

DOS REVIEWED 23-Mar-2011: DECLASSIFIED FOR RELEASE IN FULL

REWRITE 1779

REFER TO DOS

SECRET - GDS

MEMORANDUM FOR:

THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF STATE

SUBJECT: Jordanian Air Defense

The President has reviewed the conclusions and recommendations contained in the March 22, 1975, memorandum of the Secretary of Defense concerning air defense equipment for Jordan.

The President approves the recommendations to include an effort to discourage the Jordanians from actually purchasing the HAWK missile system at this time. At the same time, the U.S. commitment in principle to sell this system should be maintained, and as a fall-back position a USG offer to sell is authorized if the Government of Jordan is determined -- and financially able -- to buy the system. Such a sale, however, should involve long lead times.

As an incentive to the Jordanians to limit their purchases to the recommended \$300 million package, the President desires that consideration should be given to advancing the delivery dates of the VULCAN and CHAPARRAL and including a limited number of REDEYE missiles.

It is requested that discussions with Jordanian officials begin promptly to enable the President to review the matter at the time King Hussein visits Washington, and that simultaneously selected Congressmen and Senators be briefed on the US-Jordanian talks.

Henry A. Kissinger

OSD REVIEWED 22-Mar-2011: NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION

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THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301

DECLASSIFIED

22 MAR 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Air Defense Equipment for Jordan

(S) On January 20, 1975, you requested an in-country analysis of Jordan's air defense posture to assist the US Government in responding to a Jordanian request for modern air defense weapons. A team comprising US military experts conducted the requested survey and has concluded that Jordanian air defenses are inadequate. The team identified four general areas in which improvements are needed and has developed options at various cost levels which include:

- short-range CHAPARRAL missiles and VULCAN anti-aircraft guns to protect ground forces (particularly important in view of troop morale considerations);
- additional CHAPARRAL and VULCAN to protect airbases and radar sites;
- expansion of fighter-interceptor inventories and modification of these aircraft with improved radar;
- improved medium-range HAWK missiles to defend key installations near the capital.

(S) Detailed discussion of this issue is provided at Tab A. The Departments of State and Defense have considered the military, political, and economic implications of the Jordanian request and the findings of the survey team. State and Defense acknowledge that the introduction of air defense weapons into Jordan may create some concern in Israel. We believe, however, that the Israeli Government generally recognizes that a loyal and effective Jordanian military establishment is fundamental to the maintenance of a stable, moderate Jordan under the rule of King Hussein. Acquisition by Jordan of a limited air defense capability, which would improve Army morale and offer a modest deterrent against more extreme Arab neighbors, would appear to be in the interests of Israel as well as Jordan. The fact that the lead times for the weapons proposed for Jordan are two to four years would further reduce the immediate impact on the Israelis of a favorable decision on the team's recommendations. (The Jordanians, on the other hand, may be disappointed.

SECDEF

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when they learn it will be several years before we can actually provide major items of equipment.)

(S) The cost of even a modest quantity of air defense weapons would create some economic strain in Jordan but could probably be offset through increasing financial aid from friendly oil-rich Arab countries.


(S) I recommend that you authorize the provision to Jordan of air defense weapons included in the options developed by the US air defense analysis team. With your approval, we will take the following actions:

- Discuss with senior Jordanian defense officials the range of options developed by the team (listed in detail at Tab B, pages iv and v);
- Suggest to them an air defense package designed to protect their Army divisions, airbases, and radar sites and strengthen their fighter-interceptor capability. This package would include short-range missiles, anti-aircraft guns and aircraft radar at a cost of approximately \$300 million, but would not include HAWK. (We would propose that this package be funded to the maximum extent possible by cash resources available to the Government of Jordan. Some FMS credit resources may be offered, but the amount of planned FMS credit in any year would be subject to the availability of funds from the Congress and the US requirement to provide FMS credits to other countries.)
- Agree to the sale of additional short-range weapons, aircraft, and medium-range missiles (i.e., HAWK), not to exceed the sum of the highest options recommended by the survey team (approximately \$550 million), if such action appears advisable on the basis of further bilateral contacts with the Jordanians and Jordan demonstrates a capacity to fund these additional purchases.
- Stress to the Jordanians that our willingness to make air defense systems available does not imply any financial commitment on our part, and that the funding of follow-on support and maintenance of these purchased systems will not be from grant aid.

APPROVE _____

DISAPPROVE _____

OTHER _____



Atchs: TAB A - Discussion Paper
 TAB B - Executive Summary
 of Survey Team Report with Options
 TAB C - JCS Comments on Team's Options

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DISCUSSION PAPERBackground

(S) In the past, we have neither supplied Jordan with a strong air defense system nor encouraged it to obtain one for three principal reasons:

- The cost would have consumed our military assistance funds, leaving no money for modernization of Jordanian ground forces which are important for internal order and stability.
- The Israeli Air Force has traditionally provided a tacit but powerful deterrent against potential threats to Jordan from Syria or Iraq. This was illustrated by Syria's reluctance to commit its airpower in conjunction with the Syrian armored force that briefly intervened on the side of Palestinian guerrillas in the Jordanian Civil War of 1970.
- The vulnerability of Jordan's ground forces to air attack has been a factor limiting Jordanian participation in the Arab war effort against Israel. Mindful of the losses suffered in the 1967 Arab-Israeli war in which Jordan was a full participant, King Hussein limited his role in the October 1973 conflict to the dispatch of a small expeditionary force to Syria. Jordanian airspace was available to Israel in the most recent hostilities.

