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AUG 11 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, SE

SUBJECT: Country Plan - Albania

1. The Country Plan for Albania is approved to be used as guidance in directing and assisting the field station in the performance of the FI mission.

2. It is intended that the Plan be reviewed periodically to be sure that it is responsive to changing conditions. Members of this Staff will call upon you from time to time to determine the current validity of the Plan as a whole or projects contributing to it.

3. It is requested, therefore, that SE keep Plans Staff/FI informed of any proposed deviations from the Plan which would require Staff consideration.

4. It is noted that there is need for greater emphasis than is reflected in the Plan on the mission of acquiring long-range collection assets. Although there is no need to revise the Plan to alter its general tone of pessimism, it is requested that SOI's going to appropriate field stations show a firm measure of insistence that efforts be made to develop such assets.



Chief
Foreign Intelligence

Attachment - Country Plan (Albania)

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
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COUNTRY PLAN FOR ALBANIA

PART I. Present Situation and Target Opportunities:

1. Since 1948, when the Yugoslav Communist regime broke with Moscow, Albania has been isolated from direct land connection with other Soviet-dominated nations and in this respect is unique among the satellite states. In addition to its isolation, other factors have contributed to making Albania a relatively promising target for clandestine activities. Among these are the ruggedness and isolation of the countryside, the existence of widespread opposition to the regime and a venerable tradition of clandestine activity by the independent-minded mountain folk of the Albanian uplands.
2. All of these factors have long been apparent to foreign intelligence agencies with an interest in Albania. As a result, this tiny country became, soon after the break with Yugoslavia, a cockpit of intelligence activities sponsored by Yugoslavia, Great Britain, Greece, Italy and the United States. The chief motivation of these activities, however, has been not so much intelligence as political action aimed at laying the basis for a blow against the regime itself. In actual fact, despite the promising target offered by Albania, the country does not possess much intrinsic intelligence interest. Although it has some strategic significance owing to its position at the entrance to the Adriatic and to the existence of harbors and shelters along the Albanian coast which might be used as Soviet submarine bases, the relatively small importance attached to Albania by the USSR also affects the intelligence potential. Although there are some hundreds of Russian military and civilian advisers attached to the various economic political and military organs of the Albanian regime, the Russians have given few other signs of a deep commitment to Albania. Consequently, little that can happen in the country has intelligence significance to the United States. The principal intelligence objective for our service therefore remains to keep a check on Soviet activities inside Albania so that we may have sufficient warning in event of a change in Soviet policy and any subsequent increase in the Soviet commitment in Albania.
3. The attractiveness of Albania as a political action target has led our service to the mounting of substantial operations to exploit the latent possibilities. Inasmuch as activities undertaken for political profit have naturally produced an intelligence by-product, the limited intelligence requirement has been substantially met without the necessity for elaborate intelligence operations. Where this intelligence by-product fails to cover requirements, and where liaison resources are inadequate, additional FI projects have been mounted, as will be indicated below.

4. The situation

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4. The situation outlined above is likely to last indefinitely. It is the considered position of SE Division that the time is not presently propitious for bringing our political action to a climax. As a result, we may presume that political action operations are likely to continue into the foreseeable future, to the obvious advantage of the FI interest in Albania.
5. As regards the accomplishments of the agent teams infiltrated recently and their likely accomplishments during the year ahead, it appears that factors which operated against the success of such activities in 1950 and 1951 and resulted in the destruction of promising networks and agent teams have mitigated somewhat. At any rate, 1952 was a fairly successful year for PP agent teams in Albania. This success may be due less to a relaxation of the stringent security precautions maintained by the regime than to the improved quality or at least the greater experience of the agents participating. The fact that these agents survived several infiltrations and were able to exist inside the country for extended periods of time, maintaining regular W/T contact with the base and producing a limited amount of positive as well as operational intelligence has been encouraging in itself. The product, however, has not been sufficient for our purposes. We therefore continue to look forward to the day which, we hope, may arrive in the year ahead, when our agents will not only be able to survive inside the country but will also be able to make contacts from which they can develop information of a higher level of importance than has hitherto been forthcoming. In particular, we still continue to hope that an opportunity will open for the infiltration of one or more agents with the objective of living legally as members of the Albanian community. However, the difficulties confronting this type of operation are probably greater in Albania than in any other European country owing to the size of the country, the backwardness and immobility of the rural population and the small size of the few cities.

