

UNCLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

6981-a

INSTRUCTIONS: Officer designations should be used in the "TO" column. Under each comment a line should be drawn across sheet and each comment numbered to correspond with the number in the "TO" column. Each officer should initial (check mark insufficient) before further routing. This Routing and Record Sheet should be returned to Registry.

FROM:			NO.		COMMENTS
COP-DD/P			100-1-142		
			DATE		
			3 May 1954		
TO	ROOM NO.	DATE		OFFICER'S INITIALS	
		REC'D			
1. FI/PLANS []	1703 L			WJH	<p><u>TOP SECRET Attachment</u></p> <p>RECORDS OFFICER STAMP</p> <p>The following action is authorized: <u>Recommend</u> <u>throughout to Secret</u></p> <p>Signed: []</p> <p>R.O. #123 - Unit <u>SM HYA</u></p> <p>Note: In distribution, cite reasons and coordinate if appropriate.</p> <p>DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3B2B NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT DATE 2007</p>
2. C/SE Attn: Albanian Branch					
3.					
4.					
5.					
6.					
7.					
8.					
9.					
10.					
11.					
12.					
13.					
14.					
15.					

SECRET

6981-2

1-142

MAY 3 1954

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, SE Division

ATTENTION: Chief, Albanian Branch

SUBJECT: Albanian Country Plan

REFERENCE: Memorandum from COP/DDP, dated 29 December 1953, to Chiefs of EE, SE and FE Division, Subject: "Denied Area Country Plans and Special Operating Instructions"

1. Subject plan has been approved and will serve as your guide for the conduct of Albanian operational activities for the next two years, subject to such approved revisions and amendments as may be initiated pursuant to paragraph 5.c. of reference memorandum.

2. All DD/P planning and programming for Albania will be based on subject plan. In accordance with paragraph 8 of reference memorandum, related (FI/PP/PM) directives to the field will assign to individual CIA missions responsibility for conduct of Albanian operations within the context of the over-all responsibility of such individual missions.

[.]
RICHARD HELMS
Chief of Operations, DD/P

SECRET

SECRET

TWO YEAR PLAN OF OPERATIONS FOR ALBANIA

Part I: Operating Conditions

A. Effectiveness of Hostile Security Services

1. Following the bomb explosion in the Soviet Legation in Tirana on 19 February 1951, more stringent security measures were imposed and swift terroristic reprisals taken. Since that time there have been few known acts of open resistance and there have been few reports of further tightening of controls. A new decree passed in early 1953 requires special permission for absence from home for more than 48 hours. However, refugees have stated that this regulation is not always enforced. There were unconfirmed reports in early 1953 that controls along the Albanian-Yugoslav border had been strengthened but the Yugoslavs appear to encounter little difficulty in sending agents back and forth and there is a small but steady flow of refugees into Yugoslavia. Controls along the Greek border are somewhat lax also and agents and refugees cross with relative ease throughout the summer months. Some areas along the Greek border are mined although one escapee reported walking through an area so marked without incident. In addition, both team members and refugees have told of passing border patrols who seemed deliberately to look the other way. Only one report has been received of the use of barbed wire; this barrier was approximately four kilometers from the Greek border, $1\frac{1}{2}$ meters in height and approximately one kilometer in length. To date no dogs, no plowed areas, no searchlights, etc., have been reported.

2. Despite the comparative ease with which agents and refugees cross the Albanian frontiers, the Albanian internal security system is effective, although controls are not nearly as far-reaching as they are in other Communist dominated countries. This seeming contradiction is explained by the backwardness of the country and the isolation of rural communities. Internal travel is at a minimum and strangers stand out as soon as their presence becomes known. Measures not yet in effect which could be taken to tighten border and internal controls are:

- (a) Plowed areas along the borders. Almost impossible because of the mountainous nature of the terrain.
- (b) Removal of population from a restricted border zone.
- (c) Barbed wire and mined areas. Both difficult due to the rugged country involved.
- (d) Use of dogs by patrols.
- (e) Installation of flood lights, watch towers and alarm systems along the border. Limited electric facilities in all rural and mountain areas make flood-lighting highly unlikely.

ERH 22 JUN 1971
Rid/Hsc0

SECRET

#1

(f) More rigid enforcement of regulations governing permission to travel.

(g) New documentation.

