



DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY



DIA, NAVY
reviews
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**DIA SITUATION REPORT
SUPPLEMENT**

63A

DATE: 21 October 1973

TIME: 2045 EDT

SUBJECT: Summary of Soviet Reactions to the Middle East
Hostilities

REFERENCE: DIA Situation Report Supplement 60A (U)

The following Soviet reactions to Middle East hostilities
have been noted since the referenced report.

[Redacted]

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2. (TSU) Political:

General Secretary Brezhnev and Foreign Minister Gromyko
continued talks today with US Secretary of State Kissinger.
According to TASS, both parties were examining the present
situation in the Middle East and seeking ways of bringing
about a ceasefire. The current talks were reportedly pre-
ceded by Soviet and East European diplomatic efforts to
assess the Mid-East situation and to discuss possible
peace terms with Arab leaders. A visit by the Yugoslav
Foreign Minister to Cairo on 16 October allegedly laid
the groundwork for Premier Kosygin's 16 to 19 October trip
there.

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NSA review completed

Colonel, USA
Deputy Director, Middle
East Intelligence Task
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(C) The Soviet press today once again attempted to separate detente with the West from Soviet support of the Arabs and reiterated Soviet willingness to play a role in ensuring peace in the Middle East. A 20 October Yugoslav commentary goes a step farther on Soviet concern for establishing peace and reports the belief that Moscow is "anxious" to find a "speedy way" out of the present Middle East crisis. The Zagreb account also mentions that the USSR would not entertain any Arab request for direct Soviet involvement since the consequences could be "catastrophic."

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~~TOP SECRET COMINT~~

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6. (U) Security: No Change.
7. (U) Economic: No Change.
8. (U) Logistics: No Change.
9. (U) Personnel: No Change.

~~TOP SECRET COMINT~~