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STATION : Heidelberg      REGISTRY NO.: MGH 642      *FSRO-11 76*  
OFFICER : AB-200      REPORT NO. : HSC/OPS/9  
SOURCE : SC/Munich      REPORT DATE : 21 January 1947  
REFERENCE: MSC 266 to 275, 308, 309, 336, 395, 424  
          MGH 391, 430      INFO DATE : Aug.1946 to Jan.1947  
SUBJECT : Operation Trident: Progress Report 1

1. Origin of the Operation. Operation Trident originated as a supplementary project of the FR Operation Belladonna. KILKENNY, who was handling Belladonna and had already established contact with UHVR leaders in Munich, indirectly introduced AB-43 to NESTOR early in July 1946 (MSC-266). After considerable preliminary sparring, continuing through July and August 1946 (MSC 267 to 270) and utilized by AB-43 to convince UHVR of the facts that he was not connected with the same organization as KILKENNY and that he was interested only in the counter-intelligence aspects of the Ukrainian question, AB-43 and the security officers of UHVR came to terms. DAEDALUS, as head of Sluzba Bezpeka (OUN security organization working for UHVR in Western Europe), arranged to share the results of his anti-Soviet operations with AB-43 in return for protection in the American Zone and some minor operational supplies. On this basis, he turned over to AB-43 some fairly detailed but so far unevaluated reports on RIS activities carried on in the Munich area through a system of bunkers (MSC 272 to 275, 308, 309) and suggested plans for verifying the material and curbing the activity. AB-43 maintained connections only with the SB, described for operational purposes as the Lynx Group, through DAEDALUS and, occasionally, NESTOR.

2. The Lynx Group Phase. In September 1946, however, in order to tighten up security, different arrangements were made with UHVR, by which all UHVR information of counter-intelligence value was to be turned over to AB-43 and he was to brief some Lynx Group agents on collecting information for our purposes in Czechoslovakia, Poland, and the Ukraine. Vetting was initiated on NESTOR and DAEDALUS, and the Lynx Group was ordered to inform AB-43 of all pending and subsequent contacts with Allied agencies. The particular security threat of ABN as a subsidiary of UHVR was partially eliminated by ordering that organization, through G-2, to discontinue all anti-Soviet propaganda in the American Zone

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TOP SECRET - CONTROL MSC/OPS/9 -- page 2

and by planning an official G-2 action against the ABN propaganda section (MSC 336). This latter plan was finally canceled for fear of compromising G-2 as an American agency through collaboration with an acknowledged anti-Soviet group, but ABN's more vociferous manifestations were reduced in volume by UHVR (MSC 395). Direct contact between DAEDALUS and AB-43 ceased, also for security reasons, and an intermediary was selected by DAEDALUS to work as our representative on our requests with the Lynx Group.

3. Establishment of an Organization. After about a month's trial (October 1946), it became evident that the arrangements made with the Lynx Group were not completely satisfactory from the point of view of security (their constant and necessary dealings with Soviet agents and the outspoken anti-Soviet attitude of ABN could not be entirely curtailed) and because of their very natural tendency to do their own work first at the expense of ours. Consequently, on 18 November 1946, a new working scheme was devised, in which all direct connections with UHVR, ABN, the Lynx Group and other related or subsidiary organizations were terminated and a new special section of EB was formed for the exclusive purpose of acting as our cut-outs and conducting operations under our orders. This section, ZSVB (Zabordona Seciya Vezvolnoi Borodyi), described in Operation Belladonna, was to be actually employed and paid by us and to have no connections with any Ukrainian organization except through its supervisor NESTOR, who would act as liaison with and obtain full cooperation from UHVR, OUN-BANDERA, UPA, SB, and ABN. Under NESTOR as supervisor the scheme called for six experienced personnel who were unlikely to be compromised in Soviet official records: an active director, a secretary, a translator, and three investigators to interview sources and collect material from various Ukrainian groups. Salaries were fixed as 700 RM per month for the director, 400 RM each for the investigators, and 300 RM each for the translator and the secretary, plus some food and PX supplies, particularly cigarettes. The contract also included our providing office space and equipment (typewriters, paper, etc.) and arranging for a car.