3. No accurate estimate can be made of the effect of controls in limiting the numbers in any one cell which may be able successfully to conspire against the present regime despite all obstacles. The Albanian security system has proved to be highly effective and many known resistance groups have been wiped out or forced to flee to Yugoslavia. However, CIA-sponsored agent teams operating in 1952 reported establishing "networks" of from 100-300 people. (It should be noted that these were unconfirmable claims. In addition, the description of these groups as "networks" was not accurate. They were rather separate clusters of men, loyal to individual leaders, linked through the contact, who was not a resident agent.) In addition confirmed information exists that teams operating out of Yugoslavia have established networks in the northern mountain regions which have been used, for example, to move escapees from Shkoder to the Yugoslav border. It is believed that any "resistance groups" are rudimentary, including possibly from five to twenty persons in a village, and that the groups are in most cases independent of each other.

B. Operational Record Inside Orbit

1. Successfully Accomplished Penetrations and Infiltrations.

	<u>1952</u>		<u>1953</u>	
	<u>Teams</u>	<u>Individuals</u>	<u>Teams</u>	<u>Individuals</u>
PP/PM	5	26	3	15
FI	2	4	1	2

2. Operations Under Hostile Control.

None.

3. Operations We Suspect of Being Under Hostile Control

None.

4. Losses in the Course of Border Crossing in Either Direction or Due to Arrest While Inside.

	<u>1952</u>		<u>1953</u>	
	<u>Teams</u>	<u>Individuals</u>	<u>Teams</u>	<u>Individuals</u>
PP/PM	1	2 Captured Alive 1 Presumed Dead	3	4 Captured Alive 3 Dead 1 Presumed Dead

5. Operations

SECRET

- 3 -

5. Operations Inside of Which We Have Had No News.

1952

1953

0

0

6. Number of Agents Available and Trained for Infiltration
Subject to Our Finding Means for Infiltration.

PP/PM/FI

18 (7 of whom are trained W/T operators)

7. Nature and Size of Pools From Which We Are Able to Recruit
Agents.

(a) Ex-King Zog's retinue: Probably three or four men of team leader calibre can still be furnished by Zog, provided he is willing to continue to cooperate and his present difficulties with the Egyptians are resolved.

(b) Refugee Camp, Lavrion, Greece: There are no men with leadership qualifications presently available in Lavrion. However, there are 75-100 men, many of them young, who could be used as team members to support a qualified team leader.

(c) Ioannina and Trieste: The interrogation centers at Ioannina and Trieste provide spotting and recruiting facilities and refugees arriving there are scrutinized for possible agent use.

(d) Albanian Guard Company: The 200-man Albanian Guard Company in Germany (now completely under U.S. Army control) is considered a pool of low-level agents to be used only in emergency or as members of a striking force.

8. Methods Which Must Be Used in View of Part I, A to Accomplish
Successful Infiltrations and Agent Residences.

(a) To accomplish successful infiltrations and agent residences under existing conditions the following methods are necessary:

(1) Use of capable highly-trained agents with useful contacts inside the country.

(2) Use of guides familiar with the border and the route to the operating area.

(3) Infiltration of agents only into native locale, at least of team leader.

(4) Direct team contact with persons of proven reliability only.

(5) Proper

SECRET

03196

SECRET

- 4 -

(5) Proper documentation.

(6) Limitation of border-crossing missions to the objective of recruiting a limited number of key agents, rather than instructing groups to remain in place for extended periods.

(7) Restricting teams in size. Normally missions should be kept down to two-man groups or even singletons.

(8) Missions should be brief and frequent rather than lengthy and occasional.

(b) Depending on opportunities over which we have little control, future possibilities exist for:

(1) Legal travel operations in event such travel becomes more frequent.

(2) Double agent activities with defected Albanian IS agents.

(3) Recruitment in place.

C. Utilization of Non-Orbit Assets

1. The opportunities for the utilization of such assets are limited by the almost complete absence of economic or cultural interchange between Albania and the free world and additionally by the fact that Albania has diplomatic relations with only two free countries, France and Italy.

2. ZODIAC - We are dependent on liaison with host services of Italy and France to procure leads, biographical data, etc., on Albanian officials, seamen, diplomatic couriers and commercial officials, if any.

3. ZOMBIE - Members of French and Italian legations are virtually the only travelers to or from Albania. A watch is naturally maintained through all sources available to us for the spotting of other travelers in the event that any should appear.