PART II. Present Facilities and Coverage:

1. There is no official cover station in Albania nor is there any expectation of there being one within the time limits set for this plan.
2. There are no facilities under unofficial cover since travel into Albania from non-Communist areas is practically impossible.
3. Operational,

3. Operational, source and agent assets fall into two general categories:

- a. Liaison: Existing liaison relationships which produce Albanian intelligence are those with the Greek, the Italian, the Yugoslav and the British services. Of these, the most productive continues to be the Italian Service. The high hopes for the newly-established liaison with the Yugoslav Service have not yet been entirely realized. That is not surprising, since the liaison is obviously going through an initial feeling-out process. If the material passed to CIA up to now represents the best available to the Yugoslav Service then this Service is less effective in its Albanian operations than we have reason to believe, although this may result in large measure from inadequate reporting. On the other hand, it is quite probable that UDB officers feel the same way about the material which CIA has passed to them. As for the product passed to us by the Greeks, this has fallen off considerably, probably as a result of the reduced flow of Albanian refugees into Greece as well as the apparent falling-off of Greek agent operations directed against Albania. However, the Greek Service continues to render valuable support services which are helpful in CE work. An example of this type of service is the coverage of mail sent to and by Albanian refugees in Greece. As for the British liaison, although an occasional report trickles down to the Albanian desk from the over-all Agency liaison structure, the most useful material passed by the British comes to us from our FIEND/VALUABLE liaison--a special arrangement on the working level between the largest of the CIA Albanian projects and its MI-6 counterpart. The British reports passed to us through this channel are mostly what has been acquired by VALUABLE officers through the debriefing of Albanian refugees and are occasionally interesting. Naturally these reports by no means incorporate all or even the most important intelligence on Albania produced by MI-6.
- b. Independent Operations: Our independent operations rely for agent material on two chief sources. The first source comprises refugees who come to the attention of our spotters and case officers, principally in Greece where our facilities for spotting and recruiting are largely concentrated. However, our best agent material to date has been provided by ex-King Zog from among his personal entourage. The caliber of these agents is relatively high because Zog has

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been able to fall back on trained officers of his former army who owe their positions to him and remain loyal in expectation of royal gratitude in the future. Although the military training of these officers would not compare well with that provided at West Point, the fact that they are literate, indoctrinated in military usages and requirements, and above all have some status in their home areas as former officers has made them a pleasant contrast with the usual illiterate if willing peasant boys who provided the bulk of our earlier agent teams. The operations mounted with these agents have received satisfactory support from the Greek Service which has provided transportation to the jumping-off areas on the Greek border, safehouses and official cover at the border, and guides to help with the border crossing. It would obviously be impossible to operate as we have done in Greece without this support and it can be counted as an important asset. Other operational assets in Greece include the usual safehouses, training areas, and case officers who recruit, train and send off the teams. Over a period of years we have been able to build up a pool of trained Albanian W/T operators which has meant that none of our projected operations for this season has had to be cancelled for lack of this type of personnel.

Another (but relatively minor) source of intelligence is the branch of project BGFIEND which is established in Rome for largely PP purposes. This sub-project supports the National Committee for Free Albania and its associated activities such as a bi-weekly newspaper and an occasional news bulletin released to the western press. Contacts among the Albanian exiles by our case officers have occasionally produced information about events inside Albania and there is a possibility that some of these sources are worth developing more intensively. A project is in the course of being developed to do just this.

Additional information from Albanian refugees is occasionally forthcoming from the [redacted] where an Albanian interrogator is stationed to debrief those few Albanian refugees who eventually arrive in Trieste, usually after a long odyssey spent largely in Yugoslavia.

4. Summary

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4. Summary of current operations and production.

a. BGFIEND.

Project BGFIEND is the name given the over-all Albanian project originated under OPC, which continues today in substantially its original form. Within that over-all project various sub-projects have been more or less productive of positive intelligence, almost all of which has come from the infiltration teams sent into Albania. The most successful of these teams bears the name APPLE and is headed by a former captain of ex-King Zog's army. APPLE has been inside Albania for more than a year and has maintained regular W/T contact with the Athens base throughout that period. It is hoped that the leader of the team will be exfiltrated shortly at which time he will be thoroughly debriefed for positive as well as operational intelligence.

FIG and WILLOW are the designations of the two other BGFIEND teams which conducted successful operations in the 1952 season and which will be similarly employed in 1953. Although both had, and will have again, objectives which are largely PP in nature, both have produced a modicum of positive intelligence.