4. Beginning of Operation Trident. On 9 December 1946, NESTOR for UPA and CADMUS for UHVR were notified by AB-43 that all relations with Ukrainian organizations were officially severed, and the same announcement was repeated by KILKENNY on 17 December (MGH 430). At the same time the FR and SC aspects of Ukrainian activities were combined and arrangements were confirmed for carrying them on through the director of the special section ZSVB mentioned in the preceding paragraph. SARPEDON (called MOOR in MSC reports) was NESTOR's nomination for Trident director, because he is a trusted OUN active member, was interned in Germany in 1939-1940 and 1942-1945 as anti-Nazi, had no political or police record in the Ukraine, and now, as a student about to complete his work in chemical engineering at Munich University, had an excellent cover. Both AB-43 and KILKENNY emphasized that

*Send for James for what to be in mind*

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HSC/OPS/9 -- page 3

SARPEDON was to be our only connection with Ukrainian organizations and would be valuable to us only as long as he was actively supported by UHVR and its associates; he was specifically defined as our agent and not UHVR's. As a part of this no-contract policy and because of security difficulties, UHVR leaders made arrangements to go underground, either independently or with our assistance, but CADMUS and NESTOR were to remain available for consultation when necessary through SARPEDON (MGH 430, HSC 5). At meetings on 14 and 17 December 1946, AB-43 requested SARPEDON to initiate the Trident Operation by finding (through CADMUS and NESTOR) a good resident agent for us in the Ukraine (a trusted but politically inactive school teacher or clerk in a large town) and a courier to contact this agent from the American Zone.

5. First Provisional Assignment. On 30 December 1946 SARPEDON was given his first provisional directions for collecting intelligence for us as the following:

a. Instruct the UHVR courier scheduled to be sent to the Ukraine during the first two weeks of January 1947 to find us one to three resident agents in the Ukraine and direct them to collect through UHVR/UPA facilities information on Soviet intelligence and police offices and officials and on Soviet officials of all types who might be defectable for ideological or monetary reasons.

b. Determine what cities of Poland have UHVR/UPA representatives and what their connections are with the Ukraine; extend this representation into Czechoslovakia and the Russian Zone of Germany in order to provide for a courier service via Berlin and Prague.

c. Investigate possible courier routes to the Ukraine, including connections between Lwow and Kiev, Katowice and the west, and supply trains such as the Soviet oil train between Drohobycz and Berlin.

d. Collect any counter-intelligence information already available in the Ukraine.

In addition, preliminary plans were made for the despatch of a Ukrainian courier to Prague to make similar arrangements there and a third courier to Berlin to contact Ukrainian elements and arrange for the receipt and forwarding of intelligence from the Ukraine. Actual handling of couriers was to be assigned to CHIRON, who had previously performed similar tasks for UHVR as agent trainer and director (MGH 391). SARPEDON was also to find a suitable Ukrainian investigator for the ZSVB Special Section, to interview personnel arriving from the Ukraine (beginning with a courier who arrived in Munich in December 1945). SB had also agreed to supply information from the Munich area, but since most of their information is of greater interest to CIC than to us, SARPEDON

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HSC/OPS/9 -- page 4

was directed to submit SB material to AB-43 for screening and then to give it to CIC and to request from CIC any services SB might require. We thus can withhold information when necessary, use whatever SB information concerns us, and legitimately cede to CIC any obligations for SB servicing.