4. Brief Summary for 52-53.

Induced defections, 1952 - None

Induced defections, 1953 - None

5. Estimated Prospects.

Contacts exist through cut-outs between case-officers and two members of the Albanian legation in Rome. Occasional meetings reveal little immediate prospect of induced defection in either case, although one shows possibilities of being converted into a D/A case. (Described in greater detail under Part III, Section E.) Audio-surveillance and

SECRET

forced entry

~~93196~~

SECRET

- 5 -

forced entry directed against the Albanian Legations in Paris and Rome are not immediate possibilities. In Paris, the equipment for audio-surveillance exists but U.S. personnel are not available. Such operations, therefore, involve liaison and we are informed that there are a number of complications. In Rome, the equipment and trained personnel are available but the relatively low priority accorded to Albania as compared to more significant denied areas means that there is small chance of any exploitation of these facilities. Generally, future prospects are conditioned by the paucity of opportunity. We intend to continue in every way possible to exploit such opportunities as do arise.

6. At one time, hopes existed of mounting operations from Yugoslavia with the support of the UDB. These hopes were based on meetings with the UDB and on assurances exchanged at these meetings. Subsequently, however, the hopes proved illusory; the UDB showed no improvement in its general attitude and it was felt that no fruitful operation could be worked out in practice.

SECRET

~~SECRET~~

SECRET

- 6 -

Part II. Requirements and Operational Tasks

A. Requirements Placed Upon the Branch

1. Foreign Intelligence

a. Procure information on the following areas:

- (1) Durres - Shipping information.
- (2) Kukes - Information on defenses against Yugoslav infiltration, Army and border guard activity.
- (3) Tirana - Information on the officials and functioning of the government and Communist Party; information on the Soviet military mission.
- (4) Vlone - Information on naval installations and activities; merchant shipping; oil installations; the potential submarine base on Saseno Island.

b. Procure military early warning information in accordance with specific requirements laid upon us by U.S. Army and Air Force.

2. Political and Psychological Warfare

a. PP requirements are set forth in NSC 162/2 (13 October 1953) and NSC 174/1 (23 December 1953, superseding NSC 58/2 and NSC 158). The Covert Operations General Plan for FY 1956 - Cold War (approved by DDP on 20 January 1954) selected the most important operational tasks for accomplishment of these requirements.

3. Paramilitary Operations

PM requirements in support of US conventional war plans are set forth in the Joint Outline Emergency War Plan 1969/1. The Covert Operations General Plan for FY 1956 - Cold War (approved by DD/P on 20 January 1954) selected the most important operational tasks for accomplishment of these requirements. Pages 19 - 21 of Annex B of such plan identifies the tasks for Albania.

a. Specific Guerrilla Warfare requirements are set forth in EQQA-26602.

b. Specific Sabotage requirements are set forth in EQQA-26293.

c. The requirement

SECRET

6156

SECRET

- 7 -

c. The requirement for Evasion and Escape facilities in Albania and the designation of pickup points are set forth in *documents* the following documents: *held in Headquarters.*

- (1) Memo 6 May 1953 (from J-3 USEUCOM to SWPE (TS #88611)).
- (2) CINCNEIM dispatch CWURI 1071 dated 15 February 1952.
- (3) USAF memo dated 16 January 1953 from ADCOS to DCI (TS 030424).

B. Operational Tasks

1. Within the framework of A above, it is directed that CIA *Kubark* operations against Albania be undertaken in accordance with the following schedule of operational tasks.

2. As established below, these operational tasks reflect all demands which have been placed upon CIA by the National Security Council, the Department of Defense, OCB and IAC, and by the Agency itself for its own operational needs. It takes into account CIA capabilities and should be interpreted in the light of certain basic principles:

a. Stated priorities indicate how the balance of emphasis should be directed, but do not imply that tasks of lesser priority shall be deferred while higher priority tasks are being performed. Further, no indication of priority rating by order of listing within individual major priority groups is intended.

b. While intelligence collection (including spotting for PM/PP purposes) and action-type assets in denied areas should be strictly compartmentalized from each other at any given time, all such assets are CIA assets, to be utilized in accordance with priorities established by national policy.

SECRET

SECRET

- 8 -

PRIORITY I

- A. Development of secure and well-placed contacts and secure and rapid communications inside target area.
- B. Development of a support mechanism for secure passage of agents in and out of target area.
- C. Establishment of a favorable psychological climate through leaflets and other means.

