

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

AUG 27 1942

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Mr. Clegg
Mr. Glavin
Mr. Ladd
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tracy
Mr. Egan
Mr. Gurnea
Mr. Hendon
Mr. Pennington
Mr. Quinn
Mr. Nease
Miss Gandy

TO: Mr. J. Edgar Hoover, Director,
Federal Bureau of Investigation.

FROM: Hugh R. Wilson

*Baron Wolfgang
Purtitz*

The attached material, which has been obtained
from a reliable source, is being forwarded to you in
the belief that it will be of interest.

H.R.W. Leo
Hugh R. Wilson

Enclosure (1)

ENCLO. 12

10-4-42 - sp-cc-aw

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

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August 26, 1942.

On July 14, 1942, this Agency sent you material on the subject of ~~Nazi Fifth Columnism~~, gathered by a former Counsellor of the German Legation at The Hague.

This material was submitted to an expert, whose knowledge of Germany and things German is encyclopedic, and he has prepared a study of this material, a copy of which is transmitted for your further information.

Enclosure (1)

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10/4/99 SP1-CCB/PAJ

ENCLOSURE

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August 18, 1942

Comments on Washington Document (file 9315) on the Subject of Nazi Fifth Columnism

The observations regarding fifth column are too generalized to give an exact picture. Regarding organization of an effective fifth column, the Germans have failed in the Netherlands. But they have not failed in their military espionage service. The surprisingly quick result of the invasion of the Netherlands was, in my opinion, achieved by the exactness of the preparation and the use of the detailed information, which the military espionage service made available. On the other hand it is proven that Hitler himself believes, or at least once believed, that a well organized fifth column in the sense of a body within the enemy-land to create internal unrest should prove to be an excellent "new weapon".

Hitler's ideas on this subject are, so far as I can judge, best represented in a quotation in Hermann Rauschnig "Gesprache mit Hitler". It was Hanfstaengel who interpreted Hitler's ideas on this subject to Rauschnig. "Every state could, by suitable methods, be so split from within that little strength was required to break it down. Everywhere there were groups that desired independence, whether national or economic, or merely political. The scramble for food and distorted ambition - these were the unfailing means to a revolutionary weapon by which the enemy was struck from the rear. Finally, there were the businessmen, whose profits were their all-in-all. There was no patriotism that could hold out against all temptations. Besides, one could always dress these things up. It was really by no means difficult to find patriotic slogans that would cover all such enterprises and would at the same time win over men who were glad to salve their sensitive consciences with some such balm. And ultimately, it was all a question of money and organization."

On page 4 starts a description of one Mr. Lutting with the remark, "his like exists in every country where an appreciable number of German nationals reside. Who the Mr. Lutting is for America, I do not know". It is my firm belief, that such a Mr. Lutting for the United States does not exist, but that the Gestapo had certain "agents" in this country, who reported on individuals of German nationality as well as on citizens.

On page 5 it is mentioned "that in every Latin American country where clusters of German nationals, some of them rich and influential, reside, work and carry on business a "Mr. Lutting" exists. That, in my belief, is - or was - true.

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DATE 5-30-81 BY SP-1 CLK/ymw

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9315

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

-2-

There was once an attempt to build up some kind of organization of German citizens in the United States by a certain Schellenberg. This attempt was nipped in the bud before Schellenberg could try the idea out by a report of Dr. Thomsen to the Fuehrer. Any attempt of this kind, Dr. Thomsen reported, could have the result of ending the neutrality of the United States.

It is correct (page 11), that Hitler occasionally gets furious about caricatures and that he demanded on certain occasions "diplomatic steps" to forbid the publication of such caricatures in foreign newspapers.

On page 13: Among the German officials which worked in the United States in "some kind of secret services", were Dr. Gysling, Consul in Los Angeles, California, Herbert Schulz, Consul in Boston, (known to have included in every pouch a personal letter to the Postage chief, Heinrich Himmler, giving opinions on other German officials) and Herr von Dienath (Embassy Washington).

On page 15: The man of the Luere Rib entrop at the Consulate General in New York City was one Heinz Thorne, formerly at the Embassy in London.

On page 16: The son-in-law of "old Kleinworth" is Martin Renner. He was, during World War I, German military attache in the Hague. He became engaged to the Kleinworth daughter before 1914 and married her in 1919 or 1920. He must be now far above 70, surely honest and surely anti-Nazi. About 1921-1928 he was German Minister in Athens.

