Special Analysis GERMANYS: Betrothed, No Date Set East Germany's political and economic vulnerabilities will make it increasingly dependent on West Germany over the next several years. This will lead, at a minimum, to common economic policies and probably to much closer coordination on a broad range of other issues. including security policy. Outright de jure reunification will be a more difficult issue, but it is conceivable that the process of change in East Germany could drive events in that direction faster than Bonn, its neighbors and allies, and the Soviets are prepared for. The most important factors transforming intra-German ties are economic ones: the new East German leaders are convinced massive new aid from West Germany is needed to avert a severe decline in living standards. Bonn sees East Germany's economic vulnerabilities as an unprecedented opportunity to make the East Berlin regime adopt reforms. East German leaders already are moving to overhaul their economic system and soon will announce a new joint-venture law and other reforms designed to attract West German investment and trade. Intra-German trade is likely to grow by at least a third over the next few years. West German investment probably will surge by at least \$5 billion, and the two economies inevitably will become more Ideologically. East German movement toward free elections, pluralism, and market-oriented reforms over time will crase the major systemic differences between the two states. Public opinion in both Germanys overwhelming supports closer relations. The cuphoric mingling of hundreds of thousands of Germans after East Berlin opened the border reaffirmed the consciousness of a single German nation, and expanded travel opportunities undoubtedly will strengthen this bonding. **Prospects: Closer Integration** Movement toward economic integration will put de facto limits on East German sovereignty; decisions involving the East German economy will be made increasingly in West Germany. Close coordination on other common interests, such as arms control, also is likely. A more formal association or confederation of the two states that limits but does not terminate East German sovereignty is a possibility. This would include synchronization of policies in key continued Top Sceret TCS 2975/89 28 November 1989

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	areas such as defense and foreign the interests of Germany's neighb support or acquiescence. Some po- including Premier Modrow—have publicly with the call for some sor	ors and allies, requiring their olitical leaders in East Germany—	
·	Formal de jure reunification woul victorious wartime powers and we Soviet and European fears about a concerns in both Germanys about make this a goal the West German under the umbrella of a European development of much stronger set Germany might move events in the	id require agreement of the four bould be more difficult to achieve, renewed German power and antagonizing their principal allies as prefer to approach gradually and "peace order." Nevertheless, attiment for reunification in East his direction faster than anyone	6.2(d)
	would have conceived only a few reunification have already appeare	weeks ago: slogans favoring ed in demonstrations.	6.2(d)
	economics in Eastern Europe. It w military leverage in the region and	human rights, and market-oriented would further weaken Soviet	3.3(b)(1)
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