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November 1971

THE UBIQUITOUS KGB

"At the rate KGB agents are flowing back to the motherland," quipped one magazine, "Moscow's perennial housing shortage may soon become critical." In September Oleg Lyalin, member of the Soviet Trade Mission in London exposed the espionage activities, including plans for sabotage, that sent packing 105 Soviet officials. Then, early in October Anatole Chebotarev, a reputed friend of Lyalin's and a member of the Soviet Trade Mission in Brussels, first disappeared and then five days later surfaced in England to give Western intelligence officers a list of KGB and GRU (special military espionage) agents operating out of Brussels. By mid-month, the Belgian Foreign Ministry announced that, as a result of Chebotarev's revelations, Soviet officials would be quietly expelled.

In England, Lyalin exposed and Her Majesty's Government expelled, officials in just about every phase of Soviet activity in that country: the Embassy, Trade Mission, Inturist Travel Agency, Moscow Narodny Bank of London, Sovexportfilm, and other commercial organizations. In Belgium, NATO circles have confirmed that Chebotarev and his former coworkers from the Trade Mission and such commercial organizations as Sovflot, Aeroflot, Sovexportfilm, the Scaldia-Volga (a Soviet-Belgian "joint venture" enterprise) auto plant, Belso, etc., were snooping around NATO in Brussels and the headquarters of SHAPE (Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers in Europe) in Casteau, near Mons. At this writing, it is thought that, on the basis of information from Chebotarev, The Hague might act to put an end to Soviet espionage activities in Brunssum, The Netherlands, where AFCENT (Allied Forces in Central Europe) is based.

The decisions to go ahead with the recent mass evictions of Soviet officials from London with a blast of trumpets instead of removing them quietly a few at a time, was undoubtedly taken in the hope that this would shock the Soviets into behaving less presumptuously. Britain had already announced the expulsion of three Soviet spies earlier in the year.* And, according to the London Daily Telegraph of 21 April 1971, the year before Britain had demanded the withdrawal of seven Soviet diplomats (one from the Embassy and six from the Trade Mission) and had refused to

*Daily Telegraph, London, of 22 and 23 June carried articles describing the expulsion of three Soviet diplomats: Dmitriy Sorokin, Lev Sherstnev, and Valeriy Chusovitin.

accept ten others (four for the Embassy and six for the Trade Mission). The expelled diplomats were thought to have been after industrial rather than military secrets and the ten refused admittance were suspected of having similar missions. Their exclusion was a clear signal to Moscow that British security services were not only alert to the activities of Soviet officials already in London, but also that they had dossiers on other Soviet officials being groomed for espionage of one kind or another. In Moscow, the signal was either ignored or misinterpreted.

Many Western government officials have expressed the opinion that Soviet espionage activity in Western Europe was increasing in direct proportion to the USSR's growing economic involvement with that area and its stepped-up propaganda and political action programs in support of the Soviet version of "European Security." The September and October revelations cannot help but bolster this argument. Nevertheless, based on other instances of expulsions announced so far this year, Soviet spying and subversion-fomenting on a world-wide scale has not been curtailed because of the KGB's stepped-up activities in Western Europe.

Signals from Kinshasa's General Mobutu have also been misread in Moscow. Soviet meddling in internal Congolese affairs has already twice caused the Congo to sever diplomatic relations with the USSR. Yet, again this year General Mobutu was forced to take action: in mid-July some 20 diplomats and non-diplomatic staff members of the Soviet, Czechoslovak, Polish and other East Bloc foreign missions were expelled because of their suspected involvement in the June Kinshasa University disorders that eventually resulted in mass arrests and the temporary shutdown of the university. The existence of a subversive student network and the role of European Communist functionaries in fomenting trouble within them were revealed by Agence Congolaise de Presse on 5 August, but the names of those expelled were not revealed.

Accra still remembers Soviet Embassy influence over former Ghanaian President Kwame Nkrumah and how the only opposition to the coup of February 1966 --- which was staged largely to prevent any increase of that influence --- came from the Soviet-trained Presidential Guard that had been set up outside of army control. Twenty members of the Soviet Embassy were then expelled along with nearly 1,000 Soviet technicians and their dependents. In 1967, Ghana was forced to expel two Soviet press representatives from Novosti and Pravda because they were "committing slanderous propaganda against the country" and working to get Nkrumah back in power.

This year, so far, the Government of Ghana has again been driven to the extreme measure of ousting two Soviet diplomats. The first deportee was Embassy Counselor Valter Vinogradov who was apprehended in Accra with cabinet documents in his pocket. After much diplomatic bargaining, the Ghanaian Foreign Ministry agreed not to publicize the Vinogradov case in exchange for the Soviet Ambassador's pledge that his staff would refrain from further subversion in Ghana. However, as the Accra Daily Graphic reported on 23 July, "before this cloak and dagger episode could be buried," another Soviet spy, Trade Mission official Gennadiy Potemkin had been caught red-handed with secret documents ferreted out of special branch files. Although Potemkin was not a diplomat, he was using a diplomatic car at the time of his arrest and at first claimed diplomatic immunity, giving his name as Butsan. Potemkin had a diplomatic identity card in the name of Anatoliy Butsan, who left Ghana in 1966 and who had been deported from the Congo in 1963.

In late July the Sudanese Communist Party, evidently with the advice and support of Soviet officials, staged a coup against the Numairy regime. After being restored to power, Numairy had the chief plotters, including the leaders of the Sudanese Communist Party arrested, courtmartialed and executed. Some 1,500 Communists reportedly were arrested. In the face of harsh criticism of the purge by the Soviet press, the Numairy regime charged the Soviets with complicity and expelled the Soviet Ambassador, Anatoliy Nikolayev and Embassy Counselor Mikhail Orlov. Nikolayev was reportedly the only foreign envoy to have met with the coup plotters during the brief period that they were in power and Orlov was charged with contacting the local Communists who staged the coup.

During March the Government of Mexico expelled five Soviet diplomats involved in training students in guerrilla warfare. They were Minister-Counselor and Charge d'Affaires Dmitriy A. Dyakonov, First Secretary Boris Kolomyakov, Second Secretary Oleg M. Nechiporenko, and member of the Soviet Commercial Office Aleksandr V. Bolshakov. On 15 March just preceding the government's expulsion action, Mexico's Attorney General Sanchez Vargas announced that the Mexican police had broken up a Communist plot against the government and had arrested 19 terrorists at "guerrilla academies" and hideouts. The Mexican students had been sent to East Germany and the Soviet Union and from there to a military base in North Korea for training in sabotage and terrorism. Some had received scholarships to Patrice Lumumba University under the Mexican-Soviet cultural exchange program. Soviet involvement in this case is vividly told by John Barron in "The Soviet Plot to Destroy Mexico," Readers Digest, November 1971.

In Ecuador it did not take long for the heavy hand of Soviet subversion to reveal itself following the establishment of Soviet-Ecuadorian diplomatic relations in June 1970. By July of the next year, the Government of Ecuador had to expel three Soviets "for interference in internal affairs." They were: Embassy Counselor Anatoliy M. Shadrin and Embassy First Secretary, Robespier N. Filatov, both of whom left Ecuador on 6 July. The Third, Soviet Permanent Trade Mission Chief Economist Valentin A. Goluzin, was on home leave at the time and was not permitted to return. Following the announcement of the government's expulsion action, Guayaquil daily El Universo reported that the government had proof that the Soviet intelligence officials had financed a strike planned by the Confederation of Ecuadorian Workers (CTE), with the objective of bringing down the Government of President Jose Maria Velasco Ibarra and replacing it with a left-wing military dictatorship. It was revealed that the Soviets had passed money to the CTE through Jose Solis, correspondent of TASS news agency in Guayaquil.

In Italy, Milan's Corriere Della Sera of 5 September 1971, reported that the Soviet Commercial Attache in Rome, Ilya Butakov, had been quietly expelled from Italy three months previously. After his departure, security officials had found out that Butakov was a missile expert who had been sent to Italy to gather data on electronic systems in missiles and tanks. Earlier in the year, the 19 February issues of Rome dailies Il Tempo and Messaggero carried the announcement that Italian security police had uncovered evidence that Valenin P. Kovanov, Soviet Embassy First Secretary, was involved in espionage activities. Kovanov had been officially expelled two days before.