(S) Jordanian requests for air defense weapons in the aftermath of the October 1973 war and the November 1974 Rabat Summit Conference require review of this issue in light of altered politico-military and economic considerations.

Politico-Military Considerations

(S) Jordan is one of the few states of the Middle East to have no modern air defense system; all of its neighbors have either American or Soviet-supplied ground-to-air missiles and related equipment. The October 1973 war made the Jordanian Armed Forces acutely aware of this gap in their defense posture. Ground combat troops, in particular, are concerned over the lack of effective air cover, and morale problems have been reported.

(S) The Jordanian military has long been the bedrock of support for King Hussein's moderate regime, and the Army's continued loyalty may well be influenced by Hussein's ability to secure the weapons, such as an air defense system, which the military leadership regards as essential.

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(S) The theory that Israel provides unspoken air defense for Jordan against Syria and Iraq is increasingly open to question. A future Syrian regime, unfriendly to King Hussein and entertaining designs on Jordan, would not necessarily be deterred by an Israeli Air Force whose vulnerability to Syrian air defenses was demonstrated in the October War. Conversely, notwithstanding the clear preference in Israel for Hussein over most Arab leaders, Israel might no longer be willing to intervene and accept high aircraft losses to protect the King in a purely Syrian-Jordanian or Iraqi-Jordanian conflict. Furthermore, introduction of an Israeli role in an inter-Arab conflict could have a detrimental effect on our endeavors to resolve the Arab-Israeli dispute.

(S) The political impact of providing even a rudimentary air defense system to Jordan would be felt most strongly in Israel and in this country.

(S) The Israelis would have two causes for concern. An air defense system would deny them the unimpeded access to Jordanian air space they enjoyed in October 1973. Israel might also maintain that Jordan, with air defense weapons, would be more inclined to participate in future hostilities, opening up the possibility of a third front.

(S) We believe it is questionable whether the acquisition of air defense weapons would have a significant bearing on Jordan's role in any future Arab-Israeli conflict. Inter-Arab pressure (and increasing Arab leverage on Jordan resulting from the payment of the Rabat subsidies) could result in full participation by Jordan in a new conflict, even without adequate air defense, as was the case in 1967. Alternatively, Syria might provide necessary protection for Jordan with its air defense assets.

(S) Israeli concerns would be counterbalanced by the realization that no alternative regime in Jordan would be as acceptable as King Hussein. A loyal and efficient Jordanian military establishment provides essential support for King Hussein and his policies of responsibility and moderation. An air defense system which improves the morale and loyalty of the Jordanian Armed Forces would benefit Israel in that it would strengthen the position of Hussein. In the event that we decide to go ahead with air defense weapons for Jordan, we would propose to inform the Israelis in advance.

(S) We could anticipate some domestic criticism of air defense weapons for Jordan, particularly if HAWK missiles are involved. This criticism would be related both to a concern for Israel's security and charges that we are fostering an arms race in the Middle East. However, we believe our position is defensible.

Economic Considerations

(S) Lacking oil, with limited arable land, and deprived of its revenue-producing West Bank territory in 1967, Jordan has suffered from a chronic inability to pay its own way. From 1970-74, Jordan received grant aid from the United States and Saudi Arabia averaging approximately

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\$120 million annually; even so, the Jordanian budget showed deficits each year. Under these conditions it has been necessary to consider carefully the types and quantities of military hardware that could be accommodated within limited available funds. Even a small quantity of modern air defense weapons would previously have meant sacrificing ground force requirements of high priority.

(S) This situation began to change after the October War, when Kuwait resumed its subsidy payments (about \$40 million annually) and Arab oil-producers increased their assistance to Jordan, especially after the Rabat Summit. Jordan's financial outlook for calendar year 1975 is bright. As a result of subsidies allocated by two Arab Summit Conferences (Khartoum and Rabat) and other periodic donations from the Gulf states, Jordan can expect as much as \$340 million in Arab aid this year over and above what the United States may provide. Furthermore, Jordan's revenues from phosphate production should increase from \$60 million in 1974 to an estimated \$150 million in 1975. Even if some Arab states should default on their pledges, Jordan stands to realize record revenues this year.

(S) The cost of a limited air defense system, which could vary between \$300 and \$500 million, would obviously place a significant strain on Jordan's financial resources. With increased Arab subsidies and phosphate revenue, however, Jordan could theoretically absorb the cost over a period of 2-3 years. It is possible that Saudi Arabia, perhaps in concert with other Arab oil-producers, would agree to defray the expenses of an air defense package for Jordan, over and above any other amounts pledged to Jordan under the pertinent inter-Arab agreements.

