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Remarks: <p>Attached is the memo you requested on Portugal in Africa, prepared jointly by</p> <div style="border: 1px solid black; width: 300px; height: 20px; margin-bottom: 5px;"></div> <div style="border: 1px solid black; width: 100px; height: 20px; display: inline-block; margin-left: 10px;"></div> <p style="margin-left: 150px;"> <div style="border: 1px solid black; width: 150px; height: 20px; display: inline-block; margin-bottom: 5px;"></div> <div style="border: 1px solid black; width: 150px; height: 20px; display: inline-block; margin-left: 10px;"></div> </p>			
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Portugal and Africa

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Portuguese Guinea

After a long period of stalemate, the guerrillas of the African Party for the Independence of Guinea and the Cape Verde Islands (PAIGC) have improved their military position in Portuguese Guinea, largely through a new capability to counter Portuguese air power. From late March to early June the guerrillas used Soviet-supplied SA-7 surface-to-air missiles to down several aircraft, forcing an abrupt curtailment of Portuguese air support activity. In May and June the rebels sustained ground operations with increasing boldness along both the Guinean and Senegalese borders, and because of the decline in air support there was a decline in morale among European troops. The PAIGC leadership, disrupted by the death of Amilcar Cabral, seems to have pulled itself together in part because of the military progress, and the leaders are now talking of a declaration of independence by the end of the year.

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Prospects for the War

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[REDACTED] PAIGC forces appear to remain at about 6,000-8,000, where they have been for the past few years, but the rebels may attempt to follow up their recent successes by undertaking sustained operations

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[REDACTED] The PAIGC may even turn to somewhat more conventional tactics in this sector, making use of roads no longer as well covered by Portuguese air power. The PAIGC is believed to have a number of armed trucks and armored vehicles available, which it may already have used to some extent in the southern zone.

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The Portuguese have contended in the past that the PAIGC will acquire an air capability. Amilcar Cabral once said that late 1972 was a target date for the return of pilot trainees and the delivery of aircraft from the Soviet Union, but there has been nothing to substantiate his claim. There has been speculation that PAIGC pilots, with training and technical assistance from Cuban instructors in Guinea, might fly combat missions out of northern Guinea. This seems doubtful, however. As high OAU officials have noted recently, air activity by any African liberation movement would involve neighboring host states in an unwanted wider war. It almost certainly would result in increased Portuguese retaliatory action against Guinea. If PAIGC pilots do make an appearance, they would probably be limited by Guinean President Sekou Toure to protecting PAIGC installations inside Guinea and might even be controlled by integrating them into Guinea's air defense system.

Portuguese manpower remains at about 30,000, of which some 25 percent is believed to be black African commandos and marines. There are an additional 13,000 militia and village self-defence forces, some with limited training. In contrast to the Europeans, Portuguese African units seem to have acquitted themselves well in recent combat. Although Lisbon is reluctant to rely on armed Africans, the programs for recruiting African troops probably will be maintained.

Should the Portuguese re-establish their air cover, the war could become stalemated again. The recently named new commander Bettencourt Rodrigues, appears to be a hard-nosed

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fighter who combines rigorous military initiative with economic and social enticements for the uncommitted populace, an approach that served the present commander General Spínola reasonably well until the developments of the last few months.

Lisbon has been searching for ways to counter the SA-7 missile, which is vulnerable to decoy and evasion techniques. The financial burden of the war and moral opposition from potential Western suppliers would seem to preclude the acquisition of more sophisticated aircraft, as one way of dealing with the SA-7. The Portuguese appear to be trying new tactics as an alternative. The PAIGC recently denounced indiscriminate high-altitude bombing and napalm attacks on civilians, an indication that Lisbon may be introducing different bombing techniques.

Foreign Assistance for the PAIGC

The USSR and Cuba are the PAIGC's major sources of assistance. The Soviets have provided arms, ammunition, artillery, medical and quartermaster supplies, motor torpedo boats, military vehicles, and, more recently, the SA-7. They appear willing to continue their aid indefinitely.

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Guinea cannot provide much financial or material support of its own, but President Toure permits the use of Guinean territory and transport facilities as a conduit for outside aid to the PAIGC and he will continue to do so. Toure also provides training and staging areas and has even backed rebel thrusts across the border with direct artillery support.

Elsewhere, support for the insurgents is erratic at best. The OAU and individual African states offer moral, financial, and material support, but deliver little of the latter. After years of equivocation President Senghor of Senegal has promised to increase financial and material assistance once the PAIGC declares independence. Libya has sent arms shipments, and rebel artillery trainees are now

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in Tripoli. Zaire recently donated \$40,000. In Europe, Scandinavian and other governments are increasing their non-military aid to all of the anti-Portuguese movements and are beginning to put more political pressure on Lisbon.

The PAIGC Leadership

The election of new party leaders in July seems to have resolved two problems that had surfaced about the time Amilcar Cabral was assassinated in January 1973. Differences had been building between the party's political leaders and military field commanders, with the latter pushing for a greater voice in political decisions and expressing their dislike of being held back by the politicians from undertaking more aggressive military actions. A second problem resulted from the almost total control of the party leadership by Cape Verdean mulattoes. Black Portuguese Guineans made up the bulk of the fighting forces and resented the fact that the mulattoes did not share combat duties equally with them. Although specific details are still unclear, these differences apparently played a part in the assassinations of Cabral by PAIGC dissidents. A more representative leadership has now been established with the election--inside Portuguese Guinea according to the PAIGC--of a four-man Permanent Secretariat, consisting of three Cape Verdeans and one black Guinean. Two Cape Verdeans with political backgrounds--Aristides Pereira and Luiz Cabral--still hold the two top party posts, but the other positions are held by men who have served as major military commanders.

Pereira was a long-time deputy of Cabral, but has not been considered a strong leader. He apparently was chosen acting secretary general after Cabral's death as a compromise until the internal disputes could be resolved. His election as permanent leader may be attributable to the recent military successes as well as to his own good judgement on delicate internal issues.

Whether Pereira can maintain his leadership is open to question. On the one hand, continued military success and steady movement toward independence could enhance his position. On the other, these gains could well lift a black military commander to rival prominence, and in a future political crisis the far more numerous blacks could seize the top leadership in the movement.

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Independence

The PAIGC has talked about declaring Portuguese Guinea independent for several years, and it appears now that a declaration may come this year. The PAIGC announced in May that it would attend the nonaligned conference in Algiers as an independent state rather than a liberation movement. Little time remains before the Algiers meeting, [REDACTED] a declaration might now be timed to coincide with the upcoming UN General Assembly. [REDACTED]

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PAIGC representatives have recently been traveling throughout Africa to gain assurance of support when independence is declared. [REDACTED]

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A declaration of independence would almost certainly receive the support not only of African states but of communist countries, and most "non-aligned" states. Some Scandinavian countries and perhaps even the Dutch could also jump on the bandwagon. The PAIGC hopes this momentum will put pressure on major Western countries such as the US to follow suit. The PAIGC also hopes to be sponsored for UN membership.

The PAIGC expects that once they have gained recognition, other countries will brand the Portuguese as aggressors, thus opening the door to increased aid and perhaps even active intervention by the OAU or African military forces if this were necessary to permit the new state to survive. The PAIGC wants to avoid a post-independence reliance on communist backing and wants as much outside aid as possible to maintain a non-aligned image.

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