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Directorate of Intelligence

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The Rwandan Patriotic Front—led government appears intent on controlling the hostile Hutu majority and will risk severing relations with international relief organizations and the UN if its plans for securing control of Rwanda are threatened.

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Rwanda: RPF at Odds With International Organizations

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Tensions between the Rwandan Patriotic Front-led (RPF) government and the UN are intensifying as the Tutsi-dominated regime takes its seat as Security Council president this month. The RPF views the UN's long-delayed launching of the war crimes tribunal—to identify and punish Hutus responsible for the genocide last spring—and slowness in deploying a force to rein in Hutu militias in Zaire as evidence that the UN and relief organizations are more concerned about the 2 million Hutu refugees than about the struggling regime in Kigali. Moreover, over the past few months, the RPF's clashes with and restrictions on the free movement of the UN Assistance Mission in Rwanda (UNAMIR) and threats to expel international relief workers have caused tensions to rise. Indeed, RPF hardliners increasingly view the international community as attempting to undermine Tutsi rule. In our judgment, the RPF is intent on controlling the hostile Hutu majority and will risk severing relations with relief workers and the UN if its plans for securing and governing Rwanda are threatened.

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Relations With International Organizations Deteriorating . . .

Despite the RPF's relatively positive relationship with aid workers initially—and its members' experience as long-term refugees in neighboring countries for the past 30 years—relations with relief organizations have steadily worsened since the RPF took power in July. The RPF needs assistance feeding the 5.3 million Rwandans remaining in-country, who have not farmed or harvested their crops in the past seven months, but it probably resents its dependence on and lack of control over relief organizations:

- [redacted] Rwanda is a country run by international relief organizations; there are more than 100 relief agencies currently providing assistance.

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The international community's contribution to stemming the massive refugee flow from Rwanda—especially after French forces withdrew from the southwestern safe zone last August—has been of decreasing importance to Kigali as it focuses on securing and governing the country. Instead, the RPF's suspicions about international support

to the Hutus have contributed to rising tensions with relief organizations:

- [redacted] the RPF's fear of Hutu infiltration and attacks from neighboring countries has prompted it to restrict the movement of civilians and even of aid workers throughout the countryside. [redacted] the RPA—the military wing of the RPF—has harassed aid workers and denied them access to certain "hot spots" in Rwanda.
- [redacted] Vice President and Defense Minister Kagame threatened in October to expel relief organizations he viewed as dividing the people of Rwanda. He warned that the relief organizations suspected of helping Hutus to plan an invasion of Rwanda would "suffer the consequences."
- [redacted] the RPF last month had temporarily closed the Zaire-Rwanda border in the north to aid workers, whom they suspected of carrying arms in convoys for Hutu refugees.

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. . . While Prospects of Clashes With UN Forces Increase

The RPF largely views the 5,500-man UNAMIR force in Rwanda as a watchdog for the international community and has little faith in the force's ability to help maintain security. The hasty pullout of the previous, much smaller UNAMIR force last April, when the genocide occurred and civil war resumed, is a constant reminder to the RPF that it cannot trust the UN to protect Tutsis. Moreover, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) [redacted] highlighted RPF atrocities against Hutus, as well as the Hutu-led genocide, prompting RPF officials to denounce the UNHCR.

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- [redacted] the RPF has restricted UN forces from investigating areas of alleged massacres throughout the country.

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- [] RPA troops fired on a UN convoy of Australian troops last month after the UN troops refused to give the RPA film that the Tutsi troops suspected contained pictures of RPA checkpoints. []

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UNAMIR's mandate to secure and protect displaced persons, in particular, has clashed with the RPF's concerns about the volatile southwest, where aid workers say the Hutu militias have the same control over the displaced persons camps there that they have over refugees in Zaire. The RPF has criticized the UN for failing to confront or disarm Hutu militias who are responsible for the bulk of security incidents:

- (b)(1) [] Hutu militias (b)(3) [] RPA convoys in the southwest and continue to encourage Hutus remaining in Rwanda to flee to refugee camps in Zaire to prepare for an invasion against the Tutsi regime []

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In October, Rwanda's Ministry of Rehabilitation announced that the government will close all displaced persons camps, which it views as havens for Hutu murderers, by the end of the year. []

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[] the RPF has already closed several of these camps over the past month. In response, senior UN military officials said they would take military action against the RPF to protect Hutu civilians. Meanwhile, []

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[] some UN forces have prohibited RPA forces from arresting suspected Hutu militia members. Such actions could provoke frustrated RPA troops to indiscriminate violence:

- In November, UN spokesmen said 21 civilians were killed in southwestern Rwanda when RPA soldiers hurled grenades into a displaced persons camp []

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RPF Expectations of Security Council Presidency

The RPF's experience in presenting the Tutsi plight before the international community—gained during its four-year insurgency—is strengthening its belief that the UNSC presidency is an opportunity to gain legitimacy on the world scene and economic assistance from the West. During the powersharing negotiations in Arusha, Tanzania, with the former Hutu regime during 1992-93, the RPF had representatives throughout Europe and at the UN who focused on public relations. The regime, however, is probably unprepared for the administrative strains likely to come from being UNSC president, a

failing that may limit its effectiveness in using the post as a public relations tool. []

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The RPF will probably try to advance the following issues this month:

- *War crimes tribunal.* The RPF's highest priority is to bring to justice the Hutus responsible for the genocide and ensure that it is not repeated. Although Rwanda voted against the UN resolution—it objected to the UN's proscription against the death penalty—Kigali pledged cooperation with the tribunal. [] the tribunal may not be fully operative until next April, a delay we believe will only embolden Tutsi civilians and unpaid RPA troops to seek unilateral justice against Hutus.

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- *UN troops in Zaire.* The RPF supports the UN's proposal to send up to 12,000 troops to Zaire to address the deteriorating security there caused by Hutu militiamen—who are responsible for most of the genocide—and army troops from the former Hutu regime. Planning for the mission is dragging, however, because of debates over the UN mandate and a lack of troop contributors. The RPF is likely to use its role as UNSC president to warn the international community that, if forces are not sent soon, the RPA will be forced to launch preemptive strikes into the refugee camps. []

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Tutsi Hardliners Dictating Kigali's Decisions

Past negotiating strategy suggests that the RPF will become more recalcitrant toward the international community only if it believes its sovereignty is being usurped. RPF hardliners exert heavy influence on Kigali's decisionmaking and are likely to be key players in any public relations campaign the RPF uses this month. For example, hardliners organized a "secret commission" to discuss UN proposals for the war crimes tribunal last October, which subsequently led to Rwanda's vote against the resolution. []

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In our judgment, the skittish RPF regime's focus is on securing its control over Rwanda, not on providing assistance to the displaced persons or providing an atmosphere conducive to refugee repatriation. Any foreign government or organization that challenges this agenda risks conflict with Kigali or expulsion from

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Rwanda. If the RPF increasingly views a continued UN presence in Rwanda as too intrusive, this may lead hardliners to urge a unilateral RPF decision to expel UN troops. The Tutsi regime appears willing to suffer the consequences of expelling aid workers and undermining relief efforts if it deems these measures necessary to ensure Tutsi survival and to quell the threat posed by Hutu extremists. At best, the UN and the West can expect the RPF to tolerate UN forces. If UNAMIR aggressively fulfills its mandate, however, clashes with RPA troops may be inevitable. [REDACTED]

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