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SOURCE	SOURCE The following report is based upon interviews with 25 Japanese repatriates who arrived in Changchun in September. Listed below are their names, area of information, date on which informant left area, and occupation, if known. 1. FUKUYAMA Jiro (滿山次部); Lungch'ing (129-26, 42-47); 4 September 1946;														
	Businessman; civic official.' 2. IRIE Shigeo (入江重雄); Chiaoho (127-20, 43-43); 2 September 1946; Employed at Naisuzan coal mine. 3. UKITA Hisanaga (歪田久永); Hunchun (130-22, 42-52); September 1946;														
	POW employed in Chinese Army Arsenal. 4. SHIMURA Ken (志村健); Tumen (129-51, 42-58); 2 September 1946; businessman.														
	5.	KANZAKI	Tsuneko	(神崎	恒子); Te	ionan (12	22-47,4	5-21);	Septembe	r 1946;	nurse.				
	5. KANZAKI Tsuneko (神崎恒子); Taonan (122-47, 45-21); September 1946; nurse. 6. MAEDA Saburo (前田三郎); Tsitsihar (123-57, 47-22); early September 1946.														
	7. FURUIA (古屋); Tsitsihar; early September 1946.														
	8. SHIMURA (志 村); Tsitsihar; early September 1946.														
	9. MITSUNA Toshio (三戶前太佳); Ant'u (128-22, 42-34); 1 September 1946; farmer, head of Japanese Association.														
	10. Japanese Research Economist; Tumen; early September 1946.														
	11. YASUDA Choei (安田長学); Lungch'ing; 1 September 1946.														
	12. NAGATA Goro (長田五許); Lungch'ing; 1 September 1946.														
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	14. MOCHIDA Ichiro (持田一幹);/Hunchun; 2 September 1946.														
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16. CIKE Nitaro (大池仁太郎); Peian (126-22, 42-14); 17 September 1946. POW.

17. USUI Jisuke (臼井治助); Tsitsiher; 13 September 1946; university graduate.

18. MURAMATSU Kameji (村松道治); Tungpei (126-45, 48-59); 15 September; farmer.

19. KATAKURA Osamu (片名修); Tsitsihar; 13 September 1946; telephone company employee.

20. MINAGANA Shoichi (管川莊一); Tsitsihar; 13 September 1946; telephone company employee.

21. ONC Masaji (大野 巨火); Manchouli (117-27, 49-36); end of August; Tsitsihar; 11 September 1946; railroad repairman.

22. HIRANO Ko (平野幸); Manchouli; end of August; Tsitsihar; 11 September 1946; railroad repairman.

23. ACYALA Tosamatsu (育山十佐本); Wangyehmiao (122-01, 46-05) and vicinity; left Wangyehmiao 31 August: left Tsitsihar 14 September 1946; graduate agricultural school; employed in Koan provincial government.

24. IMEDA Magoya (池田孫也); Chihsi (130-59, 45-18); 12 September 1946; worker in lumber camps.

25. KANARAMI Saburo ($\mathbb{M} \succeq \equiv \mathbb{R}^{3}$); Mutanchieng (129-37, 44-35); 17 September 1946; "white collar worker" in lumber camps and accounting department of Jayanese Association.

L _____ Note: Japanese living in Chinese Communist territory are subject for all propagenda issued by the Sth Route Army, and Chinese Communist groups. This report, however, covers only propaganda directed by the Communists specifically to the Japanese groups.)

Treatment of Japanese:

