

1971

RECENT MESSAGES BETWEEN US AND PRC

Attached are the specific messages exchanged by the US and PRC since April 21. Message dates are as indicated and the substance and status of each note are written in parentheses.

<u>TAB</u>	<u>Message Date</u>	<u>Description</u>
A	April 21	Message from Premier Chou En Lai delivered by Amb. Hilaly on April 27. (Reaffirms willingness to receive Presidential envoy in Peking.) Delivered to PRC Ambassador to Pakistan.
B	April 28	Oral message delivered to Amb. Hilaly and transmitted to PRC Ambassador by Yahya May 1. (Thanks Chou En Lai for constructive message of April 21 and promises early response. Also contains separate message to be conveyed to Chou En Lai as Yahya's personal views stressing President Nixon's interest in handling negotiations himself until government to government channel established.)
C	May 10	Response to April 21 message delivered to Amb. Hilaly. (President Nixon proposes secret meeting between Dr. Kissinger and Chou En Lai or representative in preparation for possible Presidential visit to Peking.)
D	May 20	Message transmitted to Amb. Farland for delivery to PRC via Yahya. (Provides text of May 20 SALT announcement and emphasis that US will conclude no agreement which would be directed against PRC.)
E	May 31	Oral message delivered to HAK by Amb. Hilaly (Yahya tells HAK a very encouraging and positive PRC response is forthcoming. Meeting will occur in Capital with travel arrangements to be made by Chinese.)

TABMessage DateDescription

F

June 2

Letter dated May 29, 1971. (Chairman Mao welcomes both President Nixon's visit and Mr. Kissinger who will precede him for preliminary secret meeting in China. Date preferred for Dr. Kissinger's visit June 15-20th.)

G

June 4

Message handed to Amb. Hilaly by HAK (Dr. Kissinger will meet with Chou en-Lai in China July 9-11 and will be authorized to settle on joint communique.)

## Message from Premier Chou en Lai

Premier Chou en Lai thanked President Yahya for conveying the message of President Nixon on 5 Jan 71. Premier Chou en Lai is very grateful to President Yahya and he will be grateful if President Yahya conveys the following verbatim message to President Nixon.

"Owing to the situation at the time, it has not been possible to reply earlier to the message from the President of the USA to the Premier of People's Republic of China.

At present, contacts between the peoples of China and the United States are being renewed. However, if the relation between China and the USA are to be restored fundamentally, the US must withdraw all its Armed forces from China's Taiwan and Taiwan Straits area. A solution to this crucial question can be found only through direct discussions between high level responsible persons of the two countries.

discussions. Of course, if the US President considers that the time is not yet ripe, the matter may be deferred to a later date. As for the modalities, procedure and other details of the high level meeting and discussions in Peking, as they are of no substantive significance, it is believed that <sup>it</sup> is entirely possible for proper arrangements to be made through the good offices of President Yahya Khan.

April 21, 1971

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE

Extract of MEMCON dated May 5, 1971

Ambassador Hilaly called today asking that the following information be passed to the President:

The message which Dr. Kissinger gave him on April 28 was transmitted directly to President Yahya that same evening. President Yahya has cabled Hilaly confirming that Yahya personally conveyed the message to the Ambassador of Communist China on Saturday morning, May 1. It most probably reached Chou-en-lai the same day or the following day.

Ambassador Hilaly said that what he had told President Yahya on behalf of President Nixon on the basis of Dr. Kissinger's talk with him was as follows:

The President asked that the following message be passed to President Yahya:

My warm thanks for the helpful role you have played. I particularly appreciate the delicacy and tact with which you have handled these important exchanges. Please thank Chou-en-lai for his message which I think is positive, constructive and forthcoming. I will soon be replying to it in the same spirit.

Ambassador Hilaly noted further that Dr. Kissinger asked him to convey the following to Chou-en-lai stated as President Yahya's personal views:

I feel that President Nixon is very anxious to handle these negotiations entirely by himself and not to let any politician come into the picture until a government-to-government channel is established. My Ambassador in Washington thinks this is because President Nixon will find it more difficult to move quickly in the matter if American politicians come into it. Therefore, it would be best until President Nixon's reply is received and an American envoy is designated for these discussions if the Chinese government would not discuss the matter with any American politician. This does not mean that there is any objection to continuation of the People-to-People program. In fact, Ambassador Hilaly thinks that President Nixon would be very happy if every other kind of American visitor is encouraged to visit China--students, reporters, scholars, etc.--so this is a temporary thing until the official link is established.

Ambassador Hilaly said that he received a telegram from President Yahya saying that the above was conveyed as suggested.

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE

*by Mr. Kissinger &  
Amb. Helms 12<sup>th</sup>, 5/10/71*

President Nixon has carefully studied the message of April 21, 1971, from Premier Chou En-Lai conveyed through the courtesy of President Yahya Khan. President Nixon agrees that direct high-level negotiations are necessary to resolve the issues dividing the United States of America and the People's Republic of China. Because of the importance he attaches to normalizing relations between our two countries, President Nixon is prepared to accept the suggestion of Premier Chou En-Lai that he visit Peking for direct conversations with the leaders of the People's Republic of China. At such a meeting each side would be free to raise the issue of principal concern to it.

In order to prepare the visit by President Nixon and to establish reliable contact with the leaders of the Chinese People's Republic, President Nixon proposes a preliminary secret meeting between his Assistant for National Security Affairs, Dr. Kissinger and Premier Chou En-Lai or another appropriate high-level Chinese official. Dr. Kissinger would be prepared to attend such a meeting on Chinese soil preferably at some location within convenient flying distance from Pakistan to be suggested by the People's Republic of China. Dr. Kissinger would be authorized to discuss the circumstances which would make a visit by President Nixon most useful, the agenda of such a meeting, the time of such a visit and to begin a preliminary exchange of views on all subjects of mutual interest. If it should be thought desirable that a special emissary come to Peking publically between the secret visit to the People's Republic of China of

- 2 -

Dr. Kissinger and the arrival of President Nixon, Dr. Kissinger will be authorized to arrange it. It is anticipated that the visit of President Nixon to Peking could be announced within a short time of the secret meeting between Dr. Kissinger and Premier Chou En-Lai. Dr. Kissinger will be prepared to come from June 15 onward.

It is proposed that the precise details of Dr. Kissinger's trip including location, duration of stay, communication and similar matters be discussed through the good offices of President Yahya Khan. For secrecy, it is essential that no other channel be used. It is also understood that this first meeting between Dr. Kissinger and high officials of the People's Republic of China be strictly secret.

ETS-HK-AA851YJ

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

VIA SPECIAL CHANNEL

May 20, 1971

FOR: AMBASSADOR FARLAND

FROM: HENRY A. KISSINGER

Please deliver attached message to Yahya personally  
for immediate transmittal by him to PRC Ambassador.

Best regards.

Attachment

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

HAK:AMH:mlh:typed 5/20/71



*Backchannel to Farland  
for Yahya 5/20/71*

MESSAGE FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE  
PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA

In case the People's Republic of China has not been apprised, the United States Government wishes to inform it of the following statement made by the President of the United States on May 20, 1971:

"The Governments of the United States and the Soviet Union, after reviewing the course of their talks on the limitation of strategic armaments, have agreed to concentrate this year on working out an agreement for the limitation of the deployment of anti-ballistic missile systems (ABM's). They have also agreed that, together with concluding an agreement to limit ABM's, they will agree on certain measures with respect to the limitation of offensive strategic weapons.

"The two sides are taking this course in the conviction that it will create more favorable conditions for further negotiations to limit all strategic arms. These negotiations will be actively pursued."

President Nixon wishes to emphasize that it is his policy to conclude no agreement which would be directed against the People's Republic of China. Mr. Kissinger is prepared to include this issue and related questions on the agenda of the proposed meeting with the designated representative of the People's Republic of China.

*Orig. message  
Pakistan  
Grady, 5/31/71*

1. There is a very encouraging and positive response to the last message.
2. Please convey to Mr. Kissinger that the meeting will take place in the capital for which travel arrangements will be made by us.
3. Level of meeting will be as proposed by you.
4. Full message will be transmitted by safe means.

"Premier Chou En Lai sincerely thanks His Excellency President Yahya Khan for most rapidly transmitting the three messages from President Nixon.

"Premier Chou En Lai has seriously studied President Nixon's messages of April 29, May 17th and May 22nd 1971, and has reported with much pleasure to Chairman Mao Tse Tung that President Nixon is prepared to accept his suggestion to visit Peking for direct conversations with the leaders of the Peoples Republic of China. Chairman Mao Tse Tung has indicated that he welcomes President Nixon's visit and looks forward to that occasion when he may have direct conversations with His Excellency the President, in which each side would be free to raise the principal issue of concern to it. It goes without saying that the first question to be settled is the crucial issue between China and the United States which is the question of the concrete way of the withdrawal of all the U. S. Armed Forces from Taiwan and Taiwan Straits area.

"Premier Chou En Lai welcomes Dr. Kissinger to China as the U. S. representative who will come in advance for a preliminary secret meeting with high level Chinese officials to prepare and make necessary arrangements for President Nixon's visit to Peking.

"Premier Chou En Lai suggests that it would be preferable for Dr. Kissinger to set a date between June 15 and 20th for his arrival in

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China, and that he may fly direct from Islamabad to a Chinese airport not open to the public. As for the flight, he may take a Pakistan Boeing aircraft or a Chinese special plane can be sent to fly him to and from China, if needed. The talks plus the flights on both ways will probably take three or four days. If there is the desire to use his own telecommunication equipment on a temporary basis during his stay in China he may do so.

"As it is difficult to keep Dr. Kissinger's trip strictly secret, he may well consider coming for the meeting in an open capacity. If secrecy is still desired the Government of the Peoples Republic of China will on its part guarantee the strict maintenance of secrecy. When the talks have yielded results, the two sides may agree to a public announcement to be made after the meeting, if it is so desired.

"As for other details, they may be discussed and arranged through President Yahya Khan directly with the Chinese Ambassador.

"Premier Chou En Lai warmly looks forward to the meeting with Dr. Kissinger in China in the near future."

*Handled to  
Hillaby 530, 6/4/71*

President Nixon has carefully reviewed the May 29, 1971, message from Premier Chou en-Lai which President Yahya Khan so kindly conveyed. President Nixon looks forward with great pleasure to the opportunity of a personal meeting and discussions with the leaders of the People's Republic of China.

The President appreciates the warm welcome extended by Premier Chou en-Lai to his personal representative, Dr. Kissinger. Because of the shortness of time available and the need to arrange a suitable pretext for his travel, Dr. Kissinger now finds it impossible to leave Washington before the first week of July. Accordingly, President Nixon proposes that Dr. Kissinger arrive in China on July 9 and leave on July 11, flying in a Pakistani Boeing aircraft from Islamabad to Peking.

Dr. Kissinger will be authorized to discuss all issues of concern to both countries preliminary to President Nixon's visit to China, and to make all arrangements for the President's visit. Dr. Kissinger will not require his own telecommunication equipment. It is envisaged that four members of his personal staff will accompany him.

President Nixon appreciates the fact that the Government of the People's Republic of China will maintain strict secrecy

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with respect to Dr. Kissinger's visit and considers this essential.