Findings of the Air Defense Analysis Team

(S) An Executive Summary of the report of the Air Defense Analysis Team is attached at Tab B. The team concluded that Jordan's present air defense system, based on low caliber anti-aircraft guns and a small number of fighter-interceptor aircraft, is inadequate to meet potential threats. After examining critical Jordanian national assets, the team determined three groups of potential targets which require more effective air defense: the four ground force divisions (a particularly important aspect in view of troop morale); two principal air bases and associated radar; and the military logistical complex near the capital city of Amman and the nearby town of Zarqa. The team also established a requirement for an improved fighter-interceptor capability. Together these areas wherein improvement is needed form four phases in a planned expansion of Jordan's air defense structure. Under each phase, the team developed a series of options at varying cost levels. The options are shown in quick reference form on pages iv and v, Executive Summary (Tab B). If the highest option under each phase were selected, the total cost of equipment would be slightly more than \$500 million. Further explanatory comments on the team's options by the Joint Chiefs of Staff are attached at Tab C.

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(S) The team has concluded that the military impact on Israel of an improved Jordanian air defense system would be minimal. This assessment is based on the quantity and sophistication of Israeli weapon systems. From a purely military standpoint, the impact of such a system on Syria would not be significant when viewed in the context of Syria's total assets. It would, however, put Jordan in a position to deal with a limited Syrian incursion such as took place in 1970. An air defense system within the parameters proposed by the team could have an appreciable deterrent effect against Iraq in view of the greater distances over which the latter would have to operate and the doubtful ability of the Iraqi Air Force to operate its medium-range bombers.

Recommended Approach

(S) The Jordanians view the team's survey of their air defense posture not only as a tool for US policy making but also as an opportunity to obtain US judgments on improvements which should be made. Consequently, we believe the full range of options developed by the team should be reviewed with the Jordanians during the forthcoming bilateral military talks planned in early April.

(S) However, in order to encourage an effective and economical air defense program which is not escalatory, we propose to suggest to the Jordanians initially an air defense package designed to meet three particularly important areas of need identified by the team: protection of ground divisions; protection of airbase and radar sites; and expansion of fighter-interceptor capabilities. Such a package would cost approximately \$300 million and would include the following principal components:

- One battalion of short-range CHAPARRAL missiles (two batteries) and VULCAN anti-aircraft guns (two batteries) for each of the Army's four divisions (Phase I, Option A);
- Two composite batteries of CHAPARRAL and VULCAN to protect one major airbase and one prime radar installation (Phase II, Option B);
- Modification of the 32 F-5E fighter-interceptor aircraft already programmed under grant aid to mount the improved APQ-153 radar (Phase III, Option C).

(S) This package would allocate major resources to the protection of ground forces, while applying somewhat lower-cost options to other phases of the air defense plan. This initial program would not include HAWK which is quite expensive and designed to fill a slightly less pressing requirement: defense of the military-logistical complex between Amman and Zarqa. An air defense package which does not include HAWK would also probably be of less concern to the Israelis and would raise fewer domestic political problems.

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(S) In our negotiations with the Jordanians, however, we would want to retain sufficient flexibility to modify this initial package through substituting other options from the team's report -- including HAWK -- if deemed advisable by the two parties concerned.

(S) The Jordanians could, and undoubtedly would want to, build upon this initial program by adding to it the remaining options suggested by the team. These would include two more composite CHAPARRAL/VULCAN batteries to defend an additional airbase and radar site, 16 more F-5E fighter-interceptor aircraft equipped with APQ-153 radar, and ultimately the six-battery HAWK battalion with associated fire distribution and radar to defend the Amman-Zarqa area. These additions, which would almost double the cost of the initial program, could be regarded as follow-on stages of the Jordanian air defense plan to be reached as additional funds may become available.

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

1. (S) General. At the request of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Near Eastern, African, and South Asian Affairs), (International Security Affairs), a Jordan Air Defense Analysis Team (JADAT) conducted a survey of the air defense of the Kingdom of Jordan.
2. (S) Objectives and Goals. The JADAT was tasked to accomplish the following: (U)
 - a. (S) Analyze the nature and adequacy of existing Jordanian air defenses.
 - b. (S) Recommend alternatives to improve Jordanian air defenses taking into account tactical needs and available funds.
 - c. (S) Determine the price and availability of weapon systems in each recommended alternative.
 - d. (S) Assess the military impact of each alternative on neighboring countries.
 - e. (S) Address the training and follow-on maintenance requirements of each alternative.
3. (S) Threat. In essence Jordan faces a formidable air threat from three neighboring countries: Israel, Syria, and Iraq. The threat can approach from 360° and is of sufficient magnitude (in comparison with Jordan's air defense capability) to destroy Jordanian military effectiveness.

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 SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
 ON 11/11/83
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 DATE 11/11/83 BY TWO

4. (S) Conclusions. The Jordanian air defense system possesses the following inadequacies:

a. Insufficient ground based air defense to protect three major target areas:

- (1) The Amman/Zarqa complex
- (2) Four Army divisions
- (3) Airbases and prime radar installations

b. Insufficient numbers of air defense aircraft and air-to-air missiles.

