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Vol 6
Latin Division - 1945

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LABOR DIVISION

LABOR DIVISION - 1945LABOR DIVISION - LONDONIntroduction

As the earlier sections of this volume indicate, the Labor Division of SI had developed a more or less autonomous organization within the SI Branch. It had its own training school, Milwaukee, its own briefing and document section, the Beach Section, and its own field of operations, Labor and Left groups. Until late in 1944, it was the only section which had made any intelligent approach to the penetration of Germany and its Faust program was the only one actually operating agents inside Germany. Logically, the experience and facilities of the Labor Division were heavily relied on in the SI German penetration program which began late in 1944. With the absorption of the Labor Division into the Division of Intelligence Procurement and the appointment of Mr. Pratt, former head of the Labor Division as chief of DIP, the Labor Division tended to lose its separate identity. The Milwaukee school was taken over by Schools and Training and was for quite some time the only SI training area in England available for the training of Germany-bound agents. The elaborate research organization, the Beach Section, was transferred in early January to the Division of Intelligence Procurement. The balance of the Labor Division in London became an operating desk in DIP.

The Labor Division or Desk had a few more responsibilities than most of the operating desks of DIP. Among

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the extra responsibilities were supervision and coordination of the work of Field Base C, Milwaukee. Forward, the Swedish base and the Swiss base. In the case of the Swiss base, Mr. Van Arkel continued to report to the Labor Desk, but his main sphere of activity was with Mr. George Pratt, who remained as coordinator of the Labor Division OSS, following the virtual disappearance of the Washington Labor office. (296)

Contacts with British Labor Movement

Another function of the London Labor Desk was the work of Mr. Lawrence Levin. Mr. Levin was instructed to maintain contact with the British Labor movement and write reports on its activities. This work was done with the knowledge and consent of the Labor Attache of the American Embassy and did not conflict in any way with the latter's work. Mr. Levin's background was such that he had a considerable number of personal friends in the British Labor movement and his reports were based on conversations of a more or less unofficial nature with the English trade unionists he had known before the war. His reports went to Mr. Pratt and to no one else, although they were available to the Reports Division through Mr. Pratt. Mr. Levin's principal activity was the reporting of the performance of the American delegates to the World Trade Union Conferences in London in February. He wrote his personal estimate of the ability of the American delegates, as well as a running account of the problems of the conference, and of the background interplay of forces and personalities. The reports were purely informal and were in no sense an

(296) pp. 276-282 this volume

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official function of the Labor Division.

Twilight Project

Another extra activity of the Labor Division was the Twilight Project. (297) Some 150 prospective Twilight agents were interviewed between September and December 1944, about 80 of whom were selected and tentatively placed in a pool. It was planned at various times that these men should do various things. One of their functions was to act as guides in newly captured German cities. The function which the Labor Division wished them to undertake was that of undercover agents in captured cities. The men were all German refugees of leftist persuasion. Four or five of the original 80 selected were actually used; the rest were not used because of the difficulties which developed, both in getting them into Germany and in operating them.

The refugees were Germans who had left their native country because of persecution of the Nazis. For the most part they hoped to return to Germany permanently following the collapse of Naziism. It was very difficult indeed for these men to be objective in their treatment of German civilians. They were constantly tempted, as was only human, to use their special status with the United States authorities to give special help to distressing cases they ran across in the course of their work. It was feared that they would constantly request special treatment in terms of food and lodging for their friends. The second difficulty that developed was that

(297) Intv with Carl Devoe 24 May 45

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the refugees who had lived in England since 1938 or before could not accustom themselves to the rigors of living in post-collapse Germany. It was found after the first trial that the men would have to depend on unusual assistance from OSS in order to survive. This assistance would inevitably set them off from the rest of the German civilians and thereby expose them.

A further difficulty that developed was that despite solemn agreements with OSS, they would engage in forbidden political activity with any remnants of the leftist groups that remained in their area of operations. OSS simply could not control them. (298)

Operations in 1945

The Labor Desk in 1945 entered a period of intensive operations, as Lieutenant Gould began to find the Free Germany Committee contacts more and more fruitful. These contacts were possibly the best single source of agents available in England. (299) The missions that resulted from the contacts were designated the Tool series.

Free Germany Movement, CALPO, and the Tool Series

The personnel of the SI Labor Division had always had a strong reluctance to work directly with communists or communist sympathizers. There was nothing in the charter of the Labor Division which prohibited them from working with communists. However, the personnel of the Labor Division had strong feelings on the matter and preferred to work with socialists or non-political trade unionists. An illustration of this was the care and

(298) Intv with Carl Devoe 24 May 45
(299) Id

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and trouble with which the ISK movement was cultivated by the Labor Division in the summer and fall of 1944 to the virtual exclusion of other groups.

When the problem of penetrating Germany became acute in October and November 1944, the communists and their sympathizers were one source of agents which had not, up to that time, been tapped. The communists were undoubtedly among the most active anti-Nazis in Europe. The only evidence OSS had of any real resistance movement inside Germany at that time showed very clearly that at least some of it was communist-organized. It therefore seemed essential to the Labor Division that the urgency of the need for intelligence from Germany should override the personal feelings of the staff members. Approval for the proposal to recruit communists and communist-sympathizers was obtained by the Labor Division in October 1944. Lieutenant Joseph Gould was placed in full charge of all the agents of what came to be known as the Tool series, and of all the negotiations with the organization from which they were to come.

The organization that was contacted to aid OSS in obtaining agents that would be acceptable to the communist underground in Germany was the Free Germany Movement. This movement owed its inspiration to Russia but had autonomous branches in Switzerland, Sweden, France and Great Britain, as well as a reputed network of some strength inside Germany itself. Lieutenant Gould particularly noted that not all the members of the Free Germany Committee were communists. The organization was in a sense an attempt at a united front movement of Germans to overthrow the Nazis. The members were communists, socialists and middle class liberals. (300)

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The Free Germany Movement of Great Britain was contacted through Dr. Jurgen Kusezynski, an influential member of the leadership of the movement, although without official position. The operating member of the movement who was taken into the confidence of Lieutenant Gould and actually placed on the OSS payroll was [REDACTED]. It was made extremely clear to [REDACTED] and to the agents from the very outset that OSS's dealings would be with individuals and not with these individuals as representatives of the Free Germany Movement. (301)

In France and in Switzerland the movement was known as CALPO or Comite Allemagne Libre pour L'Ouest. It will be recalled from the 1944 account of the Labor Division that in Sweden Lillian Traugott had been given the responsibility of contacting communist elements in touch with Germany. In Switzerland G. P. Van Arkel had not neglected communist sources of information. In Paris Lieutenant Jolis was in contact with CALPO and secured much information on their activities in France. He advised against working with them for agent penetration purposes, and preferred not to participate in the Free Germany plan owing to the security risks involved in dealing with agents of conflicting political viewpoints. (302) Early in January it was possible to pull all these far-flung contacts together and arrive at agreements which would do two things: 1) Provide OSS with capable agent recruits, and 2) Provide these recruits with safe addresses and, it was thought at first, with communications.

(301) Political Background Tool Series - Gould 10 May 45
(302) Intv with Jolis Sep 45

The agents were almost exclusively recruited from German refugees who had reached England before the war, some of whom had spent time in the Isle of Man under the terms of the 18B amendment, as dangerous to the security of the British Isles. British SOE was not at all happy about OSS using these people and SOE representatives more or less informally warned the Labor Division on several occasions not to have anything to do with them. (303) Nevertheless OSS persisted and the British saw fit to facilitate the operations as far as was in their power.

The agents supplied by CALPO had no reservations attached to their use. It was understood that the agents would be used for all forms of information and that priority would be given to military information, that political information would be included where possible, and that CALPO would have an opportunity to exchange political questions and answers with the agents on their return. (304)

CALPO had five types of safe addresses in Germany, which are described below in order of their security:

1) Through penetration into the Wehrmacht by its members CALPO had created "points of support" and were able to depend on safe addresses produced by people having contact with the Wehrmacht. These were available to OSS on the basis of a letter written by [REDACTED] to his representative in Germany. The letter would serve to establish the identity of the agent.

2) Political safe addresses operating during the period 1935 - 1940, and developed by CALPO during the war. Again a signed paper would suffice to establish identity for OSS agents.

(303) Intv with Devoe 24 May 45

(304) Min Inter-Br Mtg DO 10 Jan 45

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3) CALPO had members in the foreign worker organization of various nationalities, particularly French. They had placed these agents during the occupation of France and could guarantee at least eight absolutely secure addresses in various parts of Germany.

4) Personal political safe addresses where the political feature was not the dominant character. These were not considered reliable by CALPO.

5) CALPO had official liaison with the Comite des Prisonniers et Deportees which was also doing agent work in Germany through various nationalities. CALPO said that it could obtain safe addresses from this organization.

CALPO's limitation on the use of these safe addresses was as follows: They would be available "only to its own agents as employed by OSS, agents of the Free German Movement of Great Britain and such operations as its representatives, either in France or Great Britain, will agree may be provided with these addresses. The actual addresses will be placed in the hands of the Free Germany representative for Great Britain, as they apply to operations whether now pending or subject to development." (305)

Although it seemed of vital importance at the time to have safe addresses, last minute changes brought about by the increased tempo of operations as in the case of the Pickaxe Mission, made the safe addresses of less importance than they had seemed at first. The Hammer team, however, did make full use of the safe addresses and could not have operated without them.