Dr. Kissinger will be authorized to settle on a possible communique to be issued sometime after his return to the United States if this is mutually desired.

Dr. Kissinger warmly looks forward to his visit to China and to his meeting with Premier Chou en-Lai. President Nixon considers this trip a very positive first step in improving relations between the United States and the People's Republic of China.

## MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTONSECRET/SENSITIVE

April 27, 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR DR. KISSINGER

FROM: Harold H. Saunders *Hal*

SUBJECT: Urgent Request for Appointment with  
Ambassador Hilaly

Ambassador Hilaly called at 3:45 p.m. today to ask for five minutes of your time as soon as possible. He says he has an urgent message from his President having to do with Communist China.

I explained that you might be leaving town, and he stressed the urgency of this and said that he would only need five minutes.

Since you know more about this operation than I do, I simply pass this along and will be glad to serve as a channel if you can give Hilaly five minutes before you leave.

I will see him. \_\_\_\_\_

Other \_\_\_\_\_

SECRET/SENSITIVE

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Message from Premier Chou en Lai  
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Premier Chou en Lai thanked President Yahya for conveying the message of President Nixon on 5 Jan 71. Premier Chou en Lai is very grateful to President Yahya and he will be grateful if President Yahya conveys the following verbatim message to President Nixon.

"Owing to the situation at the time, it has not been possible to reply earlier to the message from the President of the USA to the Premier of People's Republic of China.

At present, contacts between the peoples of China and the United States are being renewed. However, if the relation between China and the USA are to be restored fundamentally, the US must withdraw all its Armed forces from China's Taiwan and Taiwan Straits area. A solution to this crucial question can be found only through direct discussions between high level responsible persons of the two countries.

discussions. Of course, if the US President considers that the time is not yet ripe, the matter may be deferred to a later date. As for the modalities, procedure and other details of the high level meeting and discussions in Peking, as they are of no substantive significance, it is believed that <sup>it</sup> is entirely possible for proper arrangements to be made through the good offices of President Yahya Khan."

April 21, 1971

TAB 18

DELIVERED BY HILARY  
6:15 27 APRIL 71

I was summoned to the White House by Mr Kissinger this morning at 11 a. m. He told me that in reply to the message sent by Premier Chou en-Lai through our President which I conveyed to him on the 9th December, President Nixon would like to send a fresh message to President Yahya for passing it on to the Chinese Prime Minister (he presumed this would be through the Chinese Ambassador in Pakistan). He then gave me an unsigned note in an envelope. When I asked him what it contained he said that in response to Chou en Lai's suggestion that a special representative of President Nixon would be welcome in Peking to discuss the question of Taiwan, President Nixon wished to inform Premier Chou en Lai that the U. S. Government was prepared to attend a preliminary meeting at an early date in a location convenient to both sides to discuss what ~~the~~ arrangements could or should be made for sending a U. S. delegation to Peking for high level discussions. In reply to questions from me, Mr Kissinger said that the preliminary meeting could take place in Rawalpindi if General Yahya's government would not be embarrassed in any way by it. From the U. S. side the representatives could be, Ambassador Murphy or Mr Dewey or Ambassador David Bruce. Or it could also be himself. (He could arrange to pay a visit to Vietnam and under that cover, arrange a halt in Pakistan for the purpose of meeting the Chinese representative. It would depend on what kind of official the Chinese would send to Pakistan for this purpose).

Mr Kissinger added that if a U. S. delegation ultimately went to Peking, the discussions would not be confined to the

question/....

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question of Taiwan but all matters connected with improving relations with the Chinese and reducing tensions would be discussed. Also that it would not be difficult to comply with the Chinese request for withdrawing American forces from Taiwan. There were no American military forces there except advisory and training missions .


THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTONTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE

May 3, 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR:

THOMAS KARAMESSINES  
DEPUTY DIRECTOR FOR PLANS  
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Please deliver the attached message for Ambassador Farland [redacted]  
[redacted] on an Exclusively Eyes Only basis at opening  
of business.

(b)(1)  
(b)(3)  
(b)(1)  
(b)(3)

Alexander M. Haig, Jr.  
Brigadier General, U. S. Army  
Deputy Assistant to the President  
for National Security Affairs

Attachment

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE

BACK CHANNEL

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

May 3, 1971

FROM: Henry A. Kissinger *H. Kissinger*  
TO: Ambassador Farland, Islamabad

EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY FOR THE AMBASSADOR

For the most sensitive reasons known only to the President and myself, the President wishes you to find some personal repeat personal pretext for undertaking an immediate trip to the United States in order that you may be able to confer with me. Our meeting will have to be completely covert with its nature being divulged to no one with the exception of the President, you and myself. Due to the urgency of this matter and the recognized need for you to clear your personal visit through normal State channels, I am suggesting the following two options:

(1) I will be in Palm Springs, California until Saturday, May 8. If you could arrange a pretext which would bring you to the West Coast we could then meet in Palm Springs. Perhaps you could travel there from some appropriate overt location such as Los Angeles. The fact of our meeting in Palm Springs however would have to remain completely covert.

(2) If you are unable to establish a legitimate basis for being on the West Coast prior to May 8, you should then establish a pretext for visiting the United States as soon as possible subsequent to that date. If you select this option it is essential that you plan to include a stay in Washington for

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY



TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

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not more than 48 hours because of the political climate here which could involve you in some of the Congressional controversy associated with the situation in East Pakistan.

Please examine your own schedule, consider most carefully the need to establish a bona fide personal basis for your visit which is in no way related to your meeting with me and let me know via this channel as soon as possible which option you prefer and of your estimated arrival time. I recognize the difficulties that this message will entail for you but I am sure you realize that the importance the President attaches to our meeting is the overriding consideration. The subject of our meeting will not require any preparation on your part.

Best personal regards.

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

**TOP SECRET SENSITIVE**  
**EYES ONLY**  
**CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY**  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505


TAB 35

[TS-HK-AA85/aa]

4 May 1971

**MEMORANDUM FOR: The Honorable Henry A. Kissinger**  
**Assistant to the President for**  
**National Security Affairs**


The attached reply to your message was received here  
early this morning.

  
Thomas H. Karamessines  
Deputy Director for Plans

Attachment

Message from Ambassador Farland,  
Islamabad

**TOP SECRET SENSITIVE**  
**EYES ONLY**



TO: DR. HENRY KISSINGER

FROM: AMBASSADOR FARLAND, ISLAMABAD

1. AM MAKING EVERY EFFORT TO MEET THE MAY 8 DEADLINE AND WILL INSTITUTE TRAVEL SOONEST TO LOS ANGELES UPON RECEIPT CLEARANCE FOR DEPARTURE FROM STATE DEPARTMENT.

2. IN JUSTIFICATION FOR TRAVEL AM SENDING FOLLOWING TELEGRAM TO STATE DEPARTMENT: QTE HAVE RECEIVED TENTATIVE PURCHASE OFFER FOR CERTAIN FAMILY COAL HOLDINGS; OFFER FIGURE IS IN EXCESS TWO MILLION DOLLARS. VARIOUS QUESTIONS INVOLVED WHICH CANNOT BE HANDLED TELEGRAPHICALLY AND TIMING MAJOR FACTOR. THEREFORE REQUEST ON MOST URGENT BASIS DEPARTMENTAL AUTHORITY TRAVEL TO HAWAII OR POSSIBLY WEST COAST AT OWN RPT OWN EXPENSE FOR SHORT MEETING WITH LAWYERS AND PRINCIPAL. ELAPSED TIME FROM POST INCLUDING TRAVEL FOUR-FIVE DAYS. DO NOT RPT NOT INTEND VISIT WASHINGTON AT THIS TIME BUT BELIEVE WASHINGTON CONSULTATION SUBSEQUENT DATE (EARLY JULY)

PAGE 2 ISLAMABAD [ ] T O P S E C R E T EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY (b)(1)  
 WOULD SERVE NECESSARY AND USEFUL PURPOSE. APPRECIATE  
 IMMEDIATE REPLY IN ORDER EFFECT TRAVEL ARRANGEMENTS. UNQTE.

3. IN ORDER AVOID IDENTIFICATION TO MAXIMUM EXTREME AM  
 MAKING NO RESERVATIONS FOR HOTEL ACCOMMODATIONS IN LOS  
 ANGELES. WILL SECURE LODGING ON ARRIVAL AND CALL YOU.

4. PLEASE ADVISE ME YOUR PALM SPRINGS TELEPHONE NUMBER  
 AND YOUR WHITE HOUSE NUMBER IN EVENT THERE IS ANY SLIP IN  
 ARRANGEMENTS.

5. WILL TRANSPORTATION BE PROVIDED ME FROM LOS ANGELES  
 TO PALM SPRINGS?

6. WILL ADVISE YOU IMMEDIATELY UPON RECEIPT OF TRAVEL  
 AUTHORIZATION.

7. SINCE MY DEPARTURE THIS TIME WILL BE QUESTIONED [ ] (b)(1)  
 [ ] SUGGEST YOUR OFFICE SEND SOONEST FOLLOWING CO (b)(3)  
 (b)(1)IAL  
 (b)(3)

TELEGRAM TO ME: [ ] QTE HAVE TENTATIVE AGREEMENT FOR PURCHASE  
 COAL LANDS IN AMOUNT \$2,235,000. AS YOU KNOW FROM PREVIOUS  
 CORRESPONDENCE VARIOUS QUESTIONS CANNOT BE ANSWERED BY LETTER  
 OR TELEGRAM. FEEL IT IMPERATIVE YOU MEET WITH LAWYERS AND  
 PRINCIPAL IN HAWAII OR WEST COAST SOONEST FOR TWO OR THREE  
 DAYS. INFORM YOU THAT NELSON EXPECTS EXHORBITANT FINDER'S  
 FEE IF DEAL CONSUMMATED. CAN DO NOTHING ABOUT THIS. ADVISE  
 ME SOONEST YOUR TIME AND PLACE FOR MEETING. SIGNED JAMES  
 MEENEN. UNQTE ]

T O P S E C R E T EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

*Sent by  
 Commons  
 means  
 EDT 5*

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

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TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE


May 4, 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR:

THOMAS KARAMESSINES  
DEPUTY DIRECTOR FOR PLANS  
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Please deliver the attached message for Ambassador Farland  
[redacted] on an Exclusively Eyes Only basis.

(b)(1)  
(b)(1)(3)  
(b)(3)

  
Alexander M. Haig, Jr.  
Brigadier General, U. S. Army  
Deputy Assistant to the President  
for National Security Affairs

Attachment

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE

SENT TO CIA  
AT 2:58 P.M.

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

VIA CAS BACKCHANNEL

TO: Amb. Farland, American Embassy, Islamabad, Pakistan

FROM: Henry A. Kissinger

Most grateful for your prompt and responsive action on my urgent request. The scenario you have outlined appears to be most satisfactory. I hope that it will be possible for you to arrive in Los Angeles sometime during the p.m. of May 6 PDT since it would be most convenient if we could meet on May 7 enabling me to leave Palm Springs early on the morning of the 8th. If, however, this is not possible I am prepared to stay here an additional 24 hours, until the morning of the 9th.

