

# ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

**INSTRUCTIONS:** Officer designations (see separate sheet) should be used in the "To" column. Under each comment a line should be drawn across sheet and each comment numbered, to correspond with the number in the "To" column. Each officer should initial (check mark insufficient) before further routing. This Record and Routing Sheet should be returned to Registry.

**FROM:** ACCESSION NO. **17 EL-463**  
DATE RECEIVED IN S.A. **10 Dec 46**

TO	ROOM NO.	DATE		OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS
		RECEIVED	FORWARDED		
1. <b>FBV</b>	<b>2278</b>			<b>CB</b>	<del>Worsing</del> copy detached
2. <b>FBM-8</b>	<b>2287</b>	<b>12/12</b>		<b>HP</b>	
3. <b>[ ]</b>	<b>2237</b>	<b>DEC 18 1946</b>	<b>FEB 4 1947</b>		
4. <b>[ ]</b>	<b>2281</b>	<b>2-5</b>		<b>J.T.</b>	standing - <b>1/21/47</b> POR Cabled for
5. <b>FBV</b>	<b>2182</b>	<b>24-2</b>	<b>2-12</b>		
6. <b>[ ]</b>	<b>2256</b>	<b>19/3</b>	<b>19/3</b>	<b>ag</b>	
7. <b>FBV</b>	<b>2256</b>				
8. <b>[ ]</b>	<b>2277</b>	<b>APR 15 1947</b>	<b>APR 17 1947</b>	<b>HP/mhc</b>	<b>CO. C. WIRSING</b> <b>W. C. WIRSING</b>
9. <b>[ ]</b>					<b>holler</b>
10. <b>[ ]</b>					<b>Schellberg</b> <b>connection with</b>
11. <b>[ ]</b>					<b>Worsing</b> <b>noted</b> <b>en</b> <b>12.4.47</b>
12. <b>[ ]</b>					
13. <b>[ ]</b>					
14. <b>[ ]</b>					
15. <b>[ ]</b>					

INTELLIGENCE REPORT

GERMANY

SS Stubaß Giselher WIRSING

Origin: Britzone, Germany

Date: 19 November 1946

Info: 1940-1946

Rpt.: 15 October 1946

Pages: 1

Source: Subject

1. We are attaching hereto copies of DIC, CCG(BE) FR No. 105 dated 25 October 1946 on Giselher WIRSING.

2. This report contains little OE material, but is valuable in determining the true position of WIRSING with respect to the operations of RSHA Amt VI and its chief, SCHELLENBERG.

3. The material on the EDMONT reports is particularly interesting. Should Germany be able to locate any captured copies of these reports (see para. 14, page XVI), we would be interested in having a copy for examination.

SECRET

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REC-105

FINAL REPORT

ON

Stubaf Giselher WIRSING

(Ref: Brief Int Div/A1(a)/PF 4182 dated 18 Jul 46  
enclosing: WARREC Brief PF 562/B1a, WARREC/NOH dated 18 Apr 46  
and comments by Special Service dated 16 Apr 46.

This report should be read in conjunction with:  
FIAT Preliminary Report on WIRSING, IN FIAT EP 254-82 (WIRSING),  
dated 12 Jan 46.

Draft Report from MFIU No 1, V/48/T dated 30 Jul 45.

Report from 3rd US Army Int Centre Interrogation Section, ref  
X2126, dated 25 Jul 45.

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I. PREAMBLE

1. Prisoner's role and importance in Nazi GERMANY are hard to assess. There is no convenient category into which he falls easily: his SS rank was of no significance, and even during his most influential period he was a mere Lt in the German Army. Yet Prisoner's political influence has been of significance and has stretched further than the authority normally accorded to a well-known political writer.
2. Prisoner's reputation was built primarily on his shrewd analysis of foreign affairs. His constant interest in high policy, and personal knowledge of the politicians and officials who shaped it, showed him how tenuous and potent the manipulation of power can be. There is no doubt that his own political ambitions aimed very high, and that he considered himself a future Secretary or Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. In his view titles and rank were unimportant and real influence, especially in totalitarian GERMANY, could equally well be wielded by shadowy men concealed behind the figures exposed to the public gaze. To Prisoner's mind along this way lay the road to high office: it was but one step to emerge from the shadows, and assume the mantle of public power. Such tactics required infinite finesse and a close knowledge of the infighting methods among the Nazi hierarchy. After three false starts (RÖHM, HESS and RIBBENTROP), and partial obscurity in 1942 and 1943 Prisoner, but for the accident of German defeat and total occupation, might well have achieved his ambition.
3. Prisoner did not regard himself as an unscrupulous opportunist. As a journalist he had observed the wrangles of politicians for many years and prided himself on having few illusions: to him Fascism, democracy and Communism were but symptoms of the age-old clash of cultures, part of

the dynamic struggle between decay and growth, the pattern of history blindly and often brutally groping for fulfilment. Nazism was injecting new vigour into a people forgetful of its destiny. In his youth, he had sat at the feet of Oswald SPENGLER: his was SPENGLER's philosophy brought up to date.

When Prisoner first came into prominence in the early 1930s he advocated pseudo-Socialism and State nationalism, ie the Gregor STRASSER kind of Nazism. Through his writings he persuaded the Conservative element to underwrite Nazism, arguing that the more repugnant aspects were mere teething troubles of a young revolutionary party. This was his first betrayal of the moral integrity on which he so loftily insists.

4. Prisoner is a man of exceptional intellectual faculties and literary flair. From then onwards he interpreted Nazi expansion in terms of renaissance of German "Kultur" :- his theme was German hegemony in EUROPE, cloaked in the deceptive verbiage of a "Federal Europe". The mission of German Kultur, the degrading nihilism of "Amerikanismus", the mechanistic barbarism threatening from the East, the decadence and hypocrisy of British Imperialism, all these were recurrent topics in his writings, served up with a seemingly rational erudition in which shrewd historical and social analysis, insidious half-truths and astonishing fallacies constantly intermingled.

5. Prisoner's claim that he was not a Nazi is not well founded. He was not, it is true, a believer in the Nordic blood myth. He can point to his frequent clashes with the Propaganda Ministry, with BORMANN, DIETRICH, GOEBBELS and RIBBENTROP, to his cautious public and open private criticism during the final stages of the Third Reich ("The war is lost - let us save GERMANY"), and finally to his timid intrigues to have the, as he believed, more malleable HIMMLER replace HITLER. But in 1940 when German domination over EUROPE was almost complete, Prisoner could still talk of moral values, reasoning post factum, as he had done before, that external force was an unimportant trapping of a transitional stage which would weld EUROPE into the political and cultural unity of a Pan-Germanic Commonwealth, thus proving once more to the intellectual and doubting minority that Nazi methods were historically inevitable, and, therefore, excusable and in the long run unimportant. The record of the Nazi regime is a grim historical fact, for which Prisoner must accept some responsibility. His share in the war guilt was that he shored up a vicious and cowardly dictatorship by giving it moral values and a historical perspective which he knew to be false. This is his second, irreparable betrayal.

#### History of the Case

6. Prisoner came to DIC from MISC OBERURSEL on 12 Jul 46, but reports produced by other agencies on this case were not available at the time. Interrogation was, therefore, hampered by lack of background material. When earlier reports on Prisoner came to hand these proved to contain a more detailed account of the facts than Prisoner can recall now after a considerable lapse of time.

7. Many questions in the Brief have already been fully covered by previous reports, and Prisoner has nothing new to add. In fact, such infm as he has given falls short of previous statements. Further, on the basis of the "Dustbin" Report, apparently unwarranted assumptions have been made linking Prisoner with political and economic espionage.



For instance, a whole paragraph (para 8) of the "Dustbin" Report is devoted to "WIRSING's Probable Activities" and contains hints and predictions not substantiated by data but, based, it would seem, wholly on the previous interrogators' hunches. Each of these red herrings has greatly delayed investigation.

8. Prisoner was at first sullen and unhelpful, since he had been given to understand by his American IO that he was about to be released. He has since changed his attitude and co-operated to the best of his ability. "M" Association with K.H. KRAMER (Prisoner DIC) has confirmed that Prisoner has not been hedging on any of the questions put to him.

## II. PERSONAL HISTORY

### 9. Career

15 Apr 07	Born in SCHWEINFURT/MAIN.
1925	Studied sociology and political science.
1929	Became assistant to Prof BRINKMANN at Institute of Social and Political Sciences at HEIDELBERG University. During the next few years visited Eastern European and Balkan countries.
1930	Took Doctor's degree at HEIDELBERG University. Asst Editor - "Die Tat".
1932	Published his first book: "Zwischeneuropa und die deutsche Zukunft".
	Went to BERLIN as free-lance journalist, and became an active contributor to "Die Tat".
Sep - Dec 32	Worked in the Infm Sect of League of Nations in GENEVA.
1933	Continued free-lance journalism. Published his second book: "Deutschland in der Welt-politik". Went to ITALY and YUGOSLAVIA.
Oct 33	Asst Editor of Münchener Neueste Nachrichten.
1934	Published his third book: "Köpfe der Welt-politik".
End 34	Became political editor of "Münchener Neueste Nachrichten" and editor of "Die Tat".
	Travelled widely in EUROPE for his papers, during the next few years.
Summer 36	Editor-in-chief of MNN.
Jan - Mar 1938	First journey to the MIDDLE EAST.
	Publication of fourth book: "Engländer, Juden & Araber in Palästina".
Apr - Aug 38	Visit to USA.
Jan - Mar 39	Second journey to MIDDLE EAST.
	Accepted hon position in Infm Sect of Ausw Amt, in addition to his duties as editor of MNN and "Die Tat", now renamed "Das XX Jahrhundert".
Jan 42	Publication of fifth book: "Der Masslose Kontinent".
Feb 42	Voluntarily joined the Army. His position as editor of the MNN had become untenable as a result of several editorial articles favouring a lenient policy towards FRANCE. ("There is no such thing as a "soft" or "hard" policy, only a wise or a stupid one").
	Promoted Sdf (Z) in Kriegsberichter Komp.

Apr 42	War Correspondent in RUSSIA, attached 56 Pz Corps. There wrote memorandum criticising German treatment of Russians. This memo he managed to give personally to Gen WAGNER, Deputy Chief of GS, OKH. WAGNER apparently passed it on to HITLER, for some months later Prisoner was ordered by BORMANN not to write again on Russian affairs during the war.
Dec 42	Ill: returned to GERMANY.
Jan 43	Attached to OKW/W/Pr (Wehrmacht Propaganda), working on Wehrmacht publication "Signal". Brief visits to FRANCE, SPAIN, ITALY and DENMARK.
Spring 44	Promoted Lt.
1944	Publication of sixth book: "Das Zeitalter des Ikaros".
Summer 44	"Das XX Jahrhundert" was suppressed by Propaganda Ministry as a result of an article on Hieronymus BOSCH ("allegorical inveotive").
Oct 44 - Mar 45	Wrote EGMONT Reports for RSHA VI, and became SCHEILLENBERG's political adviser.
Mar 45	Evacuated with Amt VI staff to BAVARIA.
1 Jun 45	Arrested by American CIC in BAD TOLZ, BAVARIA.

#### 10. Political

1933	Member of Reichspressekammer.
Nov 38	Hptstuf in Allg SS.
Summer 40	Joined NSDAP (no rank or office).
Autumn 40	Stubaf in Allg SS.

#### 11. Decorations

Summer 42	KVK 2nd Class.
Summer 42	EK 2nd Class.

### III. CONTACTS WITH GLS

12. Investigation has not substantiated any of the suggestions made in the brief, but there is no doubt that had Prisoner been approached to undertake special missions for Abw or Amt VI, he would have gladly done so (this on his own admission). In fact, by some oversight, no use was made of Prisoner's wide European experience and contacts. Prisoner is, therefore, almost exclusively a "political" case: as already stated, he played a significant role in the ideological and political field. The only exception to this is Prisoner's work as EGMONT, when he was given access to Amt VI material. Here again, the motive which prompted Prisoner to engage in high-level evaluation of int reports was entirely political. An account of this aspect of Prisoner's activities will be found at Appendix A.

13. League of Nations

Prisoner denies that his appointment in 1932 as Public Relations assistant in the Section d'Information of the League of Nations in GENEVA was engineered in any way through Max ILGNER. At that time Prisoner was known for his anti-Big Business politics, and IG FARBEN was one of his favourite windmills. It is, therefore, unlikely that IG FARBEN would have gone out of their way to help a young journalist who delighted in slinging mud at their org. Prisoner obtained his position through TERHAR, a friend, who was then an official in the League of Nations office (?) in BERLIN. Prisoner believes that TERHAR at the same time worked in the Infm Sect of the IG FARBEN: this is, however, the only possible link he can trace.

14. IG FARBEN Int Service

Prisoner denies any contact with this org. Max ILGNER he claims to have met for the first time after his arrest in OBERURSEL. He further denies that he was ever approached by this or any other org to carry out industrial, technical, economic or political espionage abroad. Lastly, he was not aware that SCHELLENBERG had in mind a reorganisation of Abw which would have made a wide use of the IG FARBEN Int Service.

15. Foreign Correspondents of MNN

Prisoner at first denied that any of the MNN correspondents abroad were also working for the GIS. He later admitted that he had heard that his Portuguese and Hungarian representatives were "somehow" connected with it. In view of the Propaganda Ministry ban on GIS activities, he took pains not to investigate the truth of these rumours; in any case, he took the view that as long as his correspondents fulfilled their duties to the paper, it was no concern of his what they did in their spare time; furthermore, he realised that they were likely to acquire sources of infm which would incidentally benefit his paper.

The following is a list of MNN correspondents during the war:-

SWEDEN	Graf von TOGGENBURG (formerly UK)
SWITZERLAND	BRAUTIGAM (formerly FRANCE)
TURKEY	SCHMITZ, Walter
HUNGARY	KORNHUBER (Note: Worked for SD)
SPAIN	HAGERAD <i>red</i>
LISBON	BRAGGAR (Note: Worked for KO PORTUGAL)
FINLAND	Graf KNYPHAUSEN
USA	VIERECK (Later arrested as German agent; see Appendix D, para 13)
USSR	Dr Klaus MEHNERT, later Frau Dr PORZGEN
ITALY	Egon HEYMANN
BULGARIA	Otmar MERTH
ROUMANIA	Name forgotten
JAPAN	Arvid BALK.

All his correspondents were instructed to send Prisoner weekly or fortnightly confidential reports on the political situation, including gossip on personalities, rumours from enemy

countries, and other matter which he could not print. He maintains that these reports were for his own infm only and, except for material on SE EUROPE, were not shown to anyone else. Prisoner states that in this way he was able to build up an excellent infm service, which was often better informed than official sources.

16. Contacts with Abw

a) Obstlt von LOSSOW

Von LOSSOW had formerly been the editor of "Illustrierter Rundfunk" in BERLIN and a personal acquaintance of Prisoner's. During the war this man worked in Ast MUNICH (Note: I Wi, Ast MUNICH, later Leiter I, Ast MUNICH) and came to see him about once a month. Von LOSSOW was interested in receiving news about commercial and economic conditions in SE EUROPE, and discussed with Prisoner at length the current situation. Prisoner allowed him to read the confidential reports from KORNUBER and SCHMITZ, which he judged to be reliable. Prisoner cannot say to what use LOSSOW put the very general infm he obtained from him. He denies that LOSSOW ever asked him to pass on certain briefs to his correspondents abroad.

b) Maj SOLM

Prisoner had flatly denied that SOLM was an Abw offr. He states that SOLM was his immediate chief in Wehrmacht Propaganda, and the offr responsible for the publication of "Signal". To the best of Prisoner's knowledge, SOLM was not connected with any Abw work (this is borne out by our own infm, which gives SOLM as Head of Gruppe IV b, OKW/W Pr).

c) Dr LEVERKUH

Prisoner states that LEVERKUH was a friend of SOLM's. In Aug 43 SOLM asked Prisoner to meet this man, who, SOLM said, would be arriving from TURKEY and was exceptionally well informed on Turkish affairs, and on relations between the Western Allies and the USSR as seen from that part of the world. Prisoner met LEVERKUH in SOLM's office, and questioned him on these subjects. Prisoner claims that this is the only contact he had with LEVERKUH. Prisoner was not aware that he was head of KO TURKEY.

d) KLEYENSTUBER

Prisoner has met this man twice but their relations were of no int interest. An account of the meetings is given in Appendix D, para 29.

e) Knowledge of KOs

Prisoner states that he can give NO infm on KOs SWEDEN, SPAIN or PORTUGAL. Except in the case of KLEYENSTUBER, he does not know the names of offr att'd to these orgs.