Although it was intended that the CALPO agents would

(305) Min Inter-Br Mtg DO 10 Jan 45

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be equipped with J/E or W/T there was offered to OSS the use of the CALPO courier chains, two of which were operating in January. One involved a Swiss representative of CALPO; another involved the Free Germany Movement of the Swiss which had no connection with the Soviet-inspired organization. It was thought that both these chains could be made available to OSS, although it was pointed out by the CALPO representative that the chains were already very heavily loaded and would certainly be limited in their usefulness by this fact.

Lieutenant Gould remarked that the training and preparation of the CALPO agents presented no special problems. He personally felt strongly that the men were of much higher quality than other agents recruited by OSS and were more secure and more dependable because of their strong political motivation. This judgment was supported by many of the instructors in Schools and Training. The problem of dealing with agents who belonged to left political groups had always encountered widely divergent opinions. The British had objected that there would be a major security problem because of the connections of the agents. Lieutenant Gould commented that this problem did not turn up in connection with the CALPO agents. He took the precaution of checking and found that there was no gossip in the Free Germany Committee circles about the disappearance of the men. There seemed to be no leaks at all. There was no evidence that the organization had used its connection with the United States Government to further its political aims in Great Britain. It was feared, at one time, that CALPO might use its connections irresponsibly, but this did not

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happen.

Lieutenant Gould commented that the most satisfying thing about the handling of the Tool Series was that there was no waste of time in the execution of the various missions. In the earlier Faust projects there had been days and weeks of waiting by the agents. The longest time spent on any team of the Tool Series was ten weeks and the shortest seven weeks. Lieutenant Gould remarked that the J/E training was on the whole very poor. The Pickaxe team, for example, really used its first two or three contacts in the field for a continuation of training. This Lieutenant Gould felt was very unfortunate but was due solely to the absence of adequate training personnel. As is pointed out elsewhere, in February and March Lieutenant Ancrum was practically the only J/E operator available both for training and for operations. (306)

Lieutenant Gould remarked that opposition within OSS to the use of the CALPO agents sometimes embarrassed their processing. The remaining Labor Division staff, mostly concentrated in the Bach Section, were not always sympathetic to the agents. On one occasion during the equipping of Dolf of the Mallet mission, the agent was confused by the misplaced humor of the equipping staff. Certain of the staff showed open disrespect to the agents and Lieutenant Gould found it necessary to apologise after each session for the attitude of the briefers. (307)

Summary of Missions

There were five Tool series missions, involving seven men altogether.

(306) Intv with Gould 14

Pickaxe

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Hammer Mission. Composed of [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] dropped 1 March into the Berlin area. Recuperated 16 June from the Russians.

Chisel Mission. [REDACTED] was dispatched on 17 March to Essen. The plane, an A/20 based from Harrington, did not return and two subsequent attempts to contact the agent by J/E failed. It was therefore presumed that the agent was lost with the plane before he could be dropped.

Pickaxe Mission. Composed of [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] dropped into the area of Landshut on 4 April and recovered 1 May.

Buzzsaw Mission. The agent, [REDACTED] was dropped near Leipzig on 7 April and was to operate in Leipzig, Chemnitz and Dresden. J/E contacts failed but he was instructed by BBC to make his way to the American lines. It was thought possibly that he might have remained in Russian territory because his parents resided in the Russian zone.

Mallet Mission. The agent [REDACTED] was dropped near Berlin on 10 April. Two attempts to contact by J/E failed but this was not regarded as proof that the agent was not alive at the time. As of July 1945 he had not reported back to OSS.

These missions are described in detail later. (308)

Personnel of Labor Division.

There were a number of personnel changes in 1945 directed for the most part by the changing requirements of the war. Towards the end of February, Mr. Thomas Wilson, who had succeeded Mr. Pratt as chief of the Labor Division,

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Forward. Lieutenant (jg) Carl Devoe was transferred from Cairo, following the completion of the Labor Division work in the Mediterranean, and appointed chief of Labor Division, London. Lieutenant Devoe brought with him from Cairo Mr. Leonard Appel, who became his executive and operations officer. As has been previously noted, Mr. John Clarke, formerly with the Seventh Army, was transferred to Switzerland to become Mr. Van Arkel's assistant. Lieutenant Auerbach and Lieutenant Margolies were transferred along with Corporal Bravman and Lieutenant Searchinger to Field Base C in the latter part of March to work on the Twilight program. Lieutenant Margolies and Lieutenant Auerbach, it will be recalled, had worked on the planning and screening of Twilight while in London, the former maintaining relations with the Austrians in London and the latter relations with ISK and SOE. Lieutenant Lazare Teper and Mr. Henry Sutton, together with the entire staff of the Bach Section, were transferred to DIP. Lieutenant Gould, who handled together with his assistant Lieutenant Levin all of the Free Germany contacts, was towards the end of April transferred to U.S. Group Control Commission.

Towards the end Lieutenant Devoe was transferred to Paris to carry out the liquidation of the Paris office and later returned to Washington. Mr. Leonard Appel was left in charge of the Labor office in London from early June until the end of July, when Mrs. Lillian Traugott arrived from Sweden.

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MILWAUKEE FORWARD (PARIS)Introduction (309)

The main activity of the Labor Division, Paris office in the January-May period 1945, was the collection of intelligence reports from sources in and around Paris, chiefly political refugee groups. The Labor Division of the SI Branch in Paris was specially commended by the Reports Board as a consistently large producer of valuable intelligence. During January 1945, for instance, the Labor Division alone turned in almost half of the total SI production. (310) Again in March the Labor Division was commended for its activities in obtaining reports on German emigré groups, Luxembourg affairs and domestic French affairs. (311)

In addition to the intelligence reports obtained in the Paris area, the Labor Division attempted to mount several long range intelligence missions into Germany. One of the most successful of these missions was Hoyer dispatched in February to Vienna, which returned safely in March. (312) The Paris Labor Division spent a considerable amount of time on preparing the Twilight program. (313)

Missions Proposed

There were two missions proposed by the Labor Desk, Paris, during the January-May period: the Gogol Mission and the Wheaties.

The Gogol Mission was composed of one man, whose name does not appear in the records, who was intended to contact a group of Russian workers located in the region of Frei-

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burg, Bavaria. It was known that this group was active, because they had already sent an emissary to Switzerland asking for help in building a resistance group, and indicating that the nucleus of an organization already existed. The purpose of the mission was to contact the group and report back after a short visit of approximately two weeks. The Gogol agent was briefed on the technique of organizing a reception and dropping operation. He was to explore the possibilities of developing intelligence potentialities of this group. He was to be infiltrated via Switzerland.

On 26 February the agent was dispatched to Switzerland, arriving safely in that country on 1 March. He made four unsuccessful attempts to cross into Germany through the months of March and April and was eventually returned to Paris without having gone into Germany.

The Wheaties mission was composed of two agents, an observer and a W/T, who were to be dispatched from England to report on troop movements, rail traffic and functioning of German government agencies in the Nurnberg, Augsburg and Regensberg areas. They were sent to England by Lieutenant Jolis on 1 March to receive jump training and to be dispatched in the March/April moon period.

The two men, Helinski and Shoenburger, were German nationals who had deserted from the German Army in France and had fought with the FFI. They arrived in London on 1 March and were turned over to Captain Gercke of the German Desk for processing. After they had spent a short time in training, the DIP staff began receiving a large number of complaints about their conduct. The school reported that

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they were insubordinate and lacked discipline. It was felt that they were not sincere in their purpose. After considerable discussion, they were removed from the school and sent to a prisoner of war camp, where they joined Griesert. In the opinion of Captain Alden, Schoenburger was the troublemaker. All three men were eventually released in Germany in June, 1945, to remain under the surveillance of CIC.

In March 1945, at the request of Lieutenant Colonel Verrill, liaison officer with FAAA, Lieutenant Jolis sent two W/T operators to complete an OSS team accompanying airborne troops. These two men, one of whom was Profant, a Luxembourger, returned safely within a month after completing their mission. It was reported that they did excellent work.

Twilight.

In January Lieutenant Jolis became interested in the Twilight program and for this purpose contacted German refugee groups in Paris to obtain addresses, curricula vitae, possible contacts and other information of value, as well as recruits. On 7 March Lieutenant (then Corporal) Margolis arrived in Paris from London to make the final preparations for the mission to Cologne. It was subsequently passed over to Field Base C, from which it operated.

Hofer Mission.