Thus, as of the end of October, close to 200 Soviet agents have been sent home this year to face the wrath of KGB Chief Yuriy Andropov, who in turn must face the wrath of his chiefs on the Politburo. The London spy purge, of course, has been the most devastating for the Kremlin with other West European actions coming in a very close second. There will be an element of calculation in whatever the Kremlin decides to do in retaliation -- but the overriding objective will be to try to sow dissension among Western allies. Brezhnev's almost obsessive interest in the projected European security conference suggests that reprisals against West Europeans will not be on a scale to prejudice this pet objective. Reprisals elsewhere would be minimal -- Moscow risks losing too much if London's "spy purge" becomes too popular a diplomatic gambit. The way, of course, for the Soviets to keep expulsions at a minimum is simply to voluntarily trim their representations down to acceptable size. Of course, to Yuriy Andropov, espionage is an end in itself -- and, in the long run, Soviet reaction is going to hinge on how firmly Brezhnev can talk to Andropov.

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November 1971

SOVIET OFFICIALS PUBLICLY DECLARED PERSONA NON GRATA (PNG)
February - October 1971:

<u>Country of Origin (USSR) and Name:</u>	<u>Type of Assignment:</u>	<u>Country from which expelled:</u>	<u>Month:</u>
AKIMOV, Anatoliy Ivanovich	Diplomatic	United Kingdom	Sep
AZAROV, Ivan Pavlovich	Diplomatic	United Kingdom	Sep
BUTAKOV, Ilya Petrovich	Commercial Attache	Italy	Jun
CHERNETSOV, Yuriy Yevgeniyevich	Diplomatic	United Kingdom	Sep
CHUSOVITIN, Valeriy Stepanovich	Diplomatic	United Kingdom	Jun
FILATOV, Robespier Nikolayevich	Diplomatic	Ecuador	Jul
FILATOV, Vladimir Gerasimovich	Diplomatic	United Kingdom	Sep
GENERALOV, Vsevolod Nikolayevich	Diplomatic	United Kingdom	Sep
GOLUBOV, Sergey Mikhailovich	Diplomatic	United Kingdom	Sep
GOLUZIN, Valentin Andreyevich	Trade Mission	Ecuador	Jul
KARYAGIN, Viktor Vasilyevich	Diplomatic	United Kingdom	Sep
KHODZHAYEV, Yuriy Tigranovich	<u>Sovexportfilm</u>	United Kingdom	Sep
KOLOGYAZHNYI, Boris Georgiyevich	Diplomatic	United Kingdom	Sep

KOVANOV, Valentin Pavlovich	Diplomatic	Italy	Feb
KUTUSOV, Yevgeniy Ignatiyevich	Diplomatic	United Kingdom	Sep
KUZNETSOV, Georgiy Aleksandrovich	Publisher, Embassy weekly <u>Soviet News</u>	United Kingdom	Sep
LAPTEV, Igor Konstantinovich	Diplomatic	United Kingdom	Sep
LEONTIYEV, Leonid Antonovich	Diplomatic	United Kingdom	Sep
NIKOLAYEV, Anatoliy Nikolayevich	Diplomatic	Sudan	Jul
ORLOV, Mikhail G.	Diplomatic	Sudan	Aug
PETROVICHEVA, Emilya Alekseyevna	Diplomatic	United Kingdom	Sep
POTEMKIN, Gennadiy Petrovich	Trade Mission	Ghana	Jul
PRONIN, Vasiliy Ivanovich	Diplomatic	United Kingdom	Sep
SHADRIN, Anatoliy Mikhaylovich	Diplomatic	Ecuador	Jul
SHERSTNEV, Lev Nikolayevich	Diplomatic	United Kingdom	Jun
SKOPTSOV, Ivan Vasiliyevich	Diplomatic	United Kingdom	Sep
SOROKIN, Dmitriy Ivanovich	Diplomatic	United Kingdom	Jun
VAYGAUSKAS, Richardas Konstantinovich	Diplomatic	United Kingdom	Sep
VINOGRADOV, Valter Vladimirovich	Diplomatic	Ghana	May

STERLIKOV, Aleksey Petrovich	Diplomatic	Switzerland	1970
STUDENIKOV, Igor	Diplomatic	Congo (Kinshasa)	1970
TARASENKO, Sergey Ivanovich	Embassy Engineer	Ghana	1966
TIKHOMIROV, Aleksandr Vasilyevich	Translator	United Nations	1970
TSYGANOV, Vladimir Ilich	Diplomatic	West Germany	1969
TUMANOV, Boris G.	TASS	Congo (Kinshasa)	1970
UTKIN, Stanislav Grigoryevich	Diplomatic	Norway	1970
VALYALIN, Fedor Fedorovich	Diplomatic	Congo (Kinshasa)	1970
VASILYEV, Vladimir	Attache, Soviet Trade Mission	Lebanon	1969
YAKOVLEV, Aleksandr Ivanovich	Commercial	Kenya	1966
YANGAYKIN, Sergey Alekseyevich	Diplomatic	Uruguay	1966
YELISEYEV, Viktor Alekseyevich	Diplomatic	Kenya	1969
YUKALOV, Yuriy Alekseyevich	Diplomatic	Kenya	1966
ZAKHAROV, Albert M.	Diplomatic	Greece	1967
ZAKHAROV, Venyamin D.	<u>Novosti</u>	Kenya	1968
ZAMOYSKIY, Lolliy Petrovich	<u>Izvestiya</u>	Italy	1970
ZHEGALOV, Leonid Nikolayevich	Press Corps	United States	1970

ZINKOVSKIY,
Yevgeniy V.

Commercial

Ghana

1966

ZUDIN, Aleksey
Aleksandrovich

Diplomatic

Uruguay

1966

THE RUSSIAN SECRET POLICE, Excerpts
 Ronald Hingley
 Hutchinson & Company, LTD
 178-202 Great Portland Street, London

Late 1964 saw an important change in the public posture of the KGB as the organisation embarked on an intensified publicity campaign designed to glorify exploits hitherto shrouded in secrecy. This involved advertising the deeds of Soviet spies who had so far rated as unspies—as when, for instance, the British defectors Burgess and Maclean had been paraded (in 1956) to proclaim in all solemnity that they had never engaged in espionage.¹ Now, twenty years after his execution by the Japanese, the Soviet master-spy Richard Sorge had his cover blown by the Soviet advertising machine and was posthumously created a Hero of the Soviet Union for his wartime and pre-war spying exploits. He also had a tanker and a Moscow street named after him, and appeared full-face on a new four-copeck stamp specially designed in his honour.² Thus, from having no spies at all, the Soviet Union suddenly turned out to have the best spies in the world, no doubt as part of a campaign to encourage Soviet agents still in the field after their morale had been shattered by the revelation of Penkovsky's revelations, as also by the arrest of their colleagues George Blake and Gordon Lonsdale in England, and of Stif Wennerström in Sweden. Another Soviet hero-spy was acknowledged when Chairman Semichastny wrote in honour of Colonel Rudolf Abel in *Pravda* of 7 May 1965—the first occasion on which Abel was officially honoured, an exchange having been effected between him and the American U2 pilot Gary Powers in 1961.

Another exchanged Soviet spy, Colonel Konon Molody alias Gordon Lonsdale, published a book in English, *Spy*, about his professional activities after an unsuccessful attempt had allegedly been made to trade two British-held Soviet spies, the Krogers, for a promise to withhold these inflammatory memoirs from publication.³ Lonsdale's crudely propagandistic saga has a certain importance as the first example of such material emanating from an avowed Soviet agent. That the entire text has been KGB-vetted may be inferred, and it need hardly be said that the material must be treated with caution. The same is true of *My Silent War*, the more polished memoirs of the formerly English Soviet intelligence agent Kim Philby. These received publication in 1968, five years after the author had obtained political asylum in the USSR and Soviet citizenship, as announced in *Izvestiya* on 31 July 1963. On

1. Trevor-Roper, p.24 (Trevor-Roper, Hugh, 'The Philby Affair', Encounter (London), April 1968, pp. 3-26).
2. Deakin and Storry, p.350 (Deakin, F.W. and Storry, G.R., The Case of Richard Sorge (London, 1966).
3. Trevor-Roper, p.24 (op. cit.)

19 December 1967 the same newspaper published an article 'Hello, Comrade Philby', quoting the veteran master-spy in praise of Dzerzhinsky as a 'great humanist'—the formula commonly applied in Soviet parlance to successful sponsors of mass killings.

