observers doubt this.)

In sum, China is in a transition period in which short-term development of industry and of defense as well is being subordinated to the laying of a solid foundation for future agricultural development. The probability is that by the early years of the

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period 1980-85 China will have made progress with its agricultural problems and will have an impressive array of talent and resources at hand for whatever other objectives Peking wishes to pursue.

This is not to say that China will be an economic superpower in 1980-85. It will still be a *big poor* nation, with the *potential* of superpower status. Its GNP will have grown enough to support continued expansion of industrial capacity and output, maintenance of the population at slowly rising levels of well-being, and the continued equipping of the armed forces with a growing quantity and variety of strategic weapons. The impact of population control programs is likely to have been minor by 1980-85, but Peking should be in a position (it has the will, the organization, and the technology) to make appreciable cuts in the rate of population growth thereafter. This of course would ease further the pressure of the food/population problem. (Some observers doubt Peking's ability to make *appreciable* cuts.)

Over the next decade, industrial production probably will expand at a yearly rate of about 8 percent, which would mean a doubling of output by 1985. One of the main features of the expansion will be increased industrial inputs into agriculture, as noted above. In addition, technology in the metallurgy, electronics, machine building, and military branches will have made impressive advances. Efforts to modernize the coal and electric power industries will probably have been less successful. Output of petroleum will have expanded rapidly from a small base, and petroleum will probably be a major export. While committed doctrinally to self-reliance, China will continue to tap the major industrial nations for modern equipment and new technology.

China's need for advanced technology and its efforts to reduce the technological gap between China and the US and USSR should be an important factor in China's foreign relations. In selected technologies, such as electronics, China should be able to compete with other industrialized nations in the sales of conventional products to the less developed countries. In selected areas of basic research, China may be able to announce certain developments or discoveries that contribute to the worldwide state-of-the-art.

The possibilities fan out between the period 1980-85 and the year 2000. For example, the population growth rate could drop enough to increase substantially the regime's ability to support industrial and military growth; and, if worldwide energy deficiencies become chronic, Chinese self-sufficiency in energy could become a telling advantage. On the other hand, if everything were to go wrong economically as the result of a major weather disaster or a military defeat, the economy could be in a state of near-collapse.

While more pessimistic and more optimistic variants of China's economic prospects are possible, on balance we believe that growth in output will continue during the next 25 years at about the same pace as during the past two decades. In other words, rates of growth will probably be comparable to rates in the US and USSR, leaving China in the middle group of major powers, with growth rates below Japan's and above Great Britain's. (Some observers believe that China will not do nearly this well, or at least that no judgment should be offered with even fair confidence.)

By Western standards, the Chinese will continue to be poor, even in the year 2000. However, anticipated successes in both controlling fertility and gaining greater agricultural yields should substantially ease the food/population problem. Thus living standards can be appreciably higher than they are now, while substantially expanding resources are allocated to industrial expansion and modernization.

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In the year 2000, the industrial base to support economic development and the military establishment should be about four times the present size, with great advances in technological capabilities. Other major nations will also have advanced. China will still trail far behind the US and USSR in industrial and technological strength, and, probably, will still not have caught up with Japan and Western Europe.

MILITARY STRATEGY, POSTURE, CAPABILITIES

Chinese strategic thinking derives in part from Mao's old military precepts of the Sino-Japanese and civil wars—precepts which themselves derive in part from ancient Chinese strategists such as Sun Tzu—and in part from more recent Maoist pronouncements looking to the age of nuclear weapons. The latter, like the former, have had political as well as military objectives and have sought to make the best of a position of military inferiority.

Mao has called for years for defense in depth against a land invasion, holding that China's regular armies and regional forces would be greatly aided by China's "vast militia" (more than 100 million, although a much smaller number has been trained with weapons). He has also held for years that even in the worst case, a nuclear war, half or at least a third of mankind—including hundreds of millions of Chinese—would survive and could rebuild. (Thus the rhetorical flourish that such a war would be "not a bad thing.")

More recently, looking toward the Soviet threat, he has called upon the Chinese people to: "Prepare for war . . .; dig tunnels deep, store grain everywhere. . . . "

China's military programs have clearly reflected a rational desire to deter attack from any quarter and to be able to carry on protracted land warfare should deterrence fail.[2] However, the Chinese have not been forthcoming about their nuclear strategy. This must be inferred from statements of determination by Mao (e.g., in 1965: "Yes . . . no matter what country, no matter what missiles, atomic bombs, hydrogen bombs, we must surpass them"); from pronouncements on foreign policy; and—mostly—from the actual course of weapons development and deployment of forces.

Statements by Chinese leaders and favorable Chinese propaganda treatment of the French nuclear program made clear that the Chinese regarded a minimum deterrent as essential. That is, like the French, the Chinese concluded that, lacking the means for a successful first strike or for massive retaliation, a Chinese ability to "tear an arm off" the enemy would give him pause. The Chinese are not, however, prepared to accept such a situation indefinitely. The Chinese need to defend themselves (as they see it) against two superpowers—the US being regarded as the main enemy until 1969, the USSR increasingly thereafter. (Actual deployment of strategic missiles has not followed the shift in thinking as sharply as might have been expected. The Chinese are still preparing against any contingency, including the possibility—not now expected—of a nuclear-armed Japan.)