Three additional Zog teams have been or will be infiltrated during the 1953 season. The first two of these are known as PLUM and ORANGE; the third has not yet been named. At least one other infiltration team will be mounted during the 1953 season. Its objective will be to gather operational and positive intelligence in the Lume-Dibre region of Albania. It is intended to request Yugoslav assistance in infiltrating this team. In order to test the effectiveness of Yugoslav support for such an operation, it is proposed to send a "test" team to the same region with a brief mission. Upon its successful exfiltration and its report of the treatment it received at the hands of the Yugoslavs will depend the execution of the plan to send a full-fledged infiltration team into the Lume-Dibre area with the aid of the Yugoslavs.

b. OBSTACLE.

Project OBSTACLE is designed to maintain control over an Albanian emigre group in Rome in order to maintain its availability for possible future operations and to tap its sources of information on Albania, Albanians in Yugoslavia and Albanians in Italy. The Albanian emigre group in Rome

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is known as the Bloku Kombetar Independent--(BKI or National Independent Bloc). This organization has strong connections in Northern Albania and ties with the Italians going back to the Italian occupation and before. It is basically motivated by the conviction that the U.S. is the only power strong enough, disinterested enough and devoted enough to the ideal of national self-determination to provide hope of eventual liberation and territorial integrity of Albania. ?

OBSTACLE is run from the [] directly and through the Italian I.S. Through the Italian I.S., 9 agents who are now in Yugoslavia and 4 who are in Italy are paid and certain other services are furnished. ? The direct connection to the BKI enables us to monitor intelligence on Albania provided by the Italian I.S. and to exercise some direct control.

Although expenditures in connection with this operation have been substantially reduced from earlier years, our intention is to maintain our interest to the extent necessary to continue receiving the CE and positive information available through this channel. Of particular and continuing interest is the information collected through this channel regarding Yugoslav operations into Albania and the activities of the Albanian refugees resident in Yugoslavia. No agent operations are planned under OBSTACLE for the operational season of 1953.

c. THROTTLER.

Project THROTTLER was originally established in 1951. At that time, the three-man THROTTLER team went into Albania and remained for four months. During the 1952 operational season, the THROTTLER team made a total of 3 infiltrations and exfiltrations. All were accomplished without loss or injury and although the intelligence yield has been small, the THROTTLER operations have demonstrated that missions can be successfully run across the Greek border of Albania into the southwest portion of the country. ?

The THROTTLER team personnel are still under the control of this agency and an operation is planned for the 1953 season.

d. OBSERVANT

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d. OBSERVANT.

This project was established to provide at least one interrogator to debrief Albanian refugees. The material gathered from these refugees has been voluminous and covers a wide range of subjects. It has proved valuable in the past and if it is possible to obtain an additional qualified interrogator, he will be put into this operation.

It is intended that this product and its yield of positive intelligence be continued indefinitely.

e. OBLAVATE.

Project OBLAVATE is a project for the hiring of an Albanian who is to remain on his present job, reporting what he sees and hears at the Lavrion (Greece) refugee center and acting as a live drop when such activity is required. The yield from this project is very slight in positive reports but the yield in material of operational value is substantial and it is our intention to continue this project.

f. THORNAPPLE.

THORNAPPLE is an aerial photography project run from and by the [] with the denied areas of the Balkans as its target. Up to the present, however, its operations have been limited to Albania. The photography has ranged from "poor" to "excellent" and the intelligence derived therefrom has been in at least one case, unobtainable by other means.

5. Future operations.

Although the planning is not firm, the possibility of expansion of foreign intelligence operations against Albania is being explored. There has been a tendency to concentrate our operations on personnel provided by ex-King Zog with the result that if the trend continues we may find all of our eggs in one basket. To avoid this danger, the possible reactivation of OBSTACLE operations is being discussed in the branch. Also being discussed is the possibility of operations through or with the Yugoslavs when and if our relationship with them ripens to the degree necessary for such an undertaking. An expansion from \$2100 to \$8400 has been requested in the budget for the next fiscal year for program development so that any exploitable opportunity may be seized.

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The Office of Intelligence Support of RQM recently agreed to attempt to mount an operation providing coverage of Albanian mail to the United States. This is to be done through an individual, as yet unselected, who would readily be in a position to collect such correspondence and scan it with our interests in mind.