Suggest you pursue the following procedure:

1. Upon arriving in Los Angeles, take care of your accommodations and then call me at Palm Springs at either of the following numbers: 714/FA 5-5841 or 714/FA 7-2372 or 714/327-8817. If for some reason there is no answer at these numbers then call the White House in Washington collect: 202/456-2235 or 202/456-2290 and ask for General Haig, my deputy, who is the only other individual privy at this end.

2. As soon as you are established in your hotel and we have made contact, I will arrange to have you picked up either by sedan or by air and taken to Palm Springs. Because of the sensitivity of this matter and the need to keep our meeting absolutely covert, I believe you should not stay in Palm Springs beyond

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

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should take no more than 2 hours.

3. Following our meeting, I will have you flown or driven back to your accommodations in Los Angeles.

I have dispatched simultaneously with this message the commercial wire which you recommended. Please inform me via this channel if at all possible before your departure of your estimated arrival time in Los Angeles. This will enable me to complete my own plans in accordance with the timing problems I have outlined above. In any event, please confirm via this channel that above scenario is feasible.

Warm personal regards.

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

5/5/71

Special file  
on Kerner

Arriving L.A. late evening May 6 on PAA flight #2. Will contact you morning of May 7. Assume you are aware that Ambassador Keating is returning for consultations.

Farland



MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE  
EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

May 5, 1971

THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN...

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT  
FROM: ALEXANDER M. HAIG  
SUBJECT: China

Pakistani Ambassador Hilaly visited today, in Henry's absence, and asked that the following information be passed to you:

"The message which Dr. Kissinger gave him on April 28 was transmitted directly to President Yahya that same evening. President Yahya has cabled Hilaly confirming that Yahya personally conveyed the message to the Ambassador of Communist China on Saturday morning, May 1. It most probably reached Chou-en-lai the same day or the following day."

Hilaly stated he wanted this message conveyed because of the criticism from Peking against your Administration, reported in this morning's press. He stated that in his view, while Peking had received your message of April 28th, they were already reacting to two things:

-- The State Department spokesman's statement that the two Chinas could negotiate their problems with each other, and

-- Secretary Rogers' statement in London.

Ambassador Hilaly said that he had sent a telegram to President Yahya Friday morning after the press conference, saying that your statement of Thursday evening appeared to be an effort to correct the damage done by Secretary Rogers. Ambassador Hilaly recommended that Yahya pass on this interpretation to the Chinese Ambassador. Hilaly also confirmed that a message had been conveyed to the Chinese to the effect that your hands would be tied if other American politicians

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE  
EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE  
EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

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are brought into the matter of U.S.-Peking relations. Therefore, it would be best if the Chinese Government would not discuss the matter with any other American politician until a solid government-to-government channel has been established. This does not mean that there is any objection from here to the continuation of the people-to-people program and we would welcome invitations to other kinds of American visitors - students, reporters, scholars, etc.

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE  
EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

## MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTONTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY

May 15, 1971

THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN *A*

MEMORANDUM FOR:

THE PRESIDENT

FROM:

HENRY A. KISSINGER *HK*

SUBJECT:

Meeting with Ambassador Farland,  
May 7, 1971

On Friday, May 7, I met for three hours with Ambassador Farland in Palm Springs. At that time, I outlined the exchange of messages between the U.S. and China that has taken place through the Pakistanis; I read portions of the most recent message delivered by Ambassador Hilaly on April 21 and told Ambassador Farland that you intended to respond by proposing that I meet with Chou en-Lai, or a suitable Chinese representative, either in Pakistan or at a location in southern China easily accessible from Pakistan. We considered a number of details associated with the trip and reached some tentative decisions.

-- After reviewing several alternative communication channels, we agreed to place a special Navy communicator in Karachi to provide a communications channel similar to the one I have set up with Bahr and Rush. This should be operational this week.

-- I discussed with Ambassador Farland my proposed trip itinerary which would provide for an arrival in Islamabad on a Friday, at which point he or Yahya could arrange to host me for the weekend. This would provide the cover for my meeting with the Chinese, and on Monday I would continue on to Tehran. I indicated that I would probably require about 24 hours with the Chinese and would plan on meeting in three separate sessions.

-- Ambassador Farland felt that it would be better to be taped by the Chinese than the Pakistanis, and for this reason the meeting should be conducted in southern China rather than Pakistan.

-- We discussed the relative merits of my traveling to China by Pakistani, Chinese or U.S. aircraft and tentatively decided that the optimum arrangement would be to pre-position a smaller White House

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY

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aircraft in Pakistan equipped with a Pakistani navigator. This would permit the larger aircraft in which I arrive to remain parked at Rawalpindi over the weekend in public view.

-- I instructed Ambassador Farland to discuss our meeting and my proposed trip with Yahya and made him responsible for all the technical details of the trip. He will submit for my review several possible scenarios for the China meeting as soon as the special communications channel is activated.

Ambassador Farland made several more general points:

-- He was sharply critical of Ambassador Keating who, in his view, is attempting to make a partisan issue of the Pakistani situation and discredit the Administration in the process. Ambassador Keating apparently called in a New York Times correspondent and divulged the contents of the Blood cables, and Ambassador Farland feels that Ambassador Keating will use his trip back to Washington to lobby against your Pakistan policies.

-- Ambassador Farland stressed his conviction that it will take a substantial (i. e., \$250 million) loan to sustain Pakistan for another six months and he requested support in obtaining a commitment from the World Bank or IMF. As a related matter, Ambassador Farland asked that Hannah be told in a forceful way that you want him to adopt a positive attitude toward Pakistan for at least the next six months.

-- Ambassador Farland also felt that Germany, Great Britain and possibly also Japan should be apprised of our determination to save Pakistan and asked to adjust their policies to support our position.

A full record of the meeting is attached at Tab A.

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MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/NODIS

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

Date: Friday, May 7, 1971 -- 2:50 - 5:45 p.m.

Place: 1836 Aquanetta Circle, Palm Springs, California  
(Home of Mr. Theodore Cummings)

Participants: Joseph S. Farland, U.S. Ambassador to Pakistan  
Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President  
for National Security Affairs  
David R. Halperin (notetaker)

After an exchange of pleasantries, Ambassador Farland stated that the State Department had accepted his cover story without question. Mr. Kissinger expressed appreciation for the cables sent by Ambassador Farland, and for his loyalty over the past weeks.

Mr. Kissinger then stated that McNamara was preparing to submit a devastating report concluding that it would take \$250 million to give Pakistan breathing room; he then asked Ambassador Farland whether it is, in fact, possible to provide breathing room, and whether \$250 million is a realistic estimate of the support required? Ambassador Farland replied that although he thought it would be possible, there are some real problems to contend with:

-- Ambassador Keating seems to have gone berserk; he has violated security and appears determined to break Pakistan. For example, he recently called in a New York Times reporter and, although he did not release the text, he did tell him the essence of Blood's report. Ambassador Farland is convinced that Keating is determined to make a political issue out of the Pakistani situation, and is attempting to discredit the Administration in the process.

-- Another problem is the quality of political reporting in Dacca. The reporters there are missionaries without significant practical experience. They have never before seen war and are grossly exaggerating the amount of killing and bloodshed there.

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Moving to the primary item of business, Mr. Kissinger explained to Ambassador Farland that for some time, we have been passing messages to the Chinese through the Pakistanis. Because of the communications problem, it had not been possible to inform Ambassador Farland of this previously, and messages have been conveyed directly to Yahya by the President, or through Ambassador Hilaly. Mr. Kissinger then outlined the exchange of messages that has occurred to date:

-- The channel was established in August, 1969. At that time, while visiting Pakistan, the President indicated to President Yahya (and Mr. Kissinger told the former Air Force Chief of Staff) that the United States desired to normalize relations with China.

-- President Yahya then called in the Chinese Ambassador who thanked him for his interest and indicated that China would be interested in hearing something positive.

-- Mr. Kissinger then told Hilaly that we would remove two destroyers from the Taiwan Straits as a gesture of good will. (In point of fact, this had already been decided for budgetary reasons.)

-- The Chinese responded by releasing two American yachtsmen.

-- Two days or a week later, the Chinese told Yahya that they were willing to resume talks in Warsaw. They also expressed concern about the Japanese.

-- In a subsequent message delivered by Yahya, it was said that a war between China and the U.S. is seen now as a very remote possibility.

-- For a while, the Rumanian channel was used; then, when Yahya came to the U.S. in October, the President suggested to him that the Chinese could begin talking to us in secure channels.

-- On December 9, 1970, the Chinese replied as follows: (Dr. Kissinger stressed that this must be treated with the greatest sensitivity):

"This (meaning the reply) is not from me alone but from Chairman Mao and Vice Chairman Lin Piao as well. China has always been willing and has always tried to negotiate

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by peaceful means. A special envoy of President Nixon's will be most welcome in Peking. We have had messages from the United States from different sources in the past, but this is the first time that the proposal has come from a Head, through a Head, to a Head."

-- We replied in early January: "In the light of the remarks of Premier Chou En-Lai to President Yahya, as well as the continuing United States interest in U.S.-China discussions at a higher level, the United States Government believes it would be useful to begin discussions with a view of bringing about a higher level meeting in Peking. The meeting in Peking would not be limited to the Taiwan question but would encompass other steps designed to improve relations and reduce tensions. The United States therefore proposed that representatives of the two Governments meet at an early convenient moment in a location convenient to both sides to discuss the modalities of the higher-level meeting. These modalities would include the size of the delegations, the duration of the meeting, the agenda and a clear understanding on the status and amenities which the U.S. delegation would enjoy while in the People's Republic of China." Orally, we suggested that the preliminary meeting be in Pakistan.

-- Last week, we received from Ambassador Hilaly a message probably written by the Chinese: "The Chinese Government reaffirms its willingness to receive publically in Peking a Special Envoy of the President of the U.S. (for instance, Mr. Kissinger) or the U.S. Secretary of State or even the President of the U.S. himself for a direct meeting and discussions. Of course, if the U.S. President considers that the time is not yet ripe, the matter may be deferred to a later date. As for the modalities, procedure and other details of the high-level meeting and discussions in Peking, as they are of no substantive significance, it is believed that it is entirely possible for proper arrangements to be made through the good offices of President Yahya Khan."

Mr. Kissinger stressed that these developments could be of great diplomatic significance, both with respect to Vietnam and the Soviet Union. Because (outside of the President), Mr. Kissinger is the only person who can talk to the Chinese understanding all of the inter-related aspects of the negotiations, it is desired that Mr. Kissinger be the first contact -- the subsequent one to be with the President himself.

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-- Mr. Kissinger stated that we intend to reply that the U.S. is prepared to talk on all outstanding issues and cannot confine the meeting to one topic. Each side will be free to raise whatever issues are of concern to them. The President is prepared to go to Peking, but there should be a preliminary secret meeting between Mr. Kissinger and Chou En-Lai at which time Mr. Kissinger will be empowered to select a time and the general circumstances of a Presidential visit -- possibly next year.

