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MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

INFORMATION

October 13, 1970

~~SECRET~~/SPOKE

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: Henry A. Kissinger HK

SUBJECT: Communist Political Offensive in South Vietnam

Following Madame Binh's eight point proposal in Paris last month, a good deal of evidence has been uncovered which indicates that the Communists are embarking on new political offensive in South Vietnam designed to topple the Thieu-Ky leadership. Intercepted messages, captured documents, and clandestine sources have revealed that a high level directive was distributed throughout the Communist apparatus in South Vietnam well before Madame Binh's presentation. The directive emphasized the following:

-- The Communist rank and file must be made to understand the importance of the coming political and diplomatic phase. Madame Binh's speech must be distributed to all Vietnamese groups and individuals of consequence.

-- The rank and file must be mobilized in support of a political offensive. They are to win over uncommitted Vietnamese by convincing them that only the ouster of the present regime in Saigon and a U.S. troop withdrawal stand in the way of peace.

-- Illusions of peace should not be entertained; military attacks must continue on all fronts, especially against U.S. forces.

Tactical Arguments. This directive clearly suggests that the Communists hope to use the eight points to help mount an extensive political campaign against the South Vietnamese Government. They will probably make the following arguments:

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-- The only barrier to peace is the existence of Thieu-Ky-Khiem.

-- Those three men should be disposed of soon, or at least must not be re-elected in 1971.

-- South Vietnamese political groups opposing Thieu-Ky-Khiem can make common cause with the Communists.

Problems for the Communists. However, the very fact that the Communists are using these political tactics reveals and may increase some of their problems.

-- They probably would not attempt to engage in such maneuvers unless they felt too weak militarily to follow any other course.

-- Hints of collaboration with other South Vietnamese political groups may cause real problems for the experienced Communist cadre, who do not like the idea of sharing power or collaborating with other groups. This will pose a difficult problem for Hanoi.

-- Moreover, most South Vietnamese political leaders distrust the Communists even more than they dislike Thieu.

Possible Problem for us. On the other hand, the new Communist line may pose a difficult problem for us, particularly as the 1971 elections approach. It is possible, particularly if the Communist campaign succeeds in deluding many South Vietnamese politicians, that a number of strong South Vietnamese groups will oppose Thieu's candidacy. Thieu may then use a number of questionable devices to rig the elections, raising questions about the validity of South Vietnam's claim to be a true democracy.

Your new proposal should help us meet this problem, since it can put Thieu on the right side of the peace issue in South Vietnam if he uses it properly.

THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN

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MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

INFORMATION
October 22, 1970

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: Henry A. Kissinger

SUBJECT: Hanoi's Short Term Intentions

The CIA has produced a memorandum on Hanoi's intentions over the next six months or so (Tab A). The major points follow.

Hanoi's fundamental view of the struggle has not changed. The Communists still believe that they have more staying power than their opponents, and they are gearing their efforts to a long, drawn-out contest. It seems clear that they are determined to make the sacrifices required by the wider war in Indochina; there is some evidence that Hanoi has stepped up its recruitment efforts, and the southward flow of troops from North Vietnam began earlier than usual this year.

Before the U.S. elections. The Communists could take several different courses of action in an attempt to influence the U.S. Congressional elections.

-- They could step up military pressure in the northernmost provinces of South Vietnam, attempt to inflict a severe defeat on the Cambodian task force northeast of Phnom Penh, or maneuver diplomatically to arouse peace sentiments in the U.S.

-- We have no evidence as to what they are planning.

The next six months. The range of practical alternatives open to Hanoi is not very broad.

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-- With the loss of Sihanoukville and the disruptions caused by the allied operations in Cambodia, much of the Communist effort will be devoted to expanding and reinforcing their logistics system in southern Laos, and attempting to re-establish a credible military threat in or near southern South Vietnam.

-- It is unlikely that the Communists will attempt an all-out offensive anywhere in Indochina during the next six months. Some short and sharp offensive action cannot be ruled out, but the Communists primarily will play for time by conducting a low cost, low level struggle.

-- The Communists will continue to hammer away at the Government of South Vietnam by insisting that the Thieu-Ky leadership stands in the way of a settlement.

-- They will probably engage in some wary exploration of the allied position in Paris. But they do not expect much change in the allied position, and they are not willing to pay a price that would seriously jeopardize their chances for success in South Vietnam.