5. (S) Recommendations. The JADAT proposes to improve the Jordanian air defense system inadequacies as follows:

a. Provide sufficient ground-based air defense to protect:

- (1) The Amman/Zarqa complex with an Improved HAWK defense.
- (2) Four Army divisions with a mix of missiles and guns.
- (3) Airbases and prime radar installations with a mix of missiles and guns.

b. Procure 16 F-5Es with improved radar and modify/ retrofit 32 programmed F-5Es with improved radar.

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6. (S) Summary of Principal Recommendations

- a. The following are recommendations for improvement of the Jordanian air defense system. These recommendations are listed by phases as envisioned for implementation on a priority basis. Improvements are needed in many areas, but it should be clearly understood that all areas might not be improved simultaneously due to funding limitations and leadtimes for weapon systems procurement and personnel training. Therefore, the phases as listed are in order of importance with the most important first and in successive descending order. Various options are available within each phase and are so indicated. The first option indicated under each phase provides the optimum package for a defense system improvement. The first option is also the most costly with each successive option decreasing in cost.
- b. Cost and availability information for each weapon system unit is provided at TAB D.

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PHASE I Protection for four Army Divisions 2/, 4/

- Option A - One CHAPPARAL/VULCAN (C/V) Battalion per Division for all 4 Divisions
Cost: \$240,000,000
- Option B - Two CHAPPARAL Batteries per Division for all 4 Divisions
Cost: \$168,500,000
- Option C - Defend selected Divisions with C/V Battalions or pure CHAPPARAL Batteries
Cost: Variable

PHASE II Protection for Airbases and Radar Sites 1/, 2/, 4/

- Option A - Two airbases and 2 prime radar installations with 4 composite C/V Batteries
Cost: \$82,000,000
- Option B - One airbase and 1 prime radar installation with 2 composite C/V Batteries
Cost: \$41,000,000
- Option C - One airbase with 1 composite C/V Battery
Cost: \$17,500,000

PHASE III Procurement and Improvement of the Fighter Force 3/

- Option A - Procure 16 F-5Es with the improved APQ-153 radar and modify/retrofit 32 programmed F-5Es with the improved APQ-153 radar
Cost: \$60,200,000
- Option B - Procure 16 F-5Es with the improved APQ-153 radar
Cost: \$51,500,000
- Option C - Modify/Retrofit 32 programmed F-5Es with the improved APQ-153 radar
Cost: \$8,700,000

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PHASE IV Defend Amman/Zarqa Complex 2/

Option A - Improved HAWK (IH) 6 Battery Battalion with a TSQ-51 Fire Distribution System (FDS) and a Battalion Operations Central (OC) radar
 Cost: \$134,000,000

Option B - Initial acquisition of IH with 3 or 4 Battery Battalion with a TSQ-51 FDS and a Battalion OC radar. Time-phased procurement of 2 or 3 additional batteries to reach desired goal of 6 batteries
 Cost: \$100,000,000 Initial
 \$ 34,000,000 Later

- 1/ Composite batteries in airbase defense consist of 8 VULCANS (Towed) and 8 CHAPARRAL. Composite batteries in radar defense consist of 4 VULCANS (Towed) and 8 CHAPARRAL.
- 2/ All Air Defense Artillery (ADA) costs include one year concurrent spare parts and packing, crating, handling and transportation charges only. Training costs, construction and follow-on maintenance packages are not included.
- 3/ All aircraft costs for follow-on maintenance packages are included.
- 4/ HAWK was considered for Army division/airbase defense as a near-term improvement, but was rejected due to high cost.

7. (U) Availability. Detailed weapon systems costs are in TAB D. Generally, the availability of equipment is as follows:

a. Aircraft	24 months
b. Improved HAWK	30 months
c. CHAPARRAL	36 months
d. VULCAN	48 months

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8. (S) The military impact on Israel of an improved Jordanian air defense system would be limited. Although Syria has a distinct advantage in numbers of aircraft, the effects of this advantage would be reduced by an improved Jordanian air defense system. A mass attack by Syria, however, would not be significantly deterred. The improvements recommended would provide a meaningful deterrence against potential Iraqi air attack. However, should Iraq and Syria join forces against Jordan, the presence of an improved air defense system would not alter the eventual outcome. The present Saudi Arabia Air Force is not rated as capable of mounting an attack mission of any consequence against Jordan.