Mr. Kissinger then indicated to Ambassador Farland that the President will not go to Peking unless Vietnam is concluded. Mr. Kissinger will propose to meet with Chou En-Lai or his representative either in Pakistan or a location in Southern China which is easily accessible from Pakistan.

TECHNICAL DETAILS OF MEETING

Mr. Kissinger and Ambassador Farland proceeded to discuss a number of technical details related to the meeting between Mr. Kissinger and the Chinese.

Mr. Kissinger stated that Ambassador Farland would receive a copy of everything given to Yahya. [REDACTED]

(b)(1)

(b)(3)

[REDACTED] Mr. Kissinger asked Ambassador Farland if he thought Hilaly would permit our messages to be ready by the foreign office. Ambassador Farland thought there was no danger of this since, in his view, Hilaly does not trust either his staff or the foreign office.

Mr. Kissinger next raised the question of whether our next message should be delivered to Yahya through Hilaly or through Ambassador Farland.

Mr. Kissinger asked Ambassador Farland whether it would be possible to get to Pakistan without attracting attention. The Ambassador felt that a visit by Mr. Kissinger could be easily explained in terms of the East-West crisis.

Mr. Kissinger next questioned whether it would be better to meet in Pakistan where the Pakistanis would tape the meeting -- or in China

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where the Chinese would do the taping. Ambassador Farland felt the latter would be preferable, and Mr. Kissinger agreed.

Mr. Kissinger outlined a proposed itinerary in which he would go to Vietnam on an inspection trip, stop in Bangkok, New Delhi, Islamabad on Friday, have Ambassador Farland take him off for the weekend -- and then go to Southern China for roughly 24 hours. Mr. Kissinger stated he would then go on to Tehran on Monday. He will probably travel in one of the large Presidential aircraft -- possibly Air Force 2.

Mr. Kissinger asked if there were an American Press Corps in Rawalpindi; Ambassador Farland said there was one fellow named Zeiber.

Mr. Kissinger suggested that he could say he was going to the Khyber Pass or to the hill station, and Ambassador Farland could cover for him. Ambassador Farland stated that Yahya has a summer house which could be used; it would be best if President Yahya invited Mr. Kissinger there for the weekend. Ambassador Farland stated that the Chinese have an airfield just the other side of the mountains which could be used for the meeting.

COMMUNICATIONS

Mr. Kissinger stated there were several possible channels which he could use in communicating with Ambassador Farland:

--

[REDACTED]

(b)(1)

(b)(3)

--

[REDACTED]

(b)(1)

(b)(3)

(b)(3)

-- Navy Channel ending in Karachi (a commercial plane would have to be used to get the message up to Rawalpindi, however).

-- Ambassador Farland could be shown how to use one-time pads (however, encryption and de-cryption each take about four hours).

(b)(1)

(b)(3)

[REDACTED] The Ambassador felt the Navy channel would probably be best; in his own office only his (non-State Department) secretary

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would handle the messages. Ambassador Farland felt it would be best to have the special Navy communicator in Karachi where the Attache is stationed. [redacted] (b)(1) could probably be used occasionally, and that he would have the (b)(3) Navy Channel set up by next week (Monday, if possible), after Admiral Moorer clears the Attache (named Dros).

TRANSPORTATION ARRANGEMENTS

Mr. Kissinger stated that he presently thought he would leave Rawalpindi Saturday morning and return Sunday evening -- with a stay in China of about 24 hours to permit three separate sessions.

Ambassador Farland pointed out that he would be expected to have a large reception for Mr. Kissinger who agreed that everything required by protocol must be done to avoid arousing suspicion.

Mr. Kissinger raised the question of whether the country director at State should be permitted to send a representative along on the trip -- which would pose real problems in Pakistan. Ambassador Farland suggested that the Vietnam country director be permitted to send his representative on that portion of the trip only.

PAKISTAN'S ECONOMIC SITUATION

Mr. Kissinger stated that he would talk to McNamara on Monday, May 10, and tell him that Yahya must be kept afloat for six more months; one problem will be that McNamara is emotionally against Yahya -- as is the entire liberal community. Ambassador Farland pointed out that matters won't be helped by the fact that Keating is now on his way back to conduct a series of conferences, including some with his old Senate confreres. Mr. Kissinger stated that he would tell McNamara that this is the only channel we have, and he must give Yahya at least three months. Ambassador Farland stated that six months should be the goal.

Ambassador Farland stated that he had urged Yahya to tell his staff to make a new presentation to the consortium. Ahmad is coming to the United States next week, and Ambassador Farland has stressed this to him. The Ambassador stated that one inherent problem is that the lower echelon in the Pakistani bureaucracy feels they have a commitment from China to support operations in East Pakistan. Although

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Japan is negative in their position, Ambassador Farland felt that Germany will not let Pakistan go down the drain and the British will probably help as well. Mr. Kissinger asked whether the \$250 million will be applied entirely to debt re-scheduling -- and whether Yahya could propose a plan applicable to West Pakistan. Ambassador Farland thought some of the \$250 million would be a new loan, and that a consortium proposal would be geared to East Pakistan with the West receiving/administering the funds.

Mr. Kissinger next asked what he could do bureaucratically to help. Ambassador Farland said that the most important contribution would be to get McNamara to head up the consortium. Mr. Kissinger replied that he did not think McNamara would agree to this because it would antagonize his liberal friends. Ambassador Farland then pointed out that the IMF was another possibility that should not be overlooked. Assali had previously requested a standby loan from the IMF which was turned down; however, the loan request could be reactivated. Mr. Kissinger indicated that he would take this issue up with Peterson or Shultz, and that he would report on his meeting with McNamara through the Navy channel.

(b)(1)

(b)(3)

POLITICAL SITUATION

Mr. Kissinger asked how it was that the election results were so unexpected. Ambassador Farland said that everyone has missed in their predictions. In East Pakistan, Rahman had been able to capitalize on the cyclone. When the western nations began to pour in assistance, the Benghalis realized for the first time that they were part of the world. In the West, everyone had thought the landowners could continue to retain substantial support.

\* \* \* \*

Ambassador Farland voiced some mild complaints about living in Pakistan and expressed the hope that if the China meeting came off successfully, a new post could be offered. Mr. Kissinger replied non-committally that if this gets done, "we will owe you a great debt of gratitude."

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Mr. Kissinger asked if there is any way West Pakistan can hold on to East Pakistan. Ambassador Farland said no, not in the long run. Mr. Kissinger then said that all we need is six months. East Bengal is bound to become an economic disaster; Chinese influence will grow there, and it will not be possible to win any permanent friends there. Ambassador Farland agreed and pointed out the difficulty of making a financial commitment to the Benghalis.

Ambassador Farland asked if Mr. Kissinger could have Hanna pass the word down through regular channels that we are going to work things out and support the government. Mr. Kissinger said he would insure this gets done. Ambassador Farland then said that our interest in trying to save Pakistan be conveyed to the heads of government in Britain, Germany -- and possibly also Japan. Mr. Kissinger replied that he might be going to Britain on other business and would speak to Heath about this. Ambassador Farland pointed out that at this point, the other members of the consortium do not know our position.

SUMMARY

Mr. Kissinger indicated, by way of summary, that he would:

- (1) Have Hanna told that we want a positive attitude and six months time;
- (2) Talk to McNamara along the lines above;
- (3) Look into the IMF Loan;
- (4) Personally talk to Heath;
- (5) Have Rush talk to Brandt in two weeks time -- or, in any event, before the end of the month; and
- (6) Possibly get the State Department to get to Japan if there is a convenient way to do this.

Mr. Kissinger then asked Ambassador Farland to check back with him if at any point he received instructions from the Department which were intolerable.

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DELIVERY OF U.S. MESSAGE

With regard to the means of delivering the message to Yahya, Ambassador Farland felt that he should give it to Yahya (rather than Hilaly) since he could use this to build up credence with Yahya. Ambassador Farland also suggested that this could be used as a lever to get some things done which he has been pressing for in East Pakistan. Mr. Kissinger pointed out that the two were separate, and must be kept that way. Mr. Kissinger stated that in any event the message would be shown to Hilaly and Ambassador Farland would get a copy to discuss with Yahya. All technical coordination will be done through Ambassador Farland -- who should discuss with Yahya Mr. Kissinger's around-the-world trip, his intention to stop in Pakistan for the weekend and then go on (presumably) to Tehran after leaving Pakistan. A one-day official program in Pakistan would probably have to be planned. Ambassador Farland should discuss with Yahya the fact that he met with Mr. Kissinger and also discuss the technical arrangements of the visit.

Ambassador Farland asked that the Navy attache contact him as soon as the channel is open, and Mr. Kissinger assured him this would be done -- probably by Monday.

Scenario for China Visit

A number of details were then discussed without any definite decisions being made:

- Whether to fly to China using a Pakistani, Chinese or U.S. aircraft.
- Whether to employ a second U.S. plane (possibly a Jetstar) for the flight into China in order to leave the larger aircraft parked conspicuously at Rawalpindi.
- Whether or not Ambassador Farland should accompany Mr. Kissinger into China.
- Whether to fly into China from Rawalpindi or Sargoda.

Ambassador Farland pointed out that Mr. Kissinger would be least likely to be observed in Sargoda, a military base 45 minutes south of Rawalpindi. Mr. Kissinger might initially land there on the pretext of

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TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/NODIS

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visiting the surrounding countryside. After his large plane had left for Rawalpindi to refuel, he could transfer to a smaller plane which would take his party to China and return him to Rawalpindi the following day. The problem with this plan would be that Mr. Kissinger could not normally visit a defense installation like Sargoda without arousing suspicion.

The final determination with regard to technical details was left in the hands of Ambassador Farland who indicated he would submit several well-developed alternatives to Mr. Kissinger for review.

After a few parting remarks, the meeting was concluded at 5:45 p.m.

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/NODIS

TAC 41

ABBREVIATE MESSAGEFORM  
and/or CONTINUATION SHEET

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

TOP SECRET EXCLUSIVE

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|---------------------|-------------|------------|-------|
| PRECEDENCE          | RELEASED BY | DRAFTED BY | PHONE |
| ADDITIONAL PRIORITY |             |            |       |
| INFO                |             |            |       |

TOP SECRET

CTS HK-A4851af

BT

TOP SECRET EXCLUSIVE FOR CAPT DRAZ

1. DECISION REACHED TO INITIATE COMMARRANGEMENT DISCUSSED LAST MSG THIS SYSTEM.
2. DEPT OF NAVY CIVILIAN JOHN H. (DUKE) O'NEILL, JR. TRAVELING AS TOURIST WILL ARRIVE URSTA 11 MAY AND CONTACT YOU SOON AFTER ARRIVAL. HE IS BRINGING AND WILL PROVIDE YOU INSTRUCTION IN SPECIAL CRYPTO SYSTEM. AMBASSADOR ALREADY KNOWLEDGEABLE NEW COMMO SYSTEM AND IS AWAITING NOTIFICATION FROM YOU WHEN YOU ARE READY TO TRANSMIT/RECEIVE MSGS.
3. NECESSITY TO MAINTAIN SECRECY ON THIS COMMO ARRANGEMENT, EVEN MERE FACT IT EXISTS, CANNOT BE OVEREMPHASIZED. ONLY YOU AND AMBASSADOR ARE TO BE KNOWLEDGEABLE.
4. REALIZE YOU WILL ENCOUNTER SIGNIFICANT DIFFICULTIES AND UNDOUBTEDLY WILL STIMULATE SOME CURIOSITY. SUGGEST DEVELOPMENT OF COVER STORY. WE WILL ASSIST ANY WAY POSSIBLE.
5. AGAIN CANNOT OVEREMPHASIZE SENSITIVITY AND NEED FOR ABSOLUTE SECRECY.