6. Provisional Operations in Early January 1947. Development of preliminary Trident activities proceeded briskly between 30 December 1946 and AB-43's next contact with SARPEDON on 10 January 1947. The following measures were determined during this period:

a. Office space for the Trident staff was secured in the OMG Building for Upper Bavaria, Sophienstrasse, Munich, where the typist and translator can work and keep their records without interference from American MPs or German Police.

b. A courier to go to Prague was tentatively selected: Miroslav POLANSKY, who has a complete set of Czech papers. All arrangements were in order but his departure was postponed until his documents could be reproduced for the use of other couriers. (SARPEDON obtained his papers and turned them over to AB-43 for reproduction; the actual work is being done by a Mr. LENZ in Munich.)

c. A courier to go to the Ukraine was tentatively selected (name not given to AB-43 on 10 January) and arrangements made for his despatch as soon as proper documents could be procured. The Czech papers borrowed from POLANSKY were to be reproduced for the Ukrainian courier, but a set of Polish papers is also necessary. This courier will not depart until papers are completed and reports are available from the courier who arrived in Munich in December 1946 (discussed in next paragraph).

d. A courier from UPA in the Ukraine arrived in Munich in December 1946 with information on UPA/UHVR affairs. He was debriefed by DAEDALUS and his information of counter-intelligence interest was turned over to AB-43 through SARPEDON (MSC/RIR/424 contains a translation of the report, which is being processed by FR).

e. A Trident representative for Berlin was tentatively selected: Victor HOLOT, a merchant, born 10 May 1914 in Lwow, who knows Berlin well and speaks Ukrainian, Russian, German, and Polish; 1m76 tall, weight 78 kgs., dark blond hair, oval face, brown eyes, no special marks of identification. The requirements for his trip are papers for Berlin; food for approximately three weeks; living quarters in Berlin for three to five days (he will find his own accommodations after that); and transportation to Berlin.

f. DAEDALUS went underground by resuming his original

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HSC/OPS/9 -- page 5

profession of writing children's books (MGH 430). He applied for a license to publish a children's magazine in Ukrainian, the official applicant being his uncle Father Peter DAREVICH, who is politically uncontaminated and can stand any investigation. ICD was approached and will grant the license after proper screening, and DAEDALUS will thus have an official occupation and some income.

g. Late in 1946 a member of MGB was despatched from Lwow to become resident MGB agent in Munich. He turned out to be a childhood friend of DAEDALUS and Ukrainian in both his nationality and his sympathies. He agreed to cooperate with DAEDALUS, who will interrogate him and furnish us information on him to enable us to determine his usefulness as a double agent.

h. In addition, the SB, through SARPEDON, requested blank documents to be used by UHVR/UPA and Trident couriers, including German Kennkarte for the American, French, British, and Russian Zones of Germany and for the Berlin area; Czech documents; and Polish documents.

7. Headquarters Comment. Although Operation Trident is still in a very tentative form, some aspects of its future possibilities are fairly clear. The following remarks are intended to clarify doubtful points and affirm a policy line of maximum security and no compromising commitments:

a. Operation Trident was planned as strictly a counter-intelligence enterprise, stressing penetration of Soviet Intelligence Services through anti-Soviet Ukrainian groups which had direct contact with USSR. Since it originated in conjunction with Operation Belladonna, which proposed using Ukrainian groups for positive intelligence, it was necessary in the early stages to combine the objectives of the two operations in order to utilize the facilities of the Ukrainians to their utmost. All the work thus conducted was regarded not as intelligence operations but merely as a penetration of UHVR designed to furnish necessary foundations for solid future counter-intelligence operations with Ukrainian groups in Germany and the Ukraine. No connection with the FR aspect of the work was intended once the initial stages of selecting agents, establishing courier routes, and arranging liaison had been completed. Since this preliminary period should be ended by the establishment of a regular courier service to the Ukraine, permanent formal arrangements with proper attention to security can then be set up. *I have seen any thing possible*

b. The aims of Operation Trident are:

- 27 1) Penetration of UHVR -- as a dissident group in USSR, this organization offers opportunities for contact with the Ukraine and with Soviet Intelligence services there.

