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
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DISSEMINATION CONTROL ABBREVIATIONS

NOFORN-	Not Releasable to Foreign Nationals
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The Director of Central Intelligence

Washington, D.C. 20505

National Intelligence Council

NIC #5298-83  
20 July 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

FROM : Stanley M. Moskowitz  
National Intelligence Officer for USSR-EE

SUBJECT : Monthly Warning Assessment - USSR-EE

1. The Soviet Position in the PLO/Syria/USSR Triangle.

A. Discussion.

The PLO revolt against Arafat started for internal PLO reasons but has served both Soviet and Syrian interests. Although neither the USSR nor Syria wants the PLO to fall apart completely, the Soviets have benefited from the current disarray because it has insured that Arafat is not free to engage in peace negotiations along the lines of the US peace plan; the Syrians have gained by acquiring greater control over the PLO. However, whereas the Syrians have become active in the rebellion and tried to steer it along the path they desire, the Soviets have remained more passive. They have issued a statement calling for PLO unity,

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The Soviets also appear to have made some contingency planning by hosting the leader of one of the PLO's two Marxist factions in Moscow, but they know that both of these factions are too small to play any real role in Middle East politics. For his part, Arafat, despite his personal hatred for Assad, has been careful not to break with Syria. Similarly he is being careful not to alienate the USSR which he could do by opting to reopen his contacts with Hussein. The outlook is for all three parties to maneuver carefully in line with their own agendas while being careful not to completely alienate the other two parties in the triangle.

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2. Developments in Afghanistan.

A. Discussion.

The Soviet assessment team headed by Marshal Sokolov and composed of some three dozen other Soviet general officers has left Kabul after a stay of some six weeks in country.

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
Overall, the Sokolov mission seems to have found an unsatisfactory state-of-affairs but not a crisis situation. Consequently we expect its recommendations to be along the lines of improving operations (for instance, by having better security,) rather than by making fundamental policy changes .

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3. Poland.

A. Discussion.

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The Papal visit has not brought much palpable change in the domestic political situation: Jaruzelski continues to rule by decree, the overwhelming majority of the population hates it but can do little about it. Since Jaruzelski is having Parliament incorporate key sections of martial law into civil law the impending lifting of martial law should not be seen primarily as a domestic matter but rather as part of Jaruzelski's strategy to effect Western policies toward Poland. Still, Jaruzelski sees his rapport with the Church as a stabilizing influence and may make some limited gestures to maintain that relationship, for instance, amnestying of a number of political prisoners and letting the Church expand its role in relief activities.



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4. Arms Control Negotiations.

A. Discussion.

(1). CSCE/CDE/MBFR. The Soviets compromises in CSCE, which, although they fell short of what the West wanted they have allowed the conference to terminate and paved the way for a schedule to be established for the Conference on Disarmament in Europe (CDE). The CDE Preparatory Meeting will be held in Helsinki in October and November; the conference itself will begin in Stockholm in mid-January 1984. In MBFR, the Soviets have accepted certain elements of the Western position -- particularly in "associated measures" -- albeit in very limited form (for example, inspection not on demand as desired by the West but by invitation or after negotiation).

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We expect that in the coming weeks the Soviets will draw as much propaganda advantage as possible from their proported flexibility in both these negotiations. Beyond this, they will have to devise a strategy for CDE and for linking CDE to MBFR. They will probably convene a Warsaw Pact meeting of foreign and possibly defense ministers early this fall to put the finishing touches on that strategy.

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(3). INF. The Soviets have stayed with the fundamentals of their position, that is, no US deployments and compensation for French and British systems. But they have made their position more official by spelling it out in government statements (i.e., the 28 May Soviet statement and the 28 June Warsaw Pact statement). At the same time they have made possible a media blitz for September by having Round VI of the INF negotiations begin on 6 September, and by agreeing to have the official signing of the CSCE document by foreign ministers sometime between 7 and 9 September. These dates fall just before the convening of the fall session of the UN General Assembly on 13 September. What we may thus see this fall is:

-- the tabling of some comprehensive INF proposal in Geneva around 6 September, containing cosmetic concessions

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- an appeal to the old SALT II constituency in the United States by pointing to the alleged concessions the Soviets have made in their draft START treaty combined with the admonition that the US could have this treaty if it showed "flexibility" in INF (read: cancelled deployments).
- the exploitation of their START and INF proposals both at the CSCE signing ceremonies and UN General Assembly.

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Stanley M. Moskowitz

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