GP-1

BT

TOP SECRET

|                      |         |          |              |                         |          |
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| COL NO.              | TOR/TOD | PAGE NO. | NO. OF PAGES | MESSAGE IDENTIFICATION  | INITIALS |
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| REGRADE INSTRUCTIONS |         |          |              | SECURITY CLASSIFICATION |          |
| GP-1                 |         |          |              | TOP SECRET EXCLUSIVE    |          |

*Handed by Mr. Kissinger  
18 Amb. Halaly 12<sup>00</sup>, 5/10/71*

President Nixon has carefully studied the message of April 21, 1971, from Premier Chou En-Lai conveyed through the courtesy of President Yahya Khan. President Nixon agrees that direct high-level negotiations are necessary to resolve the issues dividing the United States of America and the People's Republic of China. Because of the importance he attaches to normalizing relations between our two countries, President Nixon is prepared to accept the suggestion of Premier Chou En-Lai that he visit Peking for direct conversations with the leaders of the People's Republic of China. At such a meeting each side would be free to raise the issue of principal concern to it.

In order to prepare the visit by President Nixon and to establish reliable contact with the leaders of the Chinese People's Republic, President Nixon proposes a preliminary secret meeting between his Assistant for National Security Affairs, Dr. Kissinger and Premier Chou En-Lai or another appropriate high-level Chinese official. Dr. Kissinger would be prepared to attend such a meeting on Chinese soil preferably at some location within convenient flying distance from Pakistan to be suggested by the People's Republic of China. Dr. Kissinger would be authorized to discuss the circumstances which would make a visit by President Nixon most useful, the agenda of such a meeting, the time of such a visit and to begin a preliminary exchange of views on all subjects of mutual interest. If it should be thought desirable that a special emissary come to Peking publically between the secret visit to the People's Republic of China of



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Dr. Kissinger and the arrival of President Nixon, Dr. Kissinger will be authorized to arrange it. It is anticipated that the visit of President Nixon to Peking could be announced within a short time of the secret meeting between Dr. Kissinger and Premier Chou En-Lai. Dr. Kissinger will be prepared to come from June 15 onward.

It is proposed that the precise details of Dr. Kissinger's trip including location, duration of stay, communication and similar matters be discussed through the good offices of President Yahya Khan. For secrecy, it is essential that no other channel be used. It is also understood that this first meeting between Dr. Kissinger and high officials of the People's Republic of China be strictly secret.

**TOP SECRET**TOP: 1430 Z 13 MAY 71  
*hr*

THE AMBASSADOR REQUIRES FOLLOWING INFO TO REACH HIM BY 18 MAY FOR PLANNING PURPOSES.

- A. CONSIDERING FLIGHT PATH ALONG LINE RAWALPINDI-GILGIT AND ONWARD WHAT IS CLOSEST CHICOM AIRFIELD THAT CAN ACCEPT 707 TYPE AIRCRAFT,
- B. CLOSEST CHICOM AIRFIELD THAT CAN ACCEPT F 27(FRIENDSHIP) AIRCRAFT,
- C. EVALUATION OF POTENTIAL LR RADAR DETECTION OF EITHER TYPE AIRCRAFT BY SOVIET AND INDIAN EW SITES ALONG ABOVE FLIGHT PATH, ✓
- D. BEST ESTIMATE OF TIME FRAME FOR PLANNING AND EXECUTION PHASE W. —

**TOP SECRET**

ETS-111-02-111

TAB 46

TOP SECRET

TOR: 1430Z/13 MAY 71

WZ

P 130700Z MAY 71

TOP SECRET

A. YOUR 121500Z MAY 71.

1. IAW REF A FIRST BASE NOTIFIED.

2. FIRST BASE REQUIRES FOLLOWING INFO TO REACH HIM BY 18 MAY FOR PLANNING PURPOSES.

A. CONSIDERING FLIGHT PATH ALONG LINE RAWALPINDI-GILGIT AND ONWARD WHAT IS CLOSEST CHICOM AIRFIELD THAT CAN ACCEPT 707 TYPE AIRCRAFT,

B. CLOSEST CHICOM AIRFIELD THAT CAN ACCEPT F 27(FRIENDSHIP) AIRCRAFT,

C. EVALUATION OF POTENTIAL LR RADAR DETECTION OF EITHER TYPE AIRCRAFT BY SOVIET AND INDIAN EW SITES ALONG ABOVE FLIGHT PATH,

D. BEST ESTIMATE OF TIME FRAME FOR PLANNING AND EXECUTION PHASE W.

ORIGINATOR TENTATIVELY PLANNING TO TRAVEL TO FIRST BASE 18 MAY.

GP-1

TOP SECRET

[TS - HK-11851a] 3

VIA SPECIAL CHANNELTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

May 14, 1971

TO: Ambassador Farland

FROM: Henry A. Kissinger *[Signature]*

Message passed to Yahya through Hilaly along lines of our conversation. You were designated as point of contact for travel arrangements.

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

[TS- HK- AA 551 ay]

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

TO: Ambassador Farland

MAY 17, 1971

FROM: Henry A. Kissinger HK

Ref: Your 130700 Z May

Following is information you requested:

- A. Closest Airfield (707) -- Hot'ien
- B. Closest Airfield for F-27 -- Hot'ien or Soch'e
- C. On basis of available information must assume flight will be subjected to routine Soviet and Indian radar monitoring. Due to need for secrecy have not yet made detailed technical analysis of this problem.
- D. Current best estimate would appear to target on first half of the month of July. However, crystallization of planning will have to await response from the other side.

Best regards.

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

'71 MAY 17 PM 12:43

WHITE HOUSE  
SITUATION ROOM

MESSAGE PICKED UP BY SPECIAL COURIER

[TS - HK - HAAS/OK]

TAB 52

Eyes Only  
→ HAKC  
HAIG

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

MAY 19

Page 1 of 3 pages  
Copy 1 of 2 copiesRec'd in id  
at 12:25 a.m.  
May 22FROM: AMBASSADOR FARLAND  
TO: HENRY A. KISSINGER

OPTIONS TO ACCOMPLISH OBJECTIVES ARE LIMITED BY THE UTMOST NEED FOR SECURITY, BY TIME, AND BY GEOGRAPHICAL CONSIDERATIONS. GIVEN THESE LIMITING FACTORS, THE FOLLOWING SUGGESTIONS ARE CONSIDERED FEASIBLE IN VARYING DEGREES, THOUGH EACH IS SUBJECT TO CERTAIN DEFICIENCIES.

1. OPTION A. DAWN DEPARTURE FROM RAWALPINDI ABOARD PAI FOKKER F-27, DESTINATION HOT' IEN, FLYING TIME TO DESTINATION APPROXIMATELY THREE HOURS. RETURN TO RAWALPINDI BY DUSK. ELAPSED TIME DEPENDING ON LENGTH OF CONFERENCE. COVER STORY: TOURIST FLIGHT TO GILGIT, THEN OVERFLIGHT OF SWAT VALLEY, KHYBER PASS, ETC. NIGHT COULD BE SPENT EITHER AT RESIDENCE IN ISLAMABAD, OR IF FURTHER COVER NEEDED RESIDENCE MUREE. PRESUME ALSO THAT THE PRESIDENT'S RESIDENCE IN MUREE WOULD BE AVAILABLE. LIMITING FACTOR IS OPERATIONAL CHARACTERISTICS OF F-27, ALTITUDE OF OPERATION, FUELING, LACK OF RADAR. THIS OPTION IS THE LEAST LIKELY.
2. OPTION B. DAWN DEPARTURE FROM RAWALPINDI ABOARD PIA BOEING 707. DESTINATION HOT' IEN, FLYING TIME TO DESTINATION APPROXIMATELY ONE HOUR AND TEN MINUTES, WITH RETURN TO RAWALPINDI AT DUSK OR LATER. COVER AT EMBARKATION AND DIS-EMBARKATION. ELAPSED TIME DEPENDS ON THE LENGTH OF THE CONFERENCE. COVER STORY: GROUP GUEST OF PRESIDENT YAHYA ON A DAY LONG AUTO SIGHTSEEING TRIP. NIGHT COULD BE SPENT AS IN NUMBER ONE N OPTION A.

3. OPTION C. CONFEREES FROM CHICOM ARRIVE IN RAWALPINDI VIA COMMERCIAL PIA AIRCRAFT. AN ALTERNATIVE SECRET MEETING TO BE HELD AT THE PRESIDENT'S HOUSE IN RAWALPINDI OR IN HIS RESIDENCE IN MUREE. EITHER OF THESE LOCATIONS COULD BE EASY TO ARRANGE AND SAFE TO IMPLEMENT. HOWEVER IF MEETING IS UNDER THE PRESIDENT'S SUPERVISION, [REDACTED] WOULD HAVE COMPLETE OPPORTUNITY FOR COVERAGE. THE OPTION OF MEETING WITH CHICOM CONFEREES IN THE CHICOM EMBASSY WOULD BE FIRST CHOICE.

TOP SECRET

(b)(1)

(b)(3)

4. OPTION D. US AIR FORCE PLANE MAKES A DAWN DEPARTURE OSTENSIBLY FOR TEHRAN. TO AVOID INVOLVEMENT ADDITIONAL OVERFLIGHT CLEARANCE ROUTE PLAN WOULD BE LAID OUT FOR SOUTHERN ROUTE SKIRTING AFGHANISTAN. ACTUAL DESTINATION NOT KNOWN FLIGHT TO DESTINATION APPROXIMATELY ONE HOUR AND TEN MINUTES. RETURN TRIP TIME DEPENDENT ON LENGTH OF CONFERENCE. REFUELING AT SARAGODHA AIR BASE IN PAKISTAN IF NECESSARY. COVER STORY: MECHANICAL DELAY AT TIME OF TAKE OFF OR MECHANICAL DIFFICULTY REQUIRING LANDING AT SARAGODHA.

 Page 2 of 3  
 Copy 1 of 2

TOP SECRET

**TOP SECRET**

5. OPTION E. AS AN OPTION FROM A DIFFERENT AREA, US AIR FORCE PLANE DEPARTS HONG KONG, DESTINATION LUICHOW. THENCE ONWARD VIA BURMA WITH STOP AT DACCA FOR FIRST HAND LOOK AT OUR HUMANITARIAN INTERESTS AND / OR FLIGHT TO CALCUTTA TO OBSERVE THE REFUGEE PROBLEM. THEREAFTER REVERSE LEG TO SAIGON FOR INSPECTION, BEING THE PROFESSED REASON FOR THE TRIP. SINCE AN INTERMEDIATE STOP IS VIRTUALLY ON THE LINE OF FLIGHT, TIME UNACCOUNTED WOULD BE MINIMAL. HOWEVER, OVERFLIGHT CLEARANCE COVER FOR THAILAND AND SOUTH VIETNAM IN PARTICULAR, AND PROBABLY LAOS WOULD HAVE TO BE FORMULATED.

