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## MEMORANDUM OF MEETING WITH EUGENE B. WILHELM ON 1 JULY

EBW. This was done for  
info of JAD/6 + JAD/6  
appreciate your looking  
this copy up. It has come  
its purpose - if any.

HL

15 Jul.

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1. At 1500 [redacted] attended a meeting with Wilhelm, OSI, Jean W. Moreau of OCD, and Theodore M. Nordbeck, Acting Chief, Division of Acquisition and Distribution of the office of the Special Assistant--Intelligence, Department of State. As reported in my memorandum of 25 June, the purpose of this meeting was to ask Mr. Nordbeck to fill us in on what lay behind the 3 June letter written to the DCI by W. Park Armstrong, Jr.

2. Nordbeck said that there were three reasons for writing the letter:

a. Because the State Department had received an informal suggestion from CIA that it should get on the ball and become more effective in fulfilling its collection obligations under NSCID-10.

b. Dr. Joseph B. Koepfli, Science Adviser, has felt that he must begin to utilize his science attachés to support intelligence so that somebody else does not seize the initiative and upset the relationship that his office is trying to encourage between U.S. and foreign science.

c. Reber indicated that it might be appropriate for State to write a letter requesting assistance from CIA in accordance with NSCID-10.

3. Wilhelm quickly referred the meeting to the sub paragraph at the end of page 2 and on page 3 and invited discussion first of all on g. Nordbeck said that State did not need any financial support to assist in the collection of scientific publications, with the possible exception of occasional prices of subscription. Moreau said that he felt that the science attachés were certainly picking up scientific literature but that they were probably keeping it for themselves. At this point Nordbeck emphasized that the science attachés have no instructions to pick up such literature, as this is the responsibility of the Publications Procurement Office. This responsibility is clearly described in the Berkner Report, and science attachés would only enter the picture to guide the purchases of the PPO's. Nordbeck continued on to say that he considered the real problem was a lack of clear-cut instructions from CIA. [redacted] said that he felt that there was something to be said on both sides, in other words, that material probably was being picked up which didn't get to intelligence and that clear-cut instructions were lacking. [redacted] then continued on to throw another element into the discussion for consideration.

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[ ] maintains that duplication is not a crime so long as proper arrangements are made for absorption of the duplicate copies of materials received in the U.S. It was generally agreed that [ ] thought was sound and that the mechanics for handling scientific publications could be improved to insure wider distribution and more general availability of literature to scientists. Nordbeck maintained that within Moscow the PPO was picking up everything within the limits of his capacity to do so. The limitation is manpower, and [ ] felt that there should be another man assigned to support the effort in Moscow, as some of the more useful Soviet literature appears in very limited editions, and unless somebody is constantly touring the book stores and snapping things up when they come out, he is likely to miss a good deal of material.

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4. With reference to b., the CIA contingent was inclined to feel that the scientific attaches would be much more useful to CIA if they were thoroughly briefed by OSI before going to their posts. Nordbeck says that Koepfli is still opposed to this being done. Koepfli maintains that the fostering of international scientific relations is the job of the scientific attaches, and he apparently feels that their approach to this job would be warped if they received intelligence indoctrination before leaving the U.S.

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5. With reference to c., [ ] maintained that the placing overseas of known and competent specialists to cover specific fields of science is exactly what OSI has been doing. Nordbeck countered by maintaining that the scientists briefed by OSI are tainted with intelligence, and furthermore, he doubted that really first-rate scientists would agree to undertake an intelligence mission. Nordbeck maintains that if first-rate U.S. scientists are permitted to spend two or three months abroad, they will be talking to their peers in foreign science and will inevitably get information of value to intelligence. [ ] took issue with this statement and said that by and large it is a waste of money to send people abroad without a thorough briefing. At a later point in the meeting [ ] admitted that in the field of BW and possibly of medicine, if arrangements could be made for scientists to spend upwards of a year abroad, it will not be necessary to brief them, as men in these particular fields will act as effective vacuum cleaners of information, and their take plus their analysis of it will be helpful; however, these will be the exception. To a suggestion from Nordbeck that it might be possible to have CIA supply the briefing questions to the Science Adviser so that they would not realize they were being briefed, [ ] objected and maintained that such persuallage never worked out, particularly, [ ] because in order to fulfill its mission, the [ ] would eventually get in touch with the scientist and it would inevitably become apparent that the Science Adviser was working hand in glove with intelligence.