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THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

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JCSM-79-75
27 February 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Subject: Jordan Air Defense Analysis Team Report (C)

1. (U) Reference a memorandum by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Near Eastern, African and South Asian Affairs) (International Security Affairs) and Chairman, Middle East Task Group, I-20409/75, 22 January 1975, "Air Defense Analysis Team (U)," as modified by SECDEF 4539/302017Z January 1975, which requested that the subject report (contained in the Appendix) be prepared, considered by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and forwarded to you.
2. (S) The Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that the options pertaining to the modernization of the Jordanian air defense system are feasible programs for improving the Jordanian air defense capabilities. These options were developed as a result of in-country investigation by the Jordan Air Defense Analysis Team of Jordan's short-term air defense improvement requirements. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recognize that the ultimate decision regarding the selection and acquisition of air defense systems rests with the Government of Jordan. The Jordanian Government may desire to fulfill some area, point, and self-defense requirements simultaneously by seeking trade-offs between missiles, guns, and aircraft.* The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that the priorities given in the study report not be used as the sole basis for recommending force improvements but that the available options be evaluated as well on the basis of leadtime, cost, and contribution to overall air defense capability. The options presented provide the necessary flexibility to enable the Jordanian Government to make this decision.

* The Air Force considers it advisable to include additional air-to-air munitions and improved radar as well as additional air defense aircraft in the near-term force improvement recommendations.

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
3. (S) The following points are emphasized: (U)

a. (S) The review of the subject report by the Joint Chiefs of Staff does not constitute endorsement of a US commitment to supply specific air defense systems or equipment to the Jordanian Armed Forces on a diversion/withdrawal basis. If the recommendations of the subject report are implemented, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that the equipment be provided from normal production as outlined in Tab D to the report.

b. (S) Funding for the recommended systems and equipment should be from other than US Government resources.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

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HARRY D. TRAIN II
Vice Admiral, USN
Director, Joint Staff

Attachment

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MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

SECRET/SENSITIVE - GDS*Action*
INFORMATION

January 15, 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

FROM: HENRY A. KISSINGER *HK*

SUBJECT: Air Defense System in Jordan

During my November visit to Jordan, King Hussein and Prime Minister Rifai stressed that Jordan is anxious to expand its air defense system from one based on aircraft to a much stronger one which includes missiles, specifically the HAWK and the Redeye. Subsequently, we have had several follow-up inquiries from the King, stressing the great importance he attaches to our agreeing to supply the HAWK.

We have historically withheld approval of a strong air defense for Jordan because:

- The HAWK system is extremely expensive and would have eaten up our military assistance funds, leaving no money for modernization of ground forces which were more important for internal order and stability.
- The Israelis would object strenuously. Jordan is and has been vulnerable to Israeli air attack, should the King be tempted to join forces with Syria and Egypt in a war. Jordan air space is now open to Israeli attacks on Syria should that become necessary. Finally, Israel can hope to exercise some moderating influence on Jordan if Israeli aircraft provide (as in 1970) the only effective means of deterring Syrian or Iraqi air attacks on Jordan.
- These unusual military relationships between Jordan and Israel have also generally strengthened our influence on Jordan.
- An air defense system which altered the critical military relationships between Jordan and Israel would increase greatly the chances of Jordan entering into a new Arab/Israeli war regardless of whether the Arabs or the Israelis initiated the attack.

We have, in short, subscribed to the belief that the existing missile-less air defense system in Jordan assured King Hussein's alignment:

- with the U. S. rather than with Arab states,
- toward moderation in a settlement with Israel rather than combination with Arab states against Israel. (Jordan continues to have, in our view, a crucial place in any West Bank settlement although its role may have been reduced since the Rabat Conference.)

For instance, when we trebled our military assistance offer to Jordan after the October War, we turned away Jordanian requests at that time for air defense missiles. Instead, we targeted our aid to Jordan's ground forces, although we also agreed to an upgrading of the Air Force and to the dispatch of a U. S. air defense team to study Jordan's needs. The DOD air defense study team has never been sent, but Jordan now seeks to use Arab funds which were promised at the Rabat Conference to purchase HAWK missiles. It is also eager to have the DOD team come as soon as possible.

King Hussein wants reassurance that we are not weakening in our support for Jordan in the wake of pre-PLO decisions at the Rabat Conference and in the United Nations General Assembly. For our part, we have an interest in demonstrating to the King, other Arab leaders, to the PLO -- and to Israel -- that despite Rabat and the UN, Jordan will continue to have U. S. backing and will therefore be an important factor in any settlement concerning the West Bank and Palestinians. Jordan can play a positive role in helping to neutralize radical pressures on the Palestinians during the negotiating process as well as in helping to guarantee the stability and good conduct of any West Bank entity which might emerge from negotiations.

I believe there would be a great advantage in agreeing now in principle to sell Jordan an improved air defense system, and immediately dispatching a DOD team to Jordan to study the needs and to recommend the organization and equipment most suitable for Jordan. We would inform King Hussein of this, also telling him that your decision on the sale of HAWKS or other air defense weapons will be made after reviewing the study.

In making this study, the DOD representatives would be instructed to coordinate their recommendations with State. This will assure that political as well as military and financial considerations are given due account in whatever recommendations are made to the GOJ by the USG.

This approach would have several advantages. It would:

- preserve Jordan's confidence in us and in itself until the next steps in the Middle East negotiations are clear;
- forestall Jordanian recourse to other Western manufacturers (or to the Soviets) for air defense missile systems which are now commonplace in the Middle East. Without an agreement in principle, it would be more difficult for us to persuade Jordan that it should not spend its Arab subsidies elsewhere than in the U. S. ;
- allow you to make a final decision, taking into account the existing political situation, after being informed of relevant technical, financial and military considerations; and
- in the meantime, give King Hussein something to show his own military and other Arab countries for his close relationship with us.

