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December 2, 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR HENRY A. KISSINGER

FROM: Al Haig

**SUBJECT: Talking Points for PFIAB Meeting, 12:30 p. m.,
Thursday, December 3, 1970**

1. **The following people will be attending the luncheon:**

Admiral George Anderson, Chairman

Dr. William Baker

Gordon Gray

Dr. Edwin Land

Franklin Lincoln

Dr. Franklin Murphy

Ambassador Robert Murphy

Frank Pace

Governor Nelson Rockefeller

Dr. Kissinger

General Haig

2. **Intelligence Problems.** You have expressed the intention of talking to the FIAB about the overall intelligence problem and of refining our current bill of particulars which is proof-positive of the deficiencies with which we are faced. I would suggest that you draw on the following points:

-- One of the most valuable services the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board could perform would be to take a hard look at the entire intelligence community to see what we can do to make sure that the President and the National Security Council get the best possible intelligence support.

-- It is a fact that, while the National Security Council process itself has been updated to make it more vital and useful to the President, the intelligence community has remained essentially the same, limping along with structure and procedures that are years out of date.

NSS Review Completed.

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Since January of 1969, there have been several very serious shortcomings surface underlying intelligence deficiencies. These include:

(a) The Sihanouk fiasco, which the FIAB has recently thoroughly investigated and the report on which you now hold. (You may wish to compliment the Board on a comprehensive, hard-hitting and most helpful report. The Board will probably want to know what remedial action is anticipated and you may wish to suggest that the President has directed some personnel changes.)

(b) The Soviet Strategic Threat. From the outset of our preparatory work on SALT, it became evident that the intelligence community, and especially CIA, much like the Sihanoukville case was unable or unwilling to grapple with available intelligence data and to analyze this data in a way which accurately reflected Soviet accomplishments toward the development of a MIRV, or capability equivalent to a MIRV. Only in the last few weeks has CIA finally come around to the view that the Soviets have, indeed, been testing such a weapon. This could have had the most serious implications, not only for our SALT preparations but for our whole ABM development program.

(c) The Middle East Ceasefire Violations. The manner in which positive evidence of Soviet/Egyptian cheating on the missiles was treated is a classic case of the incompetence of our intelligence community. It took days, and in fact even weeks, before the community ever arrived at a firm assessment of the nature and scope of the extensive cheating which had occurred.

In this instance, the community's failure to promptly and accurately assess the situation had serious repercussions.

(d) Chile Assessments. Here again, the intelligence community failed to sharply assess the full implications of the political trends in Chile or, perhaps more seriously, having assessed them with some accuracy, they permitted policy preconceptions to flavor their final assessments and their proposals for remedial action in the covert area.

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