Philby's views on his own former chiefs Menzhinsky, Yagoda, Yezhov and Beria are unfortunately not available. They would have been particularly valuable in the light of certain circumstances outlined in earlier chapters, for it was at about the time of Philby's original recruitment that his ultimate superior Yagoda was, according to official Soviet record, engaged in murdering or attempting to murder Menzhinsky and Yezhov, his immediate precursor and follower as security police overlords. Meanwhile the future police chief Beria was (again according to official doctrine) secretly in league with Britain—the very country which his underling, the still youthful Philby, had so blithely congratulated himself on betraying. In this context Philby's comment on his reason for enlisting as a Soviet intelligence agent ('One does not look twice at an offer of enrolment in an élite force')⁴ seems to carry a certain pungency all of its own.

Be that as it may, the main purpose of the new publicity given to Philby and to the KGB in general was to demoralise and intimidate the non-Communist world by creating the impression of an 'ubiquitous KGB man . . . dedicated servant of an international government', who 'moves like a superior being, irresistible, among the ill-guarded, guilty secrets of the divided West'.⁵ In this campaign by the KGB various 'capitalist' newspapers showed an eagerness to co-operate which appeared to confirm Soviet claims of western decadence in an alarming degree.

The *Izvestiya* interview with Philby formed only a small part of elaborate celebrations staged on and about 20 December 1967 in honour of the Soviet security machine's fiftieth birthday. Along with eminent spies, domestic agents too were honoured, including four elderly Chekists—survivors of the anti-Leninist White Terror, as also of the Stalinist great terror in which so many of their colleagues had fallen. Probably selected for their benevolent facial expressions, these former hunters of Bruce Lockhart and Boris Savinkov beam down like elderly uncles from the pages of *Pravda* as if in assurance that all is for the best in the best of all possible worlds. So much for the small fry. On a more august level the crowning point of the KGB's jubilee was a speech by Chairman Andropov in the presence of Politburo-members, including Shelepin and other notabilities. Shelepin received no personal tribute in Andropov's speech. Nor was any other head of the

4. Philby, p. xxi (Philby, Kim, My Silent War (New York, 1968).
5. Trevor-Roper, p.25 (op. cit.)
6. Pravda, 20 December 1967.

YASAKOV, Vyacheslav Diplomatic Aleksandrovich		United Kingdom	Sep
ZAVORIN, Ivan Panfilovich*	<u>Inturist</u>	United Kingdom	Sep
ZOTOV, Konstantin Diplomatic		United Kingdom	Sep

*An article in the Daily Mail, 9 October 1971, erroneously lists ZAVORIN as "ZUBARIN."

SOVIET OFFICIALS PUBLICLY DECLARED PERSONA NON GRATA (PNG)
1966-1970:

A total of 95 officials, of whom 55 were under commercial, trade, or other non-diplomatic cover.

<u>Country of Origin</u> <u>(USSR) and Name:</u>	<u>Type of</u> <u>Assignment:</u>	<u>Country from</u> <u>which expelled:</u>	<u>Year:</u>
ABRAMOV, Valdimir Mikhaylovich	Trade Mission	Ghana	1966
AGADZHANOV, Eduard B.	Commercial	Kenya	1968
AKHMEROV, Robert Isaakovich	Diplomatic	Ghana	1966
ALEKSANDROV, Vladimir Ivanovich	Embassy employee	Italy	1970
ANDREYEV, Igor Ivanovich	Diplomatic	United Nations	1969
BOROVINSKIY, Petr Fedorovich	Diplomatic	West Germany	1970
DOGOMATSKIKH, Mikhail Georgiyevich	<u>Pravda</u>	Kenya	1969
DUSHKIN, Yuri A.	Trade Mission	United Kingdom	1968
FEDERENKO, Gennadiy Gavrilovich	Diplomatic	Austria	1969
GLADKIY, Nikolay Ivanovich	Diplomatic	Ghana	1966
GLOTOV, Viktor N.	Diplomatic	Uruguay	1968
GLUKHOV, Vladimir A.	<u>Aeroflot</u>	Netherlands	1967
GLUKHOVSKIY, Vasiliy Vasilyevich	Trade Mission	Ghana	1966

IVANOV, Nikolay Iosifovich	Diplomatic	Uruguay	1966
KAMAYEV, Yevgeniy Borisovich	Diplomatic	Ghana	1966
KATAYEV, Valeriy V.	Diplomatic	Ghana	1966
KAZANTSEV, Aleksey N.	<u>Novosti</u>	Ghana	1967
KHOMYAKOV, Aleksandr Sergeyevich	Press Officer	Lebanon	1969
KISAMEDINOV, Maksut Mustarkhovich	Diplomatic	Ghana	1966
KISELEV, Ivan Pavlovich	Diplomatic	Ghana	1966
KOBYSH, Vitaliy Ivanovich	<u>Izvestiya and Radio Moscow</u>	Brazil	1966
KOCHEGAROV, Yevgeniy Mikhaylovich	Official of International Telecommunications Union, United Nations	Switzerland	1969
KODAKOV, Vladimir Alexsandrovich	Diplomatic	Kenya	1966
KOPYTIN, Viktor Vasilyevich	TASS	United States	1969
KOROVIKOV, Valentin I.	<u>Pravda</u>	Ghana	1967
KOZLOV, Yuriy Nikolayevich	Diplomatic	Ghana	1966
KRIVOLAPOV, Viktor S.	Trade Mission	Ghana	1966
KURITSYN, Yuriy Vasilyevich	<u>Novosti</u>	Kenya	1966

LADYGIN, Anatoli I.	Attache/Press Information Officer	Uruguay	1968
LAPUSHENKO, Nikolay Ivanovich	Instructor	Ghana	1966
LAVRUSHKO, Igor P.	Technical Expert	India	1968
LEBEDEV, Sergey Mikhaylovich	Diplomatic	Norway	1970
LEMZENKO, Kir Gavrilovich	Trade Mission	Italy	1966
LOGINOV, Vladimir A.	Engineer on Trade Mission	United Kingdom	1968
MALININ, Aleksey Romanovich	Diplomatic	United States	1966
MAMONTOV, Yuriy Leonidovich	Trade Mission	Argentina	1970
MAMURIN, Leonid Aleksandrovich	Commercial	Thailand	1966
MATUKHIN, Georgi G.	Trade Mission	Uruguay	1968
MATVEYEV, Viktor Ivanovich	TASS	Ethiopia	1969
MATYUSHIN, Anatoliy Nikolayevich	TASS	Ghana	1966
MEDNIKOV, Viktor Nikolayevich	Labor Specialist on TDY	Mexico	1969
MESROPOV, Valeriy Moiseyevich	Commercial	Norway	1970
MONAKHOV, Konstantin Petrovich	Diplomatic	Italy	1969
NETREBSKIY, Boris Pavlovich	Novosti and Diplomatic	Netherlands	1970

RANOV, Nikolay I.	<u>Aeroflot</u>	Cyprus	1967
REVIN, Valentin Alekseyevich	Diplomatic	United States	1966
ROZHKO, Gennadi A.	Trade Mission	Italy	1968
RYABOV, Yuriy Ivanovich	<u>Inturist</u>	Argentina	1970
SAVICH, Boris Trofimovich	Commercial	Belgium	1970
SAVIN, Nikolay Andreyevich	Diplomatic	Switzerland	1970
SERGEYEV, Vladimir Yefimovich	Labor Specialist on TDY	Mexico	1969
SHARAYEV, Vladimir Ivanovich	Interpreter at Soviet Permanent Exhibition	Ethiopia	1969
SHAROVATOV, Vladimir Semonovich	Embassy Employee	Netherlands	1970
SHELENKOV, Albert A.	Diplomatic	Ghana	1966
SHPAGIN, Mikhail Mikhaylovich	Trade Mission	West Germany	1966
SHVETS, Vladimir Fedorovich	Diplomatic	Uruguay	1966
SILIN, Boris A.	Attache's Driver	Ghana	1966
SIMANTOVSKIY, Oleg Vladimirovich	Diplomatic	Congo (Kinshasa)	1970
SMIRNOV, Leonid Vasilyevich	Diplomatic	Tunisia	1966
SOLYAKOV, Leonid Dmitriyevich	TASS	Kenya	1966

