

~~SECRET~~

The Director of Central Intelligence  
Washington, D.C. 20505

National Intelligence Council

NIC No. 7637-83  
21 October 1983


MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence  
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

THROUGH : National Intelligence Officer for Warning

FROM : Milton Kovner  
National Intelligence Officer for Western Europe

SUBJECT : Monthly Warning Assessment: Western Europe

Item I. Post-INF Europe



(b)(1)



(b)(3)

~~SECRET~~

The Peace Movement. For the initial post-deployment period, peace movement activity is likely to decline, reflecting some exhaustion after the autumn peace campaign and demoralization in the face of initial deployments. There is little evidence yet of any plans for major 1984 peace actions, but spontaneous, small-scale activities can be expected. The flagging interest of moderate, non-violent anti-INF groups could, however, leave the field to more militant protestors who will resort to violence and sabotage to stop the continuing deployment schedule. The potential for revived protest activity remains, since the organizational structure of anti-nuclear groups will be kept alive by a hard-core element, aided by Soviet-sponsored front groups and local Communist parties. We cannot rule out greater peace movement activity next year in the Netherlands and Belgium, where governments have avoided firm deployment decisions and, especially in the Netherlands, where anti-nuclear sentiments are strong across the political spectrum.

Soviet-West European Relations. If Moscow's judgment is that an acceptable agreement cannot be reached quickly, it may see value in interrupting the talks in order to exacerbate the serious split between West German political parties on NATO nuclear policies and impel Bonn to seek Western concessions to revive the US-Soviet dialogue. The Soviets might link the suspension of talks with a vague final offer in November, believing that such maneuvering could give it the upper hand in the INF public relations game. Soviet approaches to Western Europe following the December deployments, however, will have to balance a desire to punish NATO for acquiescing to deployment with Moscow's wish not to undermine the strong West European desire for detente. Some analysts believe that Soviet reactions to INF could prove more benign and shortlived than generally assumed, in part because Moscow will wish to continue the arms control dialogue either in resumed Geneva talks on INF or in other arms control fora (e.g., MBFR and CDE). Most analysts, however, concur with the recent Memo to Holders on INF that does not rule out more dramatic Soviet military and political countermeasures or a long breakdown of the Geneva talks.

Arms Control/Defense Agenda. Once initial INF deployments occur, other NATO Allies are likely to try to set a more positive tone in European arms control fora and could challenge US positions on related security issues. Most allies are not wedded to full-scale INF deployment, and they might propose that the Alliance explore ways to transcend the current impasse at Geneva -- possibly by slowing further deployments, merging INF and START, and including discussion of UK/French forces in that or some other forum. The allies are aware that broader negotiations could be even more protracted -- thereby slowing a resolution of the INF issue itself -- and that the superpowers might use them to negotiate over their heads. Allied fears of a breakdown in INF will redouble their interest in moving ahead in MBFR and in promoting CDE as a serious East-West security forum.

Item II Prospects for UDI in Cyprus

The DDI analyst believes there are growing indications that the Turkish Cypriots are seriously considering declaring independence, a move that almost certainly would kill any hope of a negotiated settlement. More important, although Ankara has restrained the Turkish Cypriots from taking this step in the past, there are signs that it may be reevaluating its policy. UDI, however, probably would not come until it was clear a proposed summit between Denktash and Cyprus President Kyprianou either will not take place or has ended in failure -- presumably not until the first quarter of 1984. The US would have little warning of a declaration, and Turkey almost certainly would not be amenable to last-minute appeals. This analyst believes that Ankara retains firm control over major Turkish Cypriot policy actions. Thus, a declaration of independence -- and early steps in that direction -- would require Turkey's approval. [redacted] Ankara [redacted]

[redacted] shift in thinking is linked to the perception that the recent UN initiative is disadvantageous to the Turkish Cypriots and that the Greek Cypriots are attempting to change the focus of the negotiations.

The NIO/WE believes that Cyprus developments bear increasingly close scrutiny within the Intelligence Community, since a crisis of sorts is likely if diplomatic efforts to resume talks between Greek and Turkish Cypriots fail and the latter, with Ankara's blessing or forbearance, declare their independence. He therefore urges that attention be paid [redacted] to the question of Turkish intentions, especially following the November elections marking a return to civilian rule in Ankara.

*H. Kovner*  
Milton Kovner

