


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NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY CABLE

Thursday March 3, 1977

CG NIDC 77-050C

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National Intelligence Daily Cable for Thursday, March 3, 1977.

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SOUTH AMERICA: Resentment of US

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[redacted] US policies on human rights and nuclear proliferation are arousing deep resentment in southern South America. The US stance on these issues seems certain to add to the already pronounced tendency of Argentina, Uruguay, Chile, and to some extent Brazil to draw closer together because of their common problems and perceptions of the outside world.

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[redacted] //The US decision to reduce aid to Argentina and Uruguay because of human rights abuses has drawn an angry reaction in both Buenos Aires and Montevideo. Both governments announced their intention to refuse the lower levels of aid still

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available to them. Uruguay termed the US move unjustified interference in its internal affairs; both Argentina and Uruguay said the action could aid the cause of subversion.//

3.5(c) [redacted] //Brazil, already smarting over US efforts to limit its access to foreign nuclear technology, is taking a dim view of the cuts in aid to its neighbors. Though not directly affected, the Brazilians undoubtedly see the reductions as another example of US "intrusion" in the area's affairs.//

3.5(c) [redacted] //Brazil's military-backed government, moreover, may well believe that it too could come in for serious US pressure on human rights. [redacted]

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3.5(c) [redacted] US efforts to influence the Brazilians on the nuclear issue also are having an unsettling effect in Argentina. Instead of applauding a move that could conceivably arrest the nuclear progress of their traditional Brazilian rivals, the Argentines are expressing solidarity with Brazil. The Argentines obviously realize that their own imports of nuclear equipment could make them susceptible to similar pressures.

3.5(c) [redacted] Argentina may see in the present situation an opportunity to rebuild its regional influence by capitalizing on resentment of US efforts. In addition to expressing solidarity with the Brazilians, Argentina is quietly suggesting itself as an alternative source of nuclear know-how and natural uranium for the region. Argentina's nuclear technology, though limited by world standards, is the most advanced in the region and its uranium is plentiful.

3.5(c) [redacted] The Argentines are also reviving earlier proposals for nuclear cooperation with Brazil and Chile, with Argentina playing a central role. The idea may be hard for the Brazilians to accept, but the Argentines seem serious about exploring it.

3.5(c) [redacted] The sense of physical isolation from most of the world that has always existed in southern South American has been accentuated in recent years by the growing distaste in the US and in some European countries for the kinds of governments that hold sway in the region. The latest US actions will increase this sense of isolation.

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[] All the countries of the area are administered by conservative regimes that are run or dominated by the countries' military establishments. Most of the regimes came into being in response to real or perceived threats from the left, and all justify their methods by citing a continuing threat from communism.


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[] The leaders of these countries believe they are being abandoned by the US, the country that had frequently warned them in the past of the dangers of communism.

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