NOMOKONOV, Vladimir P.	Technical Expert	India	1968
NOVIKOV, Mikhail	<u>Novosti</u>	Ethiopia	1969
OBOLENTSEV, Fedor R.	TASS	Libya	1966
OBUKHOV, Aleksey Aleksandrovich	Diplomatic	Thailand	1966
OGORODNIKOV, Anatoli T.	TASS	Belgium	1967
OREKHOV, Boris Mikhailovich	<u>Pravda</u>	United States	1970
ORLENKO, Vladimir Ivanovich	Doorkeeper	Ghana	1966
OSHURKOV, Ignor Pavlovich	Commercial	Greece	1967
OVECHKIN, Vladimir Yevgenyevich	TASS	Ghana	1966
PASHKOV, Y.V.	Technical Expert	India	1968
PETRIN, Boris M.	Diplomatic	Cyprus	1967
PETROV, Ivan Yaklovlevich	Official of International Telecommunications Union, United Nations	Switzerland	1967
PETRUK, Boris Georgiyevich	Instructor	Ghana	1966
PODKILZIN, Boris	Diplomatic	Congo (Kinshasa)	1970
POPOV, Nikolay Sergeyevich	Diplomatic	Ghana	1966
PUCHKOV, Aleksandr Nikolayevich	Press Officer for World Health Organization, United Nations	Denmark	1969

security machine so honoured, excepting only the organisation's first two chiefs: Dzerzhinsky and Menzhinsky, the saintly and the unobtrusive Polc. Thus Yagoda, Yezhov and Beria were passed over in silence apart from an oracular reference to political adventurers in the NKVD who had once committed unlawful acts, attempting to remove the State security agencies from the Party's control. In stressing the primacy of Party over police, Andropov's statement was especially typical of post-Beria etiquette for KGB Chairmen. Characteristic too was the devotional language in which Andropov referred to the typical Chekist as 'a man of pure honesty and enormous personal courage, implacable in the struggle against enemies, stern in the name of duty, humane and prepared to sacrifice himself for the people's cause'.⁶ Such was the post-Stalinist projection of the KGB officer—that of a jovial padre with a core of steel, an image reinforced by the numerous hagiographies of the butcher Dzerzhinsky which began to flood the presses.

In the summer of 1969 the KGB brought off yet another notable *coup* by prevailing on the British government to exchange the Krogers (Soviet spies who had received long prison sentences in Great Britain in 1961 for their part in the Portland Case) for a British lecturer in Russian, Mr Gerald Brooke, who had been condemned to five years' imprisonment in 1965 by a Moscow court for anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda. Since his release from the Soviet Union Mr Brooke has published newspaper articles describing how his arrest and trial came about.²¹ At the behest of NTS, the Russian anti-Soviet organisation of which mention has been made above, he had smuggled into the Soviet Union certain material concealed in a photographic album and dressing-case. He was, accordingly, guilty as charged, though the possibility cannot be discounted that the mysterious 'George' (who had recruited him to carry this compromising material to Russia in the first place) was an *agent provocateur* acting on behalf of the KGB. Be that as it may, the KGB appears to have set itself from the start to use Brooke as a human lever to extort the release of the Krogers. As part of this campaign he was deliberately produced in emaciated condition during one of his wife's visits, and was also prevailed upon by his captors to write to some London newspapers urging the Krogers' release in exchange for his own. When these tactics failed, the prisoner was threatened with a new trial on the more serious charge of espionage. He was informed that this would be backed in court by the evidence of the formerly English KGB spy Philby (now resident in Moscow), who would testify that the NTS was in the pay of British intelligence. These newly concocted espionage activities related to conversations be-

21. Brooke, *passim* (Brooke, Gerald, Articles in The People (London), 3, 10, 17 and 24 August 1969.)

tween Brooke and certain other prisoners in a concentration camp sick-bay at Potma. Here he was surrounded by other patients who paraded anti-Soviet views, but who appear from his own description to have been *agents provocateurs*, even though he himself apparently did not recognise them as such. Had the Soviet authorities persisted with the new charge of espionage, Mr Brooke could conceivably have faced a death sentence. In the end, however, the British government capitulated to this long sequence of threats from the KGB by agreeing to release the Krogers. Right or wrong, the decision would appear to put all British visitors to the Soviet Union at hazard during the foreseeable future. So far as the history of the KGB is concerned, the episode is an instructive illustration of the extravagant lengths to which the organisation will go to rescue its agents from foreign imprisonment.

Valuable further confirmation of certain features in KGB methodology is provided by a recent defector to the West, Anatoly Kuznetsov. On 24 July 1969 this well-known Soviet novelist happened to travel from Moscow to London in the same plane as the released Gerald Brooke. On arrival he eluded the personal escort provided by the Soviet authorities, sought refuge with a leading British daily newspaper, proclaimed his intention of emigrating from the Soviet Union and published articles in the British press describing the particularly close surveillance which the Soviet political police maintains over all Soviet writers. In his own case this had included ostentatious shadowing by agents, the bugging of his flat, the recording of his telephone conversations and sundry attempts at 'provocation'. On one occasion a certain student had sought him out and delivered a tirade against the Soviet Union, describing it as a Fascist country, after which Mr Kuznetsov found himself in trouble for failing to report the incident to the authorities. On another occasion a young woman informed him that she had been instructed to become his mistress, and to report all his activities on pain of expulsion from the institute at which she was studying. Kuznetsov also confirms many accounts by previous Soviet defectors when he speaks of the prolonged and elaborate vetting process to which all Soviet citizens are subjected before receiving the rare and coveted privilege of foreign travel. Out of every fifteen members of one Soviet 'delegation' on which he had travelled, at least five were under KGB instructions to report on the other members' behaviour, apart from which each member of the party was obliged to supply a political report on himself and his fellow-travellers. Kuznetsov also describes how he had compromised himself in various ways in the past by failure to co-operate fully with the KGB, but had then decided to work his passage back by simulating a degree of docility sufficient to qualify him for an exit visa. He had therefore pan-

23. Kuznetsov, passim (Kuznetsov, Anatoli (A. Anatol), 'Russian Writers and the Secret Police', The Sunday Telegraph (London), 10 August 1969).
24. Nabokov, p.263 (Nabokov, Vladimir, Speak, Memory: an Autobiography Revisited, revised edition (New York, 1966).

dered to official conspiracy-mania by inventing an imaginary plot by certain fellow-writers to bring out a new clandestine literary journal, and had then clinched his return to favour by promising to write a novel about Lenin.²³ Such methods finally took him to London and put him in a position to start a new career as an émigré writer.

The tactics employed by Mr Kuznetsov to effect his escape have incurred sporadic criticism from western writers not themselves subject to comparable pressures—an example of self-righteous censoriousness such as is all too easily engendered in societies free from totalitarian police control. So far as the present study is concerned, Mr Kuznetsov can only be saluted for his success in extricating himself from the long line of literary victims of the Russian political police—the list which also includes such illustrious names as Alexander Radishchev, Alexander Pushkin, Nicholas Chernyshevsky, Fyodor Dostoyevsky, Leo Tolstoy, Isaac Babel, Osip Mandelshtam, Boris Pasternak and Alexander Solzhenitsyn.

As is stressed by Vladimir Nabokov, himself in youth a potential victim of Russian police terror, Russian history can be considered from two points of view: 'first, as the evolution of the police . . . and second, as the development of a marvellous culture.'²⁴ That these strands are intimately intertwined, and that the second cannot be understood without an appreciation of the first, was one reason for attempting the study now concluded. Though its purpose has been to record the past, one prediction of the future may be risked as a parting word: that between the completion of this book and its appearance in print new scandals will have further enriched the annals of the developing Russian political police.

That the final epitaph of this gigantic and historic organisation will not be written by anyone now living also seems probable.

Conclusion

In the foregoing pages an attempt has been made to describe the operations of Russian political security organisations while quoting sources of information in detail, as is particularly desirable in a field of study so riddled with obscurities and difficulties of various kinds. An attempt will now be made to sum up certain aspects of the material in a manner somewhat more speculative and wide-ranging. This discussion will take the form of a general comparison between the two main historical phases concerned: the Imperial and the Soviet.