I recommend that you authorize me to direct that DOD send a small team to Jordan as soon as possible to study Jordan's air defense needs and make recommendations. (I would, at the same time, inform the Israelis to soften their reaction.) I would inform King Hussein that the team is coming and that we have no objection in principle to the sale of the HAWK. However, we wish to take a final decision on the details of what weapon systems to supply and how to finance them after the DOD study team makes its recommendations. I would also inform the Israelis, before they hear about it from someone else, in order to minimize any negative reaction.

At Tab A is a memorandum to the Secretary of Defense to send a small team to Jordan to study its air defense needs. The memo directs that the recommendations of the study be coordinated with State to take account of political as well as military considerations in a stronger air defense system in Jordan.

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize me to sign the memo at Tab A and inform King Hussein and the Israelis.

Approve RR-7

Disapprove _____

SECRET/SENSITIVE - GDS

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

SECRET/SENSITIVE - GDS

January 20, 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR:

THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: Air Defense System in Jordan

The President has requested that an analysis be conducted of Jordanian air defense posture as a basis for reaching decisions on appropriate U. S. assistance to the Government of Jordan in this area. The President has asked that the analysis be based upon the report of an in-country examination of Jordanian air defense requirements by a U. S. team from the Department of Defense. Accordingly, it is requested that such a team be dispatched to Jordan as soon as possible. The team should advise the Government of Jordan of its mission to develop alternative proposals for strengthening Jordanian air defense to include incorporation of the HAWK and/or other missiles, aircraft and guns. The team should not discuss with the Government of Jordan the options it ultimately will prepare. Drawing upon the information developed by the team, an assessment should be prepared which:

-- analyzes the nature and adequacy of the air defenses of Jordan, including the prospective improvements which will result from the planned modernization of the Royal Jordanian Air Force, and

-- outlines alternatives for a strengthened Jordanian air defense system, including the HAWK, taking into account both the needs and the available funds of the Jordanian Armed Forces.

For each alternative, the study should describe the:

-- price and availability of the pertinent U. S. weapons,

-- military impact of each alternative on neighboring countries, and

-- requirements for training and follow-on maintenance.


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The study recommendations should be coordinated with the Department of State to assure that political and economic as well as military considerations are taken into account.

The completed study and the recommendations should be submitted by March 3, 1975, for consideration by the President.



Henry A. Kissinger

cc: Deputy Secretary of State

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MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

SECRET - GDSACTION

April 8, 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

FROM: HENRY A. KISSINGER *HK*

SUBJECT: Jordanian Air Defenses

On January 20, 1975, you authorized me to direct a study of Jordan air defenses in order to develop a proposal for the sale of U.S. missiles, aircraft, or guns (Tab C). This study has been completed by the Department of Defense, and Mr. Schlesinger has forwarded its conclusions together with recommendations that have the concurrence of the Department of State (Tab B).

You also authorized me to tell the Jordanians that there was no USG objection in principle to the sale of the HAWK. I did so, but also told the Jordanians that there were a number of options (not only the HAWK option) for improving air defenses, and we considered it prudent to examine all political, military, and financial considerations and then make recommendations to the Jordanian Government.

The Jordanians accepted this rationale and cooperated fully with the team. They are now anxious to examine the options which have been prepared. It would be desirable to give the Jordanian military a summary of the study in early April, at least two weeks before King Hussein's visit to Washington on April 29.

The study appears good although it arbitrarily excludes provision of the REDEYE, a portable anti-aircraft missile fired by an infantryman. (This weapon would be of great psychological and political value to the Jordanian army although of limited military capability.) The study also accepts without question rigid and very long delivery schedules (to which the Jordanians will almost certainly request exceptions). On the other hand, the study proposes good options, based on an analysis of changing Mideast circumstances and taking into account the reasons which have led us in the past to repeatedly refuse to provide Jordan with a strong air defense (especially one which includes missiles).

Mr. Schlesinger recommends that:

- You authorize an offer to Jordan of a \$300 million package which does not include the HAWK. This would include a short range missile

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called the CHAPARRAL and a fast-firing gun called the Vulcan for air base and division defense at low levels. It also includes new radar for the F-5E aircraft now programmed for Jordan, improving their air-to-air intercept capability;

- You also authorize, as a fall-back position, the sale of a medium range missile such as the HAWK, together with other short range missiles and additional aircraft, if the Jordanians want -- and can pay for -- the additional items;
- The total value of any air defense package should not exceed \$550 million; and
- That a full range of options developed by the team be discussed with the Jordanians while stressing that we are making no financial aid commitments either for the equipment or for follow-on support in maintenance. (Mr. Schlesinger does not rule out the possibility that we might decide to make some FMS credit available, subject to Congressional approval and other demands.)