PART III. Requirements:

1. The most important requirement laid on CIA Albanian operations is to provide reliable information on the readiness of the people to revolt and on general economic and morale conditions which have a bearing on U.S. plans with regard to the exploitation of Albania's isolation from the rest of the Satellite area. ✓
2. Some IPC target material has been received and forwarded to the field. In brief, the major objective is that of obtaining sufficient information on Albania to forewarn us of any change in its strategic importance and in its development as a Soviet base. We continue to watch for any indication of such change, for example, the development of an Albanian airforce and supporting installations; significant developments in commerce and shipping and the extent to which Soviet and Satellite personnel are used to maintain Communist control of the country.
3. The coverage at present afforded us by the debriefings of refugees and by Italian intelligence on commerce and shipping between Albania, the Satellites and the USSR, is believed to be adequate for our intelligence needs.

PART IV. Plans and Programs to Implement Section A of the FI Mission:

1. Personnel.

- a. 1 January 1953 to 31 December 1953: At the present time the Albanian Branch has available 14 staff and contract personnel who work full time [] on Albanian operations. A senior staff officer in Rome devotes part of his time to Albanian operations. Three contract personnel and two staff secretaries also work in Rome. ?

At headquarters, the Albanian Branch at present has 14 full time employees. No significant changes are planned in the immediate future in either the field or the headquarters TO's.

- b. 1 January 1954 - 31 December 1954 and 1 January 1955 - 31 December 1957: It is not contemplated that there will be any significant expansion of either the field or the headquarters TO's although recruiting will certainly be necessary to replace departing personnel.

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2. Agent

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2. Agent Personnel and Facilities.

- a. 1 January 1953 - 31 December 1953: During this period our expectation is that agent operations will continue on about the present level. Recruiting and clearance of these agents has virtually been completed and we anticipate no significant additions or changes.
- b. 1 January 1954 - 31 December 1954 and 1 January 1955 - 31 December 1957: Developments during this period depend largely on the success or lack of success of our current operations. The only essentially new factor at this time is the possibility of infiltrations supported by the Yugoslavs. As indicated above, a test operation is in the stages of planning by which we hope to determine the effectiveness of such support.

3. Cover and Facilities.

No significant extension of current facilities is contemplated.

4. Intelligence Support.

Our intelligence support needs now and in the foreseeable future are very limited. The major item in this regard is the securing of quantities of Albanian currency for our infiltration missions. Because the Albanian lek is not used for trade with non-Communist countries, the obtaining of such currency has been a continual problem in the past. We continue to collect whatever we can from all available sources but thus far have not been able to meet our needs.

5. Liaison and Penetration.

Not applicable.

6. Security.

Not applicable.

PART V. Plans and Programs to Implement Section B of FI Mission:

1. Operations against Priority Targets.

As previously stated, there are few important targets within Albania to which we would be justified in devoting attention. The role played by Albania within the Soviet sphere is necessarily an insignificant one because of the country's geographical isolation. Information as to Soviet intentions presumably could, however, be obtained if we had access to

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cipher traffic between Tirana and Moscow or the satellite capitals, but, as will be explained below, our efforts to defect two important Albanian diplomats, with a view to obtaining the Albanian cipher, have been unsuccessful. We are therefore forced to limit our objective as regards Albania to maintaining sufficient coverage to warn us of a change in the country's strategic importance; in the unlikely event of such a change, priority targets might come into existence and it would then be necessary for us to mount operations designed to cover them.

2. CE Operations.

CE operations against Albanian targets are not contemplated. Albanian espionage in Western Europe is carried out primarily through the Albanian Legations in Rome and Paris, whose activities are not of sufficient importance to justify CE operations directed against them. However, adequate CE coverage of the Albanian Legation in Rome is obtained through our normal liaison with the Italian Service. CE coverage of the Albanian Legation in Paris, on the other hand, is not made available to us due to the limited exchange of information between the Paris Station and the French services.

3. Subversion and Defection.

- a. 1 January 1953 to 31 December 1953: Amongst the instructions given to the various infiltration teams sent into Albania is that of subverting and if possible defecting Albanian officials. We have been informed that the APPLE team leader, when he exfiltrates from Albania, intends to bring with him a "pretended" Communist. Following the failure of the former OSO attempt to defect the chief Albanian IS official in the Paris Legation, no further effort has been made to defect this individual or any other member of the Paris Legation. With regard to the Press Attache of the Albanian Legation in Rome, contact is being kept alive between him and a third party, which contact is monitored by our branch. If this contact provides an opportunity for making a defection approach, such an approach will be made.
- b. 1 January 1954 - 31 December 1957: There are no present plans for this period.

4. Penetration Operations.

The activities of Albanian diplomatic installations are not believed of sufficient importance to justify physical or personnel penetrations, except in the case of our being

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presented with a ready-made opportunity.