Jean Lambert's mission to Vienna, which was successfully accomplished in March, was one of the most interesting missions of the Paris office of the Labor Division. Besides the success of the mission itself, the arrangements for the mission resulted in close contacts between the Labor Division and the Soviet representatives in Paris. This

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enabled Lieutenant Jolis to do much valuable reporting on Russian emigré groups in France. (314)

Lieutenant Jolis was also concerned with the administration of the Ruppert mission. Upon Ruppert's return late in March Lieutenant Jolis accompanied the agent to Switzerland for the purpose of making contact with officials of the SD whom Ruppert had contacted in Berlin. However, the contacts were not made in Switzerland owing to difficulties in getting the men out of Swiss internment camps, and it was not until later that the information which they possessed was available to OSS. (315)

Trade Union Banquet

On 28 February the Labor Division introduced the CIO delegates to the World Trade Union Conference and the Bureau Confederale of the CGT at St. Germain, the Labor Division Paris area. According to Lieutenant Jolis, reporting the dinner and the conversations thereafter were of great assistance in maintaining good relations, not only between the CGT and the CIO, but also between the Labor Division and both groups. (316)

For the three months December, January and February 1945 the Paris Labor Division was concerned with an attempt on the part of a certain Yves Rameau to expose the activities of OSS agents in Switzerland. The activities of Rameau were extremely complicated and were followed with considerable interest by Lieutenant Jolis. The details of his investigations were turned over to X-2 for action. Rameau was actually of little danger to Mr. Van Arkel, the Labor

(314) See full account of Hofer Mission page this volume.
 (315) See Report Mission page this volume.
 (316) Memo Jolis to Pratt 9 Mar 45.

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Division's representative in Bern, but at one time Lieutenant Jolis thought that he might well be a danger. Out of it all came an interesting report on the activities of the Swiss Surete and their relationships with the ISK group in Switzerland with which Mr. Van Arkel was working. (317)

Personnel

The personnel of the Labor Division, Paris, for the January-May period was as follows:

Lieutenant A. E. Jolis	Chief.
Captain K. A. Lehto	Administrative Officer.
Max Lippman	Responsible for the bulk of political reporting on German Social Democrats and the movements of the Saar emigrade.
Leo Sanders	Responsible for political reporting on assistant emigrade groups.
Jack Gourevitch	Engaged in political reporting on Russian emigrade circles and to a limited extent on the Soviet Union.

Gourevitch's reports were termed extremely valuable by Lieutenant Jolis.

Mr. Thomas S. Wilson, formerly Chief Labor Division, London, engaged in Luxembourg political reporting and was in charge of processing and editing other reports.

Staff Sergeant Mary Heron, WAC, secretary, and Corporal Caroline Heller, WAC, secretary.

Administratively the Labor Division SI, Paris, was under Commander Thomas G. Cassady, chief of SI, but it maintained close relationships with the London Labor Division and particularly with Mr. George Pratt as coordinator

(317) Memo Jolis to Pratt Dec 29 44
Memo Jolis to Holcomb Feb 16 45

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of Labor Division OSS.

Lieutenant Jolis noted that there were no particularly pressing administrative problems in the Paris office with one exception. He said he felt that the enlisted promotions situation was extremely badly handled. "It was a constant source of irritation and continuing injustice to individuals." (318)

Intelligence Reports

During the period January to May 1945 the following intelligence reports were accessioned by the SI Registry in Paris and credited to the Paris Labor Division:

January

- a) Dornier Factory at Bregenz.
- b) Volksturm in Bregenz, Austria.
- c) German War Plants on Swiss-Austrian Border.
- d) German Communist Party in France.
- e) Report on Three German Suspects Living in Paris.
- f) Sira Who's Who Biographical Sketches on French Trade Unionists.
- g) Central Committee for the Struggle for Polish Independence.
- h) Secret Document on French Foreign Policy.
- i) Report on the German Social-Democratic Party in France.
- j) Organization of Calpo in Southern France.
- k) Organization among Emigres of the Saar Territory.
- l) German and French Socialist Youth Movement. Discussions between leaders of both groups.
- m) Quai D'Orsay proposals for unifying Austrian Representation in France preparatory to French recognition.
- n) Interview with members of the Soviet Trade Union Delegation.
- o) Report of Discussion between Soviet Trade Union Delegation and the Bureau Federale of the CGT.
- p) Russian Army of Liberation and White Russian Propaganda.
- q) France-Germany. Social Democrats convene at Toulouse.
- r) France-Germany. Separatist Movement among Saar Emigres.
- s) Germany. Nazi and Anti-Nazi Personalities in Pforzheim (Baden).

(318) Intv with Jolis 15 May 45.

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February

- a) Saar Separatist Movement.
- b) German Social Democrats in France.
- c) Austria. Material issued by Paris Group ANF.
- d) USSR/Georgian Social Democracy.
- e) France/Political. "Volontaires de la Liberte".
- f) France/Germany. Activities of Saar Emigres.
- g) Reactions of Luxembourgeois to their present government.
- h) Anti-American propaganda from Luxembourg.
- i) France/Austria. Hapsburg Activities in France.
- j) Austrian Emigre Activities in France.
- k) Pamphlet on "London Information of Austrian Socialists in Great Britain."
- l) Pamphlet on Information of the Social Democratic Party in France.
- m) Interview between Director of l'Association de la Sarre and General Secretary of German Social-Democratic Party in France.
- n) New Efforts to create a Unified Austrian Representation.

March

- a) France/Germany. Recent Events among the Saar Refugees. Meeting of Association Sarrois.
- b) Preparations of German Social Democrats and Trade Unionists in Case of Collapse of Hitler.
- c) Report re Association Francaise de la Sarre and Monsieur Theobald.
- d) Memorandum on post-war tasks and problems (Economic Study).
- e) European Commodity Clearing through European Economic Corporation (Economic Study).
- f) Freedom of the Press in Luxembourg.
- g) Political Situation in Luxembourg.
- h) List of Anti-Nazis in Pirmesens.
- i) Luxembourg Newspaper.
- j) French Interest in Luxembourg.
- k) List of Anti-Nazis in Kaiserslautern.
- l) Organization of German Social Democratic Party in France.
- m) Meeting between German Social Democratic Party and German Communist Party Representatives in Paris.
- n) Pamphlet of Association Francaise de la Saure.
- o) Calpo Agents being trained by French.
- p) Report on actions and personalities in the Association Francaise de la Sarre.
- q) Report on German Communists in France infiltrating their agents into Germany.

April

- a) Reaction of French Prisoners to General Eisenhower's Appeal.
- b) R.C.A. - General Vlassov's Army - German Anti-Russian propaganda.

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- c) Calpo Director's Meeting.
- d) Documents on Association Francaise de la Sarre and La Ligue des Militants Sarrois.
- e) Bulletins on "Volontaires de la Liberte".
- f) Letter of French Military to Calpo.
- g) Report on "Union des Refugies Sarrois en France."
- h) Report on "Committee for the Liberation of the Saar".
- i) Report on "Equipe Catholique Militante".
- j) Bulletins on German Social Democrats in France.
- k) Report on Russian Emigre Group in France known as "Union of the Soviet Patriots."
- l) Proclamation of General Denikin to Group of "White Russians."
- m) Saar Political Personalities.
- n) Report on the German Question by former member of Reichstag.
- o) Report on Messerschmidt now a Prisoner of War.
- p) Luxemburg Newspaper.

May

- a) Comments on Joint Leaflet of German Communists and German Social Democrats purportedly found in Saar.
- b) Secret Decree of French Government re Saar Regiment Formation.
- c) Col. Passy taking Soustelle's place as head of BCRA.
- d) Discussions between representatives of German Social Democratic Party and German Communist Party re Division of Germany, etc.
- e) German Social Democrat-German Communist Party discussions re Trade Union problems.
- f) Information on Luxembourg Resistance organizations.
- f) Luxembourg - "Eperation Trial" of head of ARBED.
- h) Activities of Intergovernmental Refugee Committee.
- i) Views of Soviet Citizens re U.S.S.R. Regime.

FIELD BASE "C"Introduction

The work of the Belgium-based Labor Division for the period January through May 1945 consisted of three main activities.

- 1) The best and most up-to-date Bach intelligence was obtained from Field Base C, ⁽³¹⁹⁾ produced for the most part by Lieutenant (then Tec 5) Siegfried Hoxter. Operating very closely with Lieutenant Lazare Teper, chief of the Bach Section, London, Hoxter turned in dozens of important briefing intelligence reports.

(319) Intv with Teper, May 45

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2) Field Base C was responsible for the recruiting and planning of six intelligence missions. Two of the missions were despatched, one of which, Faro, was highly successful. Four others reached an advanced stage of preparation but had to be cancelled. The missions were Sunspot, Comet, Typhoon, Hurricane, Monsoon, and Faro. They will be described below.

3) In the latter part of the activities of Field Base C, Captain Richard Watt became responsible for the operations of the Twilight mission and participated in developing post-war SI plans for Germany. He effected the introduction of the SI Twilight team into Bonn and Cologne.

It will be recalled from the 1944 Diary of Captain Watt's activities that procuring direct intelligence reports was not considered the main function of Field Base C. (320) However, a considerable flow of intelligence reports was sent to Paris to be accessioned by the SI Registry there.

Intelligence for the Bach Section, London.

By the end of 1944 Captain Watt had arranged for frequent directives from the Bach Section, London, describing precisely what types of documentary and cover story intelligence were needed for SI operations. These directives continued throughout his operations in 1945, the work increasing in volume until April, when Watt commented that most of the Bach intelligence available in Belgium had been collected.