There were also political reasons—perhaps just as important—for acquiring an advanced weapons capability. Apart from the symbolic rewards of nuclear power status,

[2]Maoist concepts—emphasis on careful preparation and surprise, the strategic denial of mainline Chinese forces (i.e., holding them back from areas where they would be vulnerable to sudden attack), guerrilla tactics supported by the aroused masses, indoctrination of confidence in eventual triumph—would undoubtedly be important features of Chinese strategy against invading forces. Situational and technological factors, however, have led the Chinese to prepare positions which would enable them to carry out a static defense of some strategic areas.

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the main one was for its use in support of Chinese policy toward Asian non-Communist states, some of which are within the present range. The Chinese have understandably proclaimed a no-first-use policy with respect to nuclear weapons, in the face of overwhelming American and Soviet superiority, but Peking's possession of such weapons is recognized by other Asian capitals as giving the Chinese an option. And Peking has already "rattled" these weapons toward Japan, India, and Taiwan, and even the US.[3]

A few years ago, observers of the Chinese nuclear weapons program generally believed that China, while deploying medium-range ballistic missiles and intermediate-range ballistic missiles, would develop an intercontinental ballistic missile as quickly as possible, in order to be able to strike anywhere in the Soviet Union and at least some parts of the continental US. The Chinese have not in fact, however, progressed as rapidly as generally expected.[4]

The Chinese now have about 60 operational TU-16 medium bombers deployed with operational units (with production apparently stopped). They have recently been found to have a short-range ballistic missile, apparently designed for targets only within China's borders, i.e., against an invader. They also have a few dozen of the 600-nm CSS-1 missiles and 1400-nm to 1500-nm CSS-2 missiles in the field. The CSS-X-3 missile, with perhaps as much as a 3500-nm range, has not yet been deployed, [redacted] All this is well short of the strategic attack forces once projected by outside observers for this year.

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In sum, what the Chinese have is a respectable *start* on a nuclear retaliatory capability against the USSR, holding several large Soviet cities hostage—but not Moscow; and against US forces and bases in Asia—but not the continental US.[5]

For the foreseeable future, China's strategic military position vis-a-vis both the USSR and the US will probably not be much better than it is now. In the period 1980-85, much of China's deterrent force will be vulnerable to a disarming strike, but *some* missiles would probably survive. The Soviet advantage with respect to general purpose forces will be maintained, but this will not make a land war against China an attractive option. Peking will remain dependent—against the Soviet threat—on a small nuclear deterrent and a determination to defend the country in depth against a conventional attack. (Chinese leaders appear to believe, as do we, that this combination will be sufficient.) Peking by 1980-85 will also have a small nuclear deterrent (CSS-X-4s and SLBMs) against the US, although this is a capability Peking does not expect to have to use. The capabilities of China's general purpose forces will be limited, in offensive actions, to China's periphery; the Chinese do not seem to envisage any substantially larger capability for these forces for some years.

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[3]E.g., the then Chinese Foreign Minister made a long-term threat against the US in 1966 and a short-term threat against Japan (relating to possible Japanese involvement in the Vietnamese war) in 1967.

[4]The Chinese apparently no longer fear an *imminent* Soviet nuclear strike, and in recent years they have not feared an American strike.

[5]Moscow might be brought in range by CSS-X-3 missiles from Sinkiang, but Moscow has an ABM system, and Sinkiang itself is vulnerable to Soviet conventional forces.

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Looking to the period of 1980-85, there is little chance that the Chinese will be able to make a major technological breakthrough which would affect the strategic balance vis-a-vis the US and USSR. Some qualitative improvements will probably have been incorporated into Chinese strategic weapons forces by that time, but not enough to affect the balance significantly.[6]

As for strategic *offensive* forces, toward the end of the period 1980-85, the Chinese will have some medium-range jet bombers (no long-range jet bombers) and perhaps some long-range reconnaissance aircraft, but they have apparently decided that strategic bombers are of limited value, and there seems little doubt that the principal weapons will be missiles. The question is really that of what kind of missile combination the Chinese will choose to put together.

The poor prospects for small-force silo survivability suggest that the Chinese will probably decide to deploy more CSS-2, 1400-mile missiles, which can be transported and to some extent concealed. The CSS-X-3 could conceivably be deployed in a similar mode, but this would be much harder to do, and is less likely. Total regional missile deploymen[redacted] still a small force as compared to those of the US or USSR.

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The land-based missile force as of 1985 probably will include hardened silos-[redacted]-for longer range ICBMs capable of hitting both the European USSR and the continental US. But the emphasis will probably be on a combination of land-based semi-mobile shorter-range systems and submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), as the best means of assuring force survivability.[7]

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By 1980-85, the Chinese probably will have put considerable effort into the development of an SLBM system. One of the first applications of solid-propellant technology will probably have been an SLBM program.[redacted]

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Whatever their missile systems, the Chinese will probably not be a party to arms limitation agreements through 1980-85. Chinese military strength, however, will not be so great as to prevent Soviet-American agreements.

As for strategic *defensive* forces in the period 1980-85, China will continue to face a much graver threat from Soviet strategic air forces than does the US. In addition, the Chinese must consider the threat posed to their country by Soviet tactical air forces.