DIC  
CCG(BE)  
25 Oct 46

.....  
for Colonel GS  
Commandant DIC, CCG(BE)

DIC  
CCG(BE)  
25 Oct 46

APPENDIX A to FR 105

TOP SECRET

Giselher WIRSING

APPENDIX A

THE "EGMONT" REPORTS

NOTE: This Report should be read in conjunction with the following reports:

FIAT ("DUSTBIN") Report IN FIAT EP 254-82 (WIRSING)  
dated 18 Jan 46.  
Draft Report from MPFU No 3 dated 30 Jul 45.  
Counter-Intelligence War Room Liquidation Report No 6  
SF 52/4/22(5) - W.R.C. 3a, dated 9 Oct 45.

This report does not set down the results of the detailed investigation, since the subject has already been fully covered in the above reports; it merely elaborates points on which Prisoner has given additional infm. In view of the nature of the Brief, some repetition is inevitable.

1. Introduction

From Oct 44 until Mar 45, RSHA VI published its own analyses of world affairs which were circulated only at highest levels. These reports, which appeared at irregular intervals - about every two or three weeks - were called "EGMONT" Reports and classified "Top Secret". For some time SCHELLENBERG, the ambitious head of Amt VI, had been an opponent of HITLER's and RIBBENTROP's foreign policy, and considered that HITLER was badly advised by the Ausw Amt. Through his "EGMONT" Reports, which reached HITLER through HIMMLER, SCHELLENBERG, by giving what Prisoner calls "unbiased reports" of political trends, aimed to counteract RIBBENTROP's influence and, if possible, to oust RIBBENTROP from his position.

At the time, SCHELLENBERG's main preoccupation was the necessity of concluding an immediate peace with the Western Allies, in order to salvage as much as he could from a GERMANY which, he considered, had plainly lost the war; he based his hopes for a German renaissance on the pattern of events which followed the 1914 - 18 war. To have said so openly in a report which was read by HITLER, would have been considered high treason, but SCHELLENBERG, by presenting "objective" reports - GERMANY's position in world affairs being, on any showing, depressing enough - counted on persuading HITLER to listen to the "moderates", and failing this, to convince HIMMLER of the urgent need of betraying his "God" and removing the man who stood in the way of the long-term salvation of GERMANY. Although HIMMLER seems to have accepted the general argument behind the "EGMONT" Reports, he could not bring himself, until it was too late, to take the drastic step of overthrowing HITLER; HIMMLER's final peace talks with Count BERNADOTTE are historical facts too well known to need recapitulation here. SCHELLENBERG saw in HIMMLER the only man in GERMANY capable of taking over control from HITLER, and possessing sufficient authority to conclude an immediate peace. Prisoner now claims that he himself never saw in HIMMLER

more than the head of an interim government for a strictly limited period and mentioned BRÜNING as a possible successor; but these were only nebulous formulations doubtfully accepted by SCHELLENBERG; the main point of agreement between SCHELLENBERG and Prisoner was that HITLER must be removed. HIMMLER hesitated until it was too late, and the real aim of the "EGMONT" Reports came to nothing.

2. WIRSING was the man chosen by SCHELLENBERG to produce the "EGMONT" Reports. His relations with SCHELLENBERG in this connection have been admirably summed up in Liquidation Report No 6, Counter-Intelligence War Room, dated 9 Oct 45:-

"The essential conception of SCHELLENBERG's int service was the preparation by Amt VI of a properly coordinated summary of political int from all available sources; and SCHELLENBERG to achieve that end did not hesitate to go beyond the recognised organisation of Amt VI..... A striking example is his use of Dr WIRSING in the preparation of the "EGMONT" Reports. Dr WIRSING was a journalist and author of note whose grasp of political affairs SCHELLENBERG much admired. He was, however, in no sense an Amt VI offr or agent. But SCHELLENBERG, recognising his ability (Note: and also a kindred mentality and political ambition) decided that WIRSING, with his wide knowledge of political affairs and his training as a political writer, was better fitted for the task he had in mind than any Amt VI offr, and did not hesitate to invite WIRSING to prepare reports on political matters for Amt VI. The remarkable feature is that WIRSING was given access to all Amt VI material likely to be of assistance to him. With this material at his disposal WIRSING prepared reports on various aspects of political importance which were in turn passed to the Zentral Büro (of Amt VI) for further distribution as the "Egmont Berichte". SCHELLENBERG had calculated in this way to have these reports, which attempted to be a true assessment of a deteriorating situation, passed through HIMMLER to HITLER with the hope that the foreign policy of the Reich would be framed to meet realities which HITLER would not face".

3. Origin of Name

In 1942, Prisoner, while a war-correspondent in RUSSIA, produced a memorandum for AOK IV severely criticising the German adm in occupied RUSSIA. This memo reached HITLER, or, at any rate, his immediate entourage, and Prisoner was considered a carping critic for his remarks. Prisoner, furthermore, had a long-standing disagreement with GOEBBELS and the Propaganda Ministry and had also personally offended RIBBENTROP by refusing to take over the Infm Sec of the Ausw Amt in 1941 (see Appendix B). In order, therefore, not to prejudice the value of the Amt VI reports, it was agreed by SCHELLENBERG that they should appear anonymously as "EGMONT" Reports. EGMONT refers to a quotation from GOETHE's "EGMONT": "It is not meet to oppose the king, yet one must stand in the way of the king who takes the first unfortunate steps along the wrong path". "King" obviously is not a very

subtle allusion to HITLER, while it speaks against Prisoner's acumen that he should consider that HITLER made the first mistakes in autumn 44.

4. It was a condition of Prisoner's verbal agreement with SCHELLENBERG that HITLER, GOEBBELS, RIBBENTROP and BORMANN should in no circumstances be informed of his activities as "EGMONT". In case of inquiry, SCHELLENBERG would claim authorship himself, but no query of this nature ever arose. The following persons were aware that Prisoner was the author of "EGMONT": HIMMLER, KALTENBRUNNER, the Gruppenchefs of Amt VI, the staff of the Zentralbüro of Amt VI, KRAMER (by special permission of SCHELLENBERG), TROTT zu SOLZ and Dr Alexander WERTH (both of the Kul Pol Abt of Ausw Amt).

5. Prisoner's Relations with SCHELLENBERG

In early 44, Prisoner's friend, TROTT zu SOLZ, mentioned in the course of political discussions, that SCHELLENBERG was, for an SS Gen, a "reasonable" man, and might be a useful contact. He, TROTT, would arrange a meeting between Prisoner and SCHELLENBERG. TROTT was executed for his part in the 20 July plot, but he had already arranged for a meeting and through SCHELLENBERG's adjutant, SCHMITZ Prisoner met SCHELLENBERG for a drink at the Hotel Adlon in Sep 44. SCHELLENBERG told Prisoner that he had read, and agreed with, Prisoner's most recent book "Das Zeitalter des Ikaros", which contained some veiled criticisms of HITLER. Prisoner then plunged into a long talk on the political situation, the gist of which hinted that the war was lost, and that in order to get the best terms, GERMANY must make peace now, while she still had some tangible assets with which she could bargain, eg a partially effective Wehrmacht and occupied territories. Furthermore, prolongation of the war would cause further needless destruction in GERMANY and possibly dangerous internal political repercussions. SCHELLENBERG asked Prisoner whether he was aware that his views were opposed to HITLER's. Prisoner replied that he had no info as to what HITLER's views might be, but asked whether HITLER had access to reports which might enable him to form a dispassionate, objective judgement. SCHELLENBERG did not answer directly, but asked Prisoner whether he would be prepared to undertake the evaluation of all international material from Amt VI special sources, for use at highest level. From this discussion the "EGMONT" Reports were initiated.

6. In the following months, Prisoner remained in closest contact with SCHELLENBERG, and became, in fact, his political adviser. Prisoner made it clear to SCHELLENBERG that he would not consent to become an official of Amt VI, or even agree to work in the Amt VI offices. SCHELLENBERG therefore instructed his Zentralbüro that every day the relevant Amt VI files should be sent to Prisoner's flat; these were collected again next day and a new batch delivered. This somewhat peculiar arrangement seems to have functioned satisfactorily, and saved Prisoner the trouble of wrestling with adm routine.
7. About once a week, or once a fortnight - according to the general situation - Prisoner visited SCHELLENBERG at his office, and they spent an afternoon going through the draft "EGMONT" Report which Prisoner had brought with him. SCHELLENBERG rarely made any major alterations, and Prisoner took this opportunity to raise

specific points which could only be briefly touched on in the reports, on which he considered SCHELLENBERG should take action (see para 11).

8. Prisoner's knowledge of GIS

Prisoner claims that his knowledge of GIS org and personalities was slight, and that although he had access to GIS material, he considered himself an outsider and abstained from closer inquiry. Prisoner denies having any knowledge of GIS methods of obtaining int from abroad. He claims to have been aware of the existence of the KOs, but denies knowledge of details. There is no reason to disbelieve Prisoner on this point, since extensive knowledge of the GIS org was not necessary for the production of EGMONT Reports.

At the beginning of Prisoner's collaboration with Amt VI, SCHELLENBERG gave Prisoner a general outline of the GIS, and specifically of the Amt VI org, without disclosing int methods. Prisoner states that as a journalist, he had hitherto had a low opinion of the efficiency of the GIS, and was surprised by the quality of infm available. SCHELLENBERG introduced Prisoner to the heads of his Gruppen, and Prisoner recalls meeting Standf SANDBERGER, Standf STEINE, Ostuf PUFFGEN, Ostuf CLASSEN, Maj OHLETZ and Oberfeldrichter SCHON. SANDBERGER later explained to Prisoner the internal adm of Amt VI. When Amt VI evacuated to BAVARIA in spring 45, Prisoner met Stubaf OHLBRUCK, Obst BUNTROCK and Ostuf DAUFELD.

9. Contents of Reports

Prisoner claims that after a year's imprisonment, his memory is beginning to fail, and he is therefore unable to reconstruct the contents of his reports. He states, on the other hand, that he wrote a fairly complete summary of his reports while he was in American captivity, and could certainly not improve on it. It is not believed that Prisoner is evading the issue on this point; to reconstruct the twelve or thirteen reports after this lapse of time would certainly be a feat of memory. For the sake of completeness, Prisoner's previous reconstruction of the "EGMONT" Reports, taken from the DUSTBIN Report, IN FIAT EP 324-82 (WIRSING) dated 18 Jan 46, is reproduced below:-

(NOTE: The reports are summarised month by month, as Prisoner claims that he could not remember which events were treated in each separate report)

"October 1944

ROOSEVELT's and CHURCHILL's QUEBEC Conference results in the renewed determination for victory in Europe before the Far Eastern victory. Considerable disagreements with RUSSIA as evinced by the decreased lease-lend deliveries. No co-ordination of Anglo-American and Russian conduct of war. This, however, may not be interpreted to indicate that an open conflict between the two groups can be expected before GERMANY's defeat. It means that there will be a race for BERLIN. As the stabilisation of the German front in the West has come as a surprise to EISENHOWER and MONTGOMERY, an opportunity presents itself for initiating negotiations with the Western Powers".



(In one of the first reports, Prisoner mentioned Christmas 44 as the last date by which contract would have to be made with EISENHOWER, any later date would lessen GERMANY's chances).

"November 44

STALIN's first turning against JAPAN demonstrates that RUSSIA is sensitive to American pressure in the matter of deliveries (STALIN's speech at the beginning of Nov shortly before the ROOSEVELT elections). Everything indicates that the Far East problem is in the foreground of American politics (regardless of the QUEBEC agreement). ROOSEVELT uses negotiations for deliveries as a means to obtain Russian participation in the Far East war, urgently demanded by public opinion in the United States. STALIN's speech is the first concession in this respect. By virtue of her sphinx-like behaviour in the Far East, RUSSIA holds the key to the general situation. GERMANY may fear that the Americans will trade Russian concessions in the Far East problem for concessions made to the Russian viewpoint on Europe and particularly on GERMANY. Therefore, the need for early negotiations with EISENHOWER becomes still more urgent. These negotiations make sense only before complete American-Russian agreement is reached, in which, of necessity, the European and Far Eastern problems are being balanced."

"In ENGLAND no vital interest in this horse-trading of the two others. Great internal tension over foreign policy, by which EDEN himself is affected. The inner circle of the Tories is vitally interested not to have the Russian influence in Europe become too preponderating, since this would be in contradiction to the policy of balance of power. The first contact of this influential Tory circle with the Conservative Roman Catholic forces everywhere in Europe. In this connection especially important the role of BIDAULT, who maintains very close contact not only with the Vatican but also in ENGLAND with personalities like VOIGT and others. Important in this connection CHURCHILL's visit in PARIS on 11 Nov (Plans for Western Block)."

"Importance of this also recognised in MOSCOW, hence invitation to DE GAULLE and BIDAULT to come to MOSCOW; this came as a decided surprise during CHURCHILL's presence in PARIS".

"There remains a slight chance for GERMANY to make contact with these circles, especially as Amt VI has contacts with BRUNING through SWITZERLAND."

(NOTE: Prisoner had met BRUNING in 1932, but claims that he had not kept contact with him. When TROTT and Prisoner were looking for a suitable figurehead for a new Government, BRUNING's name was mentioned. TROTT then said that he was in contact with BRUNING through, Prisoner believes, an American who was working at the International Bank in BASLE, and Anton BOHM, of the Ausw Amt, was also in correspondence through another source. SCHELLENBERG himself had another personal contact to BRUNING through SWITZERLAND, but nothing further is known to Prisoner. Prisoner cannot say how far BRUNING was aware of developments inside GERMANY, but thinks

"that, up to 20 July, he was kept informed by TROTT.)

"In the following is given the pivotal point (Note 1 below) of the entire series of EGMONT reports: The Catholic and Conservative Wing cannot possibly negotiate with GERMANY without first establishing preliminary conditions in internal politics. The attempt to capitulate only in the West pre-supposes the establishment of corresponding preliminary conditions:-

- a) in the Roman Catholic problems,
- b) in the Jewish problem (Note 2, below),
- c) in the policy in the territories still occupied, especially in DENMARK and NORWAY.

Unless this is done, GERMANY is unable to negotiate even with those circles in ENGLAND and AMERICA which view with disfavour so great a Soviet preponderance in EUROPE. Reference to utterances in this sense by the American DULLES in SWITZERLAND, and by Americans in LISBON."

"(Note 1: The main point, ie HITLER's resignation or removal could naturally not be included by SCHELLENBERG expressis verbis in the report. It was made evident by the above-mentioned preliminary conditions, which HITLER would never have been able to fulfil, and HIMMLER naturally only as a transitional solution for quite different forces. Therefore, in the last EGMONT report, the proposal was made to ask BRUNING to form the new government)"

"(Note 2: Neither HITLER nor HIMMLER understood the above-mentioned reasoning. The only result was that SCHELLENBERG began negotiations with a member of the Swiss Council (Ex-president MUSY) - for the purpose of freeing Jews who were still in German hands; this was later stopped by HITLER. The second consequence was the granting of a few small concessions to DENMARK and NORWAY and to some of the French who had been arrested; these concessions were, however, nullified by the Gestapo.)"

"December 1944

In MOSCOW anti-Japanese propaganda continues to be moderate. The main problem of American-Russian relations still remains open. So long as this is the case there remains the infinitesimal chance of saving the unity of GERMANY under Anglo-American occupation. On the other hand the result of DE GAULLE's and BIDAULT's visit in MOSCOW is a renewed defeat for the Tories. RUSSIA demonstrates by this that she too insists on speaking decisively in Western European matters. Infm indicates that no final agreement has yet been reached on the problem of the German zones beyond the decisions reached in TEHERAN. GERMANY must take advantage of this before it happens. In JAPAN first inklings of a move to form a cabinet for peace negotiations under KONOYE."

"Battle of the Bulge Interrupts Reports

With the beginning of the LUXEMBURG offensive the reports are interrupted for a while in order to await the results. When Prisoner heard of this plan a short while before, he told SCHELLENBERG that all chances which still existed would be ruined if the offensive was not a huge success, something which could hardly be expected. SCHELLENBERG said that no-one could dissuade HITLER from this plan. He gave Prisoner to understand that HIMMLER was too undecided to act openly against HITLER - although SCHELLENBERG, too, clearly saw that that moment offered irrevocably the last chance.

