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FM THE SITUATION ROOM//TOHAK 05//

TO BREMER/COVEY/RODMAN FOR THE SECRETARY

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VIA BLACK PATCH WH52482

State Dept. review completed

TOHAK 05

DECEMBER 11, 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT
FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT
SUBJECT: INFORMATION ITEMS

BREZHNEV STRESSES SOCIALIST SOLIDARITY: EMBASSY MOSCOW
VIEWS BREZHNEV'S DECEMBER 9 SPEECH IN WARSAW AS A FURTHER
REFLECTION OF SOVIET PREOCCUPATION WITH ITS EAST EUROPEAN
CLIENT STATES, WITH ONLY BRIEF FORAYS INTO NON-EUROPEAN
MATTERS, BREZHNEV:

-- STRESSED "SOCIALIST SOLIDARITY" BY FOCUSING ON
EAST EUROPE'S SHARED REALPOLITIK INTERESTS AND
IDEOLOGICAL VIEWS;

-- AFFIRMED THAT DETENTE CONTINUES TO BE TODAY'S
DOMINATING TENDENCY AND INDICATED THAT PROGRESS
IN IMPLEMENTING CSCE WOULD PRODUCE CONCRETE RE-
SULTS IN 1977 IN BELGRADE;

-- USED UNUSUALLY INTEMPERATE LANGUAGE TO DENOUNCE
WESTERN BASKET III EFFORTS.

THE U.S. EMBASSY IN WARSAW COMMENTS THAT SOVIET PREOC-
CUPATION IS DUE IN PART TO CONCERN THAT SOLIDARTY IS
ENDANGERED BY EAST EUROPEAN MANEUVERING DURING AND AFTER
THE CSCE NEGOTIATING PROCESS AND BY THE LIMITED SOVIET
CAPACITY TO SATISFY EAST EUROPEAN ECONOMIC REQUIREMENTS.

***** WHSR COMMENT *****

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PAGE 01

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THE POLES, IN ANY EVENT, ARE ON PUBLIC NOTICE THAT KEEPING THE WINDOW OPEN TO THE WEST SHOULD NOT MEAN CLOSING THE WINDOW ON THE EAST.

KORNIYENKO ON MARITIME AGREEMENTS: IN A MEETING WITH SOVIET DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER KORNIYENKO ON DECEMBER 9, AMBASSADOR STOESSEL ADVISED THAT THE U.S. ATTACHES CONSIDERABLE IMPORTANCE TO CONCLUDING A MARITIME AGREEMENT, AND THAT FAILURE TO DO SO COULD JEOPARDIZE GRAIN DELIVERIES AND WOULD BE A STEP BACKWARD IN OUR ECONOMIC RELATIONS. KORNIYENKO REPLIED "WITH SOME HEAT" THAT THIS IS A VERY DIFFICULT MATTER ON WHICH THERE SEEMS TO BE COMPLETE DISAGREEMENT. HE ADDED THAT IF THE U.S. STICKS TO ITS POSITION, IT WILL BE DIFFICULT, IF NOT IMPOSSIBLE, TO OVERCOME THIS PROBLEM. HE ASKED WHY THE USSR SHOULD PAY MORE THAN THE WORLD PRICE AND THEREBY SUBSIDIZE THE AMERICAN FLEET. STOESSEL POINTED OUT THAT HE COULD NOT ACCEPT THE EXCLUSION OF U.S. SHIPS FROM THE CARRIAGE OF BULK CARGOES SUCH AS GRAIN AND THAT THIS WOULD CONTRAVENE ONE OF THE BASIC PRINCIPLES OF THE MARITIME AGREEMENT. THE AMBASSADOR STATED THAT UNLESS WE ARE SATISFIED ON THIS POINT THERE IS NO CHANCE OF AGREEMENT. KORNIYENKO EXPRESSED THE HOPE THAT THE NEGOTIATORS COULD FIND A WAY AROUND THE PROBLEM BUT CONCLUDED THAT THE USSR COULD NOT AGREE "TO THE DISCRIMINATORY CHARACTER OF YOUR PROPOSALS, JUST AS WE COULD NOT AGREE TO THE DISCRIMINATORY CHARACTER OF LAST YEAR'S PROPOSAL ON TRADE AND MFN." AMBASSADOR STOESSEL COMMENTS THAT THERE WAS LITTLE GIVE IN KORNIYENKO'S POSITION BUT THAT HE MAY EITHER NOT BE WELL INFORMED OF THE REAL SOVIET POSITION, OR MORE LIKELY, NOT AUTHORIZED TO SIGNAL A FALL-BACK.