5. COMINT Procurement.

Extensive operations are carried out in Italy in cooperation with Italian Naval Intelligence to monitor Albanian communications. However, these come under the jurisdiction of STD and the Italian Branch rather than of the Albanian Branch.

6. Liaison and Penetration.

Not applicable.

7. Intelligence Support.

Other U.S. agencies give considerable attention to Albania, but are not in a position to offer much assistance to CIA activities there.

8. Amputation.

Amputation is not contemplated except under circumstances not foreseeable at the present time.

PART VI. Plans and Programs to Implement Section C of SO Mission:

1. Headquarters.

In view of the limited nature of Albanian operations and the fact that we have no personnel within Albania itself, the present headquarters structure is believed adequate for our needs. Because of the extremely limited amount of travel between non-Communist countries and Albania, infiltration of personnel into the country necessarily demands installations of an only partially covert character and no attempt to organize a thoroughly clandestine service would therefore be justified.

2. Staff Officers.

The use of staff officers under durable cover and not identified with CIA is unnecessary to the implementation of our program of Albanian operations. There are only two main points from which, short of war, we can definitely plan on basing operations, i.e., Italy and Greece; in addition, there is a possibility of eventually carrying on joint operations from Yugoslavia in cooperation with UDB, although such a course is not now contemplated. In neither Italy nor Yugoslavia can our representatives, because of more important commitments, be expected to carry on such operations except on a liaison basis, and liaison arrangements rule out the use

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of any but superficial cover for the case officers concerned. The Greek country plan envisages the establishment of a clandestine service under durable cover on which we would be forced to rely exclusively should our present liaison arrangement become no longer practicable in the future. However, under such a fully clandestine arrangement it is unlikely that Greece will any longer be of use as an operational base into Albania; operations into that area require and probably will continue to require the partially covert facilities normal in a wartime operational situation, and such facilities cannot by their nature be hidden from the local security services.

3. Cover.

See paragraph 2 above.

4. Agents.

No plans have been made for the recruitment of long-term agents, in view of the difficulties of operating inside Albania and the consequent lack of opportunity and also of the fact that present activities are directed toward hastening the end of the current situation.

PART VII. Plans and Programs to Implement Section D of SO Mission:

1. Stay-Behind Nets.

Not applicable.

2. Evacuation.

The evacuation of agents in Greece, Trieste, and Italy forms a part of the evacuation plans of those areas.

3. Bases.

In case of war, certain selected Albanian agents in Greece, Trieste, and Italy will be evacuated in accordance with the respective plans of those areas, to the North African base. Plans for allotment of space for personnel and supplies will be arranged with the competent persons at such time as a base is secured and we have some possibility of planning realistically.

4. Stockpiling.

- a. D-Day to D-plus-90: It is assumed that no operations will be mounted into Albania during this period, since all available facilities will be devoted to more

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important areas. No stockpiling of materials for this period is therefore necessary.

- b. D-plus-90 days to D-plus-12 months: Although the extent of Albanian operations cannot accurately be foreseen, it is safe to assume that during this period and the one which follows such operations will be at their height, in order to obtain accurate information on the enemy actions and intentions in regard to the area. For purposes of requisitioning, we should therefore count on dispatching up to ten teams of about four men each, and normal allotments of arms, ammunition, W/T sets, and miscellaneous supplies should have been requisitioned accordingly.
- c. D-plus-12 months to D-plus-24 months: During this period, we should assume, for requisitioning purposes, that five four-man teams will be dispatched in each six month period.
- d. D-plus-24 months to cessation of hostilities: During the final phases, stockpiling will be based upon current requirements for Albanian operations, which are impossible to determine now.
Note: The above statement of our intentions is superficial, but is believed adequate to indicate the probable scale of our operations. A detailed list of items to be stockpiled cannot be drawn up at the present time. A study of what is needed should be made once the question of the North African base has been settled.

5. Reallocation and Regrouping.

- a. D-Day to D-plus-90: The senior staff officer presently concerned with Albanian operations in Athens could be placed in charge of operations from the North African base, assisted by the other staff officer now working on Albanian operations in Athens.
- b. D-plus-90 days to D-plus-12 months: It is not foreseen that any expansion of the staff described in (a) above will be required during this period.
- c. D-plus-12 months to D-plus-48 months: In the last two phases, increase or decrease of personnel should be governed by current strategic needs and previous experience.