The Chinese defensive problem is similar to that of NATO, and Peking's solution may come to resemble NATO's; i.e., better interceptors capable of performing both

[6] E.g., solid-propellant missiles might form a large part of the force. There should also be some improvement in the accuracy of Chinese missile systems, but not enough to give them a hard target (counter-force) capability. The Chinese may be able to master the technique of multiple-reentry vehicles (MRV) by 1985, but are unlikely to be able to deploy missiles with multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRV) by that time. Of more importance, if they develop adequate early-warning systems and sufficient force-readiness, they will be able to threaten launch-on-warning (a capability they do not now have) against any potential nuclear attack. This would, of course, increase the credibility of the Chinese deterrent without requiring any increase in the size of the force.

[7] In connection with all types of land-based missiles, the Chinese might make greater use of deception, scattering empty silos around the country on the calculation that anything which *can* be considered a launch-point *will* be, thus increasing the Chinese deterrent. Some observers believe, however, that such a scheme would be both provocative and quite expensive (at such a cost, Peking might as well put missiles in the silos), and is thus highly unlikely.

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air defense and tactical air roles will be deployed, with most assigned to units with the primary mission of ground attack. However, they may settle for fewer interceptor aircraft than are now deployed, and missiles of the Soviet SA-2 variety should continue to be reserved for very important targets, with development priority given to surface-to-air missiles capable of providing tactical protection to ground forces.

General purpose forces, in the period 1980-85, will have been improved in several respects and will still play an important role. The Chinese have recognized the extremely limited mobility of their ground force units relative to Soviet forces, and have begun to produce more equipment to solve this problem. Air defense forces, as indicated above, may well be oriented more toward the needs of ground field forces, with a much higher priority given to tactical air capabilities.[8] Even apart from the attention given to ballistic missile submarines, China's navy in the period 1980-85 will be substantially improved, with capabilities for operations beyond coastal waters.

By the year 2000, assuming the past rate of military and economic development, China will be virtually secure from invasion by conventional forces. It is also probable that China's strategic nuclear forces—by this time, perhaps, missile systems which are quite accurate and equipped with MIRVs—will continue to be a sobering (not absolute) deterrent; i.e., such as to force any potential attacker to accept assured destruction of a substantial number of "value targets."

This is expected to be true even if the US and USSR *increase* the gap in strategic capabilities between themselves and the Chinese. There is only an outside chance of a technological breakthrough by the US and USSR so great—e.g., development of an effective laser anti-missile system—as to nullify any delivery system the Chinese are able to field.

In sum, China in the year 2000 will *not* be a military superpower comparable to the US and the USSR, but it *will* be an important military power.

It can be argued that Chinese nuclear forces will not in fact play an important role in the Soviet-American military balance, as targeting requirements imposed by the growth in Chinese forces can easily be met; and Chinese forces, compared to those of the US, will have little capability to attack Soviet strategic forces and, compared to those of the USSR, little capability to attack US strategic forces. The point, however, is that neither the US nor the USSR could have *assurance* of fully knocking out the Chinese retaliatory capability, and the Chinese capability for surprise attack—perhaps unidentifiable attack from submarines—must be a source of concern.

Moreover, if, as is expected, the nuclear forces of the two superpowers continue to be neutralized by each other, China's large conventional forces will necessarily make an important difference in the calculations of both. This is especially true for the USSR, to whom these forces are the greater threat.

In any sense, a tacit Sino-Soviet or Sino-American military alliance (no formal alliance is in prospect) would be a serious concern for the excluded party, especially for the Soviets. The Chinese may thus be in a position to make the superpowers bid against each other for Peking's favor.

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[8]Part of increasing these capabilities should be provision for delivery of tactical nuclear weapons by aircraft assigned to attack units. This offers Peking a way out of developing costly tactical nuclear missiles. Nuclear artillery rounds are another objective.

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THE LEADERSHIP

The leadership in either 1980-85 or 2000 will be determined in part by the character of the leadership that precedes it, a question which itself is in doubt.

The actuarial probabilities are that both Mao (80), and Chou (75), both of whom have serious medical problems, should depart peacefully in the next few years. This assumes that they escape assassination or a coup (marginal threats to both) and that Chou is not purged (perhaps a bit more than a marginal threat to him).

Chou has played various critically important roles. He has been, and may still be, the Party's de facto Secretary General, directing the entire Party apparatus (inter alia, supervising both the Military Affairs Committee, which directs the military establishment, and the political security network). He is still Premier of the State Council, managing the simplified but still complex government, and carrying out foreign policy. And he has been in recent years Mao's principal adviser, the most stable source of a moderating influence on Mao, and probably the principal advocate of the turn to the US. In the present period of a leftward turn in Chinese policy, Chou has seemed to be on the defensive, but he has conducted his defense skillfully by espousing policies more leftist than he is believed to personally favor and the recent slowing of his pace seems due entirely to poor health. (He has been asserting his poor health for more than a year, has shown signs of hypertension, and is credibly reported to have suffered at least one recent heart attack.)

Last year's Tenth Party Congress brought up several younger leaders to replace Chou—if thought necessary or desirable—in his various roles, and Mao has since "rehabilitated" another possible replacement—Teng Hsiao-ping. Chou's departure might lead to intense competition for his vacated posts and roles, but the Party should hold together. (Mao is the main unifying force, it is Mao's "coalition" in there now, most Politburo members are Mao's proteges, and the security chiefs are almost all men close to Mao.) *National* stability would probably not be severely affected by the loss of Chou.