In January 1945 Lieutenant Hoxter, as chief of the Bach Intelligence Section of Field Base C, had six men working with him: Private First Class Pfister, Lieutenant Muller,

(320) Pp. 191-206 this volume.

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Lieutenant Profant, Lieutenant Casali, Corporal Metal and Lieutenant De Geynst. Watt commented that the difficulties caused by the German offensive in December greatly reduced the flow of Bach intelligence at first, but later increased it because of the availability of German prisoners.

The Bach intelligence was obtained primarily from the interrogation of foreign workers recently returned from Germany, from PW interrogation, and from brief forays into occupied portions of the Rhineland, particularly in the Aachen area. The staff was always overstrained but did as much as it could in the time available. From among the prisoners resulting from the German offensive in December Lieutenant Hoxter was able to select several men who had been company clerks and administrative officers in the army and was able to obtain from them invaluable information on procedures, particularly those concerning furloughs, travelling, etc.

The large PW cage at Jambes was combed for prisoners with interesting Bach backgrounds. Captain Watt was able to arrange to have the regular screeners at the PW center indicate to him the prisoners who appeared to have information of the type desired for Bach purposes. The screeners were told to look for the following types of PWs:

"a. Any PW who has served in or has information regarding: Gestapo, Kripo, Geheime Feldpolizei, Schutzpolizei.

"b. Hauptfeldwebel and Schreiber having information about filling out and use of military documents, especially Wehrmachtreiseschein, and Wehrmachtmarschausweis. Men recently returned from furlough may have information on these.

"c. Any PW who worked in a Wehrbezirkskommando or Wehrmeldeamt or anyone else having information about the filling out of the Wehrpass.

"d. Any PW who worked at one of the economic services such as Wirtschaftskammer, Wirtschaftsamt, Ernährungsamt, Arbeitsamt.

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"e. PWs previously discharged and then reinducted.

"f. PWs with recent knowledge of living conditions in Koln, Dusseldorf, Hamburg, Bremen, Frankfurt, Hannover, Berlin, Kassel, Mainz, Munster, Mannheim, Ludwigshafen, Koblenz, Karlsruhe, Stuttgart, Freiburg, Lorrach, Schaffhausen, Cities of the Ruhr.

"g. PWs with information regarding: Foreign workers, especially with respect to Verbindungsmanner; OT; Arbeitsbattillon L; draft deferment; railroad travel restrictions; restricted areas near the front (Rotezone); Nazi preparations for underground activity after defeat; special Nazi organizations such as Einsatzstaffeln and Einsatzsturme.

"h. PWs recently inducted from the following civilian occupations: Civil Service, Farming, Skilled Handicrafts.

"i. Former members of German Trade Unions (Freie und Christliche Gewerkschaften).

"j. Any PW who fought on the Republican side in the Spanish Civil War." (321)

Sixteen Bach reports of the most useful type were obtained during this period. The reports included information on changes in living conditions of foreign workers in Germany, priority codes in German production and freight traffic, case histories of Belgian, Dutch and French workers in Germany, living conditions and controls in various large German cities, Wehrmacht furlough and service procedures, and a report on special control by Wehrmacht personnel operating in civilian clothes on trains.

By the beginning of February Watt had more Bach material in note form than he had time to process. In early February three reports were considered unusually important: An analysis of the German soldbuch and an analysis of the German military travel papers which at that time had only recently been changed. A third report on the Sipo and Gestapo was pronounced by Horton of the Reports Division as "the most comprehensive he has yet seen on the subject." (322)

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February produced more Bach reports than any other month Watt had been operating, 41 in all. These included reports on living conditions in 15 major German cities. Information on the Wehrmacht, foreign workers, trade deferments from military service, military service, documentation and case stories of German civilians and labor controls. The Bach work continued along the same lines during March.

In April the entire Bach personnel were occupied in dispatching the eight agents included in the five planned missions. They did not have time therefore to do a great deal of Bach work and furthermore, it seemed increasingly clear that the bulk of the job was substantially accomplished. Captain Watt commented that as the front line moved rapidly forward, it became almost impossible to perform Bach intelligence work from a "very rear area". Captain Watt wrote Mr. Pratt that the W/T and J/E teams at that time operating could turn in the best Bach intelligence.

In summary, during the period the detachment was actually engaged in obtaining Bach intelligence, 174 individual reports averaging $3\frac{1}{2}$ pages each were prepared and submitted. The bulk of these were prepared during the four months from 1 December 1944 through 31 March 1945. In addition a very large quantity of documents, both blanks and filled in samples, were obtained and sent to London, along with a considerable number of text books, collections of laws, official codes, etc., having to do with conditions and regulations of all kinds in Nazi Germany. (323)

Watt's general conclusion on Bach work was that a

(323) Memo Watt to Pratt 28 May 45.

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detachment such as his could not possibly cover all the available Bach intelligence, simply because the number of the personnel was too small. He suggested that a Bach intelligence man be assigned to each of the OSS army detachments, after having been trained for about two weeks under a Bach specialist. He felt that coverage over a wide front was essential to really efficient operations. While his detachment was always occupied full-time, it was never able to exhaust all possibilities, even while it was close to the front.

Missions Planned.

The Field Base "C" Detachment had three missions which actually got into Germany: the Faro mission, which was parachuted near Plauen and which was an outstanding success; the Eclipse mission, which was infiltrated from Switzerland and which unfortunately was not a success owing to the personal failure of the agent; and the Comet mission, which crossed the lines into occupied Holland but found that conditions were such that the agent had to turn back. (324)

In addition to the missions that were actually infiltrated Captain Watt developed four other missions which, owing partly to bad luck and partly to the lateness with which they were begun, were never used. These were Sunspot, Typhoon, Hurricane and Monsoon.

Sunspot. The Sunspot agent was [REDACTED] (student name Etat), 51, a German born resident of Brussels, Belgium, whose motivation seemed to be that of obtaining Belgian citizenship. He was initially contacted by Lieutenant Henry De Geynst. This agent was supposed to be infiltrated

(324) Details of the Faro and Eclipse missions will be found on pp.

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into Holland and from there to make his way to the Ruhr. He was to report intelligence by returning at the end of two months to Belgium. He had been completely security cleared by 18 March but unfortunately, owing to radical change in the military circumstances and a liberal supply of bad luck, the mission was cancelled early in April. The British offensive in the Dutch area was at that time just getting under way and it was felt that any agent who had been living in the rear areas of the armies would know too much to be risked in enemy territory. The plan had been for him to infiltrate on 20 March but the mission was refused for security reasons. Furthermore, the Ruhr area was by that time very nearly cut off and there seemed no point in sending the man in. The agent however, was offered to the Twilight program late in April. He subsequently produced outstanding reports under the post-hostilities program. (325)

Typhoon. The Typhoon agents were [REDACTED] 30, a Luxembourger, born in Esch on Alzett, Luxembourg, whose student name was John, and [REDACTED], whose student name was Walter, was born in Mainz, Germany, and was recruited by Lieutenant Hoxter and Hauser during a visit to Aachen in February. He was a communist and was therefore anti-Nazi on ideological grounds. His motivation was political.

Three pin-points were worked out for the Typhoon mission: Mainz, Giessen and Magdeburg. A combination of diabolical timing, of bad weather and rapid military advances, made it necessary to discard all three, despite

(325) Memo Watt to Shepardson Att. Brooks, 1 Sep 45

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the fact that the agents were ready for a period of weeks. The W/T operator, John, was returned to his home in Luxembourg, and the agent, Walter, originally scheduled for Twilight, committed so many breaches of security that he was disqualified and finally turned over to Area "V" for safe keeping.

Hurricane. The Hurricane mission was originally planned as a series of coordinated tourist type missions. The men were Jean [REDACTED], Artur [REDACTED], Andrew [REDACTED], Peter, a fourth man, whose name does not appear in the records, was dropped early in the program. The idea was for Jean and Artur to follow one route, Andrew a second and Peter a third. The plan of the mission was drawn up with the cooperation of the 12th Army Group. The area involved was to be east and north of Kassel. However weather during the last half of the moon period prevented dispatch, which was to be by air from Dijon. The agents, with the exception of Peter, arrived in Dijon but were never dispatched although two of them, Jean and Artur, were flown over the pin-point. These two were subsequently returned to their homes.

Monsoon. Agent Andrew of the Hurricane mission was alerted late in April to go on a mission into the redout area with J/E equipment. The mission was cancelled at the same time as the Hurricane project. The agent Andrew was turned over to the Twilight group.

The Comet Mission. The Comet mission was submitted to Mr. George Pratt for approval in a memo dated 12 March 1945, and involved [REDACTED] (student name Jack), 52, born in Hamburg. The original plan for the Comet mission

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called for sending this former German labor leader into Bremen and Hamburg for the purpose of obtaining intelligence. The particular type of intelligence he was to get was, it was thought, to be of a long range character. He was to concentrate on obtaining information on Nazi personnel and post collapse organizational plans for the occupation period, particularly such information as would assist in the smashing of all post-war Nazi activities in the Hamburg area. Arrangements were made with Melanie to have the agent infiltrated into occupied Holland through a Dutch resistance chain, and the departure date was set for 5 April. The agent was successfully infiltrated on 6 April. However, once on the other side he discovered that the railway line running east into Germany was cut, that military motor traffic was virtually non-existent and that since the beginning of the Allied offensive German military personnel no longer travelled singly but always by units. These facts, which were apparently unknown to the Dutch intelligence officers on the Allied side, made it appear very unlikely to the agent that he could get through to Bremen successfully. He felt that he stood a good chance of being bottled up with the German units in western Holland. The agent reported that his underground contact on the other side of the line advised him to return. Captain Watt commented that in view of the very possible interpretation that the agent backed down for no good reason at the last minute, the entire operation would be investigated. However, the war advanced at such a speed that the entire question became academic. The agent was finally used in the Twilight program.