"Beginning January 1945

The LUXEMBURG offensive, though not absolutely decisive, has been relatively successful in that the American deployment has been considerably disturbed for some time and in that GERMANY has proved that it still exists. It is all the more important now to draw the political consequence from this, especially since everything indicates an early conference of the Big Three. This is repeated urgently at the end of January. In the meantime, the great Russian offensive has, as could be foreseen, ruined the preliminary conditions which were the basis of the EGMONT reports of October, November and December (Renewed interruptions of the reports)".

"End of February 1945

Detailed analysis of the YALTA conference (this report is in American hands). Prisoner compared all the items which had come to his knowledge and on which an agreement had been reached with those which had remained unsettled. The result of the report: A final accord, as GERMANY had feared for some time, has been reached between the Allies. Presumably it also covers, in principle, the Far East problem. GERMANY's last chance is gone for the realisation of the plan submitted in autumn 1944. (In fact the preliminary conditions in internal politics, which were indispensable, had not been fulfilled.) There can no longer be any hope of a separate Anglo-American policy, not even with regard to capitulation."

"March 1945

The last reports dealt with the opposition in ENGLAND to parts of the YALTA decisions (the Polish question). They gave, however, only a condensed picture of the general situation. The last report recommended the voluntary dissolution of the NSDAP and the appeal to BRUNING to form a new Reich Government."

10. Sources of "EGMONT" Reports

Since the "EGMONT" Reports were essentially political reports, much of Amt VI's specialised infm was of no interest to Prisoner, or served merely as confirmation, in detail, of the general trend already known to him. Under this heading falls all military and most industrial int. Furthermore, since Prisoner

was an outsider in Amt VI he made it a point of etiquette not to inquire into the sources of the infm. Lastly as an experienced foreign commentator, Prisoner had acquired, over the years, a thorough knowledge of foreign affairs which continued to serve him for his interpretation of broad policy.

a) Basic Material

Material drawn from sources not connected with the GIS:-

(i) International News Agencies (Reuter, UP, AP, INS, TASS, etc).

The DNB provided a German translation of all messages sent by the International News Agencies, which came to about 200 pages a day. Security grading was "Secret". Similarly, they also provided a monitoring service of foreign broadcasting stations. Prisoner received these foreign news summaries as political commentator for "Signal". Prisoner's secretaries undertook the preliminary sifting of this bulky material.

(ii) American and British Papers and Magazines, eg the airmail edition of "The Times". Previously most of this material had come via LISBON, but now Prisoner had to rely on the somewhat limited supply from STOCKHOLM.

(iii) Reports from German Embassies in Neutral Countries.

As a political writer of repute, Prisoner, over the years, had formed a number of personal contacts with high-ranking Ausw Amt officials, from whom he received occasionally infm and guidance regarding the trend of foreign affairs, and who showed him, privately, reports sent in by the Embassies in SWEDEN, SWITZERLAND, SPAIN and PORTUGAL. During the period of the "EGMONT" Reports his most important contacts were no longer available (eg TROTT zu SOLZ had been executed in summer 44 for his part in the 20 July plot), but Prisoner consulted the following:-

Dr SIX	Head of Infm Sec, Ausw Amt. SIX did NOT show Prisoner confidential reports.
Dr Alexander WERTH	Infm Sec, Ausw Amt. Prisoner's main contact at the time. Provided Ausw Amt reports regarding the Western Allies.
Leg Rat BRAUN	Far East Sec, Ausw Amt. Provided infm on the Far East.
Dr Anton BOHM	Vatican Referat. Provided infm on Roman Catholic affairs.
<i>Sue</i> (Sdr KRAMER)	Embassy, STOCKHOLM. In parentheses, KRAMER should be added to this list. KRAMER was aware that Prisoner had difficulty in obtaining access to Ausw Amt reports, many of which were circulating at the Embassy in STOCKHOLM. KRAMER made a practice of abstracting

inform he thought might interest Prisoner, and forwarding it via the Amt VI courier service to BERLIN with the prefix "for EGMONT". The messages were passed on to Prisoner by Maj OHLETTZ of Mil C, without going through normal channels.)

Prisoner states that Embassy reports were in general interesting only for what they failed to report.

(iv) German Personalities from Abroad

Prisoner had a very wide circle of acquaintances, many of whom were abroad as foreign correspondents for German papers. Whenever these returned to GERMANY they made a habit of calling on him and exchanging news. Prisoner recalls having spoken to the following during the "EGMONT" period:-

Journalists: SELIGO Correspondent for DINATAG in LISBON. Saw Prisoner in winter 44 in BERLIN.

Sued von TOGGENBURG Former MNN correspondent in STOCKHOLM and personal friend of Prisoner's. TOGGENBURG was fairly frequently in GERMANY and excellently informed.

SCHMITZ MNN correspondent in TURKEY.

PORZGEN Correspondent of "Frankfurter Zeitung" in SOFIA, formerly in MOSCOW and TANGIER.

ST. Ger Diplomats: DIECKHOFF Ambassador in SPAIN; on leave in GERMANY in Nov 44. A close personal friend of Prisoner, and well-informed on Anglo-American matters.

RAHN Ambassador in ITALY. Also a personal friend of Prisoner. Prisoner met him three times during this period:-

Aug 44: Prisoner visited RAHN in FASANO to ask him to intervene on behalf of TROTT zu SOLZ.

Nov 44: Prisoner introduced RAHN to SCHELLENBERG. Prisoner hoped that RAHN might be induced to put out peace feelers for SCHELLENBERG through DUILLES in SWITZERLAND, and also act as Amt VI informant. Prisoner denies that RAHN agreed to collaborate with SCHELLENBERG.

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Dec 44: Prisoner met RAHN in WURZBURG to discuss RAHN's Vatican contacts, and the Nazi attitude towards Roman Catholicism, which Prisoner hoped to modify. He wished peace feelers to be sent out through RAHN's Vatican contacts.

Von PAPEN

Ambassador in TURKEY. Prisoner met von PAPEN in BERLIN after the latter's return from TURKEY in autumn 44.

Travellers:

Prof SCHMITZ

Internec repatriated from USA; until the war head of the Deutsche Akademie in NEW YORK.

Frau BOVERI

Another repatriate from USA; member of the BROWN-BOVERI family.

(v) Foreign Personalities

Prisoner denies that during this time he met any foreigners of note. He recalls, however, having some discussions with two members of the Japanese Embassy in BERLIN, regarding the political situation in the Far East:-

USHIDA

First (?) Secretary at Japanese Embassy.

Adm KOSHIMA

Naval Attache at Japanese Embassy.

b) Ant VI Material

Ant VI material, taken by itself, was much too limited in scope to allow Prisoner to draw from it the extensive summaries required for his reports, but it was valuable in that it supplied concrete proofs and substantiated, in many details, his conclusions.

(i) Monitoring Reports (Sechausdienst)

Valuable as supplementary material to the International News Agencies reports (see above). Owing to the paucity of material about the USSR, the Russian sec of this report was specially useful.

(ii) Ant VI Daily Reports (Tagesbericht)

(NOTE: Prisoner has been questioned on SCHULLENBERG's statement that the Daily Reports also went under the cover-name of "EGMONT" Reports. Prisoner states this must be a misunderstanding; he claims that only his reports were known by this name.)

The Daily Reports recorded, in brief excerpts or summaries, all the important messages which had come in during the preceding day, but co-ordination and evaluation of these messages were not attempted, eg from EISBERG (good connections in Roman Catholic circles, military infm must be accepted with reserve). Origin of source was not indicated. The Daily Reports ran to six to twelve pages, and contained military routine material, eg shipping reports from GIBRALTAR, tactical reports from FAKs, troop movements, chains of cmd etc of enemy armies. Prisoner was not interested in this type of int, but looked for items of political int which sometimes were found among these messages.

Prisoner states that he does not remember the cover-names of these sources, except the following, which provided him with the only valuable political int material:-

*Sined* JOSEPHINE: Provided excellent political sitreps, especially on the Western Allies.

EISBERG: Infm about Roman Catholic matters.

HECTOR: Mainly a mil and industrial source.

*Por.* "LEANDER": *ced* SCHELLENBERG's private source in LISBON. Through this source SCHELLENBERG obtained an American contact (through DULLES ?) and received infm about internal American political personalities.

*SP. (Hepat.)* "OSTRO": *FIDBMUC* Another excellent source for political int on Western Powers.

Far East Sources: Mil C ran three agents in the Far East (SHANGHAI ?), who also seemed well-informed politically; one of these was known as BORODIN. They reported on peace feelers by JAPAN to reach a settlement with CHIANG KAI SHEK, the political situation in CHINA and often good material about Soviet industry and the equipment of Soviet armies in SIBERIA. Once there was also a report on a secret meeting of Japanese and Russian delegates in SIBERIA.

Prisoner admits that he was aware that JOSEPHINE and HECTOR were KRAMER sources, but claims that he deliberately abstained from trying to find out further details. Some JOSEPHINE political int messages carried the prefix "EGMONT" and were passed to Prisoner directly they reached Amt VI. Prisoner knows nothing about the OSTRO source, except that the infm came through SPAIN.

Under this heading fall also the memos of SCHELLENBERG on conversations he had with personalities of int interest.

Prisoner recalls two such names, one on a conversation with Adm KOSHIMA of the Japanese Embassy in BERLIN, the other on conversations with MUSY.

(iii) Agents' Original Messages

SP. For Prisoner's purposes, the most important and reliable political int was contained in the JOSEPHINE and OSTRO messages. He also remembers the following: -

V-Man JAKOB: Apparently in close contact with the Swiss IS, and also some contact with DULLES in BERNE. Prisoner believes that JAKOB may have been an agent run directly by SCHELLENBERG.

Contact with Spanish Foreign Office

A certain amount of material from the Spanish Foreign Office was available. Prisoner remembers several official Spanish reports regarding the political situation in TURKEY. He can give no infm as to how this material was obtained, eg whether it was passed on by the Spaniards, or stolen from Spanish Foreign Office files.

Roman Catholic Sources

Again, Prisoner can give nothing but the vaguest infm. Some of this material was reliable, some of it pure invention. The only source Prisoner can recall is a V-man, designated by a number, whose no doubt unwitting, informants included the Prior of the SCHEYERN Monastery in BAVARIA and the Bishop of LJUBLJANA in SLOVENIA.

French Source from SWITZERLAND

A private source of SCHELLENBERG's reporting about the internal political difficulties of DE GAULLE and his relations with BIDAULT. This source reported at great length on the significance of DE GAULLE's visit to MOSCOW, winter 45. Prisoner believes this infm may have come from someone close to BONNET, then living in SWITZERLAND.

Chinese Source in SWITZERLAND

A private source of SCHELLENBERG's, from which he obtained at the time the sensational disclosure about the YALTA Conference, that the Russians had acted as intermediaries in introducing Japanese representatives to STETTINIUS. Prisoner still thinks this infm is of doubtful reliability.



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USA There were NO agents' reports.

GREAT BRITAIN There were NO agents' reports. In the Daily Report there was, however, occasional mention of the effects of V-weapons; movements of troops, etc.

(iv) Decoding Dept of OKW (Chi-Berichte)

Ant VI received translations of diplomatic telegrams in cipher which had been broken. These were specially useful to Prisoner, since they contained facts which he could test against his own conjectures. There was no continuity of coverage, nor did they reveal any startling news. The info was necessarily scrappy, but Prisoner recollects messages from the following Embassies:-

Turkish Ambassador in MOSCOW to his Government. This was the only complete coverage available. Messages indicated the extreme pressure which the USSR continually brought to bear on TURKEY.

Bulgarian Ambassador in MOSCOW to his Government. Reported mainly on events in the BALKANS, especially developments in GREECE.

Japanese Ambassador in MOSCOW to his Government. Occasional telegrams were deciphered which indicated clearly that the Japanese were having increasing difficulties in maintaining friendly relations with the USSR. Through this source came confirmation from an Ant VI Far East V-man regarding a secret meeting of Japanese and Russian emissaries somewhere in SIBERIA.

(NOTE: Prisoner has been pressed on the accuracy of his statement, in view of CLASSEN's claim that OKW/Chi III was unable to break the Japanese code, although in possession of the Basic Japanese code-book (OSDIO(WEA) Final Report 85 on CLASSEN, Appendix C, para 1, dated 27 Jul 45. Prisoner nevertheless maintains his contention.)

Ambassador HARRIMAN in MOSCOW to the State Dept on Russo-Polish relations.

Polish mission in JERUSALEM to Polish Govt in LONDON. Continuous coverage of reports on developments in BALKANS and NEAR EAST, especially ELAS rising.

Bulgarian Envoy in SWITZERLAND to his Government. Reported on BALKAN affairs and attitude of Western Powers towards BALKANS.

American missions in BALKANS. Reported on difficulties with Russians.

CORDELL HULL to US Embassy PARIS. Announced the arrival of Ambassador CAFFERY.

British Codes: Prisoner does not recollect seeing an intercept from a British code.

(v) Evaluated material from Amt VI Gruppen

This consisted mostly of the reports by the various Gruppen concerning either their geographical sphere as a whole, or detailed analysis of a specific point.

Summary of activities in SOUTH AMERICA; monthly reports on the FAR EAST. For example, the Far East Referat prepared a monthly report on events in the FAR EAST. Other reports concerned the effect of V-weapons in the UK, British political pressure on TURKEY, character-sketches of new political foreign personalities and an analysis of the American elections.

Summing up all the sources of infm available to him, Prisoner concludes that on the whole, only the JOSEPHINE and OSTRO Reports were genuine and reliable political int. It was, therefore, Prisoner's practice, before committing to paper his own analysis of important political developments, to await the JOSEPHINE and OSTRO telegrams on this point, which, however, agreed generally with his own views. Thus, in the matter of the YALTA Conference, apart from the international news releases and radio comments, Prisoner received infm from three sources:-

SCHELLENBERG's private Chinese source, reporting American-Japanese peace negotiations. This news was treated with reserve, and Prisoner awaited confirmation.

SP. OSTRO gave a full and reliable report on the YALTA Conference about ten days later; there was no mention of the Japanese envoys.

JOSEPHINE (KRUMER through ONODERA in STOCKHOLM) reported about a week after OSTRO; this was the most reliable of all three. There was no mention of the Japanese envoys.

There were NO WT intercepts on YALTA.

11. Distribution

Draft Reports handed in by Prisoner to SCHELLENBERG after final discussions were headed "EGMONT Berichte", and were passed out on the authority of KALTENBRUNNER. Prisoner is unable to say whether KALTENBRUNNER made any corrections before they left the RSHA. The reports were then retyped in special "Führer-type" (an especially large typewriter) on RSHA VI paper and headed "Aussenpolitische Lageberichte". (Prisoner claims he only glanced at one such final copy and is not certain of the exact phraseology.) With each copy went a note from KALTENBRUNNER, saying: "Herewith the latest report from Amt VI".

External distribution was as follows:-

One copy to FEGELEIN for HITLER.

One copy to HEWEL, Ausw Amt LO at FHQ. HEWEL had given a written undertaking that he would not show these reports to RIBBENTROP.

One copy to HIMMLER.

One copy to SEYSS-INQUART (a personal friend of KALTENBRUNNER).

Internal RSHA Distribution of "EGMONT" Reports was:-

One copy to KALTENBRUNNER.

Several copies kept by SCHELLENBERG, who may have given them to various persons at his discretion. For instance Ogruf LORENZ read many of the reports and Prisoner believes that SCHELLENBERG circulated them among his Gruppenleiter.

One copy kept by Prisoner.