Comment. The CIA clearly interprets the evidence, including recent infiltration activity, as part of a long term Communist effort. It largely discounts any significant increase in military action during the next six months, either before or after the U.S. Congressional elections. We agree that much of Hanoi's efforts during this period will necessarily be directed toward rebuilding diminished capabilities, but it is also quite possible that Hanoi may try some spectaculars during this period, such as rocket attacks on U.S. bases.

Hanoi's growing manpower commitments bear watching. The Communists have injected about 20,000 troops into the Laotian panhandle since June. The destinations of all these troops is not yet clear; some could be bound for South Vietnam or Cambodia, though most of them will probably be used to expand and reinforce the trail network in southern Laos. In addition, about 3,800 troops have begun to move toward southern South Vietnam (COSVN) so far this month. The numerical sequence of the groups in which they are moving suggest that many more are scheduled to follow. Last year, infiltration into the Laotian panhandle itself was negligible, while groups destined for southern South Vietnam did not start to move until early November.

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
7 October 1970

INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM

Hanoi's Short-Term Intentions

Introduction

Viewed from either Hanoi or Washington, the current situation in Indochina appears unusually complex, and the complexity in turn raises the possibility that the Communists may go off on a new tack in the war. We believe, however, that Hanoi's fundamental view of the struggle has not changed and that the Communists are as committed as ever to the notion that, although their struggle will be long, painful, and often unspectacular, they have more staying power than their opponents. They also apparently continue to believe that South Vietnam is the main target. Although their attention may be shifted to Laos and Cambodia at any given time, whatever they do elsewhere is ultimately geared to the war in South Vietnam.

Note: This memorandum was produced solely by CIA. It was prepared by the Office of Current Intelligence and coordinated with the Office of Economic Research, the Office of National Estimates, and the Special Assistant for Vietnamese Affairs.

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Options for October

1. It is this outlook that will govern what the Communists do during the current election campaign in the US. Hanoi has no doubt examined the range of actions it might take in the next month with a view to embarrassing the Nixon administration, but this consideration would almost certainly be no more than peripheral. As always, Communist actions over the next month will be governed mainly by their view of the current tactical and strategic situation in the war as a whole.

2. Within this framework, we do see three areas where the Communists may take actions that might have some impact in the US. (Various other moves--in southern Laos, for instance--could also be undertaken at any time, but their political effect would be much less impressive.) First, they could make life difficult for the Cambodian column now bottled up on the road to Kompong Thom; they might even send in more troops and mount a full-scale assault against it. 25X1

3. Second, Hanoi might send some of the units now in the infiltration pipeline to northern South Vietnam for further tests of ARVN's mettle. This would accord with the use the Communists traditionally make of regular North Vietnamese divisions like the 308th and the 320th, 25X1 It would also mesh with the steady rate of military activity that the region near the DMZ has been seeing lately. Actions against ARVN near the DMZ might be supplemented by local "high points" elsewhere in South Vietnam and by more extensive military activity in Cambodia. 25X1

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4. Third, the Communists might dole out another installment of their political and diplomatic "offensive" before the US elections, perhaps by playing a variation of the cease-fire or the POW theme. This would be a public move, aimed more at peace sentiments in the US and South Vietnam than at the governments in Washington and Saigon. Although the Communists would make use of any political assets they have in South Vietnam to whip up support for such an initiative, they would nevertheless have to tread carefully. It would be all too easy for Washington to turn a Communist move on the peace front to its own advantage in the election campaign by citing it as evidence that Hanoi was beginning to feel the strain. Moreover, the US has the floor in Paris at the moment, and the Communists might have trouble getting an initiative of their own launched before 3 November.

5. Any of these moves is possible; further action against the Cambodian column may in fact have already begun. We would emphasize, however, that it is long-range considerations, and not just a desire to weigh in during the US elections, that will determine what the Communists do.

The Longer View

6. How, then, is Hanoi ordering its longer-term priorities? The evidence, as always, is spotty: numerous reflections of troop movements, a flood of propaganda, scores of captured documents and prisoner debriefings, [redacted] 25X1 and second-hand diplomatic gleanings. In general, it seems clear that the Communists remain determined to make the sacrifices demanded by the wider war in Indochina that erupted last spring. There has been a hint or two, particularly in a few press articles this fall urging expansion of the North Vietnamese militia, that the sacrifices might indeed be extensive. This year's southward troop flow which has begun earlier than usual apparently will be quite substantial.

