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
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MOZAMBIQUE: RENAMO Asserting S	trength in South	
RENAMO guerrillas in recent weeks have electricity supply three times, attacked		
capital, and raided several economic pr	ojects in the region	_(b)(
Mozambique's g speculate that some components of So	overnment-influenced media	(b)(
armed services are trying to derail impl	roving relations between	
Maputo and Pretoria by supplying the	guerrillas despite President	
Botha's pledge in September that Sout	h Africa does not provide	(1.)(
RENAMO with "positive support." Mozambican President Chissano has he	oped that South African	(b)(
assistance to RENAMO would taper off		(b)(
meeting with Botha in September		(t
Comment: RENAMO appears to be rea	asserting itself after the	
Botha-Chissano summit by attacking hi	igh-profile targets near the	
capital. Maputo almost certainly overes	timated Botha's ability or	
willingness to control the insurgents an	d underestimated RENAMO.	
The increases are increasingly calf out	ficient and probably able to	
The insurgents are increasingly self-suf continue operations without outside as:	ficient and probably able to sistance. Hardliners in Maputo	
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