## 12. Addenda to "EGMONT" Reports

As a rule, each "EGMONT" Report contained a short addendum, in the form of a private aide-memoire for SCHELLENBERG. In it Prisoner raised specific points at greater length than was possible in a political survey; these points were the result of the several hours' discussion Prisoner had with SCHELLENBERG before the publication of each "EGMONT" Report. During these discussions, especially in the later stages, SCHELLENBERG and Prisoner openly discussed what could be done to end the war in the light of the existing situation, and any concrete measure which might contribute to that end was touched on during the discussions, eg the MUSY negotiations to release the Jews from the concentration camps (aim: favourably influencing world opinion towards GERMANY); negotiations for the release of Danish police and Danish Jews from concentration camps; release of five Swedes sentenced to death in the WARSAW trials (aim: to win the goodwill of SWEDEN as a prerequisite for SWEDEN's services as intermediary in peace negotiations); reversal of Gauleiter's HOFER's radical anti-Catholic policy in AUSTRIA (aim: to maintain what Prisoner considered the vital goodwill of Vatican circles, through whom peace feelers were also attempted); These were all relatively small points which SCHELLENBERG could bring up in the course of his interviews with HIMMLER, who in turn might either give the desired instructions on his own responsibility or try and obtain HITLER's sanction at a convenient opportunity. The aide-memoires were essentially briefs for SCHELLENBERG, stating the problem and recommending action to be taken. Through them SCHELLENBERG, in fact, became the mouth-piece of Prisoner, and Prisoner was gratified by the influence he could exercise without assuming public responsibility.

## 13. Destruction of "EGMONT" Reports

Prisoner has been interrogated at some length on this point. He professes ignorance as to the whereabouts of any of the reports distributed through Amt VI. His own personal copies, he claims, were destroyed in the last days of Apr 45. Pressed for details on the alleged destruction, Prisoner slightly modified the version he gave previously, and now states the following:-

When Amt VI evacuated to BAVARIA in spring 45, Prisoner, with four or five other Amt VI officials, was living in BAD HEILBRUNN. There Prisoner met Ostuf DAUFELD of Amt VI, who had recently been expelled from SWITZERLAND for int activities for Amt VI. DAUFELD introduced Prisoner to his father-in-law, GUT, the owner of the Hotel Kaiserhof in BAD TOLZ. GUT agreed to let Prisoner use the safe in his hotel, and the "EGMONT" Reports were deposited there, since Prisoner did not wish to have them in his billet. Prisoner states that GUT and Frau DAUFELD knew only that "the yellow folder" contained secret state documents; Ostuf DAUFELD was aware that it contained the "EGMONT" Reports.

From 29 Apr to 2 May 45 Prisoner was in FLENSBURG (see Appendix C). During this time, BAD TULZ was overrun by American troops. Ostubaf DAUFELD was in hiding at the time, but before he left he gave instructions to his wife and father-in-law not to let the "yellow folder" fall into enemy hands. Shortly before the Americans arrived, GUT and Frau DAUFELD burned these reports. Prisoner learned these facts from DAUFELD himself, who was later arrested by the Americans, and together with Prisoner was at FREISING, 3rd US Army Interrogation Centre.

A few days after Prisoner's return from FLENSBURG, in the first week of May 45, Prisoner's secretary, Frau Hannelore RAHM, went to BAD TULZ and learned that the documents had been destroyed. She related this to Prisoner, and it was from her that he first knew of their destruction. Prisoner insists that when he left for FLENSBURG, he gave NO instructions to anyone what to do with the reports in the case of American occupation.

14. Two Reports believed captured

Prisoner believes that two reports have been captured. At beg Jun 45, Prisoner was interrogated at FREISING by Capt FLEX, US Army, who told him that the "EGMONT" Report about YALTA had been found among documents seized at SEYSS-INQUART's HQ. Later, in Dec 45, Lt MITTELBERGER told Prisoner in OBERURSEL that another copy had recently been found.

15. Prisoner's Relations with KRAMER *ced*

KRAMER, through his JOSEPHINE Reports, was Prisoner's most important source for the "EGMONT" Reports. Furthermore, KRAMER was the only int agent personally known to Prisoner. His relations with KRAMER may therefore be of interest.

Prisoner made KRAMER's acquaintance in Mar or Apr 43, when KRAMER called on Prisoner in BERLIN with a letter of introduction from TOGGENBURG. As a political journalist Prisoner always welcomed an exchange of info with well-informed persons from abroad, although this had become more difficult since the war. Even during KRAMER's first visit it was evident that he was extremely well informed, especially about political trends in the UK and USA. KRAMER introduced himself as a member of the German Embassy in STOCKHOLM, and Prisoner asked him to call again on his next visit to BERLIN. KRAMER afterwards called regularly on Prisoner whenever he happened to be in BERLIN, which was usually about once a month or every six weeks. The two men became personal friends, since they found their political outlook to be very similar, and they had systematic discussions covering all aspects of the international situation, eg the military situation, political trends among Axis and Allied powers, the role of the chief political personalities, Allied intentions, strategy, etc. Prisoner states that before the war, he was accustomed to have many such discussions with other, similarly well-informed persons, mostly journalists or members of the Ausw Amt. Now, however, there remained only TROTT zu SOLZ and Albrecht HAUSHOFER (both executed after the 20 July plot). KRAMER's info, for him, was therefore specially valuable, since this info, especially his knowledge of the UK, was apparently based on facts and not on surmise and conjecture.

At first, KRAMER did not mention his duties in STOCKHOLM. After some time, he hinted that they were in connection with the GAF

Führungsstab, and about a year after their first meeting, he told Prisoner he was a member of the Abw. Prisoner claims that he studiously avoided inquiring into details or questioning KRAMER about the sources of his infm.

Prisoner claims that until autumn 44 he made no use of the political int he heard from KRAMER. He stoutly maintains that as a journalist and political writer, it was his job and ambition to be well-informed; the fact that he was then working in a minor capacity on the propaganda journal "Signal", for which this infm was unnecessary, was irrelevant. KRAMER's conversations corroborated Prisoner's growing conviction that GERMANY was losing the war, and that an early negotiated peace with the Western Powers was the only way out, a conviction shared by, among others, KRAMER himself and TROTT zu SOLZ, who was also working towards that end.

When Prisoner began his career as "EGMONT" he told SCHELLENBERG that he knew KRAMER, and asked permission to make use of KRAMER directly. KRAMER told Prisoner that the JOSEPHINE reports came via a Swedish source, and their conversations now included operational and mil questions, on which subject KRAMER had hitherto shown a certain reserve. But Prisoner still did NOT question KRAMER about his sources of infm. From time to time, Prisoner asked KRAMER for confirmation or elaboration of certain political news he had received from other Amt VI sources; these briefs were sent to KRAMER via Amt VI, and his replies were prefixed "for EGMONT". Prisoner states that KRAMER was the only int offr with whom he was in contact - otherwise he knew only cover-names of reports. For instance, the identity of OSTRO, the only other source of high political int value, was not known to Prisoner.

KRAMER was aware of Prisoner's political significance as "EGMONT". Although, for his own sake, Prisoner had not taken KRAMER into his full confidence regarding his political intentions, KRAMER knew of, and supported Prisoner's and SCHELLENBERG's attempt to negotiate a peace with the Western Allies. By 1945, KRAMER was able to discuss German peace overtures openly with SCHELLENBERG when he went to report to Amt VI, and KRAMER kept SCHELLENBERG informed directly of the political situation.

During Prisoner's visits to BEST in COPENHAGEN (see Appendix D paras 30 and 31) he met KRAMER for discussions. These, however, differed in no way from the talks they had in BERLIN.

#### 16. Prisoner's Relations with PFLEIDERER

PFLEIDERER fits into the framework of SCHELLENBERG's and Prisoner's overriding interest in SCANDINAVIA as the only remaining German asset. Prisoner and SCHELLENBERG were both agreed that the TERBOVEN-HITLER policy of resistance and scorched earth in NORWAY and DENMARK was mistaken. Meanwhile, KRAMER had become friendly with PFLEIDERER, head of the Consular Dept in the German Legation at STOCKHOLM, who also desired to see better relations between SWEDEN and GERMANY, the more so, since the Swedish Govt would be unlikely to act on GERMANY's behalf in any peace negotiations unless their most pressing demands were sympathetically considered.

At beg Mar 45, KRAMER reported to Prisoner that PFLEIDERER, an expert on Scandinavian affairs, had had some unofficial talks with Danish and Swedish personalities on the subject and regarded with deepest dismay the present German policy.

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Towards end Mar 45, whilst PFLEIDERER happened to be in BERLIN, he went to see Prisoner at KRAMER's suggestion and discussed the whole Scandinavian question very openly. The substance of this conversation has been fully reported in CSDIC(WEA) Final Report 21 on PFLEIDERER, Appendix E, paras 6 - 10 and has been confirmed by Prisoner. Prisoner asked PFLEIDERER to let him have a memorandum on SCANDINAVIA; PFLEIDERER wrote this on his return to STOCKHOLM, and sent it to Prisoner through KRAMER. This memorandum was incorporated in another "addendum" to an "ECMONT" Report, stressing that unless SCHELLENBERG could bring HIMMLER to take immediate action to reverse or at least soften HITLER's Scandinavian policy, peace negotiations through SWEDEN would inevitably fall.

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DIC  
COG(BE)  
25 Oct 46

APPENDIX B TO FR 105

TOP SECRET

Giselher WIRSING

APPENDIX B

THE INFORMATION SECTION OF THE AUSW AMT

Sep 39 - Autumn 40

1. Scope of Knowledge

From Sep 39 to autumn 40 Prisoner, at the invitation of RIBBENTROP, acted as hon adviser to the newly formed section. The inf'm he gives may be regarded as reliable, although Prisoner is exceedingly vague about Civil Service org and adm routine.

2. Prisoner's Contacts with Ausw Amt (till autumn 39)

As a well known publicist on foreign affairs Prisoner had formed connections with higher Ausw Amt officials, dating back to 1928, when he met HASSEL, von SCHULENBERG, DIRCKSEN and others at the house of KOCH-WESER, the then Minister of Justice and Leader of the Social Democratic Party. In 1932 Prisoner published in the "Tägliche Rundschau" a series of articles purporting to show that the foreign policy of the government was crippled by the obstructive attitude of key Ausw Amt personnel, and calling for urgent reforms: these articles had something like a "succes de scandale" and were, Prisoner claims, partly responsible for initiating the abortive re-organisation of the Ausw Amt attempted by von NEURATH.

From 1933 to 1939 Prisoner remained in fairly close touch with the Ausw Amt. He was at the time editor-in-chief of the "Münchener Neueste Nachrichten" and for his own inf'm Prisoner cultivated his many contacts in the Ausw Amt. Prisoner was the first German editor to organise air-mail deliveries of his paper to foreign countries: from 1935 onwards the MNN was distributed in POLAND, CZECHOSLOVAKIA, the BALKANS, ITALY, FRANCE, SWITZERLAND, SPAIN and PORTUGAL before any other German paper, and had a foreign circulation three times as high as that of the "Frankfurter Zeitung", its nearest competitor. This gave the MNN a valuable asset, and the Ausw Amt was anxious that it should be well informed. Prisoner emphasises that the MNN did not become the mouthpiece of the Ausw Amt although he was on good terms with most of the leading Ausw Amt officials. During his frequent travels abroad he visited the German Embassies, and came to know a large number of German diplomats. In the course of time Prisoner formed specially close ties with ~~Sec~~ Ambassadors DIECKHOFF, ALTENBURG and RAHN, with Fürst von BISMARCK, Unterstaatssek HENCKE, ~~Ambassadors~~ von HEEREN and von RENTHE-FINK, with TROTT zu SOLZ and Dr Alexander WERTH. Prisoner also met other officials socially at receptions given in BERLIN and elsewhere.

Prisoner denies that he had any contact with the Büro RIBBENTROP. He was granted only one short interview with RIBBENTROP in LONDON in early 1939, while RIBBENTROP was Ambassador at the Court of St James.

### 3. Conference at FUSHL

At beg Aug 39 Prisoner received a telephonic summons to FUSCHL, RIBBENTROP's residence, where he met a number of other journalists known for their comparative independence: KIRCHER and SIEBURG, of the "Frankfurter Zeitung", von PUCKLER, of the "Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung", von STUDNITZ of the SCHERL publishing house, and Ernst JUNGER, the well-known author. The Ausw Amt officials present were Gesandter ALTENBURG, Leg Rat RAHN and Prof BERBER.

RIBBENTROP opened the two-day conference by a review of the present international crisis. His theme was that even if the "war party" in BRITAIN should gain the upper hand, the French Govt could be trusted to exert a restraining influence. Nevertheless, in RIBBENTROP's opinion, the crisis was likely to last for some months, until the "Polish question" was settled. A period of intense German propaganda abroad was desirable, firstly as a justification and secondly as an instrument of German policy. RIBBENTROP therefore requested the journalists present to put their services, either on a part-time or a permanent basis, at the disposal of the propaganda section of the Ausw Amt. SIEBURG accepted and became Botschaftsrat, von PUCKLER and STUDNITZ agreed to serve as advisers in an honorary capacity. KIRCHER and JUNGER refused. Prisoner offered his part-time honorary services to the Ministry, spending two-thirds of his time in BERLIN and the rest in MUNICH with his paper.

### 4. Reorganisation of the Infm Section of Ausw Amt

After this conference the Infm Section was reorganised. ALTENBURG was put in charge of the section, the personnel of which was as follows:-

<u>Ausw Amt personnel:</u>	<p>Ges ALTENBURG: Head of the Section, personal liaison with other depts.</p> <p>Leg Rat RAHN: Deputy Head. In charge of actual work of section.</p> <p>Leg Rat Baron von RANTZAU: LO to OKW.</p> <p>Leg Rat KRUG zu NIDDA: (successor to RANTZAU).</p> <p>Konsul TUCHER</p> <p>Gen-Konsul Baron von SCHELLA</p> <p>TROTT zu SOLZ (Left for USA in autumn 39, retd summer 40).</p> <p>Wiss Hilfsarb Alexander WERTH (joined early 40).</p> <p>Leg Sek WOLFF</p> <p>Leg Sek SIMON</p> <p>Wiss Hilfsarb RICHTER.</p> <p>(Five or six other officials, names forgotten).</p>
<u>Journalists:</u>	<p>Von PUCKLER</p> <p>Von STUDNITZ (Left shortly afterwards for Presse Abt).</p> <p>Prisoner</p> <p>Albrecht HAUSHOFER Jr (demographer).</p>



The Infm Section was on the same level as the Presse Abt (under SCHMIDT) and the Rundfunk Abt (under RÜHLE), but cooperation with them was somewhat loose (see para 8 (c)). In addition to the Infm Section there existed the Deutsche Informationsstelle, under Prof. DERBER, a public company sponsored by the Ausw Amt, whose functions were, theoretically, tech supervision of layout and printing of literature produced by the Infm Sec, and dissemination to foreign journalists in BERLIN. In practice, it tended to duplicate the work of the Infm Sec. This led to intense rivalry between the two depts. Prisoner states that the series of hysterical propaganda pamphlets: "England Unmasked" (England Ohne Maske) were produced by this dept. In addition there were also two inter-departmental committees, the Engländerausschuss and the Frankreichausschuss, on which the Infm Section was represented. These will be referred to in para 7.

Prisoner states that the Infm Sec, in the early days, was a small body of a few specialists, who worked on a flexible and non-bureaucratic basis. RAHN and Prisoner appear to have been the driving force behind the Sec: ALTENBURG was fully occupied in straightening out difficulties with other depts.

In spring 43 Dr SIX (formerly head of RSHA VII) took over control of the sec, and the Infm Sec was greatly enlarged, merged with the Kultur Abt and renamed the Kul-Pol Abt. Prisoner can give no infm about its activities, but he states that it became an unwieldy apparatus with many subsections and Referats which failed to function efficiently.

#### 5. Functions

To disseminate German propaganda in neutral countries Prisoner stresses: a) that the sec was not responsible for distribution; this was the function of the German Embassies abroad, and was the particular job of the Kulturattaches; b) that the sec did not deal with propaganda in enemy countries.

#### 6. Projects Carried Out

Prisoner claims to be unable to remember all the work done by the Sec during the months he served in it. It was flooded with propaganda ideas from well-meaning outsiders and a large amount of time was taken up in sifting this material. Prisoner's duties were to advise RAHN on practicable propaganda projects. He remembers the following as having been carried out.