7. There are one or two possibilities that can be discounted with a degree of confidence. Hanoi almost certainly is not planning an all-out, Tet-type offensive anywhere in Indochina in the next six months; not only does it have too few resources in place, but such a course would be out of keeping with the whole thrust of Hanoi's war policy during the past two years. Nor does it appear that there will be much heavy fighting in the southern half of South Vietnam, where Communist forces are in no position to mount a major challenge against the allies. In North Laos, the apparent withdrawal of some North Vietnamese units suggests that the Communists may be less active than last year, although we still anticipate a move in some strength against Vang Pao's headquarters at Long Tieng.

8. Maintaining and expanding the logistics system in the Lao panhandle and in eastern Cambodia almost certainly is one of Hanoi's priority concerns. The lower end of this system has been disrupted, and, even more important, Sihanoukville is no longer available. Thus the Communists have become more dependent on the Ho Chi Minh Trail, and the trail is coming under increasing attack. They must simultaneously expand the system's carrying capacity and improve its defenses; to do this, they are developing new routes, dispersing their storage areas, and augmenting the combat forces along the trails. Although land routes almost certainly will be the most important way of moving men and materiel south, Hanoi may also step up its efforts at seaborne infiltration, especially in the Mekong Delta.

9. Just as important in Communist eyes--and vastly more difficult--is the maintenance of a credible military threat of some sort in and near southern South Vietnam. North Vietnamese and Viet Cong regulars, without whom the effectiveness of Hanoi's other assets is seriously reduced, were badly off in this area even before Sihanouk's ouster. Since then, they have received few replacements from the north; moreover, some troops already there have been diverted to the war in Cambodia, and the rest have suffered from supply shortages and loss of their sanctuaries. This situation, we believe, demands that Hanoi quickly send substantial numbers of troops southward and develop new channels for supplying them.

10. It is impossible to make a meaningful estimate of the manpower commitment involved in these two tasks, but without a doubt it is substantial. Between November 1969 and May 1970, the Communists sent about 60,000 troops through the infiltration system, almost half of them to South Vietnam's two southern military regions. This total probably did not even replace the losses incurred during the same period; moreover, almost no new troops have arrived in southern South Vietnam since August. The Communists could send very considerable numbers of troops south and still not regain the ground they lost in the last year. They must also move large numbers of men into the Lao panhandle and Cambodia to operate and defend their expanded logistics network, while at the same time maintaining at least minimal levels of military activity in all three parts of Indochina.

11. Although the main Communist military effort in the next six months may be devoted to refurbishing and defending their logistics system and their military structure in southern South Vietnam, this does not rule out the possibility of some strong offensive actions. In southern Laos the Communists may mount a fairly extensive operation along their western flank, in an effort to gain additional infiltration routes and enhance the security of the routes and bases they now have. The Communists will also keep up the pressure in Cambodia. There they will probably continue to concentrate on the countryside, building an indigenous "liberation movement," keeping the Cambodian Army tied down, and perhaps occasionally trying to bring parts of that army to bay. Doing even this job may require more men than Hanoi has committed so far. We see little evidence that the Communists plan to move forcefully in the next few months to bring down Lon Nol, and they are unlikely to try anything--a move on Phnom Penh, for instance--where the costs and risks would be high and the benefits considered questionable.

12. Northern South Vietnam is also likely to see some increase in military activity, but there are no signs that the Communists are ready to try to take

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on the South Vietnamese there in a big way. In north Laos the Communists will probably husband their resources carefully, even though some offensive action is almost certain. In southern South Vietnam, they are almost certain to maintain a very low military posture.

The Chance for a Respite

13. This is a full order for Hanoi, and the question arises whether the Communists perceive a need to lighten their military burdens by being more forthcoming at the Paris talks. Most of the evidence indicates they do not. Still, there may be something of substance in recent statements from people who talk to the North Vietnamese, and who have taken the line that the Viet Cong's new eight point proposal is a "flexible" document subject to bargaining even on the key issues. [redacted] 25X1

14. If the Communists do want to act positively in Paris, we would not anticipate a specific initiative. Rather, they might take advantage of any private talks to angle for a new way to attack their old problems. They probably expect to be talking with the United States before long in any case, and their line will be tailored to what the US has to offer. If the US is prepared to discuss the issues they consider fundamental--particularly the matter of political power in South Vietnam--they are likely to come up with some concessions of their own.