On page 17: That the Germans bought Dutch currency and shipped it to Germany by dispatch bag is a fact. In my opinion this fact is the main reason for the rumors that Nazi agents have tried to build up "nest eggs" in Amsterdam and elsewhere. They did the same in Switzerland, converting their Italian currency into Swiss and transporting the latter by dispatch bag to Berlin. I do not know if the same method was used in the United States. The quantity of German marks in notes in New York City was a relatively small one and for some time there was more demand than offer. But there seem to be quite a quantity of dollar bills in German hands. In my opinion the notes have been confiscated in Poland and Rumania, where "black markets" for American notes existed and such notes were hidden in safes.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

9315

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

-3-

That Canaris has a wide-flung spy net (page 22ff) is beyond doubt.

That strong short wave transmitters are, or were, in use at several diplomatic missions in different countries seems to me probable. I do not know how these transmitters can be detected. Before the outbreak of World War II, I heard that a German engineer had invented a transmitter, safeproof against detection by the usual methods. It seems to me also probable that information about ships leaving American harbors is picked up by German submarines. But how could it be detected? If once the crew of a German sub would be caught, one should try to find out through the man aboard in charge of the radio.

The remarks on page 26ff seem to me not to be very sound. There will always be some Americans of German descent who have a weak spot for their old country. But to a much greater extent that is the case with the Czechs, the Poles, the Hungarians, the Syrians, etc. "Individual fools and notheads" may exist in this country, but I think that in this regard the FBI seems to have done an excellent job. That there seems to be no Nazi sabotage organization in this country is to me to be proven by three points.

1. Many of the Germans who lived in this country and did not take out citizenship papers have returned to Germany, some of them governed by their Nazi feelings, many just lured into the homeland by promises and by people interested to sell them "Rueckwanderer Spornmark" and in the liquidation of their American property. The promise of a decent job, especially in such fields in which a high "initiation fee" prohibited a German to get such job here in the United States, used to be more attractive to a German artisan than the promise of a fat payroll. That many of the emigrants who returned to Germany feel disappointed does not change this picture.

2. Not a single case of organized industrial sabotage seems to have occurred, at least not a single case has become known, and I presume it surely would have become known, if it existed.

3. The fact that two groups of saboteurs have been landed by submarines seems to me to be in itself proof, that no, or at least no organized sabotage exists in this country.

The remarks on page 29 regarding school teachers seem to me to be correct. So far as such school teachers were chosen by the cultural department of the Auswaertiges Amt, especially for South America and the Near East, their ability to propagandize always seemed more important than their ability to teach.

9315

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

-4-

This was already the case in the last years of the Weimar Republic. But in these days they thought "pro-Germanism" not anti-Americanism. That the same teachers tried after the Nazis coming to power to show the superiority of the Nazi system in all respects was, in my opinion, as reason, that there did not exist a single "liberal" or "democratic" teacher among these "Auslands-Lehrer". Most of the German families, living in South America would not have accepted a teacher who was not "nationalistic at heart".

On page 30, the "Kartotek" of Dr Butting is mentioned. In the United States, at least so far as I know, such a Kartotek of all the Germans was kept only for members of the "Arbeitsfront". But on the other hand, the "Auero Ribbentrop" kept a very detailed and extensive "Kartei" on every member of the diplomatic and consular service of every nation on this globe. There were - and I guess still are - files on every politician, containing dossiers on his weaknesses, on all the scandals, those which have come already to light and those which have not. It was the German Embassy in Washington which had collected such "material" on George Bonnet, the French Ambassador. A "special report" had to be delivered on every official newly appointed to a post in Germany. Also, every American official who once had been attached to a post in Middle Europe, had to be reported on again and again, whenever he was transferred to another place or raised in rank.

Regarding the repatriation (page 33) I remember only, that in New York City a girl got a letter from her mother, to return as soon as possible to her birthplace (in Bavaria) as she, the mother, felt quite ill and that she should call at the consulate for further instructions. After calling at the Consulate she reported that there were no instructions received, but she left anyway as she felt homesick. Many others seem to have left because they lost their jobs as cooks and housemaids and could not get new ones. But in Holland the repatriation of German citizens to their homeland was practiced on a large scale. In the United States, only among industrial workers of German citizenship, propaganda was made for the return to Germany. As at that time, 1937/8, many of these Germans were idle, quite a number followed the call. But some seem to have remained, voluntarily or not, in Japan.