##### a) German War Photographs

A great asset at the time was GERMANY's monopoly of war photographs. Prisoner realised the value of this, and KANTZAU, later KRUG zu NIDDA, was appointed LO to the OKW to ensure that a steady and speedy supply of photographs was made available to the foreign Press via the Deutsche Informationsstelle. Censorship was relaxed in some respects for this purpose, eg the rule that no photograph of a dead German soldier should appear, was waived. The Press releases were directed mainly towards the USA, and the Ausw Amt was able to send out pictures which, to some extent, counteracted the notion that SS thugs and Junker types predominated in the German Army.

b) Pamphlets on HITLER's Peace Offer

These were prepared after the Polish campaign and summarised HITLER's speeches on the subject. They were slanted differently according to the country for which the pamphlets were intended.

c) "Rien que la Vérité"

A fortnightly 24-page magazine in French, Roumanian and Turkish. It was satirical and sexy in treatment, containing biting comments on extracts from the enemy Press, reporting on the allegedly "severe" conditions in GERMANY. The most fruitful source was the "Daily Mail", which often carried detailed "eye-witness stories" about alleged shortages or other hardships suffered by the German people. The Infm Sec had no difficulty in ridiculing these sensational products of a sub-editor's brain.

d) Leaflets

A number of leaflets were distributed relating to GERMANY's war aims and/or peaceful intentions. After each HITLER speech leaflets were prepared giving the gist of HITLER's remarks concerning the country towards which the propaganda was directed. For instance, POLAND was the subject of much ingenuous propaganda, since the Infm Sec was aware that the Poles were none too popular abroad, even with the Allies. They stressed the undemocratic, reactionary, feudal nature of POLAND, and one leaflet, issued on the instructions of RIBBENTROP, contained atrocity stories about the use of poison gas by the Polish Army during the Polish campaign. There was little truth in this; the facts were that a number of poison-gas shells had been captured by the German Army during the Polish campaign.

e) "Tory MP"

One of the scoops of the Sec concerned the book "Tory MP", by an anonymous author, published by Victor GOLLANCZ during the war. Prisoner saw a review of the book in the "Spectator". Export of the book was banned by British Censorship, but eventually a copy was procured via the German Consul-General in AMSTERDAM. The book was reprinted in GERMANY in its entirety, and distributed privately to influential personages abroad. Thus, a Swedish MP would meet another Swede, who for this purpose was acting for the Kulturattache of the Embassy in STOCKHOLM, at a social gathering. In the course of conversation the MP would be "lent" a copy of the book "which had recently been published in ENGLAND", and which the other "happened to have with him".

The position in the USA was different. "Tory MP" had been published in AMERICA. The German Infm Library in NEW YORK was instructed to buy up copies and send them to influential people on their mailing list, such as isolationist senators. In fact, "Tory MP", according to Prisoner, did the British cause much harm, and was quoted gleefully by isolationists in Congress and Senate.

For wider use, a German version of "Tory MP" was prepared. It ran to about a hundred pages, and omitted the disparaging remarks about GERMANY, Fascists, etc. The Germans added more "dirt" on Parliamentary personalities, which, by some oversight, had been left out by the author, and tastefully illustrated it with unflattering drawings and photographs of the MPs concerned. Distribution was in the normal way through the Embassies in neutral countries.

f) Reply to British White Paper on Outbreak of Hostilities

This pamphlet was written by Prisoner himself in collaboration with Botschafter von MOLTKE, head of the Documentation Section of the Ausw Amt. In it Prisoner did his best to discredit the British White Paper, seizing on the fact that Lord HALIFAX, during the last decisive days, had not exerted pressure on the Polish Govt to restrain their "aggressiveness". The German reply was given out through the DNB and German radio, and also issued in pamphlet form through Embassies abroad.

g) German reply to French Orange Book

The Quai d'Orsay issued their own version of the circumstances leading to the commencement of hostilities, which, however, was less factual than the British version. Prisoner had less difficulty in demolishing the French case. The German reply was distributed in the same way as the reply to the British White Paper.

h) Kriegsatlas

This idea was copied from the Oxford pamphlets "The War in Maps", and the colourful atlas contained tendentious maps demonstrating German strategic needs, "Lebensraum" and the rest of the German "demographic" effusions. It was distributed in all neutral countries.

7. Propaganda in Enemy Countries

Prisoner states that this was not the function of the Infm Sec. During the period under review the Sec made one exception to the rule: It suggested to the OKW the production of a leaflet, in the shape of an autumn leaf, to be dropped over enemy lines. On the reverse was printed a ~~free~~ pass to the German lines, promising preferential treatment as PW. The idea was accepted by the OKW and later copied by the Allies. Propaganda in enemy countries was the province of two special committees, viz:-

a) Englendausschuss:

An inter-departmental committee responsible for overall directives for political warfare against the UK. Prisoner claims he can give no infm about this committee, since the Infm Sec, at least during the "phoney war" period, was hoping for an early peace and was careful not to antagonise GREAT BRITAIN by hysterical or dangerous propaganda. They therefore thought political warfare against the UK a mistake and took no interest in this committee, although they were instructed to send a representative (RANTZAU).

The committee consisted of representatives from the following depts:-

Chairman of Committee:	Geh Rat HESSE
Ausw Amt Depts:	Presse
	Rundfunk
	Pol Abt
	Wirtschaft
	Information

Propaganda Ministry  
OKW  
Luftwaffenführungsstab  
Abw (?)

b) Frankreichausschuss

A similar inter-departmental committee existed for propaganda in FRANCE, headed, Prisoner believes, by Otto ADETZ. It ceased work after the occupation of FRANCE in Aug 40. The only example of its work Prisoner remembers is a series of pamphlets on French politicians, which gave the impression of emanating from a French Radical Socialist critic. After about ten pages the pamphlets switched over to virulent personal attacks on the character of the politician in question. The pamphlets were somehow smuggled into FRANCE via BELGIUM and achieved a wide distribution.

8. Liaison with Other Departments

a) Propaganda Ministry

Liaison was maintained with the Auslands Dept of the Propaganda Ministry (BOHME and BRAUWEILER). Prisoner is vague about the division of functions between the two depts, but states that co-operation was negligible. It appears that a bone of contention was control of the Kulturattachés at the Embassies, which was vested in the Ausw Amt. In spring 40 inter-departmental jealousy grew to such an extent that a special Führer Edict was issued to settle the matter: in fact, non-co-operation continued as before.

b) OKW

The Infm Sec had its own LO (RANTZAU) at the OKW, whose duties were to pass on all suitable material as quickly as possible (eg: war photographs for foreign release). The Infm Sec also asked for directives through this channel, and were given some strategic infm, since their propaganda to neutral countries was dependent on the military situation. For instance, if GERMANY had planned to attack GIBRALTAR in the near future, this would have necessitated a revision of German propaganda towards SPAIN. Prisoner states that the Infm Sec never received advance news of impending military operations in time. The Sec was informed of the Western Campaign and the invasion of NORWAY a few days before these operations started, but this was much too late for use in propaganda. Therefore the Infm Sec could not help the Wehrmacht to "soften the ground" politically before the Army struck.

Maj SOLM began production of "Signal" in summer 40. He was in touch with the Infm Sec regarding material, but except for that there was no co-operation.

c) Presse and Rundfunk Abts, Ausw Amt

Liaison was effected through ALTENBURG. Prisoner states that there was no close co-operation, although frequently common directives were received by all three depts following RIBBENTROP's morning conferences relating to common presentation of important news.

d) Wirtschaftsministerium

Co-operation was good. The Infm Sec maintained a special sub-sec, Wirtschafts-Propaganda, which kept in close touch with the Ministry. Wirtschafts-Propaganda published a fortnightly magazine "Globus", in all European languages, which in layout copied the "Reader's Digest" and contained reprints of articles on economic subjects which had appeared in the Axis-controlled Press.

e) Arbeitsfront

There was similar collaboration in social questions, and the Infm Sec had a special sub-sec, Sozial-Propaganda. It featured all matters concerning social legislation and workers' welfare in Axis-occupied countries, and also organised congresses of foreign workers in GERMANY. Its aim was to suggest abroad that the worker was better off under Fascism than Democracy.

9. RIBBENTROP's Conferences

Prisoner states that during the time he worked in the Sec he attended six or seven informal conferences called by RIBBENTROP. One conference dealt with the concoction of an atrocity pamphlet on poison gas allegedly used by the Polish Army, two others with the framing of the German replies to the French and British Foreign Office publications on the commencement of hostilities, at another the sec was instructed to prepare a propaganda campaign to show up British Imperialism at its worst (oppression of INDIA, exploitation of Colonies, subjugation of workers at home, etc; this eventually appeared in the "England Unmasked" series of pamphlets prepared by the Deutsche Informationsstelle; the Infm Sec was apparently lukewarm in its attitude towards such a scheme). Another conference dealt with the German propaganda line after the invasion of NORWAY. The last three conferences were in connection with the USA Presidential elections. RIBBENTROP wished to launch a tremendous propaganda campaign in the USA against ROOSEVELT, using "Yellow Press" methods to revile the President. After the occupation of PARIS a document was found in a French Freemason's Lodge, the Grand Lodge of the Grande Orient, containing formal addresses to and from ROOSEVELT, with photographs of the ceremonial presentation. RIBBENTROP saw in this a proof of the sinister influence of International Jewry, Freemasonry, etc. Prisoner had some difficulty in persuading RIBBENTROP that the document was innocuous and useless for mud-slinging purposes. RIBBENTROP then ordered Prisoner to "find" (ie forge) another more damaging document, but Prisoner claims that he managed to stall RIBBENTROP until the elections were over. DIECKHOFF, who was also present at these meetings, backed Prisoner in his general argument that German intervention on the side of WILKIE in what was an internal US matter would merely serve to strengthen ROOSEVELT.

*CONF*  
In the course of these conferences Prisoner had opportunities of raising matters of high policy with RIBBENTROP. At one time, Prisoner, in association with DIECKHOFF, ALTENBURG, ABETZ and RAHN, was strongly in favour of a "moderate" policy towards FRANCE; even now, Prisoner believes that had the Germans admitted FRANCE as a junior partner in the "Pan-Germanic Commonwealth", the political constellation in EUROPE would have been hard to unsettle. RIBBENTROP, however, was not in favour of such a course, and HITLER, warned by his intuition that GERMANY was not popular in FRANCE, was in no mood to make concessions.

At the last conference in Oct 40 RIBBENTROP offered Prisoner the post of head of the Infm Sec, with the rank of Gesandter 1st Class. The position had become vacant through ALTENBURG's appointment as Chairman of the Roumanian-Hungarian Frontier Settlement Commission and RAHN's transfer as envoy to PARIS. Prisoner asked for 24 hours to think it over. He decided, however, that by becoming a state official he stood to lose his political reputation, without being able to influence German foreign policy. Prisoner's avowed ambition for some time had been that of king-maker, in his self-chosen role of the man-behind-the-scenes: he was prepared to bide his time until he could serve under another more malleable man whose political star was on the rise. He therefore declined RIBBENTROP's offer, a refusal which led to a period of almost complete political impotence until in Prisoner's "Egmont" period he once more became a power among the Nazi satellites, and but for GERMANY's defeat, might have become the guiding brain behind the Foreign Minister-to-be, SCHELLENBERG.

#### 10. Prisoner's Subsequent Contacts with Infm Sec

After Prisoner's refusal to serve under RIBBENTROP, relations were strained between the two men. Prisoner broke off his connection with the Infm Sec and returned to MUNICH. He continued to act as honorary adviser to the Sec, and visited it whenever he was in BERLIN. He states that during the following years he was rarely consulted on the work of the sec, and is not familiar with its productions, but as a journalist he was more than ever interested in keeping up his Ausw Amt contacts. He was cordially received in the Infm Sec and given access to Ausw Amt files which normally would not have been available to an outsider.

Prisoner has been questioned at length on his contacts with Prof F A SIX, who in 1943 succeeded WUSTER and STAHLCKER as head of the Infm Sec. SIX invited Prisoner to co-operate more closely with the new Kul-Pol Abt, on the lines of Prisoner's previous work with the Infm Sec. Prisoner was then one of the editors of the OKW paper "Signal", and had occasionally taken part in conferences between the two depts concerning common problems of foreign propaganda. Prisoner formed the impression that SIX had little idea of propaganda: his methods struck him as crude, forceful and as inept as those of RIBBENTROP. It also appears that Prisoner disliked SIX on personal grounds. For these reasons he again declined to collaborate with the sec, and his visits became very much rarer and were undertaken for his own infm, and to exchange news with TROTT zu SOLZ and WERTH - his personal friends - who were both working towards the 20 July. After TROTT's execution Prisoner hardly entered the sec. He states that SIX was not aware of his role as "Egmont" for Amt VI, and denies knowledge of SIX's previous association with RSHA VII.

DIC  
CCG(BE)  
25 Oct 46

APPENDIX C TO FR 105

TOP SECRET

Giselher WIRSING

APPENDIX C

PRISONER'S LAST MEETING WITH SCHELLENBERG

FLensburg, 29 Apr - 1 May 45

(See also Report by 3rd US Army Interrogation Centre,  
dated 25 Jul 45; ref X 2126, and O20 Final  
Report on SCHELLENBERG, pp 108-110)

1. Evacuation of BERLIN

Towards the end of Mar 45, Prisoner had a long conversation with SCHELLENBERG in BERLIN, in which he pointed out that their joint efforts to arrange a negotiated peace with the Western Powers had come to nothing, since the pre-requisite for such a move - the liquidation of HITLER - had not been fulfilled. Nor had HIMMLER had the courage to begin direct peace negotiations with the Allies. The time for peace negotiations, in Prisoner's opinion, was now past. He considered, therefore, that his usefulness had come to an end, and did not propose to await the Russian attack on BERLIN; he informed SCHELLENBERG that he would leave BERLIN with the Amt VI staff which was then evacuating to BAVARIA. SCHELLENBERG did not share Prisoner's pessimism, but asked him to remain in touch with Standf SANDBERGER, in charge of adm of Amt VI, who was also going SOUTH.

Prisoner left immediately afterwards with SANDBERGER's party, and arrived some days later at TEGERNSEE, where Ast MUNICH had put a house equipped with a WT station at their disposal. Finding the accommodation too crowded, Prisoner moved to another billet in BAD HEILBRUNN, in which town Ostubaf PIFFGEN and four or five others of Amt VI were also living. During the next few weeks, Prisoner maintains that he did nothing and was NOT in communication with Amt VI, but he was visited from time to time by SANDBERGER, who kept in touch with the RSHA staff scattered about the district.

2. WT Messages from SCHELLENBERG

About 25 Apr 45 SANDBERGER visited Prisoner and told him that a WT message from SCHELLENBERG had just been received, requesting Prisoner to fly to LUBECK for discussions. Prisoner was at first inclined to refuse, since he was loath to leave BAVARIA again, and, in any case, SANDBERGER could not obtain an aircraft to take Prisoner NORTH. He therefore ignored the message.

A few days later SANDBERGER, in a state of great excitement, again called on Prisoner and told him that a second WT message from SCHELLENBERG had just been received, and that an aircraft was now standing by to take Prisoner to LUBECK. Prisoner was still reluctant to go, but says he allowed himself to be persuaded by SANDBERGER's argument that Prisoner could not know whether SCHELLENBERG had succeeded at the last moment in entering into more concrete peace negotiations. SANDBERGER handed Prisoner a memorandum for SCHELLENBERG on the reorganisation of Amt VI in the SOUTH, undertaken by KALTENBRUNNER, which virtually amounted to a dissolution of Amt VI. WATNECK and SKORZENY were to be in charge of what remained of the GIS in the SOUTH. SANDBERGER urgently requested Prisoner to obtain written instructions from HIMMLER to rescind KALTENBRUNNER's order.

### 3. Prisoner flies NORTH

After some trouble SANDBERGER found an aircraft which would take Prisoner to LUBECK. Prisoner left in a Ju 88 at 0330 hrs on 30 Apr 45 from AIBLING airfield (nr ROSENHEIM) and arrived at LUBECK at 0530 hrs. In LUBECK he contacted SCHELLENBERG's secretary, who told him that SCHELLENBERG was in SWEDEN in connection with the BERNADOTTE negotiations, but would arrive that evening in FLENSBURG. Prisoner left instructions to wire SCHELLENBERG of his arrival, and in the afternoon flew on to FLENSBURG. There he heard that CHURCHILL and TRUMAN had issued a communique on HIMMLER's peace negotiations with BERNADOTTE, categorically refusing to entertain offers directed solely to the Western Allies. Prisoner concluded that further negotiations were futile, and gave instructions to his aircraft to stand by to take him back to BAVARIA that night.