PRIORITY II

- A. Collection of internal political intelligence.
- B. Collection of data on the organization, methods and personnel of the Albanian intelligence and security services.
- C. To undertake preparatory steps during the next two years which will permit the ultimate fulfillment of U.S. military requirements for clandestine support of U.S. and SHAPE war plans with initial emphasis on the following specific tasks:
 - 1. Continuous interdiction of the Perhond-Vlone oil pipeline.
 - 2. Establishment and training of one agent resident each in the VLONE and TIRANE areas for spotting potential sabotage organizers.
 - 3. Establishment and training of one agent resident in each of the following areas for the purpose of forming a guerrilla nucleus:

a. A-1 Erzen River Region	10 Miles Southwest of TIRANA (4113-1943)
b. A-2 CAMERIJA Mts.	12 Miles SE of SARANDE (STI. QUARANTA) (3949-2011)
c. A-3 ALBANIAN ALPS vicinity of Lake Shkoder	18 Miles North of SHZODRA (SCUTARI) (4217-1933)
d. A-4 Lake MAHQ, Lake PRESQA, and Lake OHRID region	16 Miles North of KORCA (KORITSA) (4048-2051)
 - 4. Establishment and training of one resident agent each for spotting facilities (e.g. agents, safe houses, collection and hideout areas, movement routes, cross border exfiltration points and sea and air pickup points) for the following Evasion and Escape lines:

SECRET

SECRET

- 9 -

- a. A mechanism capable of supporting a generally southward flow between the four guerrilla areas.
- b. A sea pickup point on the southern Albanian coast in the general area of KERKIRA Island.

[The PM objectives listed in the paragraph C above were selected on the following basis:

- a. They are considered, each individually, to be of sufficient significance to U.S. war plans in this area to justify the commitment of CIA operational assets under present operating conditions.
- b. In the aggregate they are considered to constitute a PM operational program of a magnitude which it is realistic for CIA to undertake during the period of this plan in the light of present operating conditions.

The field station should be authorized to recommend to Headquarters the substitution of other specific objectives for those listed herein if localized operating conditions or other factors appear to make such substitution desirable.]

- D. To obtain data on positive intelligence targets as set forth in IPC list, excepting political intelligence. (See Priority II A)
- E. To recruit Albanian officials outside of Albania.
- F. Continue radio PW operations against Albania.

PRIORITY III

A. Continue support to NCF under present diminished schedule.

B. A continuing objective is procurement of Special Intelligence, as defined in CSI 52-3, concerning Albania. Targets for operations for this purpose exist within Albania and in installations in other countries. Specific requirements are available in FI/Staff D. However, in accordance with CSI 52-3, no operational activity to procure Special Intelligence should be undertaken without prior consultation with and clearance from FI/STD.

SECRET

3158

SECRET

- 10 -

Part III. Projects to be Undertaken Toward Meeting Requirements

A. Mechanisms to Spot Agents in Non-Orbit Countries

1. Project OBERSE. This is a project establishing an Albanian-speaking agent in Trieste, where he is in a position to spot potential agents arriving there as refugees. In the event that Trieste is taken over by Italy, it is planned to place the agent in an Italian DP camp where he would be in a position to provide similar services.

2. [] This [] consists of one contract agent assisted by several field agents who live in the Greek city of [] a screening center for incoming Albanian refugees. They work with the Greek IS in interviewing newly-arrived refugees.

3. OPOPUS/OBLIVIOUS. As a by-product, this project (which is described more completely below) provides, through the National Committee for Free Albania, facilities for spotting potential agents in Italy, in the Lavrion Refugee Camp near Athens and elsewhere. Members of the Committee, which has offices in Rome and Athens, are asked to interview any arrivals. Actual spotting and recruiting, however, are not done through the Committee as such.

B. Debriefing of Refugees and Defectors for Operational Leads

1. All three projects cited above provide debriefing as well as spotting services.

2. OBSERVANT. This project is directed to increasing coverage of Albanian refugees in Greece. It consists of two field agents, one of whom interviews refugees while the second translates interrogation reports.

C. Establishment and Maintenance of Support, Training and Dispatch Facilities

1. [] Support, training and dispatch facilities for cross-border operations are maintained in Greece, which is the only country neighboring on Albania to which CIA has easy access. The [] provides air support, administrative support, supplies and through its liaison staff arranges for Greek IS support for the dispatching of agents across the border.