In general, I agree with these recommendations. As you know from my January 15, 1975, memo to you on this subject (Tab C), we have historically withheld approval of a strong air defense system to Jordan. However, in the present military situation in the Middle East, we should no longer refuse to sell elements of such a system to a friendly state like Jordan. Air defense emerged as a critical element in the October war, and Jordan now appears to have the funds from Arab states to purchase such a system -- if not from us then from someone else. King Hussein has, for instance, indicated an interest in arranging to borrow air defense equipment from the Saudis and might also turn to the Syrians for Soviet equipment.

However, I believe there is some utility in attempting to discourage them from actually requesting the HAWK at this time. The HAWK would have a much greater political impact, in this country and in Israel, than the other recommended weapons systems, and it would raise real fears that Jordan was being so heavily armed that it would be able to join other Arabs in any future hostilities with Israel. This would be the case once it were known that Jordan had ordered the HAWK even though the delivery date were to be well in the future.

As a tactical approach, I believe we should maintain our willingness in principle to supply the HAWK but note carefully to the Jordanians the long lead time involved (4 years) and offer instead early delivery of a limited number of REDEYE missiles. These were excluded from the DOD study because they are out of production and would have to come from DOD stocks. However, a limited number would not impact heavily on U.S. inventories and would be very welcome to the Jordanians. At the same time, we could also offer to try to advance

some of the other delivery dates, which are extremely long in the DOD proposal: the CHAPARRAL in 3 years, the Vulcan in 4 years, and the F-5E radars in two years at the earliest (development of this radar has just begun).

Quite apart from the utility in providing the Jordanians some incentives not to press for the HAWK, I am convinced that shorter delivery schedules will be essential to Jordanian acceptance of any U.S. offer. An offer which does not improve combat capability until three or four years have passed is not likely to be acceptable.

If, however, the Jordanians should continue to press for the HAWK the fall-back position can be adopted -- with long lead time for delivery.

I believe, therefore, that you should authorize an offer of HAWK's, including price and availability data, only after efforts have been made to dissuade the Jordanians from taking this course. The \$300 million package might be acceptable if some REDEYES are included and delivery dates are advanced.

On the grounds of Congressional concerns and public reaction, a case can be made for not opening such sensitive arms discussions at a time when we are severely limiting such discussions with Israel. The Administration will be accused by Congress of contradictory policies if news of Jordanian air defense talks leak -- as they are very likely to do. Furthermore, Congress is concerned in general about arms sales to the Middle East, and may in this case also question such a large sale to a country which receives such generous U.S. assistance. The sale could therefore add to the Israeli's growing sense of dilemma and estrangement from the U.S. and arm domestic critics of our Middle East policy. On the other hand, the sale would also be an important signal that we intend to stand by our commitments to friendly Arab states and I believe -- and Max Friedersdorf agrees -- that these sales will be accepted in Congress within the context of our overall efforts to promote a peace settlement in the Middle East.

At Tab A is a memorandum addressed to the Secretary of Defense and the Deputy Secretary of State approving the recommendations concerning the sale of air defense equipment to Jordan. The memo directs efforts to discourage the Jordanians from buying the HAWK at this time and asks that, as an incentive to drop this request, every effort be made to advance delivery dates in other weapons systems and sell a small number of REDEYE missiles. It also directs consultations in a general way with selected Congressmen and Senators.

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize me to sign the memorandum at Tab A.

Approve

[Handwritten Signature]

Disapprove _____

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

SECRET - GDSACTION

March 31, 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: SECRETARY KISSINGER

FROM:

CLINTON E. GRANGE *CG*
ROBERT OAKLEY *RO*

SUBJECT: Jordanian Air Defenses

On January 20, 1975 the President directed a study of Jordan air defenses in order to develop a proposal for the sale of U.S. missiles, aircraft, or guns. This study has been completed by the Department of Defense, and Mr. Schlesinger has forwarded its conclusions together with recommendations that have the concurrence of the Department of State (Tab B).

The President authorized you to tell the Jordanians that there was no USG objection in principle to the sale of the HAWK. You did so, and also told the Jordanians that there were a number of options for improving air defenses (not only the HAWK option) and we considered it prudent to examine all political, military, and financial considerations and then make recommendations to the Jordanian Government.

The Jordanians accepted this rationale and cooperated fully with the team. They are now anxious to examine the options which have been prepared. You told King Hussein during your last visit to Amman that we would give them a summary of the study by early April, or at least two weeks before Hussein's visit to Washington. Detailed discussions would take place here between the Department of Defense and a Jordanian team, at the time of Hussein's visit.

The study appears good to us with two exceptions: it arbitrarily excludes provision of the REDEYE which Ambassador Pickering believes would be of great psychological and political value, and also the study accepts without question standard DOD stipulations for rigid and very long delivery schedules. On the other hand the study proposes good options, based on an analysis of changing Mideast circumstances and taking into account the reasons which have led us in the past to repeatedly refuse to provide Jordan with a strong air defense (especially one which includes missiles).