One striking difference between the Imperial and Soviet secret police lies in the size of the organisations concerned, in the number of personnel involved, and in the extent of resources allotted to political security operations. During the centuries the Russian secret police has expanded from relatively tiny beginnings until it has come to swamp and penetrate every corner of society—possibly the most impressive example of the working of 'Parkinson's Law' on record. Of all the organisations concerned, Peter the Great's Preobrazhensky Office—perhaps the first true Russian political security force—holds pride of place for the economic and efficient use of resources. As stated above, it conducted political security operations throughout late Muscovy and in the first

years of Imperial Russia with a strength of less than a dozen clerks, though admittedly military units—the Preobrazhensky and Semyonovsky Guards—could be co-opted to an unlimited extent to effect arrests and act as couriers. Since then a gradual but inexorably sustained expansion in security personnel has been observed. In the late eighteenth century perhaps only a few dozen or score were so employed, but under Nicholas I the figure soared to some ten thousand, including the Corps of Gendarmes. Further expansion occurred after the foundation of the Okhrana and Police Department in 1880. It becomes increasingly difficult, however, to estimate the precise number of persons working for the secret police at any given moment, since so many gradations of bribed, bullied, blackmailed or terrorised part-time informants were to be found in the middle reaches of police operations—between the inner ring of full-time salaried police officials or agents, and ordinary citizens liable to be summoned for questioning at any time and under an obligation to denounce any manifestation of political opposition which might have come to their notice.

If one asks how many Soviet—not to mention foreign—citizens are in some sense working for the Russian secret police at the beginning of the 1970s, it must be answered that the reservoir of potential KGB informants includes practically the entire Soviet population, though dotards, infants and rustics are less likely to be so employed than town-dwellers in the prime of life. Those who encounter Soviet citizens, whether on Soviet or non-Soviet soil, would be well advised to regard all their contacts, however amiable, smiling and sympathetic, as potential KGB informants—not necessarily willing ones—owing to the obligation liable to be placed on all Soviet citizens to furnish detailed political reports on their conversations with foreigners. On this elementary fact of life many western governments now warn businessmen and others travelling to the USSR, apart from which diplomats posted to Moscow necessarily receive detailed and intense briefing on the highly sophisticated and persistent techniques of espionage to which they are certain to be exposed. Owing to the growing refinement of 'bugging' devices, many foreign embassies in Moscow and other Communist countries maintain elaborately constructed safe rooms in which, it is hoped, conversations and transactions of a particularly confidential nature may take place without the danger of eavesdropping by KGB and Soviet military intelligence operatives primed with the latest scientific devices.

So far as the ordinary tourist is concerned, he would be wise to allow for the possibility that any Soviet hotel room, restaurant table, taxi, train or aeroplane which he occupies may be 'bugged'—though of course even the KGB's huge resources, and seemingly unslaked appetite for trivial information, do not extend to the full recording and processing of all remarks uttered by all visitors to the Soviet Union at all times. It is the possibility—not the certainty—of such surveillance which should be allowed for.

Now under-employed since the restrictions on terrorism ordained after Stalin's death, Soviet intelligence by no means confines the collection of information, whether abroad or on home ground, to political, military and economic matters, though these

endemic feature of the Russian, and perhaps of all political police organisations, has been the inability of the authorities to work out any stable chain of command or system of administration. Repeated switches and changes of balance are, perhaps, an essential when one is administering what is, after all, potentially the most dangerous institution in the State—dangerous to its own masters as well as to its enemies.

Fortunately or unfortunately, the KGB seems, at the moment of writing, to show greater signs of long-term stability than any preceding Russian secret police force. Yet these words could easily be belied by events through sudden unforeseen developments occurring between the preparation of this study and its appearance in print.

naturally receive high priority. The private lives of individuals also form an object of scrutiny, particularly as such investigation may create an opportunity for recruiting agents through blackmail by threat of exposure. It is also a common KGB practice to compromise potential foreign informants by various techniques—not least by the 'provocation' of individuals earmarked as particularly vulnerable. This has frequently involved the photographing, if necessary through one-way mirrors, of the victim in an embarrassing posture deliberately engineered and implying or recording some combination of drunken, drugged, homosexual or heterosexual misbehaviour.

By contrast with the treatment of political prisoners under the Third Section and Okhrana, the political police of Soviet times has *de facto*, if not *de jure*, generally acted as detecting, arresting, imprisoning, judging and sentencing authority in political cases. These functions are, moreover, retained to a large extent by the present-day KGB, although determined attempts are now made to impart a veneer of legality to political security proceedings by creating the simulacrum of trial by independent courts. Thus the secret police still occupies, at the beginning of the 1970s, a dominant position never held by Third Section or Okhrana—and this despite a significant though by no means total retreat from institutionalised terrorism as practised under Stalin.

It is above all in the creation of systematic political terror on a nationwide scale that the Soviet police system may claim to have advanced far beyond its Tsarist prototype. Unless he was extremely lucky, an ordinary unheroic citizen of Imperial Russia could confidently expect to escape persecution on political grounds by keeping his mouth shut, by abstaining from officially disapproved activities—and perhaps by changing his religion. The essence of Stalinism was to destroy such possibilities, leaving no haven of security even for the most timorous and terrorised. In the deliberate intimidation of the entire population, in the wholesale saturation of society with spies and informers, and in the systematic use of pre-emptive arrest to forestall possible trouble by immunising vast sections of potential trouble-makers in advance—in all these techniques the Imperial police lagged far behind the Soviet . . . and this despite the earnest pioneer efforts of certain Tsarist police chiefs born before their time, among whom Actual State Councilor Liprandi and General Strelnikov have been given special mention above.

All improvements and changes in techniques notwithstanding, certain devices have remained common to both phases of the Russian secret police. Prominent among these has been 'provocation'—the procedure of destroying hostile political organisations and individuals by subjecting them to undercover police agents posing as sympathisers. This method, so successfully pioneered by Rachkovsky and Zubatov in the Imperial period, has continued to the present day as a staple feature of Soviet practice. Another

FOR BACKGROUND USE ONLY

November 1971

VIETNAM PULLOUT
SOME FACTS ON U.S. DISENGAGEMENT IN VIETNAM

-- at the peak of U.S. military involvement (mid-1969) there were more than 543,000 American servicemen in South Vietnam including 97 combat battalions and support troops, plus a vast air armada; today there are under 200,000 American servicemen in Vietnam.

-- the present withdrawal plan calls for U.S. troop strength to be at or below 184,000 by the 1 December reduction deadline; it is anticipated that President Nixon may step-up the present 14,300 monthly withdrawal rate of U.S. servicemen to 20,000.

-- only one Navy aircraft carrier (the 85,000-ton nuclear-powered Enterprise) is now on station in the Gulf of Tonkin where three carriers were in constant operation at the peak of the fighting; the U.S. Navy has already transferred 1,400 other craft to the South Vietnamese.

-- the U.S. Air Forces's peak force of 35 squadrons of attack jets (a squadron normally has 18 planes) has been reduced to 12; this includes withdrawal of all 16 squadrons of F-100s, formerly the backbone of the air war in Vietnam.

-- the entire Marine air wing, with 10 attack squadrons has been withdrawn.

-- although a few Americans have stayed on at the DMZ fire bases to tend complex optical and radar equipment, the South Vietnamese are substantially defending their own northern border for the first time since heavy North Vietnamese infiltration across the DMZ began in 1966.

-- the gradual turnover of 16 newly-built U.S. radar sites to the South Vietnamese has caused Saigon papers to discover that the radar sites are under surveillance by a Soviet intelligence-gathering ship off the coast of South Vietnam; sometime in June this year, the intelligence ship was added to the Russian trawlers monitoring American aircraft carriers operating in the Gulf of Tonkin.

-- Vietnamization has become tangible - in the communiques, the casualty lists, the combat outposts - to the point where it is clear that the South Vietnamese are taking back control of their country; if some of their reactions are frustrated, even hostile, their "withdrawal symptoms" are human and understandable to some degree.

-- the U.S. is not pulling out irresponsibly, nor abruptly; in addition to the time, political energy, money and lives already spent in South Vietnam, it is estimated that American economic aid will have to continue for the next 10 years. Necessary spending will start with about \$700 million for the first few years and end up costing the American taxpayer about \$4 billion over the decade. It is easy to shrug this off because America is rich but America is also beset with serious domestic problems to which monies spent in South Vietnam might have been applied.