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Liaison with Other Units

During the January-May period, Captain Watt maintained very close relationships with the MO field detachment, the 9th Army Detachment, and the 12th Army Group Detachments of OSS. He furthermore maintained cordial relationships with the Espinette and the Melanie missions of OSS. In the middle of February, Colonel Colby at 12th Army Group Forward called a meeting to coordinate the activities of the various OSS detachments. Resulting from this meeting was an agreement that all Bach intelligence should be shared with the various detachments interested. This had been done informally before but it now became a more regular practice. Captain Watt was able to assist the 9th Army OSS Detachment by helping to screen PWs for possible short-range line infiltration. Captain Watt's detachment also made available to the 9th Army Detachment facilities for forging documents for 9th Army missions without utilizing the London facilities, which ordinarily involved a considerable delay. The technical problem of entries on the documents was solved for the 9th Army Detachment by constant consultation with Hoxter.

The Twilight Program.

In February the Field Base C personnel were concerned with special problems of the Potomac-Twilight project. It devolved on Captain Watt to arrange and clear the introduction of the Twilight personnel into territory in which they could operate. This was an extremely difficult matter because no clear directive or approval had ever been given for the Twilight project as a whole. It was thought at first by Captain Watt that he could attach the Twilight

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personnel to the T-forces which were in early March awaiting to go into Cologne and Bonn whenever those cities were captured. Unfortunately according to Captain Watt the T-forces were something of a political football themselves and it was found necessary later on for Captain Watt to disassociate the Twilight personnel from the T-forces and forward them on their own with their own communications and their own transportation. This involved long periods of waiting on the part of the personnel and long and seemingly pointless conferences on the part of Captain Watt with various authorities, in order to get permission for the Twilight personnel to operate. Captain Watt discovered that the Twilight program had no clear agreement with CIC and military government as to what the limitations of authority and functions were to be. This led to endless trouble but the trouble was finally overcome and by 10 April the Twilight personnel were operating in Bonn and Cologne. Full details of the Twilight operation will be found below. (326)

Other Special Problems.

Captain Watt had problems with respect to personnel similar to those Lieutenant Jolis had in Paris. He spent considerable time and energy attempting to obtain promotions for his enlisted personnel, but largely without success.

Intelligence Procured.

Despite the fact that Field Base C was not set up primarily to obtain intelligence, a number of reports were forwarded to Paris. Many of the Bach reports which were

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prepared primarily for briefing and cover story purposes were found to have value as general intelligence reports. A list of all Field Base C reports accessioned by the SI Registry, Paris follows:

January

- a) Hitler Youth Training School.
- b) A report on Koln.
- c) The Reichsarbeitsdienst.
- d) German Army Discharges.
- e) Financial relief for German war veterans.
- f) City of Leipzig - A cafe for foreigners.
- g) German Inland Waterways - the use of Belgian Seamen.
- h) Information on Transporteflotte Speer.
- i) Organization of the Interpreters Service in the German Army.
- j) Report on Arbeits Battaillon "L".
- k) Priority Codes in German War Production and Freight Traffic.
- l) Recent changes in living conditions of Foreign Workers in Germany.
- m) Case History of a Belgian Worker in Karlsruhe.
- n) Case History of a Belgian Worker in Arbeits Battaillon "L".
- o) Gestapo Arrest Statistics.
- p) Living Conditions and Controls in Dusseldorf.
- q) Classification of Casualties -- Germany.
- r) Germany -- Case History of a Luftwaffe Technisches Personnel stationed at Fliegerhorst Kohlberg.
- s) Germany - Wehrmacht Furlough and Service Trips.
- t) Germany - Living Conditions in Hamburg.
- u) Germany - Fahndungsdienst, Character and Purpose.
- v) Germany - Living conditions in Koln during Dec. 1944.
- w) Germany - Case History of an OT man in the medical service.
- x) Germany - Report re change to Gauarbeitsamter.
- y) Controls in Germany - 4 page report.

February

- a) Living Conditions in Hamburg.
- b) Living Conditions in Essen.
- c) Case History of a Belgian OT man.
- d) Germany. Consolidated and comprehensive report on structure, personalities and activities of the Sicherheitspolizei and the Gestapo in Belgium.
- e) Germany. German Army Soldbuch - complete detailed report from documentation standpoint.
- f) Belgium/Germany. Legion Speer. Case History of a Belgian Worker.

After February the Bach intelligence reports became more and more technical and were not thought by the SI

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Reports Division in Paris to be of general enough interest to be accessioned and disseminated by Paris.

Personnel

Following is a list of the personnel who participated in the activities of Field Base C during the period 1 January through 12 May 1945. All of these men were not there at one time and there was a considerable turnover in personnel. The average size of the detachment was between twelve and twenty.

Lieutenant Gould was with the detachment for about a month in April and participated in the trips to Central Germany for the purpose of setting up worthwhile contacts.

Lieutenant Margolies came to Field Base C in March to initiate the Potomac project in Bonn and Cologne. He remained after the completion of this project to work on the first stages of the occupation Twilight plan for Germany.

Lieutenant Auerbach came in April and worked on the first stages of the Twilight project.

Lieutenant Hoxter directed Bach work and carried a large share of the agent handling burden throughout this period. He did an excellent job and was finally commissioned in April.

Lieutenants Ebeling, Schonfeld and Hollstein came in March as Potomac project agents. They remained and became valuable staff officers in carrying out the occupation.

Lieutenant Saerchinger came in March and participated in the Potomac project with Lieutenant Margolies and worked on the opening stages of the Twilight program.

Lieutenant (jg) Schocken served as one of the Potomac project agents.

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Lieutenant Rancourt came in February and worked principally on developing a number of missions during the last stages of the war. He also assisted in Bach work.

Lieutenants Profant, Casali and Muller were with the detachment throughout this period and did valuable work in recruiting and handling agent personnel and in carrying on Bach activities.

Mr. Gottesmann came in February and remained until April. During this period he assisted materially in developing four or five missions which the sudden end to hostilities, together with a supply of bad luck and bad weather, rendered inoperative.

Corporal Bravmann came in April and assisted in the beginnings of the Twilight project.

Corporal Metal was with the detachment throughout the period and did valuable Bach, documents, and agent training work.

Corporal Rawle came in February and remained until the end of hostilities. He performed some very valuable Bach work and proved to be very adept at handling agent personnel.

Private First Class Pfister was with the detachment throughout the period and worked chiefly on Bach activities.

Lieutenant Lewis was Administrative Officer until April. When he left he was succeeded by Captain Lehto.

Private First Class Scattoreggio served as clerk-typist and detachment clerk throughout the period.

The Motor Pool was handled throughout this period by Tec 3 Cooper assisted by Private First Class Megill. The balance of the personnel listed under the Motor Pool

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served as drivers.

Communications were handled by Lieutenant Kelso. He was succeeded in April by Technical Sergeant Jamison. The other personnel in the communications section served at various times during this period as radio operators.

Captain Watt noted: "In assessing the work of these men during this period, it is fair to say that the great majority of them did an excellent job, but I should particularly like to commend Lieutenant Hoxter and Corporal Rawle for their outstanding work during the months from January to May." (327)

FIELD BASE C PERSONNEL

Intelligence Staff

Captain Richard F. Watt, ORD
 First Lieutenant Joseph Gould, Inf
 Second Lieutenant Daniel Margolies, AUS
 Second Lieutenant Carl Auerbach, AUS
 Second Lieutenant Siegfried Hoxter, AUS
 Second Lieutenant Hermann Ebeling, AUS
 Second Lieutenant Otto Schonfeld, AUS
 Second Lieutenant Hans Hollstein, AUS
 Second Lieutenant Eugene Saerchinger, AUS
 Lieutenant (jg) Thomas Schocken, USNR
 Second Lieutenant Philip I. Rancourt, AUS
 Second Lieutenant Henri De Geynst. (French Army)
 Second Lieutenant Wenzel Profant (Belgian Army)
 Second Lieutenant Armand Casali (Belgian Army)
 Second Lieutenant Robert Muller (Belgian Army)
 Mr. Gustaw Gottesmann (civilian)
 Corporal Julius Bravemann
 Corporal Nicholas Metal
 Corporal David Rawle
 Private First Class Otto Pfister

Administrative and Services

Captain Kauno Lehto, CAC
 First Lieutenant Raymond Lewis, AC
 Private First Class John Scatoreggio

Transport (Motor Pool)

Tec 3 William Cooper
 Pfc William T. Megill

(327) Memo Watt to Shepardson, 1 Sep 45

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Private First Class Lawrence Bergheimer
 Private First Class Leeland Harmon
 Private First Class Donald Obenshain
 Private First Class Everett Eller
 Private First Class Charles Thompson
 Private First Class Johnnie Montgomery
 Private First Class Edgar Levelillee

Communications

First Lieutenant Andrew Kelso, Sig C
 Technical Sergeant Theodore Jamison
 Tec 4 Paul Jarvela
 Tec 4 John Guba
 Tec 5 William Patterson
 Private First Class John Stelling
 Private Wallace De Ponio

THE SWEDISH BASE

Introduction

The January-May 1945 period of the Swedish Base of the Labor Division was one of intense activity as the earlier groundwork began to bear fruit in every direction. From the point of view of the production of intelligence the work of the Labor Division in contacting Left political and Trade Union groups for information was the most significant. Although the missions planned for the penetration of Germany did not produce intelligence they established the important fact that left and labor groups could be used in Sweden to operate agents inside Germany. The outstanding achievement of the Swedish Labor Division in 1945 was a penetration of the German Legation in Stockholm by Mr. Dorfman as a result of which he obtained copies of cables between the German Minister and the German Foreign Office, sometimes before these cables were actually sent. The background and beginnings of the Labor mission in Stockholm have already been described. (328)

(328) Pp 224-231 this volume.