6. AM ATTEMPTING TO DEVELOP ADDITIONAL ALTERNATIVES.

7. A TOTAL OF TWO MESSAGES NOW RECEIVED FROM YOU.

**TOP SECRET**

Page 3 of 3 pages  
Copy 1 of 2 copies



TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

VIA SPECIAL CHANNEL

*Special Del  
My Stairs*

May 20, 1971

FOR: AMBASSADOR FARLAND

FROM: HENRY A. KISSINGER

Please deliver attached message to Yahya personally  
for immediate transmittal by him to PRC Ambassador.

Best regards.

Attachment

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

HAK:AMH:mlh:typed 5/20/71

MESSAGE FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE  
PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA

In case the People's Republic of China has not been apprised, the United States Government wishes to inform it of the following statement made by the President of the United States on May 20, 1971:

"The Governments of the United States and the Soviet Union, after reviewing the course of their talks on the limitation of strategic armaments, have agreed to concentrate this year on working out an agreement for the limitation of the deployment of anti-ballistic missile systems (ABM's). They have also agreed that, together with concluding an agreement to limit ABM's, they will agree on certain measures with respect to the limitation of offensive strategic weapons.

"The two sides are taking this course in the conviction that it will create more favorable conditions for further negotiations to limit all strategic arms. These negotiations will be actively pursued."

President Nixon wishes to emphasize that it is his policy to conclude no agreement which would be directed against the People's Republic of China. Mr. Kissinger is prepared to include this issue and related questions on the agenda of the proposed meeting with the designated representative of the People's Republic of China.

MESSAGE FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE  
PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA

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the United States Government wishes to inform it of the following state-  
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that it will create more favorable conditions for further nego-  
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designated representative of the People's Republic of China.

TAB 56

[TS-HK. AA6512m]

Rec'd May 20, 1971

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY  
MAY 21, 1971  
FOR HENRY A. KISSINGER  
FROM AMBASSADOR FARLAND

I HAVE APPOINTMENT SEE YAHYA IN KARACHI AT 1830 HOURS 21 MAY  
CAN AND WILL DELIVER MESSAGE MENTIONED REFERENCE. BEST REGARDS.  
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

May 21, 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

FROM:

Jon Howe *JH*

Tom Karamessines called me at 5:00 a.m. this morning to state that Ambassador Farland had made an error in his initial message as to the time of his meeting with Yahya. The meeting will be at 6:30 p.m. on May 22 rather than 6:30 p.m. May 21 as previously reported.

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

ETS-HK-777

TAB 59

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET/ SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

MAY 22

FROM: AMBASSADOR FARLAND

TO: HENRY A. KISSINGER

1. YAHYA ADVISED ME YOUR MESSAGE RECEIVED BY HIM IN LAHORE ON MAY 17, AND WAS DELIVERED TO CHICOM AMBASSADOR IN KARACHI ON MAY 19.

2. I INDICATED TO YAHYA YOUR TIME FRAME FOR VISIT TO PINDI AND HE APPROVED. HE TOLD ME HE HAD RECOMMENDED TO CHOU EN LAI THAT HE MEET WITH YOU PERSONALLY DURING VISIT.

3. YAHYA SAID HE IS FULLY PREPARED TO LAY ON COMPLETE CLANDESTINE OPERATION PROVIDING TRANSPORTATION TO DESTINATION, INCLUDING PEKING VIA PIA AIRCRAFT ON EITHER HINDUKUSH OR DACCA ROUTE. Z SAID HE WOULD ASSUME RESPONSIBILITY FOR ALL THAT WHICH COVERTLY NECESSARY

4. GARDIN MESSAGE WHICH I TRANSMITTED TO HIM, YAHYA SAID HE REALIZED THE IMPORT THEREOF AND WOULD TRANSMIT SOONEST.

BEST REGARDS

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

Page 1 of 1 pages  
Copy 1 of 2 copies

TOP SECRET

ETS-HK- AA-55-7

TAB 60

**TOP SECRET**

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

MAY 23

FROM: AMBASSADOR FARLAND  
TO: HENRY A. KISSINGER

1. PRESIDENT SUGGESTS THAT MEMBER HIS COMMAND , POSSIBLY CHIEF OF STAFF GENERAL HAMMID KAHN, ACCOMPANY YOU ON TRIP.
2. OVER STORY SIMPLY THAT YOU AND PARTY HAVE BEEN TAKEN BY PRESIDENTIAL AIDE ON EXTENSIVE SIGHTSEEING TOUR MOUNTAIN AREA WITH AN OVERNIGHT AT PRESIDENT'S GUEST HOUSE.
3. HE BELIEVES THAT I SHOULD GO TO HIS GUEST HOUSE IN MUREE DURING TOTAL TIME YOU ARE ABSENT IN ORDER TO COVER PHONE CALLS, ETC. I AGREE.
4. TENTATIVELY PLANNING TO HAVE PROTOCOL RECEPTION FOR YOU EVENING OF YOUR ARRIVAL. WOULD YOU CONSIDER DEPARTURE MIDNIGHT THEREAFTER, RETURNING FROM MEETING NIGHT OF TENTH (10)?

BEST REGARDS

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

**TOP SECRET**

Page 1 of 1 pages  
Copy 1 of 2 copies

*Orig. message  
Pakistan  
Grady 5/31/71*

1. There is a very encouraging and positive response to the last message.
2. Please convey to Mr. Kissinger that the meeting will take place in the capital for which travel arrangements will be made by us.
3. Level of meeting will be as proposed by you.
4. Full message will be transmitted by safe means.



*Transcribed from Handwritten  
document signed to H.A.R.  
by Helaly 6-2-71 8:10 PM  
Taken to Pres.*

**"Premier Chou En Lai sincerely thanks His Excellency President Yahya Khan for most rapidly transmitting the three messages from President Nixon.**

**"Premier Chou En Lai has seriously studied President Nixon's messages of April 29, May 17th and May 22nd 1971, and has reported with much pleasure to Chairman Mao Tse Tung that President Nixon is prepared to accept his suggestion to visit Peking for direct conversations with the leaders of the Peoples Republic of China. Chairman Mao Tse Tung has indicated that he welcomes President Nixon's visit and looks forward to that occasion when he may have direct conversations with His Excellency the President, in which each side would be free to raise the principal issue of concern to it. It goes without saying that the first question to be settled is the crucial issue between China and the United States which is the question of the concrete way of the withdrawal of all the U. S. Armed Forces from Taiwan and Taiwan Straits area.**

**"Premier Chou En Lai welcomes Dr. Kissinger to China as the U. S. representative who will come in advance for a preliminary secret meeting with high level Chinese officials to prepare and make necessary arrangements for President Nixon's visit to Peking.**

**"Premier Chou En Lai suggests that it would be preferable for Dr. Kissinger to set a date between June 15 and 20th for his arrival in**

-2-

China, and that he may fly direct from Islamabad to a Chinese airport not open to the public. As for the flight, he may take a Pakistan Boeing aircraft or a Chinese special plane can be sent to fly him to and from China, if needed. The talks plus the flights on both ways will probably take three or four days. If there is the desire to use his own telecommunication equipment on a temporary basis during his stay in China he may do so.

"As it is difficult to keep Dr. Kissinger's trip strictly secret, he may well consider coming for the meeting in an open capacity. If secrecy is still desired the Government of the Peoples Republic of China will on its part guarantee the strict maintenance of secrecy. When the talks have yielded results, the two sides may agree to a public announcement to be made after the meeting, if it is so desired.

"As for other details, they may be discussed and arranged through President Yahya Khan directly with the Chinese Ambassador.

"Premier Chou En Lai warmly looks forward to the meeting with Dr. Kissinger in China in the near future."

President Nixon has carefully reviewed the May 29, 1971, message from Premier Chou en-Lai which President Yahya Khan so kindly conveyed. President Nixon looks forward with great pleasure to the opportunity of a personal meeting and discussions with the leaders of the People's Republic of China.

The President appreciates the warm welcome extended by Premier Chou en-Lai to his personal representative, Dr. Kissinger. Because of the shortness of time available and the need to arrange a suitable pretext for his travel, Dr. Kissinger now finds it impossible to leave Washington before the first week of July. Accordingly, President Nixon proposes that Dr. Kissinger arrive in China on July 9 and leave on July 11, flying in a Pakistani Boeing aircraft from Islamabad to Peking.

Dr. Kissinger will be authorized to discuss all issues of concern to both countries preliminary to President Nixon's visit to China, and to make all arrangements for the President's visit. Dr. Kissinger will not require his own telecommunication equipment. It is envisaged that four members of his personal staff will accompany him.

President Nixon appreciates the fact that the Government of the People's Republic of China will maintain strict secrecy

- 2 -

with respect to Dr. Kissinger's visit and considers this essential.

Dr. Kissinger will be authorized to settle on a possible communique to be issued sometime after his return to the United States if this is mutually desired.

Dr. Kissinger warmly looks forward to his visit to China and to his meeting with Premier Chou en-Lai. President Nixon considers this trip a very positive first step in improving relations between the United States and the People's Republic of China.

*4th draft as edited by K  
to be typed as  
5th draft*

President Nixon has carefully reviewed the May 29, 1971, message from Premier Chou en-Lai which President Yahya Khan so kindly conveyed. President Nixon looks forward with great pleasure to the opportunity of a personal meeting <sup>and dinner</sup> with the leaders of the People's Republic of China.

The President appreciates the warm welcome extended by Premier Chou en-Lai to his personal representative, Dr. Kissinger. Because of the shortness of time available and the need to arrange a suitable pretext for his travel, Dr. Kissinger now finds it impossible to leave Washington before the first week of July. Accordingly, President Nixon proposes that Dr. Kissinger arrive in China ~~early~~ on July 9 and leave on July 11, flying in a Pakistani Boeing aircraft from Islamabad ~~directly~~ to Peking.

Dr. Kissinger will be authorized to discuss all issues of concern to both countries preliminary to President Nixon's visit to China, and to make all arrangements for the President's visit. Dr. Kissinger will not require his own telecommunication equipment. It is envisaged that four members of his personal staff will accompany him.

President Nixon appreciates the fact that the Government of the People's Republic of China <sup>W/C/L</sup> ~~is prepared to~~ maintain strict secrecy

- 2 -

with respect to Dr. Kissinger's visit and considers this essential.

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President Nixon has carefully reviewed the May 29, 1971, message from Premier Chou en-Lai which President Yahya Khan so kindly conveyed. President Nixon looks forward <sup>WITH GREAT PLEASURE</sup> to the opportunity of a personal <sup>MEETING</sup> ~~exchange~~ with the leaders of the People's Republic of China.

The President appreciates the warm welcome extended by Premier Chou en-Lai to his personal representative, Dr. Kissinger. Because of the shortness of time available and the need to arrange a suitable pretext for his travel, Dr. Kissinger now finds it impossible to leave Washington before the first week of July. Accordingly, President Nixon proposes that Dr. Kissinger arrive in China early on July 9 and leave on July 11, flying in a Pakistani Boeing aircraft <sup>from Islamabad</sup> directly to ~~and from a designated airport in the vicinity of~~ Peking.