Mao's departure, ahead of Chou, would surely be a traumatic experience for the Party and the country. By 1975, he will have been the Party's principal leader for 40 years. However, most Party leaders would probably recognize the imperative of not allowing China to seem weak and vulnerable (e.g., to Soviet attack) and would try to present an appearance of strong central authority.

Chou is probably still the best bet to become the Party's Chairman after Mao, if his health permits. He is now the senior of the Party's five Vice Chairmen, has great prestige, and is popular with others in strong positions. He could probably win out, either in backstage maneuvering or an honest vote.

There are probably some members of the present Politburo who are uncongenial to Chou. While it seems unlikely that Chou as Chairman would attempt a sweeping purge, certain of the doctrinaire "Maoists" and proteges solely of Mao would probably be deprived of real power. Others might remain, waiting for their post-Chou opportunity.

Chou would not be able to dominate the Party to the degree that Mao has dominated it, but he would in general be expected to get his way in the shaping of policy. In the name of Mao's "thought," he would probably pursue relatively

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Party and Government Structure

The Chinese Communist Party

Tenth Party Congress
(August 1973)
"elects"
Tenth Central Committee,
which "elects"

Chairman
Mao Tse-tung

Vice Chairmen
Chou En-lai
Wang Hung-wen
Kang Sheng (inactive)
Yeh Chien-ying
*Li Te-sheng

Other Politburo Members
Chiang Ching
Yao Wen-yuan
Li Hsien-nien
Teng Hsiao-ping
Liu Po-cheng (inactive)
Chen Hsi-lien
Chi Teng-kuei
Hua Kuo-feng
Wang Tung-hsing
Wu Te
Hsu Shih-yu
Wei Kuo-ching
Chen Yung-kuei
(plus alternates)

Politburo Standing Committee
Composed of the above officers, plus
Chang Chun-chiao
and two inactive members

Military Affairs Committee
Mao Tse-tung, Chairman
Yeh Chien-ying, Vice Chairman

Standing Committee
*Li Te-sheng
**Teng Hsiao-ping
Chen Hsi-lien
(includes others)

General Political Department
*Li Te-sheng, Director

Party committees and political officers of military region headquarters, provincial military districts, municipal garrisons, and individual ground, naval and air units

Party Secretariat
Current Secretary General is unknown, and Secretaries have not been identified.

General Office
Wang Tung-hsing, Director

Central Departments
(among those known or conjectured)
Organization
Propaganda
Culture and Education
International Liaison
Political Security
Rural Work
Industry and Communications
Finance and Trade

Provincial, Municipal, and County Committees
26 provinces;
3 major municipalities (Peking, Tientsin, Shanghai);
other municipalities; and about 2,000 counties



Government of the People's Republic of China

Acting Chairman: Tung Pi-wu
(ceremonial position, which may be abolished)

The State Council
Chou En-lai, Premier

Li Hsien-nien, Vice Premier
Teng Hsiao-ping, Vice Premier
(other Vice Premiers inactive)

General Office

Key Ministries, Commissions, and Special Groups:

Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Ministry of National Defense
Ministry of Public Security
Ministries of Machine-Building
Ministry of Finance
Ministry of Foreign Trade
Ministry of Economic Relations with Foreign Countries
Ministry of Metallurgical Industry
State Planning Commission
National Defense Science and Technology Commission
State Capital Construction Commission
Cultural Group of the State Council

*Status in doubt.

**Position not confirmed.

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moderate policies in both domestic and foreign affairs, de-emphasizing "struggle" at home and "revolution" abroad. His regime would probably hold to the turn to the US, but might well also seek a limited reconciliation with the USSR, at least defusing the border situation.

Should Chou decline the Chairmanship, or other Party leaders prove unable to coalesce around him, there might be yet another period of high instability in the central leadership while a new coalition was being worked out. There is a chance that either the "Maoists" cited above or a combination of military leaders would emerge as the strongest cohesive group in such a coalition, and that in either case the regime would halt the turn to the US, but, on balance, it seems likely that the new coalition would see the national interest served by continuing the policy which Mao and Chou initiated.

In the period 1980-85, after the presumed departure of both Mao and Chou, the possible futures for China become more various. Observers have speculated on a wide range of them.

One possibility is "collapse" at the center, "warlordism" in the regions and provinces. There seems little chance of this, except in the train of a Soviet attack, itself believed unlikely.

Another is a rapid and strong reaction against Mao's "thought," resulting in a "revisionist" Communism on the Yugoslav model, or a "non-ideological technocracy" operated by government leaders, or even a free society. These constructions are very improbable, we think, for the period under consideration: the Yugoslav model is too soft for the Chinese (they literally cannot afford it), the Party is and will remain much stronger than the government, and no totalitarian régime has put itself out of business.[9]

Another is the emergence of a neo-Confucian society, highly authoritarian and hierarchical, expunging the Communist elements of Mao's "thought" but retaining those which bear some semblance to Chinese traditions. Again, the Communist Party is sure to repel any threat to its own domination in the period considered.

Yet another is a variant of a situation already noted above as a possibility even before 1980—that of a period of high instability in which military leaders would be the strongest group. In extension of that possibility, this fourth possible future is the imposition of a military dictatorship—a coalition of military leaders at the center and in the regions. This is a serious possibility, but, just as we see the military as unlikely to be the strongest group in a post-Mao coalition, so we believe, on balance, that a military dictatorship in 1980-85 is improbable: civilian Party control of the military is being steadily restored, the PLA itself would not be unified (there have always been more "loyalists"), and successful conspiracy and coordinated action against the civilian leaders would be very difficult—as most notably illustrated in Lin Piao's failure.