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Defense and State recommend that:

- We offer Jordan a \$300 million package which does not include the HAWK. This would include a short range missile called the CHAPARRAL and a fast-firing gun called the Vulcan for air base and division defense at low levels. It also includes new radar for the F-5E aircraft now programmed for Jordan, improving their air-to-air intercept capability;
- The President also authorize , as a fall-back position, the sale of a medium range missile, such as the HAWK, together with other short range missiles and additional aircraft if the Jordanians want -- and can pay for -- the additional items;
- The total value of any air defense package should not exceed \$550 million; and
- That a full range of options developed by the team be discussed with the Jordanians while stressing that we are making no financial aid commitments for either the equipment or for follow-on support in maintenance. (Mr. Schlesinger does not rule out the possibility that we might decide to make some FMS credit available, subject to Congressional approval and other demands.)

The first question you must decide is whether to take the recommendations to the President now, or defer them until NSSM 220 (Review of Middle East Policy) is complete. The due date of the NSSM is April 10, but Jordan has pressed us -- especially in the aftermath of the Israeli-Egyptian deadlock -- to open talks on air defense systems. They want to be in a position to make decisions by the time the King visits Washington on April 29.

We believe that Jordanian air defense can go to the President now. The recommendations provide, in the first phase, for full discussions with the GOJ of the options which the team has developed. Firm commitments would not have to be made until after the Middle East review is complete. To proceed now, however, would put the President in the advantageous position of being able to review the decisions -- if he wishes -- when King Hussein visits Washington on April 29.

A good case can also be made for not opening such sensitive arms discussions at a time when we are severely limiting such discussions with Israel. The Administration will be tasked with contradictory policies if news of Jordanian air defense talks leaks -- as it is very likely to do. This would add to the Israeli's growing sense of dilemma and estrangement from the U.S. and arm domestic critics of our Middle East policy, but it would also be an important signal that we intend to stand by our commitments to friendly Arab states.

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On balance, as formal letters of offer and acceptance are likely to be delayed by discussions over the funding and availability of the new air defense equipment, we think it would be wise to begin talks promptly.

The second question is posed by the Defense/State recommended fall-back position, the sale of the HAWK's. The Jordanians have expressed a strong desire for them. While we are committed to the sale of HAWK's in principle, and have so informed the Jordanians, there is some utility in attempting to discourage them from actually requesting the HAWK at this time. The HAWK would have a much greater political impact, in this country and in Israel, than other weapons systems, and it would raise real fears that Jordan was being so heavily armed that it would be able to join other Arabs in any future hostilities with Israel. This would be the case once it were known that Jordan had ordered the HAWK even though the delivery date were to be well in the future.

As a tactical approach, we could maintain our willingness in principle to supply the HAWK but note carefully to the Jordanians the long lead time involved (4 years) and offer instead early delivery of a limited number of REDEYE missiles. These were excluded from the DOD study because they are out of production and would have to come from DOD stocks. However, a limited number would not impact heavily on U.S. inventories, in our view, and would be very welcome to the Jordanians. At the same time, we could also offer to advance some of the other delivery dates, which are extremely long in the DOD proposal:

- The CHAPARRAL in 3 years,
- The Vulcan in 4 years, and
- The F-5E radars in two years at the earliest (development of this radar has just begun).

Quite apart from the utility in providing the Jordanians some incentives not to press for the HAWK, we are convinced that shorter delivery schedules will be essential to Jordanian acceptance of any U.S. offer. An offer which does not improve combat capability until three or four years have passed is not likely to be acceptable.

If, however, the Jordanians should continue to press for the HAWK the fall-back position can be adopted.

We believe, therefore, that you should recommend to the President that he authorize specific and concrete offer of HAWK's, including price and avail-

ability data, only after efforts have been made to dissuade the Jordanians from taking this course. The \$300 million package might be acceptable if some REDEYES are included and delivery dates are advanced. The memorandum to the President at Tab I includes a recommendation to this effect.

Otherwise, the memorandum at Tab I outlines the findings of the Department of Defense and State study and endorses their recommendations. This memorandum explains the political and military implications of his decision.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab I.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Les Jans *Les* concurs.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

SECRET - GDS

MEMORANDUM FOR:

THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF STATE

SUBJECT: Jordanian Air Defense

The President has reviewed the conclusions and recommendations contained in the March 22, 1975, memorandum of the Secretary of Defense concerning air defense equipment for Jordan.

The President approves the recommendations but believes an effort should be made to discourage the Jordanians from actually purchasing the HAWK missile system at this time. At the same time, the U.S. commitment in principle to sell this system should be maintained, and as a fall-back position a USG offer to sell is authorized if the Government of Jordan is determined -- and financially able -- to buy the system. Such a sale, however, should involve long lead times.

As an incentive to the Jordanians to limit their purchases to the recommended \$300 million package, the President desires that consideration should be given to advancing the delivery dates of the VULCAN and CHAPARRAL and including a limited number of REDEYE missiles.

It is requested that discussions with Jordanian officials begin promptly to enable the President to review the matter at the time King Hussein visits Washington, and that simultaneously selected Congressmen and Senators be briefed on the US-Jordanian talks.

Henry A. Kissinger

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