

I. AIMS OF QKBROIL OPERATIONS - 1952

1. Action in 1952 to accomplish the objective of the QKBROIL Project, the weakening of the Rumanian link in the Communist chain of Satellites, falls into two categories: cold war operations and intensified cold war or hot war operations.

a. Cold War Operations. QKBROIL cold war operations will comprise four concurrent lines of action:

(1) Establishment in Rumania of clandestine ~~units~~ resistance nets, which can be expanded on order into an aggressive organization, and an escape and evasion system. During the cold war period, the overriding consideration will be to keep the organization in existence while working to expand it; no operation will be undertaken which would unduly risk discovery and destruction.

(2) Initiation of psychological warfare against the Communist regime and of a black propaganda program for the Rumanian people.

(3)
(4) Development of an effective representative political group of Rumanian refugees to serve as cover and semi-overt supporting arm for operations.

(4) Preparation for covert economic warfare activities.

b. Development of Assets for Intensified Cold War or Hot War. In order to be prepared to meet the requirements of intensified cold war or hot war conditions, it will be necessary to begin developing the following assets which will be held in reserve:

(1) A pool of approximately 500 Rumanian nationals, to be trained for the mission of activating a resistance force of 15,000 men. This group will include the 200-man Rumanian Guard Company, or Companies, which will receive basic para-military training for the purpose of readying it as a cadre for guerrilla groups.

(2) A stockpile of approximately 2,000 sterile arms for use in the later phases of the cold war period. ~~A stockpile of arms and equipment for the supply of the 15,000 man wartime resistance force.~~

(3) A support

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

- 2 -

(3) A support base from which hot war activities can be undertaken. This base would support QKBROIL as well as other projects.

II. IMPLEMENTATION - COLD WAR PHASE - 1952

1. Establishment of the Underground. The absence of any free border access to Rumania led to the adoption of the secure base concept for establishing the underground. Personnel and materiel will be air-dropped into Rumania until such time as it appears feasible to use land or water routes. Initially, air-drop missions will be flown from Athens. If negotiations with the Turks are successful, missions eventually will be flown from the Istanbul area.

a. Control. Secure and reasonably permanent bases will be established within the country as control points for operations, supply depots, and strong points for refuge. In 1952 a maximum of four and a minimum of two such bases will be established. The bases will be located in remote areas, affording good defense capabilities. In the proximity of each main base there will be an alternate base established and stocked with arms, rations, and W/T sets. The bases are not to be used in the cold war phase as collection points for recruited personnel. They are headquarters and control points from which infiltrated personnel operate. Only in cases of extreme emergency will resident agents know of or be taken to a base area.

b. Composition of Infiltrated Teams. The first two teams, scheduled for infiltration by August 1952, will be selected and recruited, preferably from recent refugees, on the recommendations of the spotters and the results of the labor assessment tests of ZRELOPE. It is planned that personnel recruited for these, and future teams, will be of higher calibre than those utilized in the past on other projects. The team chief should be a high level agent with executive and leadership qualities, capable of assuming command of a guerrilla warfare unit of battalion or regimental size.

c. Expansion and Contact. Initial organization of the nets will be carried out by infiltrated personnel operating from the bases and making contact with existing resistance groups and local people. In later stages resident agents will be directed by infiltrated agents in expanding the nets. Efforts to strengthen existing resistance groups and to develop resident

leaders will be

leaders will be carried out only after careful investigation and evaluation of all available intelligence. Compartmentation will be the rule. Each main base and its subordinate nets will be separate from the other main bases and nets. The bases will keep subordinate nets segregated from each other. Resistance nets, escape and evasion nets, and action units also will be kept separate. Control, coordination and communication will be effected from QKBROIL field headquarters first in Athens; later in Istanbul.

d. Activities. In the first year major effort will be concentrated on getting established and making contact with the inhabitants without endangering the organization. Acts of resistance or sabotage will not be undertaken unless the risk of discovery is at a minimum and the result well worthwhile. A few such acts may prove necessary to harrass the government, to encourage opposition to the regime, to aid in internal recruiting, and for agent morale.