Dr. Kissinger will be authorized to discuss all issues of concern to both countries preliminary to President Nixon's visit to China, and to make all arrangements for the President's visit. Dr. Kissinger will not require his own telecommunication equipment. It is envisaged that four members of his personal staff will accompany him.

President Nixon appreciates the fact that the Government of the People's Republic of China is prepared to maintain strict secrecy

- 2 -

with respect to Dr. Kissinger's visit and considers this essential.

Dr. Kissinger will be authorized to settle on a possible communique

to be issued sometime after his return to the United States if this is

mutually desired.

*(mainly looks forward to Dr. Kissinger participating in*

*his* President Nixon reciprocates Premier Chou en-Lai's warm

*his visit to China with warm and his meeting*  
~~anticipation of the meeting between the Premier and Dr. Kissinger.~~  
*with Premier Chou en-Lai. President Nixon*

*He* considers ~~it~~ a hopeful first step in improving relations between the

*this is very positive*

United States and the People's Republic of China.



*2d Draft as submitted  
by Dr K to be typed  
as 3d draft.*

MESSAGE FOR THE GOVERNMENT  
OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA

President Nixon has carefully reviewed the May 29, 1971, message from Premier Chou en-Lai which President Yahya Khan so kindly conveyed. President Nixon looks forward to the opportunity of a personal exchange with the leaders of the People's Republic of China.

The President appreciates the warm welcome extended by Premier Chou en-Lai to his personal representative, Dr. Kissinger. Because of the shortness of time available and the need to arrange a suitable pretext for his travel, Dr. Kissinger now finds it impossible to leave Washington before the first week of July. Accordingly, President Nixon proposes that Dr. Kissinger arrive in China early on July 9 and leave on July 11, flying in a Pakistani Boeing aircraft directly to and from an <sup>*designated*</sup> airport in the vicinity of Peking, ~~to be designated by the Chinese.~~

Dr. Kissinger will be authorized to discuss all issues of concern to both countries preliminary to President Nixon's visit to China, and to make all arrangements for the President's visit. Dr. Kissinger will not require his own telecommunication equipment. It is envisaged that four members of his personal staff will accompany him.

- 2 -

President Nixon appreciates the fact that the Government of the People's Republic of China is prepared to maintain strict secrecy with respect to Dr. Kissinger's visit and considers this essential. Dr. Kissinger will be authorized to settle on a possible communique to be issued sometime after his return to the United States if this is mutually desired.

President Nixon reciprocates Premier Chou en-Lai's warm anticipation of the meeting between the Premier and Dr. Kissinger. He considers it a hopeful first step in improving relations between the United States and the People's Republic of China.

Revised version of 1st Draft  
(Edited by SMH)  
6/3/71  
6/4/71

MESSAGE FOR THE GOVERNMENT  
OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA

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The President appreciates the warm welcome extended by Premier Chou en-Lai to his personal representative, Dr. Kissinger. Because of the shortness of time available and the need to arrange a suitable pretext for his travel, Dr. Kissinger now finds it impossible to leave Washington before the first week of July. Accordingly, President Nixon proposes that Dr. Kissinger arrive in China early on July 9 and leave on July 11, flying in a Pakistani Boeing aircraft directly to and from an airport to be designated by the Chinese.

Dr. Kissinger will be authorized to discuss all issues of concern to both countries preliminary to President Nixon's visit to China. Dr. Kissinger will not require his own telecommunication equipment. It is envisaged that four members of his personal staff will accompany him.

President Nixon appreciates the fact that the Government of the Peoples Republic of China is prepared to maintain strict secrecy

- 2 -

with respect to Dr. Kissinger's visit and considers this essential.

Dr. Kissinger will be authorized to <sup>Settle on</sup> discuss a possible communique

to be issued sometime after his return to the United States. <sup>of this is</sup>

*mutually desired.*

President Nixon reciprocates Premier Chou en-Lai's <sup>Warm</sup>

anticipation of the meeting between the Premier and Dr. Kissinger.

He considers it a hopeful first step in improving relations between the United States and the Peoples Republic of China.

Blended version of the original  
6/3/71

MESSAGE FOR THE GOVERNMENT  
OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA

President Nixon has carefully reviewed the May 29, 1971 message from Premier Chou en-Lai which President Yahya Khan so kindly conveyed. President Nixon looks forward to the opportunity of a personal exchange with the leaders of the Peoples Republic of China.

The President appreciates the warm welcome extended by Premier Chou en-Lai to his personal representative, Dr. Kissinger. Because of the shortness of time available and the need to arrange a suitable pretext for his travel, Dr. Kissinger now finds it impossible to leave Washington before the first week of July. Accordingly, President Nixon proposes that Dr. Kissinger arrive in China early on July 9 and leave on July 11, flying in a Pakistani Boeing aircraft directly to and from an airport to be designated by the Chinese.

Dr. Kissinger will be authorized to discuss all issues of concern to both countries preliminary to President Nixon's visit to China. Dr. Kissinger will not require his own telecommunication equipment. It is envisaged that four members of his personal staff will accompany him.

President Nixon appreciates the fact that the Government of the Peoples Republic of China is prepared to maintain strict secrecy

- 2 -

with respect to Dr. Kissinger's visit and considers this essential. Dr. Kissinger will be authorized to discuss a possible communique to be issued sometime after his return to the United States.

President Nixon reciprocates Premier Chou en-Lai's anticipation of the meeting between the Premier and Dr. Kissinger. He considers it a hopeful first step in improving relations between the United States and the Peoples Republic of China.

6/3/71

MESSAGE FOR THE GOVERNMENT  
OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA

President Nixon has carefully studied the May 29, 1971, message from Premier Chou en-Lai which President Yahya Khan so kindly and helpfully conveyed. President Nixon sincerely appreciates the constructive nature of this message. He looks forward with great anticipation to visiting China and meeting with Chairman Mao Tse-Tung, Vice-Chairman Lin Piao and Premier Chou en-Lai.

Dr. Kissinger will be prepared to discuss all matters concerning the visit by President Nixon to China and to begin a preliminary exchange of views on all issues of mutual interest. He will not need to use telecommunications equipment during his stay in China since he will have full Presidential authority to speak on the subjects at the meeting.

President Nixon desires that this meeting be kept <sup>strictly</sup> secret at least until it has taken place. The question of a possible public announcement after the meeting is one of the topics that can be discussed between the ~~Chinese officials~~ and Dr. Kissinger. *Dr. Kissinger has discussed this with Washington Premier*

In order to maintain the secrecy of this meeting, it would be most convenient for Dr. Kissinger to travel to China during the period of July 9 to July 11. He proposes flying in a Pakistani Boeing aircraft directly from Pakistan to China arriving at an airport to be designated by the Chinese on the morning of July 9, 1971, and returning to Pakistan.

- 2 -

on July 11, 1971. He hopes that these arrangements will be acceptable to the Government of the People's Republic of China.

Dr. Kissinger warmly looks forward to his meeting with Premier Chou en-Lai and other appropriate officials of the People's Republic of China.



H+K Fair Day

6/3/71

which President Yahya Khan  
so kindly conveyed.

President Nixon has carefully  
reviewed the <sup>May 29, 1971</sup> message <sup>from</sup> of Premier Chou-En-Lai  
Nixon's ~~friend~~ <sup>pleasure</sup> looks forward to the opportunity  
of a personal exchange with the leaders of the People's  
Republic of China.

for the ~~reason~~ <sup>reason</sup> the President appreciates  
the warm welcome extended by Premier Chou-En-Lai  
to his personal representative, Dr. Kissinger. Because  
of the shortness of time available and the need to  
arrange a suitable pretext for <sup>his</sup> travel, Dr. Kissinger  
now finds it impossible to leave Washington before  
the first week of July. Accordingly, President Nixon

proposes that Dr. Kissinger arrive in China early on  
July 9 and leave ~~on~~ <sup>on</sup> July 11, 1971. <sup>flying in a Pakistani Boeing aircraft directly from Pakistan to and from an airport to be designated by the Chinese.</sup>

Dr. Kissinger will be authorized to discuss all issues of common  
interest ~~to arrange~~ <sup>to arrange</sup> preliminary & further arrangements  
to be the ~~concern~~ <sup>concern</sup> of the President's personal representative.

Liaison telecommunication equipment. President  
The  
The  
 Nixon appreciates the <sup>fact</sup> that the ~~intelligence~~ <sup>fact</sup> that the ~~fact~~ <sup>fact</sup> of the PRC  
 is prepared to maintain strict secrecy with regard  
 to Dr. Kissinger's visit and considers <sup>this</sup> essential. Dr.  
 Kissinger will be <sup>outlined,</sup> prepared to discuss a possible  
 communiqué to be issued some time after his  
 return to the ~~U.S.~~ United States.

Pres. <sup>idat</sup> Nixon appreciates Premier Chen En-lai's  
 anticipation of the meeting between the Premier  
 & Dr. Kissinger. He considers it <sup>a hopeful</sup> ~~only~~ the first step  
 in <sup>improving</sup> ~~deepening~~ relations between the <sup>United States</sup> ~~U.S.~~ & the PRC  
 and the People's Republic of China.

6/4/71

TOP SECRET/EYES ONLY

SUGGESTED ITINERARY  
(All Times Local)

1. To Saigon

|                  |        |             |                                                       |
|------------------|--------|-------------|-------------------------------------------------------|
| Depart Andrews   | July 2 | 10:00 a. m. | (flight time 7 hrs. 20 min.)<br>(time gain: 5 hours ) |
| Arrive Anchorage | July 2 | 12:20 p. m. |                                                       |
| Depart Anchorage | July 2 | 1:50 p. m.  | (flight time 9 hrs. 10 min.)<br>(time gain: 6 hours ) |
| Arrive Okinawa   | July 3 | 5:00 p. m.  |                                                       |
| Depart Okinawa   | July 3 | 6:30 p. m.  | (flight time 3 hrs. 45 min.)<br>(time gain: 1 hour )  |
| Arrive Saigon    | July 3 | 9:15 p. m.  |                                                       |

2. Saigon (2 days, 2 nights)

|                |        |            |                                                     |
|----------------|--------|------------|-----------------------------------------------------|
|                | July 3 | 9:15 p. m. |                                                     |
| Depart Saigon  | July 5 | 5:30 p. m. | (flight time 1 hr. 30 min )<br>(time gain: 1 hour ) |
| Arrive Bangkok | July 5 | 6:00 p. m. |                                                     |

3. Bangkok (1/2 day, 1 night)

|                  |        |            |                                                         |
|------------------|--------|------------|---------------------------------------------------------|
|                  | July 5 | 6:00 p. m. |                                                         |
| Depart Bangkok   | July 6 | 12:00 noon | (flight time 3 hrs. 50 min.)<br>(time gain: 1.5 hours ) |
| Arrive New Delhi | July 6 | 2:20 p. m. |                                                         |