15. The Communists would probably seek to back up any political talks in Paris by trying to mobilize their political resources in South Vietnam. With a presidential election less than a year away, they would try to get as much steam as possible behind the notion that changes at the top in Saigon could bring about a settlement, and they would push as hard as they could to get grass-roots sentiment moving their way. It is hard to see that such tactics would have much success at the national level in today's

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South Vietnam, but the Communists might hope to improve their position in some localities.

Conclusions

16. The range of practical alternatives open to Hanoi in the next six months is not very broad. The course that the Communists are most likely to follow is a continuation of the tactics of protracted warfare they have relied on for so long. Essentially they will be playing for time and not for immediate results. Southern Laos and Cambodia are the most probable places for strong offensive action, but within this time frame we do not expect the North Vietnamese to try for really decisive actions in either area.

17. The Communists are committed to the concept of a long, drawn-out contest in Indochina, and they show every sign of being ready to carry on the struggle for power in South Vietnam for years. The question today is whether they might be interested in trying to alter the shape of the struggle in order to cut their costs, protect their assets, and perhaps improve their capabilities for the long-haul effort they anticipate.

18. We think they are interested in exploring the route toward a cease-fire and a situation that might improve their operating milieu in South Vietnam. Their watchword in the political and diplomatic field, however, will be wariness. They almost certainly do not expect much give in the US position in Paris, and they are not willing to pay a price that would seriously prejudice their chances of success in the struggle for power in South Vietnam.

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

15 OCT 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR: Dr. Henry A. Kissinger
Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs

SUBJECT : Logistics Impact of Interdiction Operations in South Laos

1. The attached memorandum is in response to John Holdridge's request that you wish to be informed of the amount of supplies destroyed or captured as a result of the interdiction operations in South Laos during the 1970 wet season.

2. In view of your interest in what was going on with the enemy's logistics system during the period of these operations, I am also attaching a recent publication by this Agency which discusses logistical developments in South Laos and Cambodia during the 1970 wet season.

THOMAS H. KARAMESSINES
Deputy Director for Plans

Attachments: (2)
1. Intelligence Memorandum, "Logistics Impact of Interdiction Operations in South Laos During the 1970 Wet Season," 15 Oct 70 [redacted] 25X1
2. ER IM 70-147, "Communist Logistical Developments in Southern Laos and Cambodia During the 1970 Wet Season," Oct 70 ([redacted] (Copy No. 170) [Not attached] 25X1

[redacted] 25X1

Copy No. 1

[Attached to Memo to Pres, 30 Oct. 1970. HK-D339]

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
15 October 1970

INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM

Logistics Impact of Interdiction Operations in South Laos During the 1970 Wet Season

Background

1. Allied interdiction operations against the NVA logistics system in South Laos during the 1970 wet season consisted principally of the 7AF Commando Hunt IV program and limited ground interdiction efforts by friendly guerrilla forces in Operation Gauntlet and MACSOG units carrying out Prairie Fire operations.

2. The impact of the 1970 wet season interdiction operations, in terms of supplies destroyed, was small. This result was to be expected both because of the reduced level of logistical activity during the wet season and the environmental restraints imposed on our interdiction operations. The effect of the wet season interdiction programs is, in fact, more properly measured by assessing the extent to which they complicated the enemy's attempts to keep the system in a state of readiness for the resumption of dry season operations; increased the cost and difficulties of moving even small amounts of supplies; forced the diversion of large numbers of personnel to maintain and defend the system in South Laos; and obstructed plans for the westward expansion of the system.

3. A primary reason for not anticipating a large pay-off in terms of the destruction of supplies is the meager nature of the target system, particularly during the wet season. During the 1969 wet season, for example, the 559th Transportation Group pulled out of South Laos and the actual movement of supplies was restricted to the movement of small amounts in the area around the DMZ and shuttling activities in the central Panhandle. During the

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1970 wet season the 559th remained in South Laos. But the amounts of supplies moved through the system were small, apparently adequate to maintain the forces in the Panhandle but not enough to provide a significant volume for throughput to Cambodia or South Vietnam. [redacted] By September concern about moving supplies became minimal and the operations of the 559th concentrated almost exclusively on the completion of final preparations for the opening of the 1970-71 dry season.