e. Communications. It will not be possible to establish a system of border-crossing couriers for some time. Further, the use of the mails and secret writing is limited due to the severe restrictions on mail to foreign countries. The principal method of communication will be via radio. However, the possibility of arranging a live letter drop in Bucharest will be explored. Also, mail to Israel, due to recent immigrations, is not quite as suspect as to other countries, and letter drops might be set up in Beirut or Tel Aviv.

f. Exfiltration, Escape and Evasion. Rumania's geographic position increases the problems of exfiltration, escape and evasion. ~~The project as approved provides for the purchase of one or two light aircraft, such as the De Havilland Beaver or a helicopter.~~ Consideration is being given to the best method of air liaison and evacuation. Until air pick-up of personnel can be arranged, the means of exit from Rumania for infiltrated personnel or natives are limited and hazardous. In view of the strength of the Soviet Black Sea Fleet, naval and air patrol of the coastal area, land fortifications and guards and the documentation required for travel in the restricted area, escape by way of the Black Sea is virtually impossible. Efforts will be made to develop this means, from inside the country, by establishing a safe route to the coast and running boats in from the outside. Development of this route requires more detailed information on the restricted border zone, coastal defenses and patrols, as well as establishment of contacts and safe houses by agents within the country. Another possible route is via Danube shipping to Vienna. However, this route, if developed, could not be utilized for many people. A third

route would be

SECRET

SECURITY INFORMATION

- 4 -

route would be through Yugoslavia. If arrangements can be made with the Yugoslavs, it is possible that a route might be developed through the Banat, although this border area is extremely sensitive. Establishment of any safe route will have to be initiated from inside the country due to our lack of detailed information on travel restrictions, limits of sensitive border areas, and restricted areas.

g. Method of Spotting and Recruiting Agents.

(1) Infiltrates. Agents will be recruited from the refugees on the basis of recommendations of covert consultants, spotter/recruiters, and American sources. It is recognized that many of the refugees have established themselves in Western countries; however, a number of the younger ones are willing to undertake secret missions.

(2) Resident agents. While suggestions and recommendations for such agents will be requested from refugees, *not it is not expected* that many names will be procured due to lack of recent information (e.g., whether persons are in prison, deported to other areas, moved, etc.). The majority of these will have to be spotted and recruited on the basis of recommendations of our people inside the country.

h. Timing and scope. Establishing ~~the bases~~ and building clandestine nets necessarily will proceed slowly. By the end of 1952, the following are to have been accomplished:

- (1) Establishment ^{inside the country of} of ~~at least two main base areas.~~
- (2) ~~Accomplishment of a few out of~~ ^{transit} ~~harbors.~~
- (2) Establishment of at least one safe exit route, by land or sea.

(4) Development of intelligence and contacts for use in future operations and economic warfare.

3. Training.

a. For Cold War Operations. Initially the training period for infiltrates will be two-three months. Until arrangements are made in Turkey, training will be carried on in Germany. Five members of the QKBROIL training staff, including two Rumanian speakers, will work with the German training station prior to and during the training of Rumanian agents. A detailed training schedule of 600 hours has been worked out for all agents with special courses for team leaders and W/T operators. It is planned to expand the training period to

three-four months

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

- 5 -

three-four months when the situation permits. Self defense, GW, weapons and demolitions are emphasized in training and practice jumps will be made if possible.

b. Of Reserve for Hot War.

(1) Guard Company. The training of the reserve for Hot War conditions will center on the Guard Company, although exceptional personnel may be drawn off from time to time and used as agents. In addition to the routine training which the Guard Company will receive in the way of basic infantry training, it has been suggested that groups of perhaps thirty men be removed periodically from the Guard Company for a month or two of more advanced training. Such training would be designed to select and train non-commissioned officers for the expanded shock force of Rumanian nationals. This suggestion is based on the assumption that the Army will eventually consider the Guard Companies as military units to fight with American forces in the event of a Soviet invasion and will begin to train them accordingly.