PORTUGAL -- COMMUNISTS DOWN BUT NOT ENTIRELY OUT: ASSESSING THE CURRENT PORTUGUESE SITUATION, EMBASSY LISBON FINDS THE POLITICAL RENOULUM SWINGING RAPIDLY BACK TO THE CENTER WITH COMMUNIST FORTUNES AT A LOW EBB FOLLOWING THE ABORTIVE NOVEMBER 28 COUP ATTEMPT. AS A RESULT:

- THE COMMUNIST PARTY (PCP) IS ON THE DEFENSIVE AND ITS POLICY HAS MET WITH CHALLENGES FROM WITHIN.
- ANTICOMMUNIST ELEMENTS IN THE MILITARY HAVE DECISIVELY BEATEN THE COMMUNISTS AND FAR-LEFT ELEMENTS.
- THE MEDIA ARE UNDERGOING GOVERNMENT-IMPOSED RESTRUCTURING TO CIRCUMSCRIBE FAR-LEFT AND COMMUNIST INFLUENCE.
- PRESIDENT COSTA GOMES HAS BEEN EFFECTIVELY NEUTRALIZED

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PAGE 02

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AS A PCP ALLY AND AZEVEDO'S PRESTIGE ENHANCED,

TROUBLE SPOTS REMAIN, HOWEVER, THE ECONOMY IS STEADILY DECLINING, AND, WITH COMMUNIST INFLUENCE WIDESPREAD, THE MODERATE MILITARY COULD HAVE DIFFICULTY CONTROLLING THE STREETS. THE EMBASSY BELIEVES THE GOVERNMENT OF PORTUGAL WILL STAY WITH THE WEST, SUPPORT NATO, AND AGREE TO A CONTINUED U.S. PRESENCE IN THE AZORES. WITH THE COMMUNISTS LOSING GROUND, ELECTIONS APPEAR VIRTUALLY ASSURED. CONCERNING FUTURE DEALINGS WITH PORTUGAL, THE EMBASSY RECOMMENDS WE:

- CONTINUE DISCREETLY TO SUPPORT SUCH ANTICOMMUNISTS AS AZEVEDO AND ENCOURAGE GREATER EUROPEAN INVOLVEMENT IN PORTUGAL;
- PROVIDE ECONOMIC SUPPORT, PARTICULARLY ASSISTANCE WHICH INCREASES ECONOMIC LIQUIDITY AND RENEWS INVESTOR CONFIDENCE;
- RESPOND TO REASONABLE REQUESTS FOR ASSISTANCE TO THE MILITARY AND OTHER ELEMENTS OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY APPARATUS; AND
- ACT AS THOUGH THE PORTUGUESE ARE AGAIN IN THE WESTERN CAMP, WHICH IS WHERE THEY WANT TO BE.

HABIB'S MEETING WITH PREMIER CHIANG CHING-KUO, ASSISTANT SECRETARY HABIB BRIEFED ROC PREMIER CHIANG CHING-KUO ON DECEMBER 8-9 ON YOUR TALKS WITH PRC OFFICIALS IN PEKING. HABIB INFORMED CHIANG THAT WE SHALL CONTINUE TO REDUCE OUR MILITARY PRESENCE ON TAIWAN AS AN INDEPENDENT U.S. DECISION NOT DISCUSSED IN PEKING. WHILE IT IS UNCERTAIN HOW NORMALIZATION WILL AFFECT OUR RELATIONS WITH THE ROC, HABIB ASSURED THE PREMIER THAT THE U.S. GOVERNMENT IS WELL AWARE OF ROC INTERESTS AND WOULD ACT RESPONSIBLY AND WITH PRUDENCE KEEPING IN MIND THE SECURITY AND WELL BEING OF THE ROC.

PREMIER CHIANG TOLD HABIB THAT THE BASIC ELEMENT IN ROC POLICY WAS AND WOULD REMAIN THE MAINTENANCE OF CLOSE AND FRIENDLY RELATIONS WITH THE U.S. ALTHOUGH THE ROC COULD NOT AGREE THAT DETENTE (WITH THE PRC) WAS A WISE POLICY, ISSUES ON WHICH THE U.S. AND THE ROC DID AGREE FAR OUTWEIGHED POINTS OF DIVERGENCE. ALL THE ROC NEEDED FROM THE U.S., HE SAID, WAS CONTINUED MORAL SUPPORT. THE PREMIER WARNED, HOWEVER, THAT "NORMALIZATION" FOR PEKING WAS A CONSPIRATORIAL SCHEME DESIGNED TO TARNISH THE U.S. IMAGE AS A RELIABLE ALLY AND TO GET THE U.S. OUT OF ASIA. THE ATMOSPHERE OF THE MEETING WAS RELAXED AND FRIENDLY.