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4. Other factors that limited the pay-off from interdiction operations were the sharp reductions in Air Force sorties, the influence of weather on both ground and air operations, the launching of ground operations during the period when traffic flows were at their lowest point of the year, and, finally, the hostile environment which caused many ground operations to be short-lived.

Air Interdiction

5. 7AF interdiction operations -- Commando Hunt IV -- were reduced significantly during the 1970 wet season. Only 14,400 tactical attack sorties were flown in southern Laos this summer (June-September) compared with 29,500 sorties for the same four months last year. The decrease in tactical attack sorties was partly offset, however, by the greater number of B-52 strikes which more than doubled, increasing from 1,100 last year to 2,400 this year.

6. The results of these air operations are difficult to assess in a quantitative sense. This is because the data on bombing results, principally pilot reports, and the condition under which they must be reported make them almost inevitably subject to wide margins of error. In addition, the methodologies currently used to convert BDA results to supply losses involve a number of questionable, though necessarily arbitrary, assumptions yielding results which are at odds with other intelligence. Despite these limitations which preclude any precise weighing of supplies lost because of air interdiction, a number of related factors support a judgment that the amounts lost during this wet season were undoubtedly small.

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7. The data reported by 7AF, for example, indicate that truck destruction during this wet season increased by about 25 percent compared to the 1969 wet season when truck traffic was inordinately low. At the same time, the data show that secondary explosions and fires, the category which traditionally accounts for the bulk of estimated losses, decreased by 25 percent.

8. A better appreciation of the magnitude of supply losses due to air interdiction can be had by comparing BDA data for this wet season with similar data for the previous dry season. Thus, effective truck losses averaged 4 a day during this wet season, compared with losses of 24 trucks a day during the previous dry season. Similarly, the average of 47 secondary fires and explosions for this wet season compares with an average of 200 a day reported during the past dry season.

Ground Interdiction

9. During the past wet season, two programs -- Operation Gauntlet and Prairie Fire -- involved the use of friendly ground forces in interdiction operations in South Laos. Neither of these programs resulted in the destruction of large amounts of supplies.

Prairie Fire

10. The commitment of Prairie Fire resources to ground interdiction operations during the 1970 wet season was minimal. During the period June-September, an average of 30-35 Prairie Fire operations were conducted monthly in South Laos. About 90% of these operations were oriented primarily toward reconnaissance activities. A number of operational handicaps, particularly the vigorous reactions of enemy forces, meant that these FGU missions were usually short-lived. Only a handful of these operations yielded any significant information on enemy logistics or gained access to enemy installations that were not long abandoned. In the few cases where the probes were relatively lucrative, the amounts of enemy supplies captured or destroyed were quite small. A typical example is represented by an operation in late September south of the western corner of the DMZ. This operation unearthed an ammunition cache

in a bomb-damaged bunker. The cache contained 3,800 rounds of 30 cal., 500 rounds of 50 cal., and nine rounds of 57 mm recoilless rifle ammunition -- a total of some 350 pounds of ammunition.

11. The most lucrative of the Prairie Fire interdiction operations during the 1970 wet season was Operation Tailwind, a three-day long reconnaissance-in-force operation carried out some 15 miles west of Chavane. Operation Tailwind was launched on 11 September when three platoons, totaling 136 troops were inserted by helicopter into an area near enemy Route 165/966 close to the Binh Tram 36 area of operations. Although met with almost continuous enemy harassment, the heavy application of close air support sustained the operation's momentum and allowed the force to enter several enemy installations (presumably on the outer periphery of BT 36) before being exfiltrated on 14 September. Early into the mission, friendly troops captured and subsequently destroyed an ammunition cache containing an estimated 30 tons of supplies.* In addition, some 850 pages of enemy documents were seized and returned to MACV for analysis.** Allied losses sustained during the 80-hour duration of Operation Tailwind were relatively moderate. Three troops were killed, and fifty were wounded (but only five required hospitalization). Estimates of enemy killed by air strikes numbered over 400. The operation was costly, however, in terms of helicopters. Two helicopters were shot down during extraction attempts. Another dozen helicopters were so heavily damaged by enemy fire as to be unserviceable.