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[9] While Soviet history is not binding on the Chinese, it is instructive. The USSR is still an "oligarchy"—Lenin's own contemptuous word, before his death, for the Party apparatus he had constructed—although it is now one with some restraints on the General Secretary, and there are no longer massive blood purges of the Party. It is still a society in which the citizen has no rights which cannot be taken away (therefore no rights) and in which there are no limits on the power of the Party and the police, although there are no longer many millions in labor camps. And it is still a society committed to the destruction of free societies, even though interested now in a "detente" with the US. The Ho Chi Minh succession is instructive also; the character and objectives of the regime have not changed.

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One more possible future is also a variant of a situation noted as a possibility before 1980—that of the emergence of the "Maoists" as the strongest post-Mao group. The extension of this possibility would be the emergence of a neo-Maoist dictatorship under a single dominant figure ("one line, one leader"), with a resurgence of the fundamentalist radical, revolutionary features of Mao's thought. This also is a serious possibility, but, again, just as we think that the "Maoists" are unlikely to dominate the post-Mao coalition, so we doubt that another Mao will emerge from the "Maoists."

We believe that the most likely outcome in the short term (1980-85), even though it may follow a period of instability, is a nationalist, specifically Chinese type of Communism, with a relatively strong and effective central government. The regime, still a "proletarian dictatorship," will probably be dominated by civilians, career Party cadres, although it will have important military representation and may be subject to significant regional influences. It will be a more competent and constructive regime than either a military or a neo-Maoist dictatorship would be. It will be officially animated by Mao's thought, but probably in a diluted form. We expect a "collective" leadership, with a Party Chairman being approximately in the position of his predecessor (Chou or whoever Mao's immediate successor is) or of Brezhnev in the Soviet Party today. That is, he will be the pre-eminent (less than dominant) figure, unable simply to impose his will, obliged to consult with others, presiding over and balancing groups which have somewhat differing interests and predilections but which manage to work together reasonably well. (The unifying factor will be a common desire for a China as strong as possible.) We rate this prospect as distinctly better than that of another Mao, although the latter possibility will become increasingly strong if comparatively moderate and flexible policies fail to achieve the regime's objectives. And it must be admitted that some observers regard this outcome as the *most* likely.

As of early 1974, the leading candidates for the Party Chairmanship in the period 1980-85 seemed to be the three members of the Politburo Standing Committee thought likely to be still active in 1980-85. These were: Chang Chun-chiao (c. 62), apparently in training for the post of either Party Secretary General or government Premier in a Chou-led regime; young Wang Hung-wen (c. 39), being trained across the board (political, economic and military affairs, including foreign policy) for high position; and Li Te-sheng (c. 60), a career military man, who rose in the Cultural Revolution to become the regime's second-ranking military leader. However, Li may already have fallen out of contention.

Wang is clearly *Mao's* present choice as the Party's eventual Chairman—if not after Mao himself, then after Chou, or after Chang. However, there is no way for Mao to make his will prevail after his death. Wang might not long survive Mao, and, even if he does, Chang might well prove to have a stronger organizational base and more powerful friends.

Neither Chang nor Wang seems to be an inflexible militant. Both have appeared to be anti-Soviet and have been personally agreeable to Americans. There is a little evidence, however, that Wang stands further to the left—more attracted to fundamentalist aspects of Maoism—than does Chang.

Li Te-sheng has been the dark horse, regarded as having only an outside chance of becoming Chairman. If Li has fallen, his successor as the rising military

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leader—possibly Chen Hsi-lien, a Politburo member and Commander of the Peking Military Region—would also be a dark horse. The support of such a military leader might be crucial to any contender, however, in which case military influence could be expected to rise again.

Other current Party leaders (most of them now in the Politburo) who are expected to remain key figures in 1980-85 include: a group of career Party cadres, almost all brought by Mao himself into high position; a group of career military commanders; a small group of career security specialists; and a small group of long-time proteges of Chou's. (Brief biographies of Chang, Wang, Li, Chen, and other key figures are given in the Annex.)

The ability of such leaders to work together with Chang and/or Wang and with one another, in the absence of Mao and Chou, is uncertain, but most of them probably could. There are sure to be disputes on policy—some genuine, some as counters in contests for position—which will leave casualties. But we do not expect such disputes to be so bitter and divisive that no coherent set of policies can be followed until some one group establishes an unassailable dominance.

Mao seems to have been justified in his concern—for more than 10 years now—that his successors or their successors would lose sight of his revolutionary vision, both at home and abroad. As he remarked in 1964:

> The imperialists have said that there is hope [for them] in the third and fourth generations [of Chinese Communists]. Will this hope of the imperialists be realized?

The "hope" cited is the hope that Chinese Communism in time will go soft: that is, will become non-revolutionary, will turn its back on "hard and bitter struggle," will emphasize personal interest and a higher standard of living instead of the collective interest and the future of Communism. This imperialist "hope" is likely to be fulfilled to some degree, but we expect Communist China in either 1980-85 or the year 2000 to be recognizably similar to what it is today.