### 4. Prisoner meets SCHELLENBERG

Prisoner met SCHELLENBERG at 2200 hrs. SCHELLENBERG asked Prisoner to accompany him in his car to HIMMLER's HQ at KALKHORST nr TRAVELUNDE. During the journey SCHELLENBERG gave Prisoner a resume of his negotiations with BERNADOTTE and von POST. HIMMLER's dilatoriness had delayed negotiations until it was too late (he gave SCHELLENBERG his authority on 23 Apr 45) and in the last analysis HIMMLER must bear responsibility for the senseless destruction of German towns and the heavy German casualties in the last few weeks. SCHELLENBERG was now going to report to HIMMLER on his talks in COPENHAGEN and he asked Prisoner to be present at the interview to strengthen his, SCHELLENBERG's hand in case of HIMMLER's further vacillation. Prisoner then told SCHELLENBERG of the official Allied communique and bluntly stated that further negotiations with the Western Powers alone were impossible. SCHELLENBERG until then had been unaware of the communique; nevertheless it appears that he still had hopes of arriving at some agreement with the Western Powers, using the German occupation of NORWAY as his trump card. Prisoner then declared his intention of returning to BAVARIA as soon as possible. He told SCHELLENBERG that he was not facing up to the grim realities of the present situation, and added that the recent Werwolf propaganda and concentration camp atrocities had been incredible political blunders. SCHELLENBERG said that HIMMLER was aware of this, but appeared powerless against BORMANN and GOEBBELS, and went on to discuss possible members of an interim govt headed by HIMMLER. In the course of the conversation Prisoner handed SCHELLENBERG SANDBERGER's memorandum on the reorganisation in the SOUTH. Prisoner stresses, however, that both SCHELLENBERG and he were concerned with high policy, and took little interest in what KALTENBRUNNER might be doing in BAVARIA. SCHELLENBERG obviously considered Art VI as a thing of the past, but clearly regarded KALTENBRUNNER's action as unauthorised. He would, he said, take it up with HIMMLER.

### 5. SCHELLENBERG's Talks with HIMMLER

They arrived at KALKHORST early in the morning of 1 May 45 and learned of HITLER's suicide that night (SCHELLENBERG merely said: "Thank God for that") and of DONITZ' appointment as head of the State. (According to the O20 Final Report on SCHELLENBERG, HIMMLER had already seen DONITZ earlier that morning and persuaded the latter to dismiss RIBBENTROP immediately. Prisoner has no knowledge of this meeting.)



At about 0900 hrs SCHELLENBERG was called for a few minutes to HITLER, who informed him of the situation, and said that he intended to place himself under DONITZ' orders. He was driving over to FLON, DONITZ' HQ, immediately, and asked SCHELLENBERG to accompany him to report on the Swedish negotiations and to outline his ideas for the future. Prisoner followed in another car with HITLER's adjutants.

6. Conference at DONITZ' HQ

At about 1200 hrs the party arrived at FLON. There Prisoner learned that RIBBENTROP had been dismissed and SCHWERIN-KROSICK appointed Foreign Minister. DONITZ immediately drew HITLER into conference, and asked SCHELLENBERG and Prisoner to work out meanwhile a short memorandum on the next German move in the light of HITLER's death and the TRUMAN-CHURCHILL communique of the night before.

SCHELLENBERG told Prisoner that he (SCHELLENBERG) was to be KROSICK's deputy and that the memo was required mainly for KROSICK's info. (Contrary to the 020 FR on SCHELLENBERG, Prisoner disputes that KROSICK was at FLON at the time; he remembers that there were several telephone calls to BUTIN, where KROSICK was staying. Nor does Prisoner remember seeing KEITEL or JODL.) SCHELLENBERG and Prisoner then drew up a short memorandum containing the following points:-

- a) Unconditional surrender to all three Allies was now inevitable. This implied peaceful cession of NORWAY and DENMARK.
- b) Nevertheless, time must be gained on the Eastern Front. The Russians must be held as long as possible, thus allowing German troops and civilians to evacuate to Central and Western GERMANY (this applied specially to COURLAND). For this purpose negotiations with the USSR must be protracted.
- c) In spite of the "unconditional surrender" clause, concessions should be wrung from the Allies; the most important would be the retention of a central government.

7. SCHELLENBERG receives New Instructions

Early in the afternoon SCHELLENBERG was received by DONITZ to whom he elaborated the points in the memorandum. He was instructed (by DONITZ ?) to leave for COPENHAGEN immediately and resume contact with von FOST of the Swedish Foreign Office, to sound the Allied reactions to HITLER's death, and to assure von FOST that the new German government adhered in principle to the previous offers. Meanwhile, DONITZ had summoned Gen Obst BOHME, TEIBOVEN and BEST to report on the situation in the Northern Sector, but an immediate decision could not be expected. SCHELLENBERG was to keep in contact with the Swedish Government, and to give the DONITZ Government time to evacuate troops and civilians from the Eastern front. He was not at the time empowered to put forward an offer of unconditional surrender.

8. Final Conversations with SCHELLENBERG

SCHELLENBERG left FLON at about 1500 hrs. He was to travel via FLENSBURG to COPENHAGEN, and Prisoner accompanied him as far as FLENSBURG, where his aircraft was waiting to take him back to BAVARIA.

During the journey SCHELLENBERG and Prisoner had their last exhaustive discussion. SCHELLENBERG once more pressed Prisoner to remain, but the latter declined on the grounds that he thought all further efforts to save GERMANY doomed to failure. He considered his usefulness had ended and did not wish to be publicly associated with the liquidation of the Third Reich. (At the time Prisoner still had political ambitions for the future. A reputation untainted by the "shame" of having been responsible for the armistice negotiations, would have been a valuable asset. Similar charges had ruined the careers of the WEIMAR politicians after the 1914 - 18 war.) Nevertheless, he intimated that should the interim government develop into a government of some stability, he would be available. Privately, Prisoner claims, he anticipated the worst, although he did not state this to SCHELLENBERG.

In the course of conversation, KALTENBRUNNER was briefly touched upon. SCHELLENBERG mentioned that, should Prisoner happen to see SANDBERGER or anyone else of the Amt VI staff, he was to tell them that neither HIMMLER nor himself recognised KALTENBRUNNER's orders. Prisoner believes that SCHELLENBERG also said that HIMMLER would countermand KALTENBRUNNER's orders by WT. He states emphatically that no more was said, and that he carried back no other instructions, especially since he stressed to SCHELLENBERG that it was doubtful whether he would see SANDBERGER or anyone else. The course of events had overshadowed the internal politics of the RSHA.

#### 9. Memorandum for SCHELLENBERG

In FLENSBURG Prisoner bade a solemn farewell to SCHELLENBERG, and wished him success in the future. SCHELLENBERG asked Prisoner to leave him another more detailed memorandum on German policy after the unconditional surrender, which he proposed to submit to KROSIGK on his return from COPENHAGEN. This document Prisoner drew up that evening; he left it with SCHELLENBERG's secretary in FLENSBURG. It contained the following points:-

- a) The cardinal aim of German policy must be the preservation of a central German government, in spite of the Allied zonal division. As a suitable figurehead BRUNING's name might be put forward. The Americans should be approached for permission to contact BRUNING. (BRUNING had been mentioned previously by Prisoner in his "EGMONT" Reports, see Appendix A, paras 1 and 9). The new government could only include personalities not compromised in the eyes of the Allies.
- b) In order to placate the Allies and to gain the above concession, the following measures would have to be instituted immediately:-
  - (i) Dissolution of the NSDAP, SS and affiliated orgs.
  - (ii) Disbandment of Gestapo; seizure of all Gestapo offices and records.
  - (iii) In view of Allied disclosures of conditions in the concentration camps, a German definition and prosecution of "war criminals" was advisable. (SCHELLENBERG had mentioned MULLER, Antschef IV, and Ogruf POHL as the chief war criminals).
  - (iv) A strict ban on all Werwolf activities.

c) Prisoner added a personal rider for SCHELLENBERG. In order to preserve his political future, he would have to dissociate himself from HIMMLER (until the very end, SCHELLENBERG had been unable to appreciate how compromised HIMMLER was in Allied eyes, and had, in fact, assumed that he would remain in the DONITZ government. HIMMLER had made SCHELLENBERG; it was, for the latter, a question of personal loyalty.)

Prisoner met KROSICK later on in American captivity. He learned from him that SCHELLENBERG had put forward the points mentioned above. Only the ban on Werwolf had been carried out; DONITZ could not bring himself to swallow the rest of Prisoner's advice.

10. Return to AUSTRIA

Prisoner left EISENBURG by plane at 0200 hrs on 2 May 45. After a dangerous flight during which he was repeatedly chased by British night-fighters, he landed early in the morning in PRAGUE. In the following night he flew on to SALZBURG and continued from there by car. American troops had already overrun BAD TOLZ, and Prisoner had to walk the last 30 km. Prisoner claims that after his return he saw none of the Amt VI staff, and did not even attempt to pass on SCHELLENBERG's verbal message. He remained in BAD TOLZ until his arrest on 1 Jun 45.

11. Conclusion

Comparison of Prisoner's and SCHELLENBERG's statements (vide 020 FR on SCHELLENBERG, pp 108 - 110) has disclosed discrepancies, the most curious of which is SCHELLENBERG's omission to mention that he twice summoned Prisoner to LUBECK for consultation (this has already been confirmed independently by SANDBERGER) and his assertion that Prisoner returned SOUTH on his instructions. All info available bears out Prisoner's contention that his relation to SCHELLENBERG was solely that of political adviser, and he was summoned to SCHELLENBERG in this capacity during a crucial period in SCHELLENBERG's political career.

Prisoner merely took with him SANDBERGER's memorandum on the reorganisation in the SOUTH, but neither Prisoner, SCHELLENBERG nor HIMMLER attached much importance to KALTENBRUNNER's activities at the time. Again, SCHELLENBERG's assertion that Prisoner returned SOUTH on his instructions would seem to be an overstatement; in fact, SCHELLENBERG merely gave Prisoner a vague verbal message which he knew Prisoner, in the circumstances, was most unlikely to deliver.

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CCG(BE)  
25 Oct 46

APPENDIX D TO FR 105

TOP SECRET

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APPENDIX D

PRISONER'S TRAVELS ABROAD

(1925 - 1945)

1. Introduction

Prisoner has been questioned in detail on his foreign travels. It was sought to establish the suggestion thrown out in the brief that there was more in his travels than journalistic reporting; that they in fact served as cover for an economic and political int mission for the GIS or Ausw Amt. Prisoner has emphatically denied this, nor has infm come to hand which would indicate that he was anything but what he claimed to be; an influential German political journalist.

On the other hand, it must be remembered that Prisoner, a journalist with a reputation and ambition, was in close contact with highly placed personalities on whom he impressed his experience and views formed during his travels, the more so, since his real convictions and views were running counter to the current German propaganda. Thus Prisoner was able to exert privately considerable influence (through Albrecht HAUSHOFER on Rudolf HESS, through DIECKHOFF, RAHN and ABETZ on RIEBENTROP, much later through SCHELLENBERG on HIMMLER).

On his return from the US in 1938, Prisoner made his views on AMERICA's attitude known to high Party and State functionaries assembled at the NUREMBERG Rally (see para 14). After his return from the Middle East in Mar 39, he sounded a warning through DIECKHOFF (see para 9). In Aug 39, dismayed by RIEBENTROP's intransigent attitude at a conference at FUSCHL (see Appendix B, para 3) Prisoner prophesied that German aggression in POLAND would mean, a) war with the British Empire, b) that the French would not prevent the British reversal of the policy of appeasement, and c) that the US would enter the war six months later. This memo was passed in two copies via Albrecht HAUSHOFER; one copy for HESS and one for HITLER. In Sep 39 HESS' adjutant appeared at Prisoner's Office and confiscated the file copy and shorthand notes as "Top Secret"; this is the only official reaction known to Prisoner. Similar critical memos to Gen Obst JODL were by-products of Prisoner's visits to SPAIN in 1943 and 1944 (see paras 24 and 28).

Such criticisms of aspects of German foreign policy can hardly be regarded as political int reports, the more so, since they were unsolicited and not premeditated. Prisoner's travels appear to be, therefore, of little CI value. They have been listed briefly in chronological order, and some of his more important journeys have been treated in some detail.

2. Chronology

1925	ITALY	Holiday with Prisoner's parents.
1926	VIENNA and BUDAPEST	Study trip during University summer holidays.
1927	LITHUANIA, ESTONIA and LATVIA	Six weeks' journey, mainly in REVAL, (TALLINN) and RIGA.

1928		POLAND and CZECHOSLOVAKIA	Several weeks' journey, gathering material for his doctor's degree, much of which was used in his book "Zwischeneuropa und die Deutsche Zukunft".
1929	summer	BALTIC STATES	Several weeks' journey, more material for his book.
1930	summer	SWITZERLAND	Attended 3-months summer course in GENEVA at Oxford School of International Relations under Prof ZIMMERN, followed by holiday in SWITZERLAND.
1931	autumn	LIDAU YUGOSLAVIA, BULGARIA HUNGARY	Fortnight's holiday. Six weeks' journey for more material for "Zwischeneuropa". Financed by grant from HEIDELBERG Sociological Institute.
1932	autumn	PARIS PRAGUE PARIS LONDON LENINGRAD	Fortnight's holiday. Brief trips as free-lance correspondent for "Die Tat".
	Sep-Dec	GENEVA	A few days' visit at the invitation of Ges KOSTER, German Envoy in RIGA.
1933	spring	CROATIA	Working in the Secretariat of the League of Nations. Several weeks' journey; visit to Prof IVICIC, Prof of Sociology at ZAGREB, followed by holiday on Isle of RAD.
	autumn	Northern ITALY	Gathering material as free-lance journalist.
	Dec	PARIS	Fortnight's visit to PARIS as correspondent for Münchener Neueste Nachrichten (MNN).
1934	Mar	ROME	Covering MUSSOLINI-DOLFUSS-GOMBUS Conference for MNN.
	autumn	SWITZERLAND and ITALY	Two weeks' holiday in LOCARNO, GENOA and SANTA MARGHERITA LIGURE.
1935	summer	LONDON PARIS PRAGUE GENEVA	Brief trips to cover stories for MNN (Sudeten question, Anglo-German Naval Agreement, League of Nations Session).
	autumn	DALMATIA, GREECE, BULGARIA, ROUMANIA, HUNGARY	Originally planned as a holiday, but became a tour of the BALKANS for MNN on the BALKAN attitude towards the Abyssinian war.
1936	Feb	ROME	Few weeks as correspondent for MNN, dealing with German-Italian relations (AUSTRIA) and Abyssinian war. Prisoner was received by MUSSOLINI.
	May/June	GENEVA	Attended two sessions of the League of Nations on Abyssinian war.
1937	summer Jan-Mar	SWEDEN MIDDLE EAST	Few weeks' summer holiday. EGYPT, PALESTINE and SYRIA. Journey undertaken for MNN. Details will be found at paras 4 and 5.

summer	PARIS	Spent one week as guest of the Comite FRANCE-ALLEMAGNE at International World Exhibition. Two weeks' holiday.
autumn	ITALY	Journey undertaken for MNN, also gathering material for his book "Der masslose Kontinent". Details will be found at paras 10 - 14.
1938 Apr - Aug	USA	Stayed there for a few days after return from US, covering Sudeten crisis.
Sep	LONDON	EGYPT, SAUDI ARABIA, IRAQ, IRAN, AFGHANISTAN. Second Middle East journey undertaken for MNN. Also gathering material for his book "Juden, Engländer und Araber in PALASTINA". For details see paras 6 - 9.
1939 Jan - Mar	MIDDLE EAST	Attending Biennial Exhibition. Short lecture tour for Infm Sec, Ausw Amt, on "Economic and Political Unity of New Europe". Lectures arranged by Kulturattachés of Embassies.
Aug	VENICE	Lectures as above, through Deutsch-Schwedische Gesellschaft.
1940 Jan	COPENHAGEN THE HAGUE AMSTERDAM	Lecture as above. Stopped for two days to talk Hungarian politics with German Correspondents there, notably KORNHUBER of MNN.
May	STOCKHOLM UPPSALA	Accompanied RAHN to PARIS after the occupation (see paras 15 & 16).
June	BELGRADE BUDAPEST	Visit to RAHN and ABETZ (see para 17). For days visit for "Signal".
Aug/Sep	PARIS	Short visit to DIECKHOFF (see para 19).
Dec	PARIS and RHEIMS	Serving as Lt with Propaganda Coy on the Eastern Front.
1941 spring	ROME	Short visit for "Signal" to discuss tech and distribution problems for Italian edition.
May	LISBON and MADRID	Visit to DIECKHOFF (see para 22).
1942	RUSSIA	Short visit to BEST and meeting with KRAMER (see para 29).
1943 Mar	ROME	Visit to DIECKHOFF (see para 25).
Jun/Jul	MADRID and LISBON	Officially for "Signal"; main purpose to visit RAHN and ask him to intercede for TROTT zu SOLZ, condemned to death for 20 July conspiracy.
1944 Apr	COPENHAGEN	Reporting on the "Fall of PARIS". (see para 18).
May	MADRID and LISBON	Lecture to staff of a Heeresgruppe on international affairs.
Aug	MILAN and FASANO	Short visit to BEST and meeting with KRAMER (see para 30).
Aug	PARIS	
Nov	CRACOW	
Dec	COPENHAGEN	

## I. JOURNEYS TO THE MIDDLE EAST

### 3. Purpose

Undertaken for, and financed by, the Münchener Neueste Nachrichten, reporting on the political situation in the MIDDLE EAST.