Operation Gauntlet

12. Operation Gauntlet, the major ground interdiction program undertaken during this wet season, was launched

* Found in the cache were: 500 140mm. rockets, 300 82mm. rockets, 2,000 23mm. rounds, 12,500 rounds of small arms ammunition, and 40 bicycles.
** According to MACV reporting, these documents contain highly significant information on the 559th Transportation Group. As of 25 September, 400 pages of the documents had been classified Category A -- the highest rating for intelligence value.

on 29 August 1970 and concluded on 30 September. The Operation, including approximately 5,000 irregular troops, had as its primary mission the interdiction and harassment of enemy lines of communication (LOC's) in Southern Laos, and the displacing of enemy units deployed along the eastern rim of the Bolovens Plateau overlooking the Se Kong River and Route 16. Given this mission, the interdiction operations of Operation Gauntlet cannot be evaluated primarily in terms of the amounts of supplies destroyed and captured.

13. Another factor which drastically limited any potential pay-off from Operation Gauntlet in terms of supplies destroyed was the fact that it took place at the height of the wet season when supply movements through the Panhandle were at the lowest level of the year.

14. The quantity of supplies captured or destroyed by Operation Gauntlet forces was small -- some 23 short tons of rice and little more than 1 ton of weapons and ammunition.* The loss of these supplies will be of little consequence to the enemy. Three Communist LOC's were also temporarily interdicted during the Operation, Route 23 at Ban Toumlan, the Se Bang Hieng River well west of Route 23 and Routes 96-165 in the Chavane area. These interdictions probably had a marginal effect on supply movement since, as stated above, the level of logistic activity in these areas and throughout the Panhandle was at an extremely low level.

15. Gauntlet forces have also had some additional success in destroying enemy supplies by calling in air strikes against enemy facilities. One of the more dramatic examples of this activity was an air strike which resulted in 20 large secondary explosions and 200 smaller secondary explosions. It is probable that the ground-air cooperative ventures of this type result in much greater destruction of supplies than does ground action alone.

16. Although the effects of Operation Gauntlet have been slight in terms of the capture or destruction of

* An itemized listing is contained in the Appendix.

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enemy supplies, the program has had a measure of success in other respects. It was a contributing factor to the developments which forced the North Vietnamese to make a number of troop deployments to improve their tactical position in South Laos.

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17. The successful retaking of Phou Nong Tao and PS-26 by Gauntlet forces also has had a significant impact on the enemy's logistic capabilities. The holding of these positions has denied the enemy free access to Route 16 and the Se Kong river, critical areas which he must control before the westward expansion of his logistical system can be completed. Extensive seeding of mines along Routes 23 and 16 will also complicate the enemy's use of these routes.

18. Operation Gauntlet has also met with some success in its harassment of enemy forces. Gauntlet forces reportedly killed some 600 enemy troops and wounded another 500. Inflicting these casualties was not without its own high costs because Gauntlet forces suffered 147 killed-in-action and 677 wounded-in-action. More importantly, Gauntlet casualties account for a significantly higher share of manpower resources than do enemy casualties.

19. Phase II of the South Laos interdiction program which is to be launched on October 20th offers some prospects of significantly greater success in terms of the destruction of enemy supplies. Phase II will place forces along those north-south routes in South Laos which are major channels for the movement of supplies. It will also be taking place during the

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period when the enemy will have started his dry season logistic campaign and supply movements should be at high levels. It should be noted, however, that the [redacted] forces will be operating in areas critical to the enemy. Consequently, they will be vigorously defended and the casualties sustained by [redacted] forces will undoubtedly be much greater than they were during Operation Gauntlet.

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APPENDIX

Weapons and Ammunition Captured in Operation Gauntlet

Weapons	Unit
60 mm mortar	3
RPG-2	14
RPD machine gun	4
AK-47	36
Recoilless gun	2
SKS	2
M1	1
Bren gun	1
Pistol	1

Ammunition	Units
57 mm recoilless	45 rounds
30 caliber	4 cases
60 mm mortar	54 rounds
82 mm mortar	9 rounds
B-40 rocket	51 rounds
RPD ammunition	1,500 rounds
Hand grenades	17
AK-47 ammunition	4,130 rounds