- 1. The 3th Route Army and the Chinese Communists have, in general, lived up to their propaganda theme: "The Japanese did not lose the war; they have been liberated." Treatment of conscripted workers in Mutanchiang was described as "sympathetic".
- 2. In Tsitsiher only the wealthy experienced discrimination. More than 5,000,000 yuan were exacted from the wealthy Japanese after the Communists' arrival. Homes of well-to-do Japanese were requisitioned by Sth Noute Army officials.
- 3. Hunchun source said all nationalities were treated equally by the Communists. Tungpei source found no current anti-Japanese discrimination, but said they had been "badly treated" when the 8th Route Army first arrived. One Lungch'ing source described Chinese-Japanese relations as "very good" since the army's entry. According to him, the officers from Yenan treated the Japanese kindly, but soldiers conscripted locally performed acts of vandalism. Another Lungch'ing source illustrated the good treatment by pointing out that of 20 Japanese arrested as war criminals (including himself), only 3 were still in custody.
- 4. The discipline and good behavior of Chinese Communist troop escorts on Japanese repatriate trains was praised. In Antu, however, treatment was "generally good until the time of departure for repatriation." The basis for this charge was that the Communists had not informed repatriates of the departure date, had prohibited selling of any personal property, forcing them to abandon it. Each repatriate was allowed to take with him 100 yuan. In Lungch'ing an official Communist order allowed a family of 3 to take 4000 yuan. Actually 2000 yuan was permitted to be carried. A receipt was given for the surplus. On the receipt it was stated that the money would be used for relief funds.

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- 5. Evidence of discrimination was given by a Wangyehmiao source who stated that Mongolians living there cannot openly exhibit friendships for the Japanese. They would be called pro-Japanese and killed by the 8th Noute Army.
- 6. Sources were impressed by the treatment received on repatriation trains. Repatriates were shipped in closed cars. Nationalists effecting repatriation of Japanese had employed uncomfortable flat cars.

Chinese Communist Propaganda Themes Directed to the Japanese:

- 7.^a <u>Slogans</u>: Themes reported to have been used for winning the sympathy and support of the Japanese were: "Nork for Asia Peace" "Japan Must Become a Social Democracy (XINSHU NIPPON)" "America is Making a Colony Out of Japan" "Encourage Communism in Japan." "Rise Against the American Policy in Japan".
 - ^b <u>Anti-Capitalism</u>: Communist propagandists stressed the influence of Japanese financiers and militarists in bringing about Japan's defeat. In Ant'u, for an hour prior to the repatriates' departure, Communists lectured to the Prisoners of War on the responsibility of imperialism for Japan's downfall.
 - c.<u>Communism in Japan</u>:

I I Note: It is not clear what are the ultimate aims of Chinese Communists in their attempts to indoctrinate Japanese repatriates with Communist propaganda. This springs partly from the loose and interchangeable use of the terms "Communism" and "Social Democracy". Whether the Chinese Communists hope that Japanese repatriates can be influenced to (1) spread Communism in Japan, (2) support Social Democracy (in the European sense of the term) or (3) support social democracy, meaning freedom of action for all non-Fascistic groups, including Japanese Communists, is uncertain.

- (1) In Lungching some Japanese errested a war criminals, just before their release, were brought before the local Chief Conissioner who unged them to cooperate with the Communists in Japan. Another sourd in Lungching reported that the current line held that, since the Japanese reque were not receptive to "pure Communism", the first task was to indoctrinate them to be receptive. A third source reported that his group received no briefing prior to departure.
- (2) In Taonan it was stated that only by Communism can Japan be reborn; therefore, she must help the Communist cause there. Japanese leaving Tsitsihar were told that -- "now that they were going to their beloved land" -- they should "think and accurately judge the type of government they should have." Another source in Tsitsihar reported that before departure students of a Communist school, Northeast Military University (paragraph 12), asked him which was better--Militarism or Social Democracy. He was told not to forget to work for Social Democracy. Source in Antu was told to aid in making Japan a democracy leaning toward the Communist state.
- (3) The MINSHU RELATED (民主前日), (Democratic United Japanese Association), Communist equivalent of the Japanese Association, in Tumen stressed that Japan must become democratic in order to rise again. In Peian the SEIJI BUIN (好治日常), Folitical Section Group, a Japanese Communist research organization, emphasized the necessity of Communism in rebuilding Japan.

