

DDA

11 March 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for National Foreign Assessment
Deputy Director for Science and Technology
Comptroller
General Counsel
Legislative Counsel
Inspector General

ODP # 0-287

FROM: William F. Grant
Chief, Regulations Control Division
Information Services Staff

(b)(3)

SUBJECT: Proposed [] Use of Pseudonyms and
Cryptonyms in Cables and Telepouches
(Jobs 9111 and 9112) DRAFTS A (C)

FOR YOUR CONCURRENCE OR COMMENTS:

1. The attached proposals, initiated by the Directorate of Operations, will replace the existing [] dated 5 October 1979 (with paragraph 3a deleted by [] dated 12 December 1979) to restate existing policy and to make the following changes:

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a. In paragraph 4, guidance for use of pseudonyms and cryptonyms is broadened and streamlined by elimination of detailed examples.

b. Paragraph 6 is expanded to recommend use of general terms in lieu of identity substitutes. (C)

2. Please forward your concurrence and/or comments to the Regulations Control Division by 1 April 1980. Concurrence sheets are attached for your convenience. Any questions may be directed to [] extension [] (C)

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William F. Grant

Attachments:

- A. Proposed []
- B. Proposed []
- C. Concurrence Sheets

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cc: AO/DCI ODP
AO/RMS-CTS OF
SSA/DDA OL
C/ISS OMS
OC OTR
OS OEEO
OPPPM OPA
DDO

WARNING NOTICE - INTELLIGENCE
SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED

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This Notice Expires 1 September 1980

COMMUNICATIONS




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USE OF PSEUDONYMS AND CRYPTONYMS

IN CABLES AND TELEPOUCHES (C)

Rescission:  dated 5 October 1979

(b)(3)

Field Counterpart:  dated

(b)(3)

1. This notice presents guidelines for the use of pseudonyms, cryptonyms, and other identity substitutes in electronic communications and emphasizes the need for responsible application of these standards. Provisions concerning cables also apply to telepouches. ~~(C)~~

2. Electrical transmission of encrypted messages is secure. However, security considerations require the discriminating use of pseudonyms, cryptonyms, or other identity substitutes in many instances because of ever-increasing risks of compromise through exposure of copies of cables before or after transmission. The following guidelines are intended to promote a balance between the need for rapid comprehension of cabled information and requirements for protection of sensitive information. ~~(C)~~

3. True names should be used in cables and telepouches whenever consistent with the security of the person, activity, or thing referred to. Such usage would normally include the following:

a. For U.S. Government officials and entities of the U.S.

Government in correspondence concerning their performance of overt functions.

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b. In Agency cables that transmit information identical to that sent to field installations in "unsanitized" form by other U.S. Government agencies.

c. In cables that concern readily discernible overt matters and quotations from the media.

d. For references to countries or other entities when an identity substitute is not necessary to protect sources or methods. ~~(C)~~

4. Identity substitutes will normally be used in the following circumstances:

a. Pseudonyms and cryptonyms should be used in both operational and administrative traffic to protect employees and sources and methods.

(b)(1)

(b)(3)

COMMUNICATIONS

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[REDACTED]

(b)(1)
(b)(3)

5. Routing indicators used to aid headquarters distribution of correspondence are not to be used as cryptonyms. ~~(c)~~

6. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Improper use of identity substitutes (b)(1)
or unwarranted confidence in their utility can be detrimental to sound security (b)(3)
practices and an impediment to rapid and lucid communication. Originators
of correspondence should consider whether or not the use of identity substitutes (b)(1)
in a specific instance will contribute to the security of that correspondence (b)(3)
and act accordingly. [REDACTED]

DON I. WORTMAN
Deputy Director
for
Administration

DISTRIBUTION: AB

~~This Notice Expires 1 September 1980~~

COMMUNICATIONS

USE OF PSEUDONYMS AND CRYPTONYMS
IN CABLES AND TELEPOUCHES (C)

Rescission: [] dated 5 October 1979

Headquarters Counterpart: [] dated

1. This notice presents guidelines for the use of pseudonyms, cryptonyms, and other identity substitutes in electronic communications and emphasizes the need for responsible application of these standards. Provisions concerning cables also apply to telepouches. (C)

2. Electrical transmission of encrypted messages is secure. However, security considerations require the discriminating use of pseudonyms, cryptonyms, or other identity substitutes in many instances because of ever-increasing risks of compromise through exposure of copies of cables before or after transmission. The following guidelines are intended to promote a balance between the need for rapid comprehension of cabled information and requirements for protection of sensitive information. (C)

3. True names should be used in cables and telepouches whenever consistent with the security of the person, activity, or thing referred to. Such usage would normally include the following:

a. For officials and entities of our Government in correspondence concerning their performance of overt functions.

b. In [] cables that transmit information identical to that sent to field installations in "unsanitized" form by other agencies of our Government.

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

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COMMUNICATIONS

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c. In cables that concern readily discernible overt matters and quotations from overt media.

FIELD

d. For references to countries or other entities when an identity substitute is not necessary to protect sources or methods. ~~(C)~~


FIELD

4. Identity substitutes will normally be used in the following circumstances:

FIELD

a. Pseudonyms and cryptonyms should be used in both operational and administrative traffic to protect employees and sources and methods.

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(b)(3)



COMMUNICATIONS

(b)(3)

5. Routing indicators used to aid headquarters distribution of correspondence are not to be used as cryptonyms. ~~(C)~~

(b)(1)
(b)(3)

6.

Improper use of identity substitutes or unwarranted confidence in their utility can be detrimental to sound security practices and an impediment to rapid and lucid communication. Originators of correspondence should consider whether or not the use of an identity substitute in a specific instance will contribute to the security of that correspondence and act accordingly.

(b)(1)
(b)(3)

GEORGE D. RICHWINE

DISTRIBUTION: A, 2B, 4B, FIELD

~~C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L~~

TRANSMITTAL SLIP		DATE
TO: <u>ODP</u>		
ROOM NO.	BUILDING <u>DXL Green</u>	
REMARKS: <u>C/MS - Action due 31 Mar 80</u> <u>EO</u> <u>---</u> <u>DD</u> <u>---</u> <u>SO RPL</u> <u>D</u> <u>---</u> <u>AL/BS</u> <u>int</u> <u>E²</u> <u>file</u>		
FROM: <u>RCD/ISS/DDA</u> <u>BU-2 Amber</u>		
ROOM NO.		TENSION

FORM NO. 241
1 FEB 55

REPLACES FORM 36-8
WHICH MAY BE USED.

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