### First Journey, Jan - Mar 1937

### 4. Itinerary

ALEXANDRIA - CAIRO - LUXOR - ASWAN - WADI HALFA - SUDAN;  
by air from KHARTOUM to CAIRO - JERUSALEM - HAIFA - TEL AVIV -  
SYRIA - LEBANON; from there back to ITALY.

### 5. Contacts and Personalities

#### a) EGYPT

##### Germans

German Envoy in CAIRO, Frhr von OW-WACHENDORF.  
Leg Sek Dr SIEGFRIED.  
German Consul-General in ALEXANDRIA.  
Iwan KIRCHNER, Foreign Correspondent of Frankfurter Zeitung.  
Very well informed, with many contacts to Arab and  
Italian circles.  
SCHMITZ, Foreign correspondent of MNN.  
German business men in EGYPT (names forgotten).  
Director of German School in CAIRO.  
Members of Archaeological Institute. Very well informed  
about current situation.

##### Italians

Members of Italian Embassy and Italian journalists  
(through KIRCHNER).

##### British

British Embassy (through introduction of German Ambassador).  
Sir Miles LAMPSON.  
Oriental Secretary.  
Several British Consular officials in WADI HALFA and KHARTOUM.  
Mr. MERTON (?), Correspondent of "Daily Telegraph". Through  
him met a number of Arab journalists and politicians.  
Representative of United Press and INS.

##### French

Correspondents of "Le Temps" and "Echo de Paris".

##### Egyptians

NAHAS Pasha (Prime Minister).  
MAKRAM EBEID Pasha (Finance Minister).  
ALI MAHER Pasha.  
Egyptian Ambassador in LONDON.  
Chairman of MISR Combine, and directors of MISR Film Studios  
and Airlines.  
Editors of "El Ahrar", "El Mokattam" and other journalists.  
The first Sheikh of EL AHZAB Mosque and University.

Egyptians (Contd)

Officers of Egyptian Army, whom Prisoner met casually in ASWAN.

Several students belonging to radical nationalist circles.  
Some of the younger opposition politicians of the WAFD.

b) PALESTINE

Germans

German Consul-General DÖHLE and Vice-Consul DITTMAR.  
Dr Franz REICHERT, representative of DNB.  
German farmers and business men of German settlement  
WILHELMINA nr JAFFA.  
German business men in JERUSALEM, HAIFA, TEL AVIV.

British

The High Commissioner for PALESTINE, Gen WAUCHOPE.  
Public Relations Officer, and some other members of  
Administration.

Arab

The Mufti of JERUSALEM.  
AUNI BEY ABDUL HADI, Leader of ISTIQLAL Party.  
Chairman of Higher Arab Committee.  
Some other leading Arabs in government positions.  
The Mayor of JERUSALEM.  
Members of the Arab Committees of HAIFA and TIBERIAS.

Jews

Officials of the VAAD LEUMI.  
Officials of the Jewish Agency in JERUSALEM, in various  
Jewish settlements.  
Jewish writers, lawyers, etc in TEL AVIV.

c) TRANSJORDAN

Emir ABDULLAH.

d) SYRIA

German Consul-General SAILER, who introduced Prisoner to  
officials of the French Administration and also to  
some Syrian politicians (names forgotten).

Second Journey, Jan - Mar 1939

6. Itinerary

EGYPT - SAUDI ARABIA - EGYPT - PALESTINE - IRAQ - IRAN -  
AFGHANISTAN. Prisoner travelled by air. He returned from  
AFGHANISTAN via ATHENS and BUDAPEST to GERMANY.



7. Contacts and Personalities

a) EGYPT

Prisoner looked up his former contacts. In addition he met the following:-

Germans

Leg Sek von HEYDEN, of the Embassy, had replaced SIEGFRIED, and had been instructed by the Ambassador to assist Prisoner in every way.

Arabs

King FARUK.  
Chief of Egyptian General Staff.  
HAFIS AFIFI Pasha.  
Sheik EL MAHRAGI of EL AHZAR Mosque.

b) SAUDI ARABIA

Germans

Ges GROBEA, the new envoy to SAUDI ARABIA.

Arabs

King IBN SAUD.  
Crown Prince FEISAL.  
Foreign Minister.  
The KAIDAKIM (Governor) of Province HEDJA.

British

British Envoy, Sir Reader BULLARD.  
Mrs PHILBY.

Italians

Italian Envoy.  
Head of SAUDI ARABIA "Air Force".

Americans

Engineers of Standard Oil Co.

c) IRAQ

Germans

Members of the Legation (names forgotten; short talks only).

Arabs

NURI ES SAID Pasha, later Prime Minister.  
TASHA Pasha, Minister of War.  
Officials of the Dept of Education (Prisoner was interested in the settlement of the Bedouin tribes).  
Arab émigrés from PALESTINE.  
The Mayor of BAGHDAD.  
Sheik ASIL, Chief of the SHAMAR Tribe.

## 8. Publications

A series of twelve to fifteen articles appeared in the MNN after each journey. A large number of photographs were made available to the Münchener Illustrierte Presse. Prisoner's book "Juden, Engländer und Araber in Palästina", appeared in 1938 (DIEDERICH'S).

## 9. Other Contacts

Prisoner denies that he made any other use of the infm he gathered on his journeys. The Ausw Amt was aware that Prisoner had gone, but he did not submit a report on his return. Ges von HENTIG, a personal friend of Prisoner, gave him one or two introductions to Arabs in IRAQ, but other than that, he received no assistance.

Prisoner gathered the impression that, in spite of the appeasement policy in LONDON, the British in the MIDDLE EAST were preparing for war and regarded war with GERMANY as inevitable. He said as much publicly in his articles, and asked his friend, Ges DIECKHOFF in the Ausw Amt, to convey a warning to this effect in official quarters.

## II. JOURNEY TO USA

(Apr - Aug 38)

## 10. Purpose

To report on current developments in the USA, especially on the American attitude towards GERMANY. The journey was undertaken for, and financed by, the MNN, and the Münchener Illustrierte Presse. From May 38 onwards, sixteen articles appeared in the MNN and three illustrated articles in the MIP. Prisoner's book "Der masslose Kontinent" was largely based on impressions gathered during this trip, but did not appear until spring 42.

The immediate reason for the trip was an invitation from DIECKHOFF, then German Ambassador in the US, and a close personal friend of Prisoner's. DIECKHOFF wrote to Prisoner that he would welcome his visit, since, in his opinion, American affairs were not being fully reported or even understood in GERMANY. DIECKHOFF had sent a similar invitation to Rudolf KIRCHER, the editor of the "Frankfurter Zeitung", who had toured the US three months previously.

## 11. Itinerary

Prisoner travelled with his wife. In NEW YORK they bought a second-hand car and motored through the US. They were given introductions by the German Embassy to many "representative American personalities". German consulates were advised in advance of their arrival, and arranged introductions to local personalities. Prisoner was at pains to keep his tour informal and unofficial.

### a) NEW YORK

Guest of the German Gen Konsul BORCHERS, who gave two receptions for Prisoner, at which he met well-known NEW YORK writers and journalists. Among the guests were:-

Mr CREF (Publisher).  
Mrs Anne McCORMICK (Owner, New York Times).  
Mr BUELL (Foreign Policy Association).  
Representatives from International News Agencies.  
Journalists from New York dailies.

Prisoner also met some of the editorial staff of "Time", "Life", and "Fortune", in particular, Mr DAVENPORT, co-editor of "Fortune". He also had several talks with Henry and Claire LUCE.

b) WASHINGTON

Prisoner stayed for four weeks as guest of DIECKHOFF. DIECKHOFF complained about RIEBENTROP's short-sighted policy in his treatment of the US, especially his encouragement of the "Bund". He gave Prisoner insight into all relevant Ausw Amt files, which he brought out with him to his residence. During the four weeks, Prisoner attended the receptions given by the Ambassador, two of them in Prisoner's honour. Apart from the Embassy staff, who in turn invited Prisoner to their houses and through whom he met their personal friends, both Germans and Americans, Prisoner was introduced to a number of Senators, representatives and members of the State Dept. He can now recall the names only of Rep NYE, Senators VANDENBERG, WHEELER, WAGNER and TAFT. To all of these, in so far as they needed convincing, Prisoner expounded the beneficial and rational influence of Nazi GERMANY on EUROPE, dismissing the shadier side of the picture with a shrug and an assurance that it was designed to keep the ignorant German masses quiet.

Prisoner also had a talk with John LEWIS, then already an opponent of ROOSEVELT's. LEWIS was an attentive listener to Prisoner's smooth account of Nazi "Socialism" for the German working class.

Through the Embassy, Prisoner was granted interviews with the following:-

President ROOSEVELT	Here Prisoner's charm failed to impress. ROOSEVELT angrily denounced GERMANY's annexation of AUSTRIA, contemptuously dismissed Prisoner's protest that the annexation was the wish of the "entire Austrian people". As a result of ROOSEVELT's frigid reception and his sincere dislike of Nazism, Prisoner reported - and later elaborated the theme in his book, "Der Masslose Kontinent" - that ROOSEVELT was filled with hatred for all things German, was set on destroying German Kultur, and already then (1938) was preparing for an aggressive war. He rationalised his prejudice by saying that internal difficulties with the New Deal forced ROOSEVELT to focus discontent on an external victim (thriving GERMANY).	
Cordell HULL	Secretary of State	} Routine official interviews.
Harold ICKES	Secretary of the Interior	
Henry WALLACE	Secretary of Agriculture	

c) TENNESSEE

Thorough inspection of the TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY, and long talks with the two leading TVA officials, Mr David LILLIENTHAL and Mr MORGAN.

d) NEW ORLEANS - TEXAS - SANTA FE - CALIFORNIA

Prisoner called on local notables en route, eg small-town bosses, editors of local papers, judges, etc. Occasionally he visited a celebrity, eg Margaret MITCHELL in ATLANTA ("Gone with the Wind"). In HOLLYWOOD Prisoner toured the film studios.

e) SAN FRANCISCO - SALT LAKE CITY - KANSAS CITY - SAINT LOUIS

Leisurely return EAST, again stopping to talk to local notables. A week's stay in SAINT LOUIS.

f) CHICAGO

Invited by the North-Western University to lecture on a "Pan-European Federation". This talk was badly received, and Prisoner was directly attacked in an after-dinner speech by the President of the University. He also spoke before various clubs and societies in the city.

g) DETROIT

Through the German Consul, Prisoner was introduced to the General Manager of FORD's, and obtained an interview with Edsel FORD in DEARBORN. Extensive visit to GENERAL MOTORS, followed by invitation to address leading automobile industrialists at an informal meeting.

h) CLEVELAND

Short stay there; the German Consul introduced him to influential business circles.

i) BOSTON

Visit to Harvard University.

12. NEW YORK Final Talks with DIECKHOFF

Prisoner returned to NEW YORK, where he remained for a fortnight before leaving for GERMANY. DIECKHOFF came up from WASHINGTON, and asked Prisoner to support his apparently lone voice among Nazi politicians at home and impress upon them that the "Stop GERMANY" campaign in the US was a significant movement away from American isolationism, and was likely to grow in proportion to GERMANY's expansion. (see para 14).

When Prisoner arrived in WASHINGTON, DIECKHOFF had shown him a long report on Fritz KUHN's "Bund" which he had prepared for the Ausw Amt, in which he wrote that this org was run by opportunists, inept politicians and racketeers, and advised that no further financial, political or moral support should be given to it. His reports apparently carried no weight in official quarters, and he now asked Prisoner to support him publicly in his paper. Prisoner claims

that during his stay he did not meet KUHN, or attended a "Bund" rally. Nevertheless, from his talks with Americans he formed the same impression as DIECKHOFF, and subsequently reviewed the "Bund" unfavourably. As Prisoner and DIECKHOFF had anticipated, this article provoked the AO to indignation. Prisoner was publicly and privately reprimanded by the Propaganda Ministry. He forwarded all this material to DIECKHOFF, who, in turn, took the case as an opportunity for sending another official memorandum condemning German backing (his efforts, however, were unrewarded).

DIECKHOFF further asked Prisoner to employ George Sylvester VIERECK as the US correspondent of the MNN. To this Prisoner agreed. This is the only instance where Prisoner is known to have been in direct contact with an int agent (with the exception of the "Egmont" period) and may therefore be of interest.

#### 13. VIERECK's Employment by the MNN

DIECKHOFF introduced Prisoner to VIERECK during his visit in WASHINGTON. VIERECK was an illegitimate son of Kaiser Wilhelm II, who had lived in the US for many years. During the 1914 - 18 war, he edited the pro-German "Das Vaterland" and had many acquaintances among Senators and representatives, especially the isolationists. DIECKHOFF used VIERECK as an informer on the WASHINGTON political scene. Apparently in order to help VIERECK financially, DIECKHOFF asked Prisoner to take him on the staff of his paper, but his journalistic abilities were poor, and when DIECKHOFF was recalled from the US towards end 1938, Prisoner wished to dismiss the man. DIECKHOFF, however, was anxious to continue to receive VIERECK's reports, asked Prisoner to keep VIERECK on his staff, and agreed to refund his salary of \$ 500 per month.

VIERECK's weekly reports arrived by air mail via the BERMUDAS, and bore, after Sep 39, British censorship stamps. They were addressed to the MNN and were only signed with a rectangle (VIERECK = rectangle in German), a copy of which was forwarded by Prisoner to DIECKHOFF in the Ausw Amt. The reports contained clippings from American papers and articles, the opinions of citizens in Capitol Hill, interspersed with "inside tips" on future Presidential policy, what notables had been received at the White House, and notes on industrial development and production bottlenecks. Only the latter items were of value. Prisoner states that the reports reflected the current political atmosphere in WASHINGTON, and were, for DIECKHOFF, a useful complement to the official reports from the German Ambassador, while, after AMERICA entered the war, the scarcity of int from the US was such, that even these insignificant messages were valuable.

In spring 41, the MNN paid VIERECK a lump sum of \$ 10,000, ie eighteen months' salary in advance. Shortly after the outbreak of war, VIERECK was arrested by the FBI and the connection ceased. Prisoner has since been informed at OBERURSEL that copies of all reports sent were found in VIERECK's flat in NEW YORK. Prisoner is positive that VIERECK was only working as personal V-man for DIECKHOFF, and not for the GIS. He asked SCHELLENBERG in 1944 whether he knew of VIERECK, but the latter replied in the negative.

#### 14. Prisoner Reports on his US journey

In Sep 38, Prisoner attended the NUREMBERG Party Rally, in order to warn the leading Nazi functionaries that should it come to war with the UK, the USA would, in his opinion, join within six months.

This was in fulfillment of his promise to DIECKHOFF that he would use his influence to support DIECKHOFF's similar views. Prisoner had talks with RIBBENTROP, WEIZSACKER, DIETRICH, AMANN, ROSENBERG, HENLEIN (the Sudeten Leader), GOEBBELS, NAUMANN and FRITZSCHE. Except for WEIZSACKER and FRITZSCHE, Prisoner's warning fell on deaf ears. He later learned that the reports of the German military attache in WASHINGTON, Gen von BOTTICHER, were largely responsible for the prevailing sense of complacent security. Prisoner states that except for this he made no report to any other official quarter.