-- U.S. "Operation Retrograde" encompassing the distribution and disposal of vast stores of U.S. weapons and other materiel now amassed in Vietnam is an instructive reminder of the myriad, practical ways in which Asian allies are receiving U.S. assistance.

THE WASHINGTON POST
20 October 1971

"To End Involvement in Vietnam"

Last Tuesday, largely unnoticed, Mr. Nixon made what may be his most important statement on Vietnam. By the time he goes to Moscow next May, he said, the United States will have "end[ed] American involvement in Vietnam . . . or at least have made significant progress toward accomplishing that goal."

Three aspects of this statement were distinctive. First, he spoke of ending "American involvement," a phrase which surely goes beyond ground combat forces into the uncertain but negotiable area of advisers, logistical personnel, "residual force" and "supporting air." Second, he defined the ending of involvement as a "goal," which it properly is; previously he had tended to discuss his war aims in terms of bringing about a certain political result in Vietnam. And third, he inched closer to setting a specific date for ending the American involvement. By May, he said, "we trust that we will have accomplished that goal, or at least have made significant progress" toward it.

In short, President Nixon has lent his personal authority and prestige to a public pledge to remove the United States from the war, perhaps within seven months. Though he left himself a large loophole ("substantial progress"), he has gone further towards doing what the bulk of his responsible critics have long pleaded with him to do: set a reasonable final limit on American participation in the war. This is surely the thrust of his words.

Now, we realize that Mr. Nixon strongly urged us all not to "speculate" about what he will say in his long-scheduled Vietnam report on Nov. 15. In the joint interests of communicating with our readers and of encouraging the President to proceed along the path he now appears to have chosen, however, we will press cautiously on.

Two broad developments permit, if they do not require, Mr. Nixon to leave the war.

Inside Vietnam, events thoroughly justify the conclusion that the United States has given South Vietnam that "reasonable chance" to survive on its own. President Thieu, freshly re-elected by an eminently Vietnamese electoral process, is seated more firmly than ever; Saigon has made "great progress" towards representative government, Mr. Nixon observed last week. Ambassador Porter recently told

the Vietcong: "Of the 300 or so district and province capitals of South Vietnam, you do not hold a single one after these many years of war and your best military efforts. You are, in fact, further from military victory than ever." Politically, he said, the Vietcong are similarly disabled. We realize well that such judgments as Mr. Nixon's and Mr. Porter's are not indisputable. But we see no reason to dispute them. The important point is that the administration itself chooses to portray developments in Vietnam in a way indicating that the American mission there has been successfully accomplished. We could not agree more.

Outside Vietnam, of course, the President's forthcoming trips to Moscow and Peking have entirely altered the international context of the war. That Peking and then Moscow invited him can only mean to the Vietcong and Hanoi that their principal allies have other and larger fish to fry, as indeed they have. It need not mean a Chinese or Soviet sellout of their Vietnamese clients. It unquestionably means a judgment in Moscow and Peking that their clients are now within striking distance of a deal which they, the patrons, believe ought to be grabbed.

What kind of a deal? Back in August, Mr. Nixon said: "The record, when it finally comes out, will answer all the critics as far as the activity of this government in pursuing negotiations in established channels." Now, this could merely mean that the record will show that the Nixon administration gave it an honest try. Or it could mean that something is brewing, perhaps something which is intimately tied into Mr. Nixon's larger dealings with Peking and Moscow. By the nature of so delicate and difficult a diplomatic undertaking, it would be impossible at this point for any but a very few insiders to know. What is clear is that the President, when he talks about "ending American involvement" and claims that his negotiating record will "answer all the critics," is taking upon himself a tremendous responsibility to produce positive and conclusive results well in advance of his rendezvous with the electorate a year from now. He is creating his own political imperatives and this is perhaps the strongest assurance he could be expected to give at this point in time of his determination to deliver on his promises.

THE WASHINGTON POST
3 October 1971

For the Record . . .

U.S. Disengagement And Asian Stability

From an address by H. E. Nobuhiko Ushiba, ambassador of Japan to the U.S., before the City Club of Portland, Oregon, September 24:

How the American strategy evolves, following the "winding down" of the Indochina war, and with the application of the Nixon Doctrine, is probably the most important single element in the equation of future Asian stability. Indeed, the American strategic posture will undoubtedly affect China's future outlook.

It is a foregone conclusion that the United States will soon be disengaged from any combat responsibility in Vietnam, probably by sometime in 1972. The Nixon Doctrine

has put Asia and the world on notice that the United States—while maintaining its treaty commitments and the umbrella of its nuclear deterrent—will not again commit American troops to the defense of friendly states, except in cases of massive aggression in which the vital interests of the United States are threatened. According to the Doctrine, America will provide material assistance, when requested, to threatened nations which accept ultimate responsibility for their own defense.

U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT
20 September 1971

WHERE U.S. WILL MAKE ITS "LAST STAND" IN VIETNAM

Indo-China war will be over for most American soldiers in 1972. But not for all. Job already is being cut out for those who will remain.

SAIGON

Now becoming clear is the shape of U. S. military power that President Nixon intends to maintain in South Vietnam—perhaps for several more years.

By December, U. S. strength in Vietnam will be down to 184,000. According to Pentagon projections, this figure will drop to about 45,000 toward the end of 1972.

After that, unless the White House changes signals, American forces will remain at roughly that level until two U. S. objectives in Vietnam are achieved:

- Release of all prisoners of war held by the Reds in Southeast Asia.
- Development of South Vietnam's military capability to defend itself against a Communist take-over.



Among the first major American bases built in Vietnam, Da Nang's big port and airfield facilities will support operations in endangered Northern Provinces.

U. S. spent 142 million dollars to transform the sandy Cam Ranh Peninsula into a deep-water port, a first-rate airfield and a 17,000-acre supply center.

With its airfield, helicopter pads and supply depots, Long Binh is heart of the American military complex clustered around the capital of Saigon.

Three enclaves. By the time U. S. forces are reduced to 45,000 men, most GI's will, with virtual certainty, be concentrated in three American enclaves: Da Nang in the north, Cam Ranh Bay in the central sector and Long Binh in the south near Saigon.

Each already is a key base with airfields, nearby port facilities and vast stockpiles of war matériel. As the U. S. combat role winds down, they will be used to speed training of South Vietnamese troops, to funnel supplies to Saigon's forces and to confront the Communists with what military experts term an "active defense."

U. S. ground troops assigned to the so-called "residual force" will be drawn in the main from major units still in Vietnam: the Americal and the 101st Airborne divisions, one brigade of the 1st Cavalry

Division and one squadron from the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment.

Other Americans will come from the 9,500 U. S. advisers now working with South Vietnamese units. Some of the 500 Air Force and Navy planes and nearly 3,000 helicopters that are presently stationed in Southeast Asia will furnish air support.

Main responsibility of American infantrymen in the future will be defensive—to guard Da Nang, Cam Ranh Bay and Long Binh from Communist attack.

Still some casualties. U. S. officers emphasize, however, that American GI's still will fight and suffer casualties. To guard the bases, they say, heavily armed patrols will have to sweep the areas around the enclaves, and they are certain to run into the enemy.

American military men concede that the concentration of GI's into three enclaves will increase the danger of Red assaults. According to Col. John O. En-

sor, deputy commander of the Cam Ranh Support Command:

"As the level of combat drops in the field, our fixed bases become more attractive targets to the enemy. We must expect that the Viet Cong will begin to center his attacks on our enclaves."

For all the danger, new construction at Da Nang, Cam Ranh and Long Binh promises relatively comfortable garrison-type duty for most Americans assigned to the U. S. residual force.

New recreational facilities at Long Binh, for example, include a \$425,000 theater, a \$425,000 swimming pool and a \$153,000 craft shop.

Cam Ranh Bay already has two skeet-shooting ranges, tennis courts and a marina equipped with powerboats for water skiing.

A special-service officer expresses American intentions to remain in South Vietnam this way: "We don't plan to build expensive new facilities just to turn them over to the Vietnamese."

THE WASHINGTON POST
16 October 1971

U.S. Orders Viet Pullout Of 12 Units

Associated Press

The war in Vietnam fell back into small and scattered fighting yesterday and the U.S. Command in Saigon issued orders for 12 more army units with a total strength of 4,650 men to return home before Christmas.




The cutback was the second largest to be announced at one

time since the United States began to disengage from the conflict in mid-1969.

