

12 May 1970

CAH5

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DIA, NSA
reviews
completed.

DIA ANALYSIS OF SIGNIFICANT TACTICAL COMINT

Recent COMINT intercepted in the area of current Allied operations demonstrate continuing enemy concern over the developing situation.

Since 30 April, the Headquarters, Armed Forces Command, North Vietnam has made several attempts to contact command elements located in the area of current Allied operations. The terminal serving COSVN was fixed by ARDF north of Base Area 353 while re-establishing contact with subordinate terminals. Recent COMINT indicates Headquarters, Subregion 2 is acting as the command and control to coordinate enemy operations in the Parrot's Beak area. Traffic between elements within the Parrot's Beak reflect current Allied operations and efforts to counter sweeps into base areas.

Several attempts by Hanoi to reestablish contact with COSVN Headquarters were unsuccessful on 30 April. On 1 May, contact was established and 20 messages were passed. Apparently normal communications have resumed. Communications between COSVN and its substations are still experiencing difficulties, however, as the level of activity remains sporadic.

COSVN Hq, while attempting to reestablish communications with its subordinates was located north of Base Area 353 on 1 May. This location is in close proximity to a 26 April fix and tends to negate a 29 April location report placing the headquarters 10 miles to the north.

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Headquarters, Subregion 2 (immediately east of the Parrot's Beak) in passing a message from COSVN indicates confusion and concern over Allied operations in the Parrot's Beak.

"The Vietnamese are returning south to reinforce the white Cambodians and to suppress the Cambodian revolutionary movement of the hamlets in the recently liberated areas You are to have a plan to deploy the forces to wear down and annihilate the puppet (ARVN) and white Cambodian gangs. Certainly you must strive to destroy the spearheads of the sweep to protect the people, storage facilities, and agencies of subregion two When you strike you are to break through the flank of reinforcements north and south of Highway 1 back to Chi Phu On the nights of 28 and 29 April we ambushed with artillery into Tra Coa. We burned 12 vehicles and killed around 100 of the scoundrels, but are at present in a dilemma."

A message between unidentified Subregion 2 elements reflect an Allied sweep and efforts to avoid being caught.


"The situation is that the enemy (ARVN) is being cautious. At present they are still (moving) slowly, balking. Support (elements) are striking the border Your position is to move back over....."

Finally, in an attempt to counter Allied operations around Base Area 354 the Headquarters, 95C NVA Regiment intercept reflected the strain of their present situation.

"Whenever you encounter the enemy, you are to strike whether or not they have artillery ... Even if they have tanks by the hundreds you are to strike.

"Do not take only mortars to strike, but rather you must use the infantry and artillery you have in order to attack and annihilate the enemy concentrations and fire support bases."

This order to attack Allied forces employing every resource available might indicate a general feeling of desperation among the enemy forces.



SECRET SPOKE

**SECRET SENSITIVE
EYES ONLY**

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR




2 May 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Honorable Henry A. Kissinger
Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs

SUBJECT: Daily Report on Cambodia

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Rich

Richard Helms
Director

*P.S. I have spoken to Gen. Wheeler
who is sending the requisite
message to Gen. Abrams.*

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EYES ONLY