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d. Sympathy for Chinese Communists (Anti-Nationalist):

(Whether or not the Communist propaganda hopes to further Communism in Japan, it definitely-and naturally-aims at gaining support for the Chinese Communist cause in Japan). It was stated that in Taitsihar Communists have used the looting and bed treatment of Japanese by the Nationalists when they were in Tsitsihar as a main propaganda theme. Repatriates entraining were told that Chinese Communists bear no ill feeling against the ordinary Japanese. A source in Tsitsihar was told that the war against the Kuomintang must be quickly ended so that Japan and Chine may strive together for peace. Hunchun source was reminded that the Nationalists are conscripting the Japanese as soldiers; the Communists let "you Japanese farm and go about your business." Source in Antu was told that the repatriation service performed by Americans is only a front for their capitalistic "scheme" in the Northeast. In Hunchun source was reminded that the repatriation is the result of the Sth Route Army; therefore the Japanese should be grateful to the Chinese Communists.

- ^e. <u>Anti-American</u>: Sources referred to slogans condemning American policy in Japan. No instances were given in which repatriates about to entrain were propagandized concerning that policy.
- 6. <u>Groups indoctrinated: schools</u>: In addition to propaganda directed to repatriates immediately prior to departure, intensive propaganda has been aimed at small, selected groups of intelligent young people between 20 and 30 years of age, some of whom are sent to Communist schools for training. In Tungpei a Japanese Communist told the Japanese over 40 years that they were already instilled with ald Japanese ideas and were therefore no subjects for Communist indoctrination.
- 10. A second Communist school, TULG TEI CHUN CHUNG TA HOUSH (文北学社大学), Northeast Military University, is not open to Japanese but its students have addressed entraining Japanese repatriates.
- 11. There is a Japanese school at leian where "bright, picked" Japanese study political and military affairs. They are graduated after a three months course, told to go back to Japan to teach and support Communism.
- 12. <u>Jeranese newspapers</u>: Jenenese lenguage newspapers reported as sponsered by Communists are:

LUT.1.CHI.AG-weekly-published by MI.SHU AELMEI (Democratic United Japanese Association). (See paragraph 7c(3).

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*TUMEN--TOHCKU Nippo (使化日報)--published by 8th Route Army.

*PAIAN--Northeast Nippo paper.

TSITSIHAR---NENCHIANG NIFFO---published by 8th Route Army

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(Mot clear in original report whether printed in Japanese language.)

- 13. Effectiveness of propaganda: (Shanghai Note: Communists' success in winning sympathy for their cause can be measured not only by sources' opinion of the effectiveness of propaganda among the Japanese group but also by the extent to which sources themselves have been affected. The twenty-five sources can be viewed as being fairly representative of the total group of repatriates. It is probably true, however, that, since the repatriates were talking for American ears, they wished to appear more strongly anti-Communist than they actually are.)
- 14. Distribution: The Chinese Communists in their propaganda among the Japanese have had to wage an up-hill battle. The Japanese believe that the Chinese Communists and Soviet Communists are related, particularly since they believe the Soviets made available Japanese weapons to the Chinese Communists. Since the Japanese observed and experienced looting, raping and murder by Soviet troops invading Manchuria, they were not particularly susceptible to the propaganda of the Chinese.)
- 15. General opinion of sources is that the propaganda has been ineffective, that the Chinese people themselves are waiting for the Nationalists' entry, and that Japanese find it difficult to accept Communism.
- 16. The following comments on conditions typify anti-Communist prejudices of sources:
 - Lungch'ing: Japanese understand the lack of principles of Chinese Communist leaders and have no faith in their propaganda.
 - Tsitsihar: Communists used looting and bad treatment of the Japanese by the Nationalists as one of their propaganda themes. Yet when the Japanese were departing there were numerous cases of vandalism executed by Communists. Discipline of Communist guards on repatriation trains is good. This is coupled with sincerity and enthusiasm of individual soldiers to carry out their principles.
 - Ant'u: Source asked Americans to kill one Japanese Communist, TAKIDA Minoru (満 9 ぎ), at present in the Folice Department, who had treated the Japanese very badly.
 - Tumen: Chinese Communists are opening shops to undersell the regular stores. They say they are doing this for the welfare of the people, but source bolieves they are just trying to get the people's money.

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