

2730

~~TOP SECRET SENSITIVE~~
~~CONTAINS CODEWORD~~

June 24, 1969

*Pres has seen
6/27*

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: Henry A. Kissinger

You inquired through Alex Butterfield as to whether or not "our recent actions" triggered the June 17 rocket attack on Saigon. Reports indicate that two rockets fell during the attack. One landed in the Saigon River and the other about 100 yards from the US Embassy.

ON-FILE NSC
RELEASE
INSTRUCTIONS
APPLY

Our review of the pattern of attacks on Saigon does not reflect that our Cambodian actions have triggered retaliatory Viet Cong rocket attacks. On the contrary, I would suspect that just the opposite may be occurring. Since we started this program, the only attacks on Saigon have been isolated minor one, two or three rocket launches, most of which have caused little damage and light casualties within Saigon city limits.

An analysis of rocket attacks on Saigon compared with the B-52 bombings of Cambodia appears to bear no correlation.

Following is a table of B-52 strikes and Saigon rocket attacks since December 18, 1968.

<u>DATE</u>	<u>ATTACKS ON SAIGON</u>
February 22	7 rocket rounds-- 6 civilians KIA, 19 WIA
February 23	3 rocket rounds-- 6 civilians KIA, 23 WIA
March 2	3 rocket rounds-- 13 civilians KIA, 20 WIA

JCS review completed.

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CONTAINS CODEWORD**Table of B-52 strikes and Saigon rocket attacks continued:**

<u>DATE</u>	<u>ATTACKS ON SAIGON</u>
March 5	7 rocket rounds-- 22 civilians KIA, 28 WIA
March 15	4 rocket rounds-- 1 civilian WIA

<u>DATE</u>	<u>CAMBODIA BOMBING</u>	<u>ATTACKS ON SAIGON</u>
March 18	Breakfast	
March 30		3 rocket rounds--no casualties reported.
April 24	Breakfast Bravo Breakfast Cocoa	
April 25	Lunch	
May 11		1 122 rocket round -- 6 civilians KIA, 9 WIA
May 12		2 122 rocket rounds -- no casualties reported
May 27	Dinner	
May 29	Lunch Alpha	
June 1		2 122 rocket rounds -- 2 civilians KIA, 25 WIA
June 9	Dinner Alpha	
June 10	Lunch Bravo	
June 17		2 122 rocket rounds -- no casualties reported

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The above table shows that 24 rocket rounds hit Saigon during the three month period prior to the commencement of our Cambodian operations. In contrast, during the following three months only ten rocket rounds hit Saigon. I am inclined to suspect that the distinct drop in the number and severity of enemy rocket attacks is a result of our Cambodian operations. I must add, however, that there has been no positive proof to sustain this estimate. However, if our Cambodian operations have served to restrain enemy shellings, it would be logical to anticipate some reduction in their inhibiting effect over time.

On balance, I believe the recent shellings of Saigon have coincided with the sporadic offensive "high points" which the enemy continues to mount. During the weekend of May 11-12, 159 Allied bases and towns were shelled. This offensive action followed closely behind the release of the NLF 10-point proposal which would suggest a close correlation between the shellings and Hanoi's negotiating strategy.

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MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

TEEN
6/27
[TS-HK. D403]

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June 26, 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: Henry A. Kissinger

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