2. OBATLANTIS. This project provides for the construction and maintenance of training facilities on three isolated islands in the gulf of Corinth. The facilities include a house for the training staff, tents for the agents, a landing dock, a small vessel to carry passengers and supplies to and from the island, W/T communication with the base, a permanent maintenance staff, etc. The site was selected because of its isolation. [] although Greek IS is perforce witting as to its true purpose. The facility is not intended exclusively for use in Albanian operations, but for any projects based in Athens which may have need of it.

D. Development

SECRET

33136

SECRET

- 11 -

D. Development of ZODIAC and ZOMBIE Leads

In the free world, Albania maintains diplomatic installations in Paris and Rome only and has virtually no cultural or commercial interchange with any free countries. The Albanian branch is consequently dependent on the host stations (Paris and Rome) for facilities and personnel to develop such leads. Help can also be obtained from an SE division staff agent in Paris and from two officers in Rome, one of whom is a career agent and the other a staff employee. Of the officers in Rome the first has the primary assignment of running OBOPUS/HINEIGH; the second is a member liaison staff who has worked with the Italian IS in the past (and still does to a minor extent) on Albanian problems.

E. Counterespionage

There are currently two potential counterespionage projects in the development stage.

1. Xhevdet Skenderaj. This individual is an exile in Rome, a former Albanian army officer who has been approached by the chief of the Albanian IS in the Albanian legation. The latter is apparently making a determined effort to recruit the former, who has reported fully the details of all meetings and has agreed to allow himself to be recruited and subsequently to act as a double agent.

2. Mehmet Kuci. This individual crossed into Greece from Albania in late 1953 and confessed to the first CIA officer with whom he had contact that he had been sent on an espionage mission by the Albanian Minister of the Interior. He is being interrogated thoroughly by a case officer in Athens with a view to determining his bona fides. In the event that his story proves out and the field assessment of his qualities is favorable, consideration will be given to employing him as a double agent.

F. Other Means of Recruiting Agents Inside the Country

OBOPUS/OBHUNT. OBOPUS is the name for the overall project established to fulfill PP and PM requirements for Albania. OBHUNT is the subproject under which cross-border operations are conducted. At the moment 18 agents (7 of whom are trained W/T operators) are available in Greece for a continuation of this program during the 1954 operational season. It is intended that cross-border operations will continue to be run in the next two years in fulfillment of the operational tasks set forth in Part II B above.

G. Psychological Operations Against Groups

1. OBOPUS/OBTEST. A project for a clandestine anti-Communist short-wave radio station broadcasting to Albania in the name of the National Committee for Free Albania. This station has been in operation in Athens since September 1951.

2. OBOPUS/OBTUSE.

SECRET

33196

~~SECRET~~ SECRET

- 12 -

2. OBOPUS/OBTUSE. A project providing for the production and air-drop into Albania of anti-Communist leaflets and of food and useful articles, all in the name of the NCFAs. This project has been in operation since 1950.

H. Productive Use of Emigre Committees

OBOPUS/OBLIVIOUS. A project calling for the establishment of a committee of exiled political leaders (the National Committee for Free Albania) to provide a focus for the spirit of resistance inside Albania, a cover behind which propaganda can be directed to the Albanian population and a source of attribution for agent activities. This Committee actually exists, publishes a fortnightly newspaper and a newsbulletin and carries on the other typical activities of such a group. Its main center of activity is Rome, but it also maintains offices in New York and Athens. This project, as well as OBOPUS/HITGRUBBY and OBOPUS/OBTUSE, is carried on with the knowledge of MI-6 and to an extent in cooperation with that service. The NCFAs are sponsored jointly with the British; leaflets are also sponsored jointly, although the dropping of such leaflets is carried out separately. OBOPUS/HITGRUBBY is an independent CIA project although MI-6 is aware of its existence and its officers are shown copies of the material broadcast. Overall OBOPUS policies are co-ordinated with MI-6. There is an agreement for partial coordination of cross-border activities. This involves a mutual exchange of plans to prevent teams from interfering with each other and a yearly summary of activities. Neither of these exchanges involves detailed information on the identity of teams, contacts or locale of operations.

I. Other Projects

1. THITHER. This is a project run with the Greek Air Force with the purpose of obtaining photographic intelligence to meet FI requirements for Albania and Bulgaria. An RF-84 airplane plus photographic equipment has been provided to the Greek Services for this purpose.

2. OBSTACLE. A project run in conjunction with the Italian intelligence service to maintain control of a political group which until recently did not participate in the NCFAs; to exploit that group for positive and CE information and through it to acquit ourselves of an obligation to support a group of agents formerly active in Albania for CIA. This project is in the process of being sharply reduced since representatives of this group now participate in NCFAs and since CIA's obligation to the former agents is now considered discharged.