### III. VISITS TO FRANCE

#### 15. Early Aug 40

When RAHN took up his Ausw Amt appointment in PARIS he asked Prisoner, at the time still editor of the MNN, to accompany him, as a personal friend, and "adviser" on policy. Prisoner also covered the occupation of PARIS for his paper. He stayed for ten days, and spent most of his time going through French Foreign Office files. He was toying with the idea of preparing a pamphlet compiled from French documents proving French war guilt. He states that he met few French personalities, since these had not yet returned to PARIS, but he had long discussions with RAHN on what he considered the proper policy towards FRANCE.

#### 16. Sep 40

Prisoner returned to PARIS for a few days at RAHN's invitation. He met a number of French collaborationists, with whom RAHN and Prisoner discussed the current political situation. Prisoner is still under the impression that the Germans were joyfully received by the French, who, apparently, were able to forget their military defeat. Prisoner also went through more diplomatic documents, but came to the conclusion that there was not sufficient evidence available to produce the sensational pamphlet he had in mind.

#### 17. 10 Dec 40

Prisoner was invited by Gen SCHAAAL, GOC of a Pz Lehr Div at REHIMS, to lecture to his staff on Franco-German relations. From REHIMS Prisoner went again to PARIS, staying with RAHN for a few days. Prisoner states that he arrived at the time of the LAVAL crisis, when ABETZ and RIBBENTROP's policies towards FRANCE for the first time clashed openly. Prisoner spent many hours encouraging RAHN and ABETZ to persist in a "sane", lenient view, as opposed to RIBBENTROP's harsh treatment of FRANCE.

#### 18. 12 - 19 Aug 44

Prisoner went officially to FRANCE for "Signal", in order to gather a personal impression of the invasion and to hear first-hand reports at GHQ Heeresgruppe B, then at SAINT-GERMAIN. Prisoner had lengthy conversation with the Ic, Gen BLUMENTRITT, who told him that the campaign in FRANCE was all but over. Prisoner was received by Feldmarschall von KLUGE, who was in a black rage, and told him point-blank that the war was lost and that HITLER, KEITEL and JODL were incompetent fools (KLUGE committed suicide a few weeks later).

In PARIS, Prisoner called on ABETZ to discuss the political implications of the German defeat in FRANCE. ABETZ apparently was living in a dream world untroubled by victorious Allied armies; he was then in delicate and complicated negotiations with HERRIOT, whereby ABETZ would formally hand over the Government of FRANCE to a "French National Assembly" (events moved too fast and ABETZ' symbolic ceremony ended in undignified rout).

Prisoner claims that the Parisians, during these last few days, were extremely friendly towards the remaining German garrison. Up to the time when Prisoner left on 19 Aug, three days before the liberation, there was no trace of FFI activities. Prisoner was so impressed by the sympathetic attitude of the citizens that he recorded this in an article in "Signal" called "The Last Days of PARIS".

Prisoner claims that he made NO further use of his conversations with ABETZ and von KLUGE. He wrote a lengthy report at OBERURSEL on the subject.

#### IV. Visits to SPAIN and PORTUGAL

##### First Visit

##### 19. May 41, Visit to ESTORIL

Prisoner spent a fortnight at ESTORIL nr LISBON on behalf of the MNN. He stayed at the Hotel Miramar, ESTORIL.

##### 20. Purpose

The purpose of his visit was to gain an objective impression of the effects of the bombing of LONDON, and the political situation generally. Prisoner, listening to British broadcasts and aware of the fallibility of the Propaganda Ministry, suspected that German claims were not in perspective. He was therefore anxious to talk to well-informed persons in a neutral country and check their conclusions against his own.

##### 21. Contacts

Prisoner claims that he did not attempt to contact any member of the GIS in PORTUGAL or GERMANY for inside info. He professes to have had a low opinion of Abw, and believed that German foreign correspondents were much better informed and had their own circle of useful contacts.

As will be seen, some of the journalists were in fact members of the GIS. Prisoner denies being aware of this, and did not seek to inquire into his informants' sources.

Prisoner recalls meeting the following:-

HOYNINGEN

HENNIGEN-HUHNE

German Ambassador in LISBON. Formal courtesy call only.

Irene SELIGO *ced*

Foreign Correspondent of "Frankfurter Zeitung". Extremely well-informed (Note: Known to have been on intimate terms with Richard SCHMIDT, IM, LISBON.) DINATAG Correspondent, formerly MNN correspondent in LONDON. Also well informed.

Hans SELIGO *ced*

Heinrich BARON *cel* Correspondent of "Berliner Börsen Zeitung (Note: Known to have worked for Abw in PARIS; believed to have been a member of the SD in LISBON).

Frau VERMEREN *cel* Correspondent of "Das Reich". Exceptionally well informed, with many contacts in Portuguese and Spanish circles. (Note: Mother of Erich VERMEREN of KO TURKEY).

BRAGARD *cel* MNN Correspondent, Prisoner later learned that he was "somehow" connected with KO PORTUGAL.

Italian Diplomat (name forgotten) First Secretary (?) at Italian Legation in LISBON, from whom he received a very exact account of the bombing of LONDON, which had been given by an Italian priest recently returned from LONDON.

Prisoner also met officials of the Portuguese propaganda org, whose names he no longer recalls.

A secondary purpose of Prisoner's visit was to *cel*organise the purchase of American and Allied literature through BRAGARD. Since the war the MNN had been allotted a quota of foreign literature through the Propaganda Ministry, but this was insufficient. Prisoner was especially keen to obtain regular supplies of "Fortune", which was well-informed and apparently unaware of security restrictions.

Lastly, Prisoner treated this visit as an unofficial holiday, and spent some time collecting material for his forthcoming book, "The Age of Icarus".

#### Second Visit

#### 22. Jul 43 Visit to MADRID

Prisoner stayed for three weeks at the German Embassy as guest of Ambassador DIECKHOFF. When DIECKHOFF was appointed to SPAIN, he invited Prisoner to come and see him. At the time Prisoner was a Lt in the Army, att OKW/W Pr, and working on "Signal". He arranged with his chief, Gen von WEDEL, that he should be officially sent to Gen KRAMER *cel* Wehrmachtsattache at the Embassy, to obtain the General's suggestions for improvement of the Spanish edition of "Signal". KRAMER had barely heard of the paper, and after half-an-hour's talk, followed by an invitation to dinner, Prisoner's official mission was completed.

#### 23. Purpose and Contacts

Prisoner's real purpose was to obtain for his own use infm about political conditions in the UK and USA, and on conditions in SPAIN generally, while at the same time taking advantage of his trip as a holiday. Through his friendship with DIECKHOFF he had access to all Embassy reports and was in a position to see documents of a "Top Secret" nature, which would normally not have been available to him. DIECKHOFF had many conversations with Prisoner, in which they discussed the international situation, and DIECKHOFF related such "unofficial" infm as had come to his ears. Prisoner further had lengthy talks with Ges Rat KEMPE *cel* the Second Secretary, who also seemed well informed. Prisoner met most of the Embassy staff, but can recall only the names of LAZAR *cel* Press Attache), Dr PETERSEN *cel* (Kultur Attache) and Gen KRAMER. *cel* Prisoner denies that he had any



contacts with KO SPAIN or tried to pump Abw offrs for infm. He agrees that probably he met several offrs, but he was not aware of their duties. In any case, Prisoner claims that without a letter from Abw in BERLIN, no Abw offr would have talked openly to an outsider. Further, DIECKHOFF, as Ambassador, viewed the activities of the KO sourly, since he considered it inefficient and consisting mainly of offrs out to have a good time.

Through the Embassy, Prisoner met a number of Spanish journalists and Foreign Office officials, whose names he no longer remembers. He recalls, however, the name of Manuel AZNAR (later transferred to WASHINGTON), with whom he had lengthy discussions about the trend of the war.

Prisoner returned via LISBON, where he stayed for a few days. He again contacted German foreign correspondents stationed there, and pumped them for news about the current international situation. He bought a quantity of Allied literature on the black market, and returned by air to GERMANY.

24. Secret Memorandum

Although Prisoner could not make use of most of the infm to which he had been given access by DIECKHOFF, he wrote a "Top Secret" report for Maj SOLM, his departmental chief in W/Pr. which was passed via Gen WEDEL to Gen Obst JODL. It gave Prisoner's impressions of the current situation, as seen from SPAIN, and served to reinforce DIECKHOFF's pessimistic reports of growing Allied strength. Some straight propagandist articles appeared in "Signal", and additional material was later published in Prisoner's book "The Age of Icarus".

Third Visit

25. May 44 Visit to MADRID

Three weeks' visit to the German Embassy as guest of DIECKHOFF. Substantially, it was a repetition of his previous visit. "Signal" was persuaded to send Prisoner on a mission to the Wehrmachtsattache to inquire to what purpose he proposed to put the special funds allotted to him for propaganda among the Spanish Blue Div, then already withdrawn from RUSSIA.

26. Contacts

As before, DIECKHOFF took Prisoner into his full confidence, and showed him Ausw Amt documents of interest to Prisoner. Through Embassy contacts, Prisoner met a number of Spanish Foreign Office officials and journalists, among them again Manuel AZNAR. DIECKHOFF also gave three receptions for Prisoner; among the guests were:-

Spanish priest (name forgotten) Reputed to be confidential adviser to FRANCO.  
CAVELLERO The well-known Spanish writer.  
Editors and diplomatic correspondents of "Ya", "Arriba" and "ABC".  
The Japanese Ambassador.  
The Bulgarian Ambassador.  
Staff of German Embassy.

While Prisoner was in MADRID the Anglo-Spanish agreement of 2 May 44 was signed (guaranteeing Spanish neutrality, no more Spanish war-deliveries to GERMANY, international zone in TANGIER, etc) and Prisoner had first-hand infm on the events preceding it through the

the talks DIECKHOFF had with JORDANA on the subject. DIECKHOFF at the time was forced to put forward RIBBENTROP's policy in his official talks, although he complained to Prisoner about Ausw Amt stupidity. DIECKHOFF further stated that KO SPAIN was grossly overstaffed, and giving much more trouble than it was worth (Prisoner has once more denied that he knowingly met any Abw offrs or had access to Abw files; in view of the Ambassador's dislike of this org, it would have been an act of disloyalty for Prisoner even to attempt to gather infm from that source.)

Part of the Prisoner's stay was simply a holiday. He spent some time gathering more Spanish material for "The Age of Icarus", and accompanied Gen Konsul POCHHAMMER on a duty trip to MALAGA, returning by train a week later.

## 27. Return via LISBON

From MADRID, Prisoner returned via LISBON, where he broke his journey for four or five days. He again contacted his circle of German correspondents which now also included Dr CLAUSS of the DIZ and SERL(?) of the DNB, and bought quantities of Allied literature available in LISBON. He states that he also had an important talk with ORTEGA y GASSET, the philosopher. This conversation was held with the knowledge of TROTT zu SOLZ; it was a preliminary sounding to find out whether, in the event of a successful assassination of HITLER, GASSET would be prepared to act as intermediary between the new German government and the Western Allies. It appears that ORTEGA reacted favourably to the hints thrown out by Prisoner.

## 28. Secret Memorandum to JODL

On his return to GERMANY, Prisoner once more wrote a "Top Secret" report on his journey, which was passed to Gen Obst JODL. As far as Prisoner remembers, it contained the following points:-

The Embassy is strongly opposed to special propaganda among former members of the Blue Div; propaganda allotments should cease. Inside infm about events leading up to the signing of the Anglo-Spanish agreement; DIECKHOFF's difficulties in SPAIN as a result of RIBBENTROP's "tough" policy; FRANCO's attitude (contrary to German opinion, FRANCO is not a Gauleiter, but a shrewd statesman); Ambassador complains that KO is over staffed and inefficient; in spite of Spanish promises to the UK, wolfram deliveries to GERMANY will continue as before.

As before, several propagandist articles appeared in "Signal".

## 29. Connections with KO SPAIN

As will be seen from the foregoing, Prisoner has denied contact with KO SPAIN. He met LEISSNER (Prisoner at DIC) for the first time at this Centre. KLEYENSTUBER was known to Prisoner before, but he claims that he was only a slight acquaintance (this has been confirmed independently by KLEYENSTUBER, also Prisoner at DIC).

Shortly after Prisoner's return from SPAIN in Jun 44, KRAMER asked him to meet a friend of his, an Abw offr, who would shortly proceed to SPAIN to take over the KO there and be glad to hear from Prisoner about conditions in SPAIN, specifically of the Ambassador's attitude towards the KO. Prisoner agreed to meet KLEYENSTUBER at his flat in BERLIN. He told him of DIECKHOFF's prejudice against the KO and Abw personnel, and gave him some hints on how to improve public relations between the Embassy and the KO. KLEYENSTUBER asked

was in effect no more than a courtesy call. No int or political info was exchanged.

Prisoner denies any knowledge of Spanish int sources. He was merely aware that OSTRO operated from SPAIN; the name Paul FIDRMUC means nothing to him. For reasons already stated Prisoner refrained from closer inquiry.

#### V. VISITS TO DENMARK

##### 30. COPENHAGEN, Apr 44

Officially, Prisoner was sent there by "Signal" to write an article on German adm in DENMARK. His stay lasted about five days.

His real purpose was to make contact with BEST, German Plenipotentiary in DENMARK. Prisoner states that the "20th July circle" for some time had been sounding prominent Nazi personalities on their attitude to the regime, and gauging their probable reaction to the assassination of HITLER. At TROTT zu SOLZ' suggestion Prisoner went to see BEST, since rumours had reached the conspirators that BEST, in spite of his bad Nazi record in DENMARK and FRANCE, belonged to the moderates in the Party.

Prisoner easily obtained an interview. BEST knew of Prisoner through his writings, and Prof SIX had previously told Prisoner that BEST would be glad to make his acquaintance. BEST was surprisingly frank with Prisoner; he criticised the conduct of the war, and the incomprehensible attitude of the Reich Government (their circumlocution for HITLER). BEST talked at length about his fears that DENMARK would be the target of an Allied diversionary invasion, and that in such a case the military side would look grim. Prisoner did not commit himself either way, but later reported to TROTT that BEST, if properly approached, would co-operate.

While in COPENHAGEN, Prisoner met KRAMER. They systematically reviewed the international situation. This was of no special significance, since KRAMER usually visited Prisoner about once a month in BERLIN for the same purpose (see Appendix A, para 15).

Prisoner published an article, "The Headaches of a Reichskommissar", in "Signal" a few weeks after his return to BERLIN.

##### 31. Visit to COPENHAGEN, Dec 44

This was again of a few days' duration, officially undertaken for "Signal". By then Prisoner was already working for SCHELLENBERG, and was given great freedom by "Signal", who were aware of his highly-placed connections.

The war was drawing to a close and SCHELLENBERG was trying to send out peace feelers. On the other hand HITLER, KEITEL and TERBOVEN were in favour of a last-ditch defence of NORWAY and DENMARK. With SCHELLENBERG's knowledge and approval, Prisoner contacted BEST.

Firstly, he wished to find out whether BEST was still in opposition. He found BEST more strongly opposed than ever, and without prompting, BEST stated categorically that he would never allow DENMARK to become the scene of fighting, and thought TERBOVEN's policy for NORWAY madness. BEST gave Prisoner a biting character-sketch of TERBOVEN, and talked at length about Danish affairs. He thought the Danish Resistance movement was insignificant - at the most he estimated it at 30,000 men - and discounted a rising as unlikely. On the other hand, BEST was worried by the Danish strikes, and said he had been ordered to carry out repressive measures. He had, he claimed, asked permission to resign, but had been ordered by HITLER to carry on. Nevertheless, should he be ordered to shoot Danish hostages as reprisals, he would resign rather than be responsible for the executions. Prisoner carefully inquired what connections BEST had with SWEDEN, but BEST apparently had no contacts there. Prisoner hinted that events might be moving fast, and was assured that while BEST was in command, no last-ditch defence of DENMARK would be undertaken.

Prisoner also invited KRAMER to COPENHAGEN, and they had another talk, this time quite open on both sides, since Prisoner, as "Egmont" was aware of KRAMER's int activities.

Nothing appeared in print about Prisoner's visit to DENMARK; he merely reported verbally to SCHELLENBERG the results of his talks.

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