It will be mainly the third "generation" that will be in power in China in the year 2000. The Chairman of the Party at that time cannot possibly be forecast with confidence (although young Wang might conceivably last that long), but most of the top-level leaders will probably be career Party cadres. From what we know of such men, and of the "struggles" in which they have risen, there is no reason to believe that they will want their political system to be *radically* different from what it is today—but they will want China to be, as in 1980-85, *stronger* in all respects.

If China "evolves" politically under such men, it will probably settle into something like the Soviet Union today: the "revisionist" society which Mao fears but which would by no means be a "soft" society. The changes for China—equivalent to the changes in the USSR after the death of Stalin—will probably be reached as early as 1980-85: the absence of any individual as dominant (and arbitrary) as Mao, and the renunciation of mass campaigns as convulsive and destructive (with casualties in millions) as the "land reform" and security campaigns of the 1950s and the Cultural Revolution of the 1960s.

Even after these changes, life in China will remain harsh, and China's future leaders will have to be hard men to survive. While living standards can rise a little, the

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leaders of the year 2000 will still be urging and coercing the Chinese people to labor heroically to retain the status of a great power and to achieve the status of a superpower.

Nevertheless, the Chinese leaders of the year 2000 will probably be people with whom the West can deal, in the same way, and for the same reasons, that it is able to deal with the leaders of China today.

FOREIGN POLICY

Assuming that most of the foregoing is a fairly accurate view of China's future, China's foreign policy will present the United States with proportionately greater challenges and opportunities than it does today. This will be true even if China is an "unaggressive" power, neither attempting to expand its present territorial holdings nor waging wars by proxy. China will probably remain a revolutionary Communist adversary of the United States, threatening US interests in many respects, but it will also, we believe, remain the enemy of the USSR, even if Moscow and Peking achieve a limited accommodation.

Some Possibilities

Both in the period 1980-85 and in the year 2000, just as now, China's ability to assert its power will in general be greatest on its immediate periphery, smaller in areas removed from the mainland. We consider at this point some possibilities which we do *not,* in general, *expect,* but which represent the kinds of actions that will be within Chinese capabilities.

In Asia, Chinese territorial claims could be troublesome. Hong Kong is a British colonial possession which, unlike the "new territories" on the mainland, legally is not to revert to PRC control in 1997. The Chinese may surface a claim, toward the year 2000, to the unleased areas—Victoria Island and Kowloon—and apply political pressure on London to withdraw from this "vestige of British imperialism." (Macao is virtually incorporated already.) Elsewhere, the Chinese could use their nuclear capability as a deterrent and, beginning anytime, could develop a modernized/mechanized army of up to eight or ten million men for use in various possible forms of assertion (as well as for internal purposes).

For example, the Chinese could easily seize additional sections of the Indian border, parts of Nepal, and all of Sikkim and Bhutan—at no significant military risk. The Chinese seem more likely, however, to try to wean India away from its military alliance with the USSR.

A credible nuclear deterrent could conceivably encourage the Chinese to resume aggressive patrolling on the Soviet border, designed to intimidate a less militaristic Soviet leadership. It is very doubtful, however, that they could impel Soviet withdrawals from disputed territory in the Pamirs and from the disputed island opposite Khabarovsk; the Soviets would resist. In such a case, both sides would probably hold the fighting down to conventional-force skirmishes. But escalation into nuclear exchanges has to be regarded as a possibility.

By 2000, the Chinese will probably be able to contemplate with satisfaction the establishment of additional Communist states in some of the countries of Southeast Asia. The Chinese could encourage the North Vietnamese, Pathet Lao, and Cambo-

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dian Communists to move decisively against any non-Communist areas remaining in Indochina in order to seize state power completely. PLA units could be used in support of such moves, in the improbable event that the Vietnam Communists felt this necessary.

Without using their huge army, the Chinese could activate other Asian Communist movements. There will probably be no major force in the area to deter the Chinese from persuading—perhaps in some cases, issuing directives to—the Burmese, Thai, Malaysian, Philippine, and Indonesian Maoist Communists to replace the go-slow strategy with one of rapid expansion. Such a policy would be designed to cause the ethnic minority and peasant forces to burgeon into large conventional armies, based in key rural areas.

For urban support, the Chinese could activate agents in the overseas Chinese communities in major cities of the target countries. In addition, Chinese advisers could infiltrate borders, and clandestinely land in island countries, to help guide and organize local Communist forces.

The North Koreans, continuing the militaristic policy of Kim Il-sung, could be encouraged to go further; i.e., to open a war of attrition against the South. This would mean military probing all along the demilitarized zone on land, and against the South's northernmost islands on sea. The North Koreans might conceivably send commando teams by sea to begin guerrilla warfare inland (as they did on a small scale in 1966-68, when they dismally failed).

Elsewhere in the world, the Chinese will have the capacity to make considerable trouble: supporting "true" revolutionaries, opposing "feudal" regimes. The specifics will of course change from those of the present. It is entirely possible that some of the governments which are today revolutionary will be conservative and "anti-Chinese" by the 1990s. But the geographic range of Chinese troublemaking will extend to the Middle East and to Latin America and will be enlarged in Africa.

The Probabilities

Peking's foreign policy for the remainder of this century will probably continue to be motivated by hatred and fear of the USSR; by the forces of great-Han nationalism and Maoist Communism (both of which sustain Chinese feelings of superiority to other peoples); and by a desire to be the "leader" of a "Third World" against the superpowers.