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6. With reference to d., [ ] the program of debriefing scientists and engineers is the responsibility of the [ ] and we cannot see that any useful purpose will be served by building up another organization to duplicate our effort. [ ] repeated that Dr. Joyce had suggested that in the case of persons returning from the Biochemistry Congress, if they stopped in at Washington and wished to give intelligence information, he would tell them that such information was of interest to intelligence and would call [ ] to arrange for representation at the meeting. [ ] maintains that this system or merely the supplying of names [ ] would seem to be adequate. Nordbeck maintained that he would regard information developed by the Science Adviser as coming under the by-product clause of NSCID-7. [ ] maintained that it seemed like an abnormal interpretation of the intent of the by-product clause to supply funds or countenance the setting up of a new activity for the specific purpose of supplying by-product intelligence, particularly, as the office involved happens to be one which is so afraid of the taint of intelligence.

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7. With reference to e., [ ] defined the three types of international congresses as: first, official congresses; second, congresses where the Department of State cooperated with the international body interested in the congress and sent an official delegation; third, miscellaneous other congresses which it would be good to have covered by U.S. scientists in an unofficial capacity. [ ] that, with regard to the third category, he had proposed to Dr. Joyce that Dr. Joyce supply a list of the names to the Contact Division of those persons the Science Adviser considered should be persuaded to represent the U.S. The Contact Division would then check security and OSI interests and would then approach scientists on the list with a question as to whether they plan to go to the congress. If they said no ~~and indicated that they were short of funds, we could take it from there.~~ In the rare instances where they were short of funds yet would not go for intelligence, we could refer them to the Science Adviser.

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8. During the course of a general discussion, [ ] defined traveling scientists as falling within three categories:

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a. Scientists given specific intelligence missions which would require them to work closely with ~~all~~ secure assistance from US officials abroad. These he said should be considered as consultants, and the question as to whether or not they represent intelligence is somewhat academic, as foreign scientists will inevitably believe that any information given to a U.S. Government representative will be given to intelligence.

b. Scientists who have natural cover through their own

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interests and a natural ability to get entree to other scientists and scientific installations through their pre-eminence in the field or the stature of the organization for which they work. These are true sources, will be briefed on a very discreet basis, will be carefully instructed not to get involved with U.S. officials abroad or in any other fashion jeopardize their natural cover.

c. Other scientists who it is decided should not be briefed but who will be approached upon their return.

9. Moreau asked if many scientists were not briefed because they objected to the taint of intelligence, and the answer to this has to be somewhat of an evasion. Actually, [redacted] one or two instances where the thought of making a contribution of intelligence was repugnant to the scientist; however, a scientist does occasionally say that he feels he is pretty well acquainted with our interests and prefers not to be given specific questions as to be given classified knowledge may constrain him in his dealings with other scientists. He feels that he will normally ask most of the questions we might think of, but if we have told him that they are of interest to intelligence, he will immediately be afraid to talk freely in case he is giving something away. In answer to a further question from Moreau, [redacted] we would not normally sponsor such travelers although in the case of a man like Bolt, we might see fit to augment the sponsorship of others if the intelligence community felt that some extension of an itinerary would bear fruit for intelligence.

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10. Wilhelm plans to invite the assistance of the CIA members present in framing a draft reply to Armstrong's letter, which he will go over in detail with Nordbeck before it is put in final form. It was agreed that this would be appropriate in as much as Nordbeck cannot help but be pretty much in the middle on this whole question. At one point he admitted rather ruefully that, while he was over here, all our arguments sounded good, but he also has great respect for Koepfli's arguments supported by the weight of Koepfli's personal experience.

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