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Intelligence Procurement

The intelligence potential of the left and labor groups in Sweden was on the whole a disappointment to Mr. Dorfman and Miss Traugott. This was because the expectations of the Labor Division were too high, in the opinion of Miss Traugott. They had the impression that communists and trade unionists in Sweden had direct and continuing contact with Germany. This was not true. In 1941 the left and labor groups had voluntarily broken off all connections of any kind with Germany in order to forestall Government pressure in that direction. They felt that contacts of German refugees with Germany might provoke hostile military action on the part of the Nazis against Sweden. But although the left and labor groups did not have contacts with Germany, or with any other part of Europe for that matter, they were extremely cooperative. The men who worked closely with Miss Traugott and Mr. Dorfman did so mainly out of political conviction. In addition they frankly hoped that working with Americans would enable them later to return to Germany and carry on their political activities. They were made to realize at an early date, however, that Mr. Dorfman and Miss Traugott had no authority whatever to promise any sort of post-war aid. Nevertheless they continued to cooperate.

The intelligence the Labor Division gathered in Stockholm came mainly from Norwegian and German seamen traveling to Sweden who had contacts in the Swedish labor movement. The Swedish Trade Unionists with whom Mr. Dorfman worked would hear of the arrival of these men and report their presence. A further source was the not inconsiderable

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stream of refugees escaping from Germany through Denmark. Another source of intelligence was the Norwegian Trade Unionists who could be counted upon to produce reliable intelligence on Norway.

German refugees were useful as sources of background material. It will be recalled that Mr. Pratt in 1943 had found the German refugees in England a useful source of background material on political developments in Germany. Like Mr. Pratt in England, Mr. Dorfman and Miss Traugott could go to the refugees in Sweden with a news story and ask the opinion of the refugees as to what is meant in terms of conditions in Germany. A complete list of the intelligence accessioned by the London SI Registry from Stockholm labor sources will be found below. Miss Traugott made the statement that the reports obtained from left sources proved to be on the whole thoroughly reliable. (329)

An important contribution was made by the Labor Division Stockholm to the Bach briefing section in London. Stockholm, as has been noted before, was the source of up-to-date German newspapers, so essential to the detailed research the Bach Section was doing. Lieutenant Teper sent frequent directives to Stockholm requesting specialized information for Bach purposes.

As in all neutral countries, Mr. Dorfman and Miss Traugott experienced difficulties in operating necessitated by the conditions of security under which they had worked. It was just as necessary to use cut-outs in Sweden as it was in enemy occupied and enemy countries. For one thing, all Germans who came to Sweden were followed by members

(329) Intv with Traugott 27 Jul 45

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of the Gestapo wherever they went. It was therefore necessary for Mr. Dorfman to make certain that there was never any visible contact between himself and his sources of information. He used about four or five regular contacts who were on the payroll of OSS, and several others who worked as cut-outs occasionally. When Mr. Dorfman and Miss Traugott first arrived in Stockholm in July 1944, they had to contend with the Swedish police, who had been penetrated by the Germans and were working against the Allied governments. (330) Later as the war progressed this swung around until the Swedish Secret Police cooperated fairly fully with the Allied governments. However, Mr. Dorfman commented that the Swedish police could never be trusted and only cooperated on a strictly quid pro quo basis. In actual practice the sources of information would be seen and interviewed by Mr. Dorfman's cut-outs, who would in turn report the information to Mr. Dorfman.

Penetration of the German Legation. (331)

In the latter part of March 1945, through a Sudeten-German trade unionist and socialist, Mr. Dorfman made contact with (the [redacted] of the German Legation. The third time Mr. Dorfman and [redacted] met (about 15 April) Mr. Dorfman obtained from him detailed drawings of the code machine then in use in his office, together with a roll of the code strip.

Mr. Dorfman was advised by Mr. Tikander that there was a directive prohibiting OSS personnel from obtaining codes of foreign powers. It was, however, finally determined to send the material to X-2 in Washington.

(330) Intv with Dorfman Jun 45
 (331) Memo Dorfman to Donovan 23 May 45

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In the latter part of April Mr. Dorfman obtained from [REDACTED] the substance or exact wording of several cables sent and received by the Legation. One of them was from Admiral Doenitz to the German Minister asking that they meet in Lubeck. The Minister replied in effect that he lacked the means to do so. Some of the other cables were between the German authorities in Denmark and Norway and the Military Attache of the Legation in Stockholm, telling of plans and attitudes about the then certain surrender.

There were two especially important items. One was a cable about 3 May from the German Minister to the Gestapo chief in Norway stating that the two and others would meet at noon the following day in Charlottenburg (near the Norwegian-Swedish border) to discuss the capitulation of German troops in Norway. The cable named the German representative participating in the capitulation and stated that the negotiations were almost completed. Mr. Dorfman received this cable about one hour after it was dictated and about two hours before it was transmitted to Norway. He was also advised that the German Minister had just left to keep the appointment.

The second important piece of intelligence was the report of a telephone conversation between the commanding officer of the German troops in Norway and the German Military Attache in Stockholm on capitulation day, in which the former heatedly stated in effect that he would surrender to Allied troops only, and that if the Norwegian police (trained in Sweden) or members of the Norwegian underground should attempt to take control in Norway he would order his men to resist by force of arms.

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The motivation of the Sudeten-German, Mr. Dorfman said, was chiefly that he wanted to save his own skin. Also later it developed that he had no love for the Nazis. The procedure of delivering the information was somewhat complicated. [REDACTED] would call Mr. Dorfman's home from outside the German Legation and arrange a meeting at Mr. Dorfman's cover apartment. At the meeting copies of the telegrams would be handed over or the telegrams would be repeated from memory. In this case Mr. Dorfman handled all contacts personally.

The intelligence obtained through this channel was not disseminated to OSS. Mr. Tikander, the chief of the OSS mission, told Mr. Dorfman that the Minister was personally handling all matters relating to the capitulation negotiations in Sweden and was reporting directly to President Truman. The two main items noted above were transmitted to the President. OSS London had no knowledge of the intelligence resulting from Mr. Dorfman's work. (332)

Agent Operations from Sweden

According to the estimates of both Mr. George Pratt and Mr. Dorfman the SI staff in Stockholm was not operationally minded vis-a-vis Germany. This stemmed from the same psychological impediment that for a long time in part delayed agent operations into Germany from London. When the Labor Division representatives arrived in Stockholm, virtually nothing had been done by SI to infiltrate agents into Germany. At that time Swedish ships were plying to German ports and it seemed logical to Mr. Dorfman they were and always had been an obvious means of smuggling

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people into Germany. There were no facilities for forging documents or training or equipping agents in OSS Stockholm. Miss Traugott remarked that the penetration of Germany if it had been begun earlier could have been on quite a large scale. She noted that she had come across evidence that the Russian government had established an excellent system of getting people into Germany. Agents would return to Stockholm and be completely reequipped with a new set of papers and return to Germany within 24 hours. Miss Traugott said she could see no reason why OSS could not have achieved an equal volume.

The British were successful in building an excellent network into Denmark, but they attached conditions to the use of their lines by OSS agents. The main condition was that any agents that were sent into Germany along their lines either must be their own agents or must be developed under joint British-American projects. This was agreed to by Mr. Tikander. However, Miss Traugott and Mr. Dorfman felt that operating with the British in this way would not be satisfactory. The reason for this was that there was a basic policy difference between the Labor Division and the British organizations. The British did not want to use, and in fact would not use, communists and other left groups. Miss Traugott and Mr. Dorfman therefore felt that if they attempted to build missions around leftists they would find it difficult to get cooperation. They therefore preferred to carry on their own missions. Their difficulties were increased by a ruling which at first was laid down by the chief of mission forbidding any OSS operations in Denmark, except those that went through British hands.

