No Objection to Declassification in Part 2013/02/13 : LOC-HAK-558-21-4-5



CENTRAL INTERLIBENCE AGENCY

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

4 May 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Honorable Henry A. Kissinger Assistant to the President for

National Security Affairs

SUBJECT:

Daily Report on Cambodia

2. There are no other significant events to report.

Richard Helms Director

EYES CALY

SENSITIVE

GROUP 1
Excluded from oriomatic Grangesting and declassification

DIA, ARMY, NSA, NSS reviews completed.

25X1

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. KISSINGER

ACTION

May 4, 1970

FROM:

Richard T. Kennedy

SUBJECT:

Actions on Cambodia

Your daily report for the President of Actions on Cambodia through 1800 hours 4 May is enclosed. The reports submitted by State, Defense, and CIA are at Tabs for your information.

Recommendation:

That you forward the daily report to the President (Tab A).

Attachments

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE

Report #4 5 May 1970

DIA ANALYSIS OF SIGNIFICANT TACTICAL COMINT


Communications intelligence intercepts of 2 May have been analyzed by DIA and when associated with other intelligence information indicate the location of a major enemy headquarters, perhaps that of COSVN, immediately to the north of Base Area 352. These intercepts have been associated with the strategic intelligence bureau of COSVN's Headquarters. Of particular interest, these COMINT fixes were located in the immediate vicinity of where a four vehicle enemy convoy was destroyed on 2 May, and where a US helicopter on 3 May observed what appeared to be a large military complex which is reported to include 300 bunkers, 500 huts, a storage area, and numerous long wire antennas. COMUSMACV is currently exploiting this intelligence.

DIA analysis of COMINT indicated that two regiments of the 5th VC Division are currently moving to the northwest. The 174th Regiment pulled away from Base Area 351, perhaps fearing a new Allied operation to the northeast of "Shoemaker," and the 275th Regiment was tenuously detected in a 20-mile northwestward move, to within 15 miles of Kratie.

Elsewhere in the Fishhook, DIA has noted COMINT which reveals continuing attack preparations by the 7th NVA Division. A high degree of readiness was indicated by a 4 May message from Division Headquarters which advised all three of its regiments that: "You are to have the 15-watt radio maintain close communications with Division Headquarters."

Various 7th Division elements used such expressions on 3 May as:

"Strike and annihilate the enemy. You must take the initiative to zealously annihilate the enemy. Make contact strongly to the rear area below there.... 4th Battalion is to continue striking...to coordinate and protect the valuable stores. They are to ambush enemy armored vehicles.... 5th Battalion is to quickly go up to strike the puppet (ARVN) 5th Airborne Battalion...annihilate the puppet 5th Airborne Battalion there.... if the 5th Battalion has not yet gone out to ambush... then have them immediately go to the area...to strike strongly to the rear of the enemy... You are to closely coordinate with upper echelons to block the sweep."



DIA's judgment is that these references to attack plans are a reflection of the enemy's concern over the success of the Allied drive and indicate that he may be planning diversionary attacks to the south in the hope of forcing an Allied withdrawal.

In the Parrot's Beak, photoreconnaissance detected another major enemy base camp -- this one large enough to accommodate a full division. This base camp can be related to COMINT fixes which have placed the 271st VC Regiment in the area. Further emphasizing the enemy's difficulties in the Parrot's Beak, COMINT reveals a drastic reduction in communications activity by the Headquarters of Subregion (SR) 2. Those few messages which are still being passed generally involve only subordinate units. DIA analysis is that SR-2 Headquarters -- like COSVN Headquarters -- is either on the move to elude the Allied advance or lying low to avoid detection. A 3 May message from a commo-liaison unit in the Parrot's Beak to an element of COSVN reported that: "On 1 May the enemy struck into the base area.... (We) lost tons of rice, pigs, chickens, ducks and bicycles.... The base area will move back to Kampong Krasang (well north of the Parrot's Beak)."

The 271st VC Regiment was fixed on 2 May in the southern Parrot's Beak area, but is considered no longer combat effective. Enemy forces there apparently have not yet given up hope of assistance from Communist units in the Delta. A 2 May message on SR-2 circuits reported that coordination with Military Region 2 (northern 4th Corps) was being effected. Thus far, however, COMINT has not detected the movement of any 4th Corps enemy units toward the Parrot's Beak.



WRAP-UP PROVIDED DDO AT 051115 EDT MAY 70

A number of intelligence indicators, when taken together, strongly suggest that a major enemy military command post has been located immediately to the north of Base Area 352.

On 2 May, the Strategic Intelligence Bureau (SIB) of COSVN was fixed in the immediate vicinity of Route 7, to the north of Base Area 352. Of particular significance to this SIGINT fix were two related incidents: First, also on 2 May and occurring one mile to the north of the SIB fix, an enemy truck convoy was taken under air attack. Three 2½ ton trucks and one 3/4 ton truck were destroyed in this attack. Second, COSVN's SIB has not been observed in communications since that time. It is possible that this truck convoy could have been related to this element of COSVN's headquarters although no direct corollation can yet be made.

Additional information concerning the fixing of a major enemy military command post was provided on 3 May by a helicopter-borne observer who reported sighting a complex immediately to the north of BA 352 which included what appeared to be 300 bunkers of various sizes, a 100' x 60' command bunker, 500 huts 20' x 40', and a storage area with covered pits containing what appeared to be crates. In addition, numerous long wire antennas were observed in this area. This reported command post location is in the immediate vicinity of the 2 May activity reported on in the previous paragraph.

COMUSMACV is currently exploiting this intelligence and will provide further information on these leads at the earliest.



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