3. Liaison. FI requirements, to the extent they are met, are fulfilled largely through liaison sources. Intelligence on Albania is obtained from the British, Italian, Greek and Yugoslav services. Of these, by far the most productive is the Italian Service, which maintains an effective watch over Albanian shipping.

~~SECRET~~ SECRET

~~SECRET~~ 6

~~SECRET~~

- 13 -

Part IV. Manpower and Facilities

A. Present T/O Status:

<u>Categories</u>	<u>T/O</u>	<u>Present Strength</u>
[] Headquarters Intel Officers	9	8
Secretaries	4	4
[] Intel Officers	9	6
Secretaries	3	2
Clerk	1	0
[] Intel Officers (Contract)	3	3
Secretaries	2	2

B. Proposed Changes in the Above

1. The Headquarters T/O will probably remain approximately as set forth above. Any changes will be in the direction of a slight contraction.

2. [] Experience may show that the nine "intelligence officer" slots are too many, in which case the excess slots will be eliminated from the T/O. Emphasis is now being placed on recruiting Albanian-speaking case-officers with a view to making certain that adequate replacements will always be available.

C. Facilities

Present facilities - i.e., office space, safehouses, warehouse space, training sites, etc., appear adequate. For security reasons some of these will be changed in the next two years, but the level will remain approximately the same. In addition, a relatively large stockpile of weapons is maintained for use in the event of a spontaneous outbreak in Albania or some other development which called for the rapid reinforcement of indigenous resistance forces. The stockpile totals roughly 7,000 rifles, 2,000 submachine guns, adequate ammunition for both and 14,000 grenades.

Part V. Special Intelligence

A continuing asset at the disposal of the Branch is Special Intelligence obtainable through facilities available to FI/Staff D. This asset will include information useable in the ZOMBIE and ZODIAC programs, in planning and conducting operations, in observing Orbit reactions to operations, and in improving current knowledge of security and intelligence services. Since the nature and volume of this information is not constant, FI/Staff D will provide information and guidance to specified Branch officers in accordance with CSI 52-3.

~~SECRET~~

03130

Conditions Affecting Political and Psychological Activities in Albania

1. Although no scientific survey can be taken, all evidence indicates that an overwhelming majority of the Albanian population is opposed to and actively resents the Communist regime. Briefly, the main reasons are:
 - (a) The economic privations suffered by peasant and town-dweller alike as a result of the Communist development programs, the suppression of private trade, the collectivization program, the exorbitant taxes levied on farm produce, the enforced military and labor service, and the general inefficiency of the regime.
 - (b) The suppression of traditional values of family loyalty and personal honor which have been characteristic of Albanian life.
 - (c) The police state methods of the regime.
 - (d) The servile attitude of the regime toward a foreign power (USSR).
2. Since Albania is primarily an agricultural country the peasantry is the largest target for P/W activity and our program is aimed at developing a willingness to assist agents and anti-Communist nationalists and, at the appropriate time, personally to participate in active resistance. Other promising targets are the Army, which is reliably reported to be untrustworthy from the Communist point of view, and the people in Government service, many of whom were educated under the old regime. In addition, there are reportedly a considerable number of disaffected Communists who are the target of special defection appeals.
3. The long-standing tradition of guerrilla activity against foreign domination and central authority is also a favorable psychological factor.
4. Limitations and disadvantages affecting PP activities include:
 - (a) The rival claims of the neighboring powers, particularly Greece, on Albanian territory, which have enabled the regime to pose as a defender of Albania's sovereignty.
 - (b) PP-type activity carried on inside Albania by neighboring governments, on a particularly substantial scale by Yugoslavia, which has brought about a certain amount of confusion in the minds of the people.
 - (c) Reports reaching the populace of the lack of unity in emigre circles have also created a certain amount of confusion as to which group actually enjoys Western support, and possibly a reluctance to assist any agents who are not personally known to the contact inside.
 - (d) The limited number of receiving sets in Albania makes questionable the effectiveness of the propaganda radio broadcasts.

~~SECRET~~ SECRET

- 15 -

Distribution:

copy #1 - C/SE/1
copy #2 - FI/Plans
copy #3 - C/PM
copy #4 - C/PP
copy #5 - PPG
copy #6 - C/SE
copy #7 - RI
copy #8 - VD

~~SECRET~~ SECRET

~~02100~~