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Toward the end of 1944 Mr. Dorfman had made contacts with socialists, social democrats and trade unionists, and Miss Traugott had made similar contacts with left groups leading toward building a channel through Denmark into Germany. The main idea, as mentioned above, had been to use Swedish ships. This was unfortunately knocked out very shortly after Mr. Dorfman arrived when the Swedes removed all insurance guarantees on their ships going to Germany. This stopped all Swedish traffic. Mr. Dorfman thereafter concentrated on Norwegian ships and on Denmark.

At the turn of the year, however, an administrative decision was made by Mr. Tikander that all communications into Germany would be centered in the hands of Mr. Erichsen in the SO Branch. Mr. Dorfman was told to drop the contacts that he had begun to make. He received an assurance from SO that transportation would be provided for his agents as soon as his agents were ready. However, when the test came in early 1945, the transportation channels which SO had promised to develop did not materialize and Mr. Dorfman had to go back and pick up his contacts again in order to get his agents in. This delayed Mr. Dorfman's entire agent program considerably. (333)

Mr. Dorfman had no major difficulties building up a channel through the Danish underground. He found that, reduced to essentials, it was simply a matter of paying enough money. Each Dane he contacted would say that he could take full responsibility all down the line, and Mr. Dorfman would pay him for this. It would then develop after the payment had been made that there were at least

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two other jurisdictions through which the agents would have to pass who also needed to be paid substantial sums; but despite the fact that they cost a lot, the Danes did the job they were asked to do extremely competently. (334)

Missions

There were six agent infiltration missions planned by the Stockholm Labor Division in 1945. Four of the missions were dispatched, three of them unfortunately too late to produce intelligence. One of the missions was for the Twilight project and was dispatched in good time.

Goethe Mission. The background of this mission is to be found elsewhere in the War Diary. (335) Goethe, whose real name was [REDACTED] was one of the agents who did not get off. Her papers were ordered from the Bach Section in London. They arrived after two months delay and when they did arrive it was discovered that they were completely unusable. One document showed the agent's birth date to be in a certain month, another document showed the birth date to be in another month. Dues stamps in a third document were put in in the wrong place so that they completely invalidated the cover story. In the end, however, the Goethe agent became very ill, and the mission had to be cancelled. (336)

Brahms Mission. The background of the Brahms mission is described elsewhere. (357) It will be recalled that the Brahms' agent was to go to Hamburg and was actually dispatched safely in a German ship. His real name was [REDACTED]. He was 26, born in Sweden and a member of a Swedish trade union. He was expected to return to Stock-

(334) Intv with Dorfman 3 Jun 45

(335) Pp 270-271, this volume

(336) Intv with Dorfman 3 Jun 45

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holm in person with reports of left wing organizations in Hamburg. By the end of July 1945 he had not returned and despite investigation in the Hamburg area no news of him had been received.

Schiller Mission. The background of the Schiller mission is told briefly elsewhere. (338) The Schiller agent was [REDACTED] born in Dresden in 1913, stateless but formerly German. He was briefed in Stockholm by Mr. Dorfman and dispatched 27 March via Denmark for Leipzig. He was [REDACTED] by profession and his objective was to contact trade unions, social democrats and other socialist groups in Berlin or Leipzig for intelligence purposes. He reported once en route to Germany on 10 April from Padborg, which is on the Danish side of the Danish-German frontier. He was to communicate by courier via Denmark and by courier direct from Berlin to Stockholm. His student name was Kurt Kreibich.

Unfortunately Schiller went too late. He reached the Danish-German border and, after waiting a couple of days, was put across the border by Danish underground contacts. He actually did get into Germany, but when in Germany he found himself mixed up with a large number of Danish collaborators escaping the vengeance of the Danish underground. The British, who had reached the Flensburg border by the time he got there, simply took all the Danish collaborators, [REDACTED] included, and put them back across the Danish border. He managed, however, to contact the Danes who had originally put him across the German border and returned to Copenhagen with them. He never gave his identity away

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to the British or to the Germans and he subsequently returned to Stockholm safely.

Heine Mission. An extremely interesting mission was the Heine mission. The agent was [REDACTED] was essentially a refugee from the 20 July putsch. He had been deeply involved in it and was to have [REDACTED] [REDACTED] if the putsch had been successful. He saw many of his friends arrested before the putsch but stayed in his residence until after the attempt had failed, more or less expecting the Gestapo at any moment. They finally came to his house to arrest him. He fooled them, however, with one of the oldest stunts in the espionage game. He asked them to wait while he went to the toilet. He escaped out of the window of the toilet, jumped on his bicycle and rode off to a place where he had previously hidden his car, and drove up to Denmark. When he ran out of gas he ditched his car and made an attempt to contact socialists. He was a business man but a former trade unionist. He got to Copenhagen and was first directed to the office of the National Socialists, but later managed to contact, without any previous knowledge of any Danish underground members, the resistance movement. These people got him to Sweden where Swedish trade unionists notified Mr. Dorfman. He gave Mr. Dorfman one of the most complete accounts of the 20 July putsch received by OSS.

He was to have returned but he became extremely ill just before he left and the project had to be cancelled.

Herbert Mission. [REDACTED] was born in Hamburg in 1914. He was a German social democrat [REDACTED] who deserted [REDACTED] in Sweden in September 1944. He was

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recruited with the aid of the ITF. His objective was to contact trade union and social democratic groups in Hamburg for intelligence purposes. He was dispatched via Denmark on 18 February and Mr. Dorfman was informed that he arrived safely. He was to report back by courier via Denmark. He was specially briefed by an intelligence directive re Hamburg, received in Stockholm 18 January.

When the British entered Hamburg they found [redacted] in prison awaiting execution by the Germans as a spy. [redacted] told them that he had worked with the American government in Stockholm and the British sent a cable to Stockholm to check his statement. Unfortunately, the Stockholm Legation replied that they had never heard of [redacted] despite the fact that Miss Traugott had left complete information about him in her files. However, luckily Captain Watt heard about the case and managed to rescue [redacted].

Carl Schurz Mission. This consisted of four German refugee trade unionists who were dispatched to Captain Watt in Belgium for use in the Twilight project. The names of these agents are not available in the London files. They were never dispatched.

Reports - January to May 1945

Germany. Attitude of higher officials in Germany toward the war and Allied relations; management, direction, production, and subsidiaries of A/S Nordag in Oslo; location and description of powder and explosive factory in Sweden; creation of Deutsche Demokratische Vereinigung and National Komitee Freies Deutschland in Sweden. Effect of German sabotage on Norwegian and Swedish morale; four copies of Alt For Norge.

Sweden. Germany. German groups in Sweden. Translation of article in the March issue of "Socialistische Tribune" which is a good description of the political alignments in the German refugee colony Stockholm. Batch of newspapers and one periodical.

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Germany/Denmark. Various subjects, concerning ships in Halsingborg and information concerning Germany from crew and reports on maritime traffic in Norwegian ports and letter for German deserter showing mentality.

Germany/Norway/Sweden. 8 reports in original by Trade Unionists.

Germany/Sweden. Communism in post-war Sweden, wage policy, circumstances re resignation of Dr. Hodann of the Free German Kulturbund, Sweden.

Germany/Sweden. Various reports on location of munitions, morale among workers in Hamburg, underground poison gas factory at Krummel nr. Hamburg.

Germany/Norway. Military, Naval, and Industrial information on Hamburg, Kiel, and German "Storm-boats" moved to Norway.

Germany/Norway. Miscellaneous reports on ships in Hammerfest, machinery shipped to Kiel and Hamburg, report from Mr. Oeldenbroek, copies of Seefahrtsbuch.

Germany/Denmark. Miscellaneous reports on Stettin, Kiel, Braunschweig, Chemnitz, and Esser-Nahlheim.

Germany. Situation in Germany, political and economic.

Sweden. Possible military intervention by Sweden against the German army of occupation in Norway; Sweden "does not wish to kick Germany when it is down", but considers liberating Norway if asked to do so via SHAEF.

Norway. List of certain German Nazis in Norway, certain Norwegian Nazis in Norway, certain Berlin Nazis.

Germany. Location and description of underground V-2 factory, railway repair shop, North Germany's largest freight station, important point for trans-shipment of freight involving inland waterway ships and motorboats, rail and truck transport, companies engaged in this trans-shipment business or in the servicing thereof, and their equipment; factory for electrical motors, accumulators and Naval equipment. Document in German. Map of Hamburg with legend attached.

Germany. Berlin bomb damage, its effect upon administration and transport; morale.

Germany. Sea and land plane base near Travemunde; landing boats and other ships in harbor. Powder factory at Herrenvik. Loading piers. Shipyards at Lubeck. Arrival of material. Naval vessels in Warnemunde. No German boats arrived at Swedish ports in February.

Norway. Anti-Nazi placards in Oslo; transfer of Lt. Col. Ritter von Goss from Oslo to Berlin; storage of auto tires in silver mines; location of gasmask warehouse.

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Norway. A/S Nordag Oslo; names of men in charge, number and nationality of workers; location and production of branches, transport used by company.

Germany. Attitude of German workers; complete passivity, lack of interest of most workers in continuing the war.

Germany. List of Germans in Zuchtaus, Hamburg-Fuhlsbittel, who were particularly brutal; list of men in the same category in Halle, list of men who had helped or been decent to the Norwegian prisoners.