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PAGE 83

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ISRAELI, ARAB PARTIES' REACTIONS ON UN VOTE: IN HIS LATEST TALK WITH AMBASSADOR TOON, PRIME MINISTER RABIN ACCEPTED AND SAID HE UNDERSTOOD YOUR MESSAGE BUT MADE NO OTHER DIRECT COMMENT. HE EXPRESSED APPRECIATION FOR THE U.S. VETO OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION CONDEMNING ISRAEL'S RAIDS INTO LEBANON, THOUGH CONSISTENT WITH OUR PAST VOTES ON ONE-SIDED RESOLUTIONS, THE ISRAELIS VIEW THE VETO AS RESTORING SOME BALANCE TO THE U.S. POSITION, IN THE AFTERMATH OF WHAT THEY REGARDED AS VERY UNFAVORABLE SECURITY COUNCIL ACTIONS ON THE PLO OVER THE PAST TWO WEEKS.

RABIN ALSO EXPRESSED GRATITUDE OVER OUR DECISION NOT TO PRESS A NORMAL DEMARCHE ON THE NEW SETTLEMENTS IN GOLAN AT THIS TIME; HE INDICATED THAT THIS MINIMIZED OTHER PROBLEMS HE HAD WITH THE CABINET OVER A SERIOUS CHALLENGE FROM THE HARDLINERS ON RECENT SETTLEMENT ATTEMPTS ON THE WEST BANK. RABIN GAVE NO COMMITMENTS BUT TOLD TOON HE FULLY UNDERSTANDS OUR POSITION ON THE RAIDS ON LEBANON AND ON THE AVOIDANCE OF ANY MORE SETTLEMENTS IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES. HE REAFFIRMED HIS INTEREST IN DISCUSSING THE SETTLEMENTS ISSUE WITH YOU IN JANUARY. WITH THE SC VOTES BEHIND THEM, THE ISRAELIS WILL TURN THEIR FULL ATTENTION TO THE JANUARY DEBATE IN THE COUNCIL AND THE IMPLICATIONS FOR ISRAEL OF THE PALESTINIAN ISSUE AND THE PLO. RABIN SAID THERE WAS LITTLE CHANGE IN HIS CABINET'S POSITION THAT ISRAEL WILL NOT ATTEND THE DEBATE, THOUGH IT WILL CONSULT WITH US ON A COMMON STRATEGY. FOREIGN MINISTER ALLON TOLD TOON HE ACCEPTS THIS POSITION, ALTHOUGH HIS CONVERSATION CLEARLY CONFIRMED THE MANY PUBLIC REPORTS OF SHARP DIFFERENCES OF VIEW BETWEEN ALLON AND RABIN ON THIS ISSUE. THE BEST-INFORMED ISRAELI POLITICAL OBSERVERS SAY THAT ALLON AND SEVEN OTHER MEMBERS OF RABIN'S 22-MAN CABINET ARE PRESSING FOR A MUCH LESS RIGID POSITION ON THE PALESTINIAN PROBLEM. THERE HAS ALSO BEEN SIGNIFICANT NEW PRESS AND OTHER PUBLIC CRITICISM IN ISRAEL OF THE GOVERNMENT'S HANDLING OF THE PLO ISSUE AND THE TIMING AND SCALE OF THE RECENT ATTACKS ON LEBANON. IT IS TOO EARLY TO JUDGE WHETHER THESE INTERNAL DEBATES WILL HAVE ANY INFLUENCE ON ISRAELI GOVERNMENT DECISIONS IN THE PERIOD AHEAD. NEITHER THE EGYPTIANS NOR THE SYRIANS REACTED STRENUOUSLY TO THE U.S. VETO. EGYPTIAN FOREIGN MINISTER FAHMY'S UNUSUALLY RESTRAINED REACTION WAS APPARENTLY IN LARGE PART DUE TO YOUR LETTER TO PRESIDENT SADAT.

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PAGE 04

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