It was exceeded only last July 1, when the U.S. Command announced that 40 units, with an authorized strength of 6,095 men, were pulled out of combat to prepare for redeployment.

U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT
13 September 1971

U.S. COMBAT ROLE IN VIETNAM—FADING FAST



If President Thieu wins big, as expected, his opponents will certainly charge fraud. If he falters, there could be a wholesale upheaval of the entire machinery of provincial government and a sweeping military shake-up as well.

WAR FRONT: STILL HOPE

The military picture appears not too grim over all, compared with what is found on the political and economic fronts. That is true despite the steady pull-back from combat of remaining U. S. forces.

At the peak of the U. S. involvement, American troops in South Vietnam numbered 543,400. That force included 97 combat battalions plus all their support troops and a vast air armada.

U. S. forces are now down to 27 front-line battalions, and these have been pulled out of major combat operations. Total American strength is down to 219,000 men.

The regular armed forces of South Vietnam number approximately 525,000.

At one time there were four full U. S. infantry divisions and an armored cavalry regiment plus support troops in Military Region Two, the Central Highlands area. Strength then was about 200,000, half of whom were front-line men.

Now there are only three U. S. combat battalions of perhaps 3,000 men in the area. They aren't out looking for the enemy. One unit guards convoys that move along Highway 19 and the two others protect the Tuy Hoa Air Base and the big port and air-base complex at Cam Ranh Bay.

Reds play waiting game. Says an American military spokesman: "Obviously, the South Vietnamese have had to spread out their forces to cover the territory once occupied by U. S. units." So far, neither the North Vietnamese nor the Viet Cong have made any major pushes to fully test how determined the South Vietnamese are.

A drive in Military Region One, below the Demilitarized Zone in the Northern end of South Vietnam, is seen as likely. There U. S. ground troops have turned a string of

fire-support bases over to the South Vietnamese. American forces have moved back to three enclaves near the coast.

The U. S. pullout is also affecting its advisory efforts.

Formerly, teams of American Army advisers were out with every South Vietnamese battalion. No more.

Advisers now serve only with regimental and division-level staffs. The number of men in such teams has also been trimmed. A division advisory team that formerly had 40 Americans makes do today with perhaps half that number.

This is not necessarily bad, in the opinion of some Americans. Says one: "There's not much a young American captain or major can tell a South Vietnamese battalion commander who has probably been in combat against the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese for nearly 10 years."

Mostly, the U. S. advisers co-ordinate air strikes and help with arrangements for helicopter and other supply support.

Weakness in the air. The South Vietnamese Air Force is considerably less advanced than the ground forces, although important strides have been made. In three of the country's four military regions, South Vietnamese airmen are now in charge of the important Direct Air Support Centers which control all tactical air strikes in the country.

Over the past two years, Saigon's Air Force has expanded from 23,600 men to 42,000. By mid-1973, the force should level off at about 50,000 men.

There's not much that can be done to speed up the Vietnamization of the air war. Nearly two years is required to train a young Vietnamese high-school graduate to become a qualified pilot.

At Nha Trang Air Base, about 8,000 men will be graduated this year as tower controllers, aircraft mechanics, communications specialists and fliers. However, only through actual experience can they be trained to do the technical jobs required—and that takes time.

At Pleiku Air Base in the Central Highlands, Lt. Col. Robert L. Nicholl, as a U. S. advisory-team chief, has watched South Vietnamese take over from the Americans. Since November of last year, when they started with a bare field,

they have built a four-squadron tactical wing into what U. S. advisers consider a first-rate outfit.

While the youngish-looking South Vietnamese pilots are rated as "hot shots," often as good as their American fighter-bomber counterparts, ground support isn't up to standard. Vietnamese crews take as long as three hours to ready a fighter-bomber for another mission after it has returned from a strike. American ground crews do the same job in one hour.

With the tempo of ground combat now at a record low, the South Vietnamese are able to handle about 80 per cent of the 3,500 air strikes being flown monthly.

Should there be a sudden return to large-scale fighting, however, Saigon would be hard put to provide even a fraction of the fighter-bombers and helicopters thrown into action by the U. S. at the height of the war, in 1968 and 1969. Then the U. S. Air Force had 21 squadrons made up of about 400 fighter-bombers available for attack. In addition, the Marines and Navy threw in hundreds more.

U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT 13 September 1971

To run the country, feed its population and pay for necessary imports, South Vietnam, in the year ended June 30, 1971, received about 600 million dollars in U. S. aid. About 220 million of this was used to buy fertilizer, fishing nets, chemicals and electrical equipment considered vital to the economy.

Cloudy future. There seems to be little planning for the day when GI spending will end.

Many tens of thousands of Vietnamese working for the U. S. military will soon be out of work. Although a number have gained valuable technical skills, it's not clear how the civilian economy will be able to use their talents.

Foreign investors have hardly found South Vietnam a promising place to put their venture capital. The Saigon Government has done little to attract prospects.

A new, presumably much more liberal foreign-investment law has been long in the works. It has yet to be passed by the legislature.

In addition to the direct-aid contributions, the U. S. through its military and civilian agencies, has supported most of the country's utilities and public services.

American Army engineers have widened and paved a new highway that now links many Mekong Delta towns to the Saigon market. In the Northern Provinces, where U. S.

Now that the Marines are gone, the Navy has greatly reduced its missions over South Vietnam. The Air Force is down to five attack squadrons, about 100 supersonic F-4 Phantom jets.

By way of comparison, the South Vietnamese have only six jet attack squadrons. They are equipped with the A-37 Dragonfly jet and the F-5 Freedom Fighter jet. Three other squadrons fly the reliable but 20-year-old A-1 Skyraider propeller planes. South Vietnam's other transport, liaison, reconnaissance and gunship units add up to 15 squadrons, a total of about 500 fixed-wing planes.

The South Vietnamese have 14 squadrons of about 350 helicopters. At its peak, the U. S. Army's helicopter force numbered more than 4,000. Despite the troop pullout, the U. S. still has nearly 3,000 of its 'copters in South Vietnam.

Even with a planned build-up to perhaps 500 helicopters in two years, the South Vietnamese will have to learn to operate without the luxury of great fleets of helicopters to airlift troops around.

Marines and Army troops ranged widely for years, all-weather roads link once-isolated districts and modern bridges span streams and rivers.

The U. S. maintains and operates a network of ports and airports used by the civilian economy, but at no cost to the Saigon Government.

When the United States ends its military presence here, South Vietnam will find itself responsible for these facilities for the first time.

Says one expert: "As the tempo of the war slows down, there is a desperate need for budget planning and attention to fiscal problems; there must be a new sense of priorities."

Another authority estimates that American aid will have to continue for the next 10 years. Necessary spending for the first few years is estimated at about 700 million dollars. After that, it could taper off to perhaps 400 million a year. Projected economic-aid bill for the next decade: 4 billion dollars.

● Mostly, the mood of Americans from one end of South Vietnam to the other reflects a sense of finality. They feel the U. S. has done all it can to prepare the South Vietnamese to keep their country afloat. The way most Americans sum it up: "What happens from here on out is up to them."

BALTIMORE SUN
10 September 1971

U.S. LIKELY TO SPEED UP BI PULLOUT

Mid-72 Cut To 40,000
Range In Vietnam
Is Predicted

By CHARLES W. CORDDRY

Washington Bureau of The Sun

Washington — Government sources predicted yesterday that the military situation in Vietnam will favor a substantial speed-up in American troop withdrawals—possibly by close to 50 per cent—when President Nixon announces the next phase in mid-November.

Some sources consulted freely forecast that the American troop strength would be down to the 40,000-range in mid-1972, constituting the long-promised advisory group with certain necessary support elements. The current strength is about 216,000 and is to be at or below 184,000 when the present reduction deadline, December 1, arrives.

"Most Difficult War"

In looking ahead to the President's next move, and recalling his belief that the war will not be an election issue next year,

observers noted the assertion in his address to Congress yesterday that this country "is bringing to a conclusion the longest and most difficult war in its history."

Discussing the outlook for the South Vietnamese armed forces, a high-ranking officer recently in Vietnam said that what remains to be done by the Americans "will leave them with the wherewithal, if they have the will" to go it alone.

Mr. Nixon has not come to grips with decisions on the next withdrawal phase, informed sources said, but there is no question that the U.S. forces will be "substantially disengaged" next summer.