TOP SECRET/EYES ONLY

TOP SECRET/EYES ONLY

- 2 -

4. New Delhi (2 days, 2 nights)

|                   |        |            |                                                       |
|-------------------|--------|------------|-------------------------------------------------------|
|                   | July 6 | 2:20 p.m.  |                                                       |
|                   | July 7 |            |                                                       |
| Depart New Delhi  | July 8 | 11:10 a.m. | (flight time 1 hr. 20 min. )<br>(time gain: 30 min. ) |
| Arrive Rawalpindi | July 8 | 12:00 noon |                                                       |

5. Rawalpindi/Other Site (3 1/2 days, 3 nights) (Rawalpindi - 1/2 day, 1 night)  
(Other Site - 2 days, 2 nights)

|                                          |         |            |                                                           |
|------------------------------------------|---------|------------|-----------------------------------------------------------|
|                                          | July 8  | 12:00 noon | (Reception and dinner in evening)                         |
| Depart Rawalpindi                        | July 9  | 5:00 a.m.  | (flight time 4 hrs. 45 min. )<br>(time loss: 3 hours )    |
| Arrive Other Site                        | July 9  | 12:45 p.m. |                                                           |
| Depart Other Site                        | July 11 | 2:00 p.m.  | (flight time 5 hrs. )<br>(time gain: 3 hours )            |
| Arrive Rawalpindi                        | July 11 | 4:00 p.m.  | (Site where F-27 located )<br>(Arrive Big Pindi Airport ) |
| Depart Rawalpindi<br>(Big Pindi Airport) | July 11 | 6:00 p.m.  | (flight time 9 hrs. 20 min. )<br>(time gain: 4 hours )    |
| Arrive Paris                             | July 11 | 11:20 p.m. |                                                           |

6. Paris (1 night, 1 morning)

|                   |         |            |                                                        |
|-------------------|---------|------------|--------------------------------------------------------|
|                   | July 11 | 11:20 p.m. |                                                        |
| Depart Paris      | July 12 | 1:00 p.m.  | (flight time 8 hrs. 15 min. )<br>(time gain: 5 hours ) |
| Arrive Washington | July 12 | 4:15 p.m.  |                                                        |

TOP SECRET/EYES ONLY

TOP SECRET/EYES ONLYSUGGESTED ITINERARY  
(All Times Local)1. To Saigon

|                  |        |             |                                                       |
|------------------|--------|-------------|-------------------------------------------------------|
| Depart Andrews   | July 2 | 9:45 p. m.  | (flight time 7 hrs. 20 min.)<br>(time gain: 5 hours ) |
| Arrive Anchorage | July 3 | 12:05 a. m. |                                                       |
| Depart Anchorage | July 3 | 1:35 a. m.  | (flight time 9 hrs. 10 min.)<br>(time gain: 6 hours ) |
| Arrive Okinawa   | July 4 | 4:45 a. m.  |                                                       |
| Depart Okinawa   | July 4 | 6:15 a. m.  | (flight time 3 hrs. 45 min.)<br>(time gain: 1 hour )  |
| Arrive Saigon    | July 4 | 9:00 a. m.  |                                                       |

2. Saigon (2 days)

|                |        |            |                                                      |
|----------------|--------|------------|------------------------------------------------------|
| Sunday         | July 4 | 9:00 a. m. |                                                      |
|                | July 5 |            |                                                      |
| Depart Saigon  | July 6 | 9:00 a. m. | (flight time 1 hr. 30 min. )<br>(time gain: 1 hour ) |
| Arrive Bangkok | July 6 | 9:30 a. m. |                                                      |

3. Bangkok (1 day)

|                  |        |            |                                                         |
|------------------|--------|------------|---------------------------------------------------------|
|                  | July 6 | 9:30 a. m. |                                                         |
| Depart Bangkok   | July 7 | 7:10 a. m. | (flight time 3 hrs. 50 min.)<br>(time gain: 1.5 hours ) |
| Arrive New Delhi | July 7 | 9:30 a. m. |                                                         |

TOP SECRET/EYES ONLY

TOP SECRET/EYES ONLY

- 2 -

4. New Delhi (1-1/2 days)

|                   |        |           |                                                       |
|-------------------|--------|-----------|-------------------------------------------------------|
|                   | July 7 | 9:30 a.m. |                                                       |
| Depart New Delhi  | July 8 | 1:30 p.m. | (flight time 1 hr. 20 min. )<br>(time gain: 30 min. ) |
| Arrive Rawalpindi | July 8 | 2:20 p.m. |                                                       |

5. Rawalpindi/Other Site (3 days) (Other site - 2 days/1 night;  
Rawalpindi - 2 half-days)

|                   |         |           |                                                        |
|-------------------|---------|-----------|--------------------------------------------------------|
|                   | July 8  | 2:20 p.m. |                                                        |
| Depart Rawalpindi | July 9  | 1:00 a.m. | (flight time 4 hrs. 45 min. )<br>(time loss: 3 hours ) |
| Arrive other site | July 9  | 8:45 a.m. |                                                        |
| Depart other site | July 10 | 6:00 p.m. | (flight time 5 hrs. )<br>(time gain: 3 hours )         |
| Arrive Rawalpindi | July 10 | 8:00 p.m. |                                                        |
| Depart Rawalpindi | July 11 | 1:00 p.m. | (flight time 9 hrs. 20 min. )<br>(time gain: 4 hours ) |
| Arrive Paris      | July 11 | 5:20 p.m. |                                                        |

6. Paris (1 evening, 1 morning)

|                   |         |           |                                                        |
|-------------------|---------|-----------|--------------------------------------------------------|
|                   | July 11 | 5:20 p.m. |                                                        |
| Depart Paris      | July 12 | 1:00 p.m. | (flight time 8 hrs. 15 min. )<br>(time gain: 5 hours ) |
| Arrive Washington | July 12 | 4:15 p.m. |                                                        |

TOP SECRET/EYES ONLY

TOP SECRET/EYES ONLYALTERNATE ITINERARY  
(All Times Local)1. To Saigon

|                  |        |             |                                                       |
|------------------|--------|-------------|-------------------------------------------------------|
| Depart Andrews   | July 2 | 9:45 p. m.  | (flight time 7 hrs. 20 min.)<br>(time gain: 5 hours ) |
| Arrive Anchorage | July 3 | 12:05 a. m. |                                                       |
| Depart Anchorage | July 3 | 1:35 a. m.  | (flight time 9 hrs. 10 min.)<br>(time gain: 6 hours ) |
| Arrive Okinawa   | July 4 | 4:45 a. m.  |                                                       |
| Depart Okinawa   | July 4 | 6:15 a. m.  | (flight time 3 hrs. 45 min.)<br>(time gain: 1 hour )  |
| Arrive Saigon    | July 4 | 9:00 a. m.  |                                                       |

2. Saigon (1-1/2 days, 1 night)

|                |        |            |                                                     |
|----------------|--------|------------|-----------------------------------------------------|
|                | July 4 | 9:00       |                                                     |
| Depart Saigon  | July 5 | 1:00 p. m. | (flight time 1 hr. 30 min.)<br>(time gain: 1 hour ) |
| Arrive Bangkok | July 5 | 1:30 p. m. |                                                     |

3. Bangkok (1 day, 1 night)

|                  |        |            |                                                         |
|------------------|--------|------------|---------------------------------------------------------|
|                  | July 5 | 1:30 p. m. |                                                         |
| Depart Bangkok   | July 6 | 12:00 n.   | (flight time 3 hrs. 50 min.)<br>(time gain: 1.5 hours ) |
| Arrive New Delhi | July 6 | 2:20 p. m. |                                                         |

TOP SECRET/EYES ONLY

TOP SECRET/EYES ONLY

- 2 -

4. New Delhi (1-1/2 days, 2 nights)

|                   |        |           |                                                       |
|-------------------|--------|-----------|-------------------------------------------------------|
|                   | July 6 | 2:20 p.m. |                                                       |
|                   | July 7 |           |                                                       |
| Depart New Delhi  | July 8 | 8:00 a.m. | (flight time 1 hr. 20 min. )<br>(time gain: 30 min. ) |
| Arrive Rawalpindi | July 8 | 8:50 a.m. |                                                       |

5. Rawalpindi/Other Site (3-1/2 days, 3 nights) (Rawalpindi - 1-1/2 days;  
other site - 2 days, 1 night)

|                   |         |           |                                                       |
|-------------------|---------|-----------|-------------------------------------------------------|
|                   | July 8  | 8:50 a.m. |                                                       |
| Depart Rawalpindi | July 9  | 1:00 a.m. | (flight time 4 hrs. 45 min.)<br>(time loss: 3 hours ) |
| Arrive other site | July 9  | 8:45 a.m. |                                                       |
| Depart other site | July 10 | 6:00 p.m. | (flight time 5 hrs. )<br>(time gain: 3 hours )        |
| Arrive Rawalpindi | July 10 | 8:00 p.m. |                                                       |
| Depart Rawalpindi | July 11 | 1:00 p.m. | (flight time 9 hrs. 20 min.)<br>(time gain: 4 hours ) |
| Arrive Paris      | July 11 | 6:20 p.m. |                                                       |

6. Paris (1 night, 1 morning)

|              |         |           |                                                       |
|--------------|---------|-----------|-------------------------------------------------------|
|              | July 11 | 6:20 p.m. |                                                       |
| Depart Paris | July 12 | 1:00 p.m. | (flight time 8 hrs. 15 min.)<br>(time gain: 5 hours ) |



TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLYBRIEFING MATERIAL FOR MEETING

| <u>Title</u>        | <u>Content</u>                                                                                                                                                                                                     | <u>Priority</u> |
|---------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------|
| Scope Paper         | In general, what they will want out of the meeting and what we will want                                                                                                                                           | 1               |
| General Approach    | Do's and don'ts of conduct (e. g., treat as equals, adhere to principles, etc.)                                                                                                                                    | 1               |
| Warsaw Talks        | History and analysis of talks 1955-1968/Nixon Administration                                                                                                                                                       | 1               |
| Biographies         | Biographic sketches and views of leading Chinese figures                                                                                                                                                           | 2               |
| Summit Meeting      | Various modalities of summit including possible announcement after preliminary meeting (scenario and draft communique), sending of Bruce, and general nature of summit (date, duration, places, agenda, logistics) | 1               |
| Position Papers     | Substantive pieces on key issues including their likely position, our specific formulations, and questions/answers                                                                                                 | 1-2             |
| -- Taiwan           |                                                                                                                                                                                                                    | 1               |
| -- Vietnam          |                                                                                                                                                                                                                    | 1               |
| -- United Nations   |                                                                                                                                                                                                                    | 1               |
| -- Asia in General  |                                                                                                                                                                                                                    | 2               |
| -- Japan            |                                                                                                                                                                                                                    | 2               |
| -- Soviet Union     |                                                                                                                                                                                                                    | 2               |
| -- Arms Control     |                                                                                                                                                                                                                    | 2               |
| -- Bilateral issues | (Communications, trade, travel, Americans held in China, etc.)                                                                                                                                                     | 2               |
| Opening Statement   |                                                                                                                                                                                                                    | 2               |
| Toasts              |                                                                                                                                                                                                                    | 3               |