(2) Guerrilla Warfare Force. The Guerrilla Warfare unit will be developed from the Guard Company, through the gradual recruitment of up to 500 agents. By 1954 this will provide a nucleus sufficient to activate, under wartime conditions, guerrilla forces of approximately 15,000 combatants. Extensive support facilities for this force will have to be developed, and a para-military training program worked out. Location of this training and holding area has not yet been determined, but it is believed to be the subject of a separate project.

c. Disposal. None of these training facilities will be used for agent rejects or used agents. *Disposal of agent-type personnel is a problem which will be handled with the D+D*

4. Support. Support facilities, such as warehouses, holding and training areas, safehouses, etc., will have to be developed at field base headquarters as well as at a base to be established for direction of hot war activities. Arms and equipment in vast quantities, some sterile, will have to be procured and stored. Rations, clothing, medical supplies and items to be used in barter should be shipped to the overseas base prior to agent drops and a supply maintained. Methods of obtaining Rumanian currency are being explored.

5. Psychological Warfare Program. A carefully designed covert propaganda and PW program has been developed and will be initiated approximately 45 days prior to first agent drops in Rumania. It is necessary that the propaganda phase be initiated prior to agent drops in order to prepare the Rumanian people psychologically to receive

and assist our

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

- 6 -

and assist our agents. The Rumanians have developed fear and distrust of any sort of clandestine matter because the Communist regime has planted and fostered resistance groups in an effort to uncover opposition and potential resistance leaders. Black broadcasts and distribution of leaflets will have the dual aim of building up the will to resist on the part of the Rumanian people and of raising doubts and fears in the minds of the Communists and their tools. The propaganda staff will be based temporarily in Athens.

6. Political Situation. The political situation among the Rumanian refugees has been one of confusion compounded of distrust, personal and political rivalries, secret funds, and a partial monarch. Continuing efforts to establish a representative organization to serve as cover and support arm have been unsuccessful. A final effort is now being made to prevail upon the two major factions to rejoin forces under the aegis of the King. If this fails, it is proposed that a panel of selected refugees -- with or without the King's cooperation -- be created and controlled by CIA/opc to assist in our operations.

7. Preparation for Economic Warfare. The covert economic warfare program for Rumania will be developed slowly on the basis of experience in other countries, available intelligence, and suggestions from our personnel in the country. The present project envisages the completion of preliminary arrangements and the execution of small-scale economic warfare operations. Large-scale economic warfare operations which may involve significant expenditures, particularly in the later phases, will be covered by special separate projects.

8. Establishment of Field Headquarters. Although [] was at one time considered, it is now planned ^{to establish} that QKBROIL Field Headquarters ~~will be established~~ []. An initial cadre of ^{two} ~~three~~ staff members ~~will be~~ dispatched in January. Build-up to full T/O strength will be gradual and will depend on development of cover, official and commercial, and negotiations with the Turks on establishment of the black radio station, training and holding areas, and air facilities.

9. Summary and Evaluation. ^{development} The transition from the planning to the operational phase of the QKBROIL Project is being accomplished gradually and steadily, taking advantage of the experiences of other country projects and endeavoring to avoid the mistakes common to such operations. The year 1952 will be a period of establishment and consolidation rather than action. Active operations will be developed in 1953.

TWF/mdc

9 January 1952

Attachment: 1952 Schedule

~~SECRET~~
SECURITY INFORMATION
SCHEDULE FOR 1952

13 January C] departs for Germany.

30 January ETA C] Istanbul.

February C > departs for Istanbul.

30 April ETD Guard Company C. O. and an Adjutant for Germany.

1 May First 20 agents ready for training.

5 May ETD four members of the PW Staff (C] temporarily, C] - Athens).

10 May ETD C] for Germany.

15 May ETD C] for Germany.

1 June ETD C] for Istanbul.

15 June First black broadcast.

1 July First leaflet drop.

15 July Second drop of first leaflet.

20 July ETD C > to Istanbul.

30 July ETA approximately four other indigenous PW Staff Athens.

1 August Drop first team.

15 August ETD C] to Istanbul.

1 September Drop second team, resupply first team.

15 September Drop second leaflet.

1 October Resupply both teams.

15 October Drop third leaflet.

1 November Resupply both teams.

15 November Drop fourth leaflet.

1 December Resupply mission.

20 December Drop Christmas leaflet.

NOTE: Departure of secretaries for overseas bases will be fitted into the above schedule as they become available.

~~SECRET~~