The first of these factors has been the most important single factor in Chinese foreign policy since 1969, at the latest, when the USSR officially became the main enemy. The conflict all along has been across the board—from fundamental ideological positions to armed clashes on the border—and in recent years (since the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968) has posed a question to Chinese national security; i.e., whether the Soviets would use their overwhelming military superiority to undertake either a large-scale invasion or a disarming nuclear strike.

Through the period 1980-85, China's main effort will be concentrated on avoiding a war with the USSR, and, if possible, reducing the Soviet military presence on China's northern border. Now well aware of Soviet superiority on the border, the Chinese will behave more prudently than in 1969, when they ran aggressive patrols against Soviet border forces. In the border talks, a post-Mao leadership may modify

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Disputed Sino-Soviet Border Area





Areas of so-called "unequal treaties," which were ceded by China to Tsarist Russia and are now accepted by Peking as Soviet territory, with the exceptions of the Pamir tract in the west and Hei-hsia-tzu Island at the *Amur-Ussuri* river junction in the east.



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Balance of Forces on the Sino-Soviet Border, Early 1974



*There are another 7,500 men in the airborne division in the Turkestan Military District that could be used along the border.

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the present unacceptable demand for a pullback of Soviet forces from disputed areas before serious substantive discussions begin. If so, the Soviets may make concessions which will induce the Chinese to conclude a final agreement on the border rather than to continue a dangerous course of stalemate.

The chances of either a Soviet invasion or a Soviet nuclear strike in the near term (through 1985) are believed to be small. Neither is estimated to be more than one in five, although some observers rate the second much higher.

At least through the period 1980-85, the USSR being the main enemy, the Chinese will probably try to avoid direct military confrontations with the US, and are likely, indeed, to support some US political positions which cut against Soviet policies. These will be "necessary compromises"—the sort explicitly sanctioned by Lenin—with an essentially unchanged antagonist.

The current Chinese official line is that the US both contends with the USSR and colludes with it to "devour" China, although the focus of Soviet-American rivalry is in Europe. The most serious threat to China itself is "especially" from the USSR in the form of a "surprise attack." While the line may change, it will in fact remain of the utmost importance to the Chinese to prevent any Soviet-American detente from freeing the USSR for military action against China.

Thus the Chinese are most likely to be adaptable and helpful in opposing the Soviet military presence in Eastern Europe and in supporting the American presence in Western Europe, in opposing any extension of the Soviet naval presence on the seas and acquisition of base rights abroad, in opposing the conclusion of Soviet military-aid pacts with foreign governments, and in opposing the formation of regional organizations (e.g., Soviet-Indian) designed to exclude American influence.

The Chinese will probably be willing to refrain from military action against Taiwan for a time (although not necessarily against offshore islands on which Nationalist troops are garrisoned) after the US completes its withdrawal. Before any assault against Taiwan, they will also have to feel confident that the US treaty with Nationalist China is, in fact, dead.

In any case, Peking undoubtedly will continue its long-term effort to subvert Nationalist officials, stepping up this effort in the event of a succession crisis on the death of Premier Chiang Ching-kuo. Peking will strongly oppose any Soviet effort to arrange political ties and military-aid pacts with future Nationalist leaders on Taiwan. Moreover, Peking has been visibly annoyed by the passage of Soviet warships through the Taiwan Strait, and there may be Sino-Soviet naval incidents.

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At least through the period 1980-85, other major powers will be shown favor by the Chinese in order to increase the weight of the international power balance on the anti-Soviet side. West Germany, Great Britain, France, and Japan will be the principal ones. (China will have the greatest leverage with Japan.) In the course of doing this, China almost certainly will profit from their advanced technology.

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As for the factor of great-Han nationalism, in the long tradition of imperial dominance, this is likely to perpetuate China's territorial claims through 1980-85 and beyond. These claims probably will include the offshore and small deep-water islands (such as the Senkakus and Spratlys) as well as Taiwan. Moreover, claims to the continental shelf undoubtedly will be sustained.

In China's two border disputes, the Chinese may eventually drop their demands that the Soviets withdraw from the Pamirs (in the west) if concessions are made on river islands (in the east), but they probably will not back down on their demand that the Indians accept China's control of the Aksai Chin.

Great-Han nationalism is likely also to sustain China's effort to exert dominant power and influence over the smaller countries on its southern border.

The factor of Maoist Communism, setting forth its unique model of seizing national power through rural armed insurrection, probably will sustain China's revolutionary foreign policy toward some undeveloped countries, again through 1980-85 and beyond. This revolutionary component will combine with great-Han nationalism to produce a Chinese policy more complex than a pragmatic mixture of power-balance and *realpolitik*.

In some cases, the emphasis will be on diplomacy. For example, in South Asia, where the Soviets have made inroads with India, Peking will probably work for an improvement of diplomatic relations and forego support of insurgency. Improvement of relations with India might well include a final settlement of the border dispute, provided that Indian leaders accept the Chinese takeover of the Aksai Chin area.

But the main line of policy toward most countries of Southeast Asia will probably be a combination of conventional diplomatic action and subversive support of insurgency. Such support will be either material (Burma and Thailand) or inspirational (Malaysia, the Philippines, and Indonesia), requiring Communists in these countries to be loyal to the Chinese Party. The Chinese will probably also assist certain independent parties (the Vietnamese, Pathet Lao, and Cambodian Communists) to expand the territory they now hold—but gradually, without provoking a return of US air power. The short-range goal (through 1980-85) will be to encourage the development of a chain of benevolently neutral neighbors which pose no threat to Peking and provide no bases to the US or USSR. The ultimate goal, in line with the Maoist world-view, will be to convert countries in the region into a system of independent, cooperative Communist states oriented toward Peking.