Norway. Mobilization of men whose fathers were born in Germany. German call-up of these men quoted.

Germany: Berlin Mariendorf. People resigned to working on trenches; morale of troops growing worse; high mortality among refugees, especially the children; communist group distributing literature; copy of notice sent out in Mariendorf by Ortsgruppenleiter to all men, women, and children over 14 for essential work.

Germany. People less frightened of Soviets, expect war to be over soon. Rumors of Partisan fighting in Tyrol. New Communist paper about to appear.

Norway. Troop movements and traffic on Nordland RR, no troops moved North in period Feb. 4-17 but about 200 motor cars were sent for transport of troops. Description of difficulties of civilian travel in Norway.

Germany. Photostatic copy of leaflet issued in Berlin end Feb. by "Flichte" groups, formerly a sports club, now left wing social democratic groups which believed in working closely with USSR.

Germany. Berlin: morale attitude towards war and USSR; estimate of number of deserters in Berlin; Volksturm attitude and activity.

Germany. Legend for Eutin-Luebeck Map. AA defences, factories, storehouses, and depots; underground submarine base; airfield.

Denmark. Legend for Autokarte, AA defences, Troops, and installations West Coast.

Germany. Legent for Map A. Lubeck, section of.

Norway. Location of new underground tunnel constructions in Oslo. Food shortage and morale conditions among German troops. Plundering by Germans in North Norway.

Germany. Reaction of German workers to Norwegian prisoners; attitude of Germans towards the war; factory workers. Bomb damage in Halle, Resistance passive.

Germany. Location of German cruiser near Bremen.

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Sweden. Report on organizational activities among German seamen on behalf of ITF.

Norway. Activity of several German troop transports; 3/5/45 and 3/6/45. Germans moving supplies from their warehouses; seizure of private cars in Bergen; bunker construction in Oslo; description of German anti-Nazi literature being circulated among German soldiers in Norway.

Germany; Berlin. Resistance groups, morale, attitude towards USSR and probable occupation of Berlin; barricades built by Volkssturm; lack of visible defences on motor roads between Berlin and Dresden and Lubeck; controls on recent trip between Denmark and Sweden.

Germany. Location of following industrial establishments in Berlin area and bomb damage as of 3/1/45: Siemenswerke, Vereinigten Eisenbahn-Signalwerke, Osramwerke, Firms Klusseldorf, Maschinenfabrik Wilhelm Strasse, Das Heereszeugamt Spandau, Luftfahrtgeratwerk, Shellwerke, AEG-Werke in Friesack, Deutsche Werke, Spandau, Alkett.

Germany. Experiences of a German technician on trip from Berlin through Denmark and Sweden. Absence of documentary controls between Berlin and Warnemunde; refugees in Mecklenberg area; bomb damage in Rostock; use of soldiers having only four weeks training in Denmark; appropriation of coal in Denmark for use of Germans only; stringent border control at Helsingør.

Germany. Description of operation of air mast on U-boats.

Germany. Explanation of use of "Panzerfaust 60" an anti-tank weapon. "Der Angriff", 24 March 1945.

Germany. Article describing so-called mistreatment of German population in allied occupied areas.

Germany. SS terror against the people of Königsberg. Radio Free Germany reports that inhabitants of town demanded surrender. Mass arrests were made. People living in cellars.

Germany. What do reparations in kind mean? Broadcast to the German people by Radio Free Germany giving information on commission in Moscow and its decision on reparations to be made by Germany after the war. Report from Max to the ITF. Batch of newspapers.

Poland/Germany. The reconstruction of Warsaw. Broadcast by radio Free Germany, speaker; Leopold Achilles, appeal to all Germany to end the war and so stop the further destruction of German cities.

Sweden. Description of attempt in Sweden to whitewash and gain sympathy for German professional and intellectual groups who collaborated with the Nazis.

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Germany/Sweden. Arrests of German Communists in connection with July 20th attempt on Hitler's life.

Norway. Allied air attacks against Alesund, Egersund, Sandfjord; rumor of sabotage by German soldiers in Laksevåg; shipping information.

Denmark. Observations concerning conditions in Copenhagen, Apr. 5, '45. German refugees and wounded soldiers in Laksevåg; shipping information.

Germany. Oranienburg Concentration Camp. Lengthy report on conditions in this and other concentration camps by German seaman who was an inmate of Oranienburg C. C. Names of camp. (In German). 19 pp. Photostatic copy (negative attached) of a Reisepass used by a German working in Norway.

Germany. Lubeck: Description of blast furnaces; the Dornier airplane and speed boat wharf; location of a provision shore house, Lubeck wharf handling U-boat repairs. Rostock: Heinkel airplane works, Naptun Wharf. Warnemunde; Warships in harbor; description and location of A.A. guns. Stralsund; Location of grain sheds and Marine Barracks.

Norway. Translation of a circular which the Norwegian State Railways have had to send to all personnel, by order of the Germans.

Germany. To the German soldiers. Summary and original text of broadcast made by shoe-maker Max Emmendorfer, Vice President, Committee Free Germany.

Germany. Armed combat groups against Hitler. Summary and original text of broadcast made by Major Lewerenz, member Free Germany Movement.

Germany. The way to secure peace. Summary and original text of broadcast made by Capt. Gunther Kertscher Leipzig, member of the National Committee, Free Germany, through Free Germany Radio.

Germany. Appeal to Berliners. Summary of broadcast by Germany Radio, Feb. 23, '45.

Germany. To the mayors and municipal employees, summary and original broadcast made by Capt. Stegner, acting mayor, member of the National Committee Free Germany.

Germany. To the rank and file of the NSDAP. Summary and original broadcast made by Lt. Abel, Free Germany, Radio, Feb. 20, 45, to all members of the NSDAP.

Norway. Soviet prisoners of war supposed to have "gone over" being trained and armed in Norway by the Germans.

Germany. Information concerning German ships or ships available to the Germans.

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Germany. Territory occupied by Soviets. Summary and original text of broadcast made by Max Emmendorfer, vice president of the National Committee.

Germany. Life in German territory occupied by USSR. Schwerin a.d. Warthe, Landberg a.d. Warthe. Summary of broadcast by Free Germany Radio.

Germany. How must an officer now act? Summary and original text of broadcast made by Col. Steidle, member of the national committee, Free Germany.

Germany. Part I of a factual study concerning German National Socialist Economic Organization. 2 copies of "Sozialistische Tribune", Apr. '45. A copy of a pamphlet issued by the German Trade Union Group in Sweden entitled "Vorschlaege zu Problemen des Wiederaufbaus in Deutschland". Some German newspapers.

Germany/Sweden. Letter to ITF, London, from Irmaegaard Enderle. Concerning Jewish youth anxious to get to Palestine. (German text.)

Germany. Rebuilding of German Educational System. Suggestions made by former German Rector of High School Hamburg (German Text).

Germany. Names and descriptions of those who were in charge of the concentration camps in Sachsenhausen and Neuengamme.

Sweden. Text of certain telegrams, received in and sent from the German Legation in Stockholm.

Sweden. People in Halsingborg, suspected of helping Germans to smuggle property from Germany and Norway into Sweden. German consul in Malmo attempting to control activities of Swedish citizens. Rumors of German short-wave radio transmitters in Northern Finland and in Sweden.

Sweden/Germany. Statement endorsed by the German Social Democratic Party, the German Trade Union Organization, the German Communist Party in Sweden, and the Free German Kulturbund in Sweden, addressed to Germans freed from German concentration camps.

Germany. Requested transmission of D.A.F. property to trustee for future free trade union organizations in Germany.

Sweden. Description of certain personnel in military and air attaches offices in the German Legation in Stockholm.

Sweden. Arrivals in Halsingborg during the month of April of Norwegians, Danes, Poles and Russians recently freed from concentration camps in Germany; description of their condition. Return of certain Swedish nationals from Germany.

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Norway. Location of wreck.

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LABOR DIVISION MISSIONSTYL MISSIONIntroduction

After the Labor Division's dispatch of the Downena mission to the Ruhr, an attempt was made to create an underground railroad along which OSS agents would be infiltrated into Germany from Holland. This was the Tyl mission of one agent who was dropped near Ulrum, Holland, on the night of 10 November 1944. (339) The agent was known to everyone as Bobbie and had one of the most colorful careers of any OSS agent.

The significance of his mission was twofold. He was to be the pathfinder for a series of agents penetrating Germany. But perhaps most important he was a pioneer of the new communications system Joan and Eleanor. It was a critical mission. Without the proof that Bobbie provided that the J/E system was workable, no further development of it would have been authorized. (340)

Bobbie operated successfully from 10 November, making altogether 16 successful J/E contacts between 21 November and 30 March 1945.

On 10 February 1945 Bobbie was arrested by the Gestapo and from then on operated under duress, until he was finally recuperated. He was able to warn the base that he was operating under duress however, and was furthermore able to escape without being killed.

OSS received a copy of the interrogation of Bobbie by the Gestapo which made it clear that he had given away to the Gestapo very little of any importance.

(339) See p. 232 this volume

(340) Intv wit/Approved for Release: 2022/11/14 C00026664