6. Personnel, Facilities, and Supplies.

As has been emphasized elsewhere, the importance of Albania

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in general is minor. However, in the period D plus 90 days to D plus 24 months, it may require considerable attention intelligence-wise, to determine the enemy's intentions in regard to it. Even so, in view of the pressing demands of more important areas, there is little if anything which we would be justified in doing now to facilitate a possible, but nevertheless very uncertain, expansion in time of war. We shall make use of the persons we currently have who have had some Albanian operational experience, and shall supplement them with others as required.

7. Support of Wartime Military Mission.

- a. Any discussion of this question is difficult until the wartime military mission in regard to Albania is known. We can conjecture, however, that the FI function will be limited to ascertaining the general nature of the enemy's intentions in regard to Albania, and that in pursuance of this objective our activity will reach its peak during the period D plus 90 days to D plus 24 months. It will then probably decline, since the enemy's intentions will in all likelihood be of no more significant proportions than our own insofar as Albania is concerned, i.e., in effect to neutralize it as did the Germans in World War II, as an area where neither side has anything to gain and each has much to lose in manpower and effort should any attempt be made to make it a major military base or to capture and control it. However, there will always be reasons to maintain intelligence coverage of Albania as of all other countries, and this should be born in mind in planning war-time activities.
- b. The FI mission probably will be, at least initially, to ascertain whether or not the above hypothesis is correct. To do so requires only such elementary intelligence operations as are involved in the infiltration, by air or other means, of agent teams able to do spot OB reporting. Since this is primarily what has been done in the past, our effort needs no reorientation.

8. Military Type Units.

The needs in regard to Albanian operations are so small that planning for a military-type unit to service them alone would be inappropriate. If an overall SE Division military unit were to be established, an Albanian unit might well be incorporated in the T/O for this unit.

9. Intelligence

9. Intelligence Opportunities.

There is no present reason to believe that the war-time situation in Albania would be substantially different from that with which we are now faced. Because of its geographical location, it will necessarily play a very limited role in any new conflict; it is far removed from the main routes of advance for land forces and has no advantages as an air base, suffering instead from many disadvantages as compared to other areas which probably will be Soviet-controlled in time of war; logistically it is untenable because it is unconnected by rail or major road routes with adjacent countries; and, finally, it would be the most illogical of European countries in which to attempt to stage a landing operation against a hostile and powerful defender. For all these reasons, the "confusion and chaos" which war may bring in many areas will probably be absent here, unless directly fomented from the outside. The task of fomenting such conditions would be a formidable one, and it is beyond the purview of this paper to discuss its desirability.

The necessity of taking advantage of any particular war-time conditions of chaos and confusion which may come about is recognized, but in this case too many unknown factors make such planning impractical at present. It is worth noting in this connection, however, that should Albania be considered important enough from a resistance point of view in war-time for PP to make an all-out effort, it would be possible for us to supplement the activities of our own intelligence missions by briefing PP teams to collect the type of spot intelligence necessary for an understanding of the intentions of the Soviet Union in regard to this area.

10. Long-term Operations.

As previously stated, there are not now nor are there likely to be in war-time any long-term clandestine operations in Albania.

PART VIII. Plan for Coordination of Operations and Activities with other Divisions and Areas and, Insofar as Appropriate, with other Offices of CIA and other U.S. Agencies:

1. No special planning is necessary in this regard since only one non-SE Division [] plays any important role in Albanian operations. The working relationship with the Italian Branch continues unaltered since the time when

it formed

it formed a part of this Division. No other CIA office or U.S. agency has any significant collection possibility for, or interest in, Albanian operations, and no coordination is therefore necessary.

PART IX. Plan For Logistics and Support:

1. Personnel Needs, Including Recruiting and Training.

As stated above, no significant expansion or change in the present organization is anticipated for the foreseeable future. Replacements will be recruited as required.

2. Headquarters Structure and Organization.

The present headquarters structure is believed adequate for the needs of Albanian operations.

3. Operational Facilities Needed Abroad and in the U.S.

No special operational facilities are needed in the U.S. Facilities already available at the Athens Station suffice for Albanian needs.

4. Supplies, Both Current and Stockpile Needs.

Current needs are small and can be met from supplies presently available at the Athens Station. In the event of a substantial increase in the requirements it is expected that we can call upon the North African base to meet our needs.

5. Base.

The question of a North African base is believed to be receiving all necessary attention from the competent authorities.

6. Support and Facilities Requirements, Including Communications, Operational Aids, and Others.

The only support requirement is for Albanian currency, which we are attempting to secure through all available channels.