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HSC/OPS/9 -- page 6

- 2) Control of counter-penetrators -- as a dissident group, UHVR has always been of interest to Soviet Intelligence, and attempts at penetrating it have undoubtedly been made; through intimate knowledge of UHVR personnel and activities, we can both learn something of the type and methods of Soviet penetration and possibly acquire double agents for our own use.
- 3) Direct counter-intelligence information from USSR -- through the UHVR/UPA, and through Trident couriers briefed by us, we can contact the Soviet Intelligence Services in their own territory.

c. Our obligations to the Ukrainians of UHVR/UPA have been strictly limited and every effort has been made to avoid any kind of direct commitment. In order to secure any services, we had to supply certain assistance to individuals of UHVR and Trident, but even this was kept to a minimum. Our actual contribution to the group includes:

- 1) An office for the Trident staff in Munich (see above)
- 2) Salaries to the Trident group, who are our bona fide employees.
- 3) A small quantity of operational supplies such as 10-in-1 rations and cigarettes.
- 4) Discreet assistance to individual members of UHVR in going underground, securing necessary papers and licenses for residence.

d. No commitments that might involve American interest in anti-Soviet organizations have been made or will be made. The SB request for blank documents for their own and our couriers will not be fulfilled, because we do not have control over all the persons who will use the papers; only the Trident couriers will be supplied with all necessary papers, including Czech and Polish documents. Other documents for couriers, particularly the German Kennkarte, SB can obtain from CIC Munich as a part of the liaison, already arranged with SARPEDON under our direction, for transmitting local counter-intelligence information from UHVR and other groups.

e. Special efforts were made from the beginning of the operation to maintain careful security, even at the expense of speed of communication and complete agent control. Original contacts were limited to KILKENNY and AB-43 for us and CADMUS, NESTOR, and DAEDALUS for UHVR. On the SC side, all contact is now confined to SARPEDON as liaison between UHVR and AB-43. Through the

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disappearance of any compromising members of UHVR underground and the change of name and activity of others (MGH 430), security threats from Soviet penetration via UHVR and the possibility of involving ourselves in international diplomatic complications have been considerably reduced. [The Ukrainian groups were told firmly and repeatedly that all activities were based on the thorough understanding that American interest in Ukrainian affairs was solely to safeguard its own responsibilities in Germany and was not to be considered as sponsorship or even toleration of anti-Soviet work of any sort.] *Amazing! Why? Indeed!*

f. For the sake of security of persons, a certain amount of direct control had to be sacrificed. Relations with employees of the Trident Operation as of January 1947 were therefore not completely satisfactory. Although SARPEDON and his staff are hired and paid by us to work only for us, their natural allegiance is to the Ukrainian cause, and they cannot be expected to do anything which would lessen Ukrainian prestige or chances of success. By avoiding direct contact (at least on the counter-intelligence side) with the leaders and couriers of UHVR, we are forced to accept information filtered through our liaison man in whatever amount and form UHVR chooses to give it. This indirect approach, which makes it impossible to tell whether information of vital importance is being withheld or to evaluate what is received, can perhaps be corrected by arranging for a more immediate channel for debriefing couriers. If some person (such as an American civilian working for ICD) can be found who is completely trusted by both UHVR and us, couriers could report directly to him, thus supplying us an unprejudiced but well-informed outside contact to insure complete and unslanted information.

g. Vetting on all direct contacts and on UHVR leaders in Germany was conducted from the beginning of Operation Belladonna and increased in intensity with the development of Operation Trident. The problem of securing accurate and complete information on any Ukrainian, however, is not simple, since nearly all records and local sources are buried in the inaccessible regions of Eastern Europe. What information is available in Western Europe on Ukrainian personalities is often grotesquely colored by personal prejudice and ideological enmity, since almost no information from a member of one Ukrainian organization can be trusted if it refers to a member of a rival group. The attempt is being made to evaluate sources carefully and to take as little as possible on trust, but in some instances it is practically impossible to obtain anything more than personal estimates of individuals from sources whose reliability is extremely questionable.

h. As the permanent phases of the operation come gradually into action, emphasis will be shifted from necessary arrangements and the establishment of liaison and communication lines to the acquisition and forwarding of counter-intelligence material. The first targets, on Soviet Intelligence organization and personnel in the Ukraine, in this line have already been tentatively assigned through SARPEDON (see above). The first reports, which should be available by February 1947, will determine the line to be pursued in future extensions of inquiries into the Ukraine.