Because China will not be a superpower in the class of the US or USSR in the period 1985-2000, it will have to try to continue to use American influence to deter the USSR from attacking China and to offset Soviet efforts to encircle or contain China. (The Soviet aim is simpler: to induce the US to remain neutral in any Sino-Soviet conflict.)

The Chinese will also try to mobilize the political influence of "Third World" countries—mainly against the USSR—by acting as their "leader." This will be difficult, however. First, many less developed countries reject Peking's self-image of a poverty-stricken, less developed country; on the contrary, they see the PRC as a major power trying to use them entirely for purposes of national self-interest. Second, the "Third World" as a unified entity does not exist, inasmuch as each country has its own interests and goals, often divergent from Peking's; e.g., on disarmament and anti-Sovietism.

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Disputed Areas Along the China-India Border



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Mao and Chou both fear the emergence of Chinese leaders, following themselves, who would turn back to the USSR. The Soviets are known to be waiting for this: a border settlement, then a normalization of relations, Sino-Soviet collaboration with "have-not" countries, other limited cooperation, removal of the Soviet military threat, and perhaps even resumption of Soviet economic and military aid. A *limited* accommodation with the USSR is a fair possibility even by 1980-85, but a return in this century to the genuine Sino-Soviet alliance of 1949-53 seems very improbable.

Whether or not the Chinese arrive at some accommodation with the USSR by or in the period 1985-2000, the Chinese leaders cannot be expected to become pro-American. Indeed, they will probably become more assertive, causing problems for the US around the world. The degree of increased assertion against American interests will probably depend not only on China's evaluation of its own strength but in large measure on Peking's assessment of the overall value of the Sino-American relationship in countering the USSR. Should the Chinese come to decide, for whatever combination of reasons (e.g., accommodation with the USSR, self-confidence, indicators of US disinclination to use its influence or run any risks for China) that the US is no longer of great value in deterring the USSR, the Chinese will be that much more willing to forfeit American good-will.

Even a well-behaved, prosperous, unmilitaristic China would be a problem, as it would use diplomatic and economic means to keep some "Third World" countries in anti-Western (anti-American) positions and to try to move others into that category. However, as previously noted, "Third World" countries will probably continue to have a great diversity of special national interests and will not readily accept Chinese "leadership."

As we see it, the Chinese turn to the US has been envisaged as a long-term strategic plan, not simply a tactical manuever to speed Peking's acquisition of Taiwan. However, Peking means to get Taiwan, either by negotiations or by military force. This issue is likely to be among the most painful ones, for both Peking and Washington, and it may well come to a head in the period 1985-2000, if not before. If efforts to annex Taiwan by negotiations or subversion have failed, and if Peking is confident that the US-Nationalist China treaty has become inoperative, Peking will probably use its overwhelming military superiority against the island. Peking's decision as to how long to wait will probably depend on its calculation of the potential cost, in terms of its *overall* interests and strategy, of a military operation against Taiwan.

The direction taken by Japan will be highly important to China. With its tremendous potential as a highly advanced nation, Japan could rearm and take an anti-Chinese or even Soviet-aligned position, greatly alarming the Chinese. The possibility of an American-Japanese military alliance, with each partner possessing a large nuclear force, would be equally alarming, and, if the Chinese were unable to head it off, could impel the Chinese to reverse their anti-Soviet policy, turning back to accommodation and even alliance. However, the more likely prospect seems that of a "soft" Japan, seeking, for economic and security reasons, good relations with the USSR and better ones with China. (Some observers disagree strongly with this projection, believing that Japan for various reasons will choose to "go nuclear" before the year 2000, possibly even by 1980-85, and that this will have profound consequences

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for Sino-Japanese and Sino-Soviet relations; but we have reviewed the evidence for a "soft" Japan and continue to find it persuasive.)[10]

Even in the year 2000, despite a probable history of Sino-American cooperation in some respects, for China the US will remain an enemy—a secondary enemy, or a tertiary enemy if Japan rearms. The Chinese will still want to *use* the US against the primary enemy or enemies, and to acquire from the US certain skills and materials to build Chinese strength. But, of course, so long as China remains Communist and the US does not become so, by definition there can be no genuine friendship (of, say, the Anglo-American sort). The Chinese can be expected to continue to work actively against US interests in Asia, Africa, and Latin America.

The question remains of whether Chinese successes of various kinds (some of them at Soviet expense) will impel the Soviets not to settle for a limited accommodation with China (as of the year 2000 or thereabouts) but to use their still overwhelming military superiority to seek a "final solution" of the Chinese problem. As we see it now, either a land invasion of China or a nuclear strike against China is already discouraged by the Soviet recognition that such action would mean a prolonged war with China and a condition of permanent Chinese hostility; and we think that such an attack will be increasingly discouraged by the growth of the Chinese missile force, especially the submarine-launched system. Thus the situation seems likely to settle into one of live-and-let-live, with varying levels of tension. It would, of course, be reckless to offer an answer to this highly important question with confidence; this question is one of those which will require continual monitoring, on into the 21st century.

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China Military Regions



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