Page 40: The sentence, "The real danger of fifth columnism is not that it makes converts but that it makes doubters", should be remembered. The sentence could be used as an antiquote, if and when such doubts should be spread by some group of appeasers.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

9315

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

-5-

Page 43: What is said about the Party organization in Holland is correct, but it cannot be accepted as the scheme for all Latin American countries.

Page 46: It was not the Luero Ribbentrop which initiated a new press service, but the Foreign Office. This service ran under the name "Transcontinent" as a counterpart to "Transocean". The reason for creating this new service was, that "Deutsches Nachrichten-Luero", working under Goebbels control, apparently declined to transmit news originating from the Foreign Office. Hitler's "personalpolitik" is characterized correctly.

The "direct mail propaganda" originally was proposed by Ivy Lee, the great American "public relations man", some time in 1934. At that time it had met refusal by Goebbels. I do not remember who took the matter up again and got for it the backing of Ribbentrop. Originally, the idea was to reach all Americans of German extraction by "personal letters". The German consular authorities in the USA were asked to send in lists suitable for such purpose. About 500 different telephone books were sent to Berlin. One may remember, that especially the State of New Jersey was flooded for some time with such letters. That this "experiment" proved to be quite expensive and did not bring any results is quite understood. Ivy Lee (senior) had been paid a large retainer in 1934. He had boasted to some of the Nazi bigwigs, especially to Ribbentrop, "th t he had even whitewashed the Rockefeller" and that it should be possible to make some aspects of the Nazi ideas popular in the USA, especially the anti-bolshevistic ones. One of the schemes he had recommended was "the direct appeal to the individual". Further fees for Ivy Lee, by the way have been paid by the "American I.G." New York City.

Page 52: The role of the German Railway Luero is characterized correctly. These offices were used all over the world to spread propaganda and to collect data and commercial statistics.

Page 55: It is correct that orders were given to eliminate all Jews from representing German undertakings in foreign lands. The move originated in New York City. Dr Becker, at that time commercial attache, reported to Berlin, that such representation through Jewish firms, or by Jewish salesmen, was "contrary to the German interest".

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

7315

-6-

Page 64: The reasons given for Fritz Thyssen's "run away from his country" are "plain bunk". Nobody is interested, in these days, to hear the real story, but the facts are known to me with all the details.

Page 67: The criticism of the Dutch counterespionage service is correct, but there were some good reasons for that. The Commando of the Dutch forces as well as the Dutch police were only interested in one question; the communistic danger. Both were very keen to get informations on "Courriers of the 3rd Internationale". They believed that the communistic danger for the Dutch East Indies was of greater importance than the Japanese danger. The German Gestapo and the Spaniards soon had the Dutch military counterespionage as well as the chiefs of police of the larger cities in the palm of the hand by giving them information on communistic activities (partly falsified at least) and getting some "good will", by saying that they themselves were only interested in the activities of the British and in some of the German refugees. That Mr. Kleffens did not know anything about the activities of "Jonathan" as of the "attaché" Mr. Butting, proves only that his own apparatus was faulty. It would not have happened under Count Limburg-Stirum, or under his predecessor Baron Bevers. Both these Dutch Ministers in Berlin were always excellently informed. But Limburg-Stirum's successor, Dr. van Haerem, formerly Minister in Washington, DC, believed anything the Nazis told him, was characterized by his personal friend Herbert Scholz (from the German Embassy in Washington) "as one of those Dutch, which would not mind to see his fellow countrymen join Germany in a crusade against Bolshevism". Also the Dutch Consul General in Berlin, Mr. Montijn, formerly in New York City, had ideas similar to those of van Haerem.

There is also an error in translation: on page 23 it is mentioned that "Vertrauensmann" is used in the sense of "a man to be trusted"; that is erroneous. It really means, and is used in a sense of "confidential agent".

Conclusion: The description of the military espionage service seems to be a correct one. The description of the "Fifth" cannot be generalized. It is bound to lead to false interpretations. Besides, such organization is not created after the pattern for different countries. Surely the writer means have no doubt about it, but he seems not to have enough chance with intelligence services to find the right clues to complicated networks.

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p.135