Next Summer Target

Since it is clear that the target is to get down to the "residual" force of advisers, with certain support troops, next summer, one of the chief decisions Mr.

Nixon has to make is how to handle the withdrawal process in the intervening months—from the point of view of his administration's prospects and from the military point of view in Vietnam.

The present pullout phase calls for removing 100,000 troops in seven months up to December 1, for an average monthly rate of about 14,300.

An increase to about 20,000 a month—close to 50 per cent—for the following seven months would reduce the force to the 40,000-range by mid-1972, should Mr. Nixon decide on a withdrawal phase of that duration.

That could have the U.S. commitment down to the advisory role prior to the Republican National Convention, and officials have portrayed the advisory role as one that, itself, would go on diminishing.

Most sources doubted that the

President would choose, in mid-November, to announce a "date certain" for the total pullout from Vietnam.

He has refused to do that, linking the final withdrawal to negotiations for prisoner release and the readiness of the South Vietnamese to handle their own defense—saying last April 7 that setting such a date would "serve the enemy's purpose and not our own."

Meanwhile, the United States is in the process of removing elements of the Americal Division—one of the two divisions (there is also a separate brigade) remaining in Vietnam and, it was learned, consideration is being given to withdrawing in a month or so an F-4 jet squadron that previously was slated to leave next spring.

The latter is one of but five such squadrons remaining in South Vietnam.

NEW YORK TIMES
20 July 1971

U.S. Giving Radar Sites to Vietnamese

Special to The New York Times

VUNGTAU, South Vietnam, July 13—The United States Navy is building 16 radar sites for surveillance of ship movements along the coast of South Vietnam and plans to give them to the South Vietnamese Navy by next spring.

The first of the sites, on a mountain peak here 50 miles southeast of Saigon, has recently been turned over to the South Vietnamese.

A Soviet intelligence-gathering ship, meanwhile, has been spotted off the coast of South Vietnam and is presumably watching the new installations.

Only a month ago the intelligence ship supplemented a Russian trawler that has for

years kept a close eye on the activities of American aircraft carriers operating in the Gulf of Tonkin, according to United States Navy pilots.

According to high-ranking United States naval officers, the radar installations will "enhance the coastal defense and counterinfiltration capability of the Vietnamese Navy."

Interception Is Planned

Supplementing the radar sites, surface craft are to be assigned to identify and intercept any unidentified ships.

One United States naval adviser, who asked not to be named, said here that the radar system has a "multitude of purposes." He refused, however, to say what those purposes are.

Nine of the 16 sites span an area in which United States and Japanese petroleum companies are expected to bid for oil rights, perhaps late this year or early next year, after the presidential elections early in October.

It is understood that foreign oil companies are eager to get some assurance from the South Vietnamese Government that security will be provided before they begin drilling.

A spokesman for Rear Adm. Robert S. Salzer, commander of United States naval forces in Vietnam, said that he "couldn't talk about the cost of the electronic equipment being installed because it would give away to the other side a good idea of the capability of it."

The radar sites are being built under contract with the United States Government by R.M.K.-B.R.J., the American construction consortium, and by naval construction engineers.

Running from Hue, below the demilitarized zone, to Hondoc island, near the Cambodian border, the 16 radar installations are strung out on high hills and mountain peaks near the sea and on islands along the southern coast.

Three American advisers are to be placed at each site as it opens to make sure the South Vietnamese become familiar with the equipment. The Americans will stay at the radar sites "for only a limited period of time."

U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT
19 July 1971

VIETNAM PULLOUT

No Abandoned Arsenals This Time

SAIGON

While Americans debate the pace of the U. S. troop withdrawal from South Vietnam, a massive pullout of another kind is taking place.

Billions of dollars' worth of American military equipment—from shoelaces to 50-ton tanks—is being hauled out, no longer needed in Vietnam by the dwindling force of GI's.

One top U. S. official here calls the operation "the most elaborate military-property-disposal drive in history."

The U. S. already has shipped out of Vietnam more than 1.4 million tons of surplus supplies, valued at about 3.5 billion dollars. Officers estimate that up to 2.5 million tons remain, about half of which will be given to the South Vietnamese Government.

Basic goal of the program: to save the American taxpayer money by avoiding costly mistakes of the past.

Walking away from it. After World War II—and to some extent after the Korean War—the U. S. discarded overseas vast stores of weapons and other matériel. Much of this abandoned arsenal weathered away. Some made rich men of the traders—many of them former GI's—who rehabilitated the castoff gear or sold it as junk.

American commanders are determined to avoid a similar situation in Vietnam, where U. S. forces are being cut from a 1969 peak of 543,400 men to about 45,000 by the end of 1972. According to a military-supply expert in Saigon:

"There aren't going to be any junk islands filled with rusting equipment after this war. We are going to bring the stuff back."

U. S. officials are equally determined that no equipment or scrap metal falls into the hands of the Communists. "We don't want the scrap to be made into bullets and fired back at us," says one military source.

Code name given to the disposal program is Operation Retrograde, a complicated exercise in supply and demand, screened by computers to insure that surplus equipment goes where it is needed most.

Sliding scale. Under a priority system, U. S. troops remaining in Southeast Asia get first call on all surplus. Next come the South Vietnamese armed forces, then other U. S. allies in Asia, followed by American units in other parts of the world and in the U. S.

After these primary needs are filled, equipment goes to such secondary "customers" as the U. S. Agency for International Development, the World Health Organization, or South Vietnamese Government departments. Even U. S. federal prisons and Indian reservations receive excess supplies. The leftovers are sold to civilian bidders, usually for scrap. Since 1967, these surplus sales have totaled nearly 21 million dollars.

Vietnam commanders emphasize that Operation Retrograde saves the U. S. military-aid program money by supplying Asian allies with used equipment instead of more costly new gear. Cambodia now is an important recipient. At Long Binh, near Saigon, U. S. Army trucks, cleaned and repainted, wait in neat rows to be picked up by troops from Thailand. Rifles and radio equipment are being shipped to South Korea and Taiwan.

As of June 1, South Vietnam had received more than 1,600 surplus artillery pieces and tanks, 835,000 small arms and other weapons, 45,000 trucks and jeeps, 575 airplanes and helicopters, and 43,000 radios.

A major U. S. problem is how to avoid giving the South Vietnamese matériel they do not need or do not know how to use. Says one American officer: "We don't want to hand the Vietnamese maintenance and training nightmares by rushing them into using equipment that is too sophisticated at this stage."

About 60 per cent of the 400 installations built by the U. S.—total cost, 1.8

billion dollars—have been given to South Vietnam or are in the process of being turned over. Most of these are small camps. All so-called permanent structures on the bases are in fact temporary.

One supply officer observes: "They were designed so that, ideally, when the last American gets aboard an airplane, the building collapses."

Getting Operation Retrograde under way was not easy. An officer explains:

"We had no guidelines, and few if any precedents to go by. We've had to play it by ear. But we've learned a lot, and now things are working fairly smoothly."

Volume of matériel moving out of Vietnam, officers claim, nearly equals that which came in when the big U. S. build-up began in 1965. The 79th Maintenance Battalion stationed at Long Binh alone received and processed nearly 900,000 items between last November and mid-June.

"At one time," says the battalion commander, Lt. Col. Byard W. Rife, "we had literally acres of guns, trailers, trucks, small arms and communications gear waiting to be checked in, cleaned and shipped out."

Checking out. As each American unit is ordered to "stand down" from combat, it immediately returns to the nearest supply depot virtually all supplies and equipment, except the clothes on the backs of GI's. Tanks, armored personnel carriers and other vehicles damaged in combat often have to be dragged in.

If they can be repaired, they are. Otherwise, they are stripped of guns, engines, transmissions and axles and sold for scrap.

To meet American import regulations, all pieces of major equipment shipped to the U. S. are first cleaned with high-pressure hoses on sites resembling giant car-washes. Then most equipment is sent to Da Nang, Cam Ranh Bay or Newport, a U. S. Army port outside Saigon, to await shipment. Says Sfc. Carl Christianer at Newport headquarters:

"Ships used to come out to South Vietnam full and leave empty. You don't

see a ship leave the Far East empty any more."

Inventory control for surplus goods in the Far East is located in Honolulu. Various depots in the Pacific region handle different equipment. Tracked vehicles from Vietnam go first to Sagami, Japan. Small trucks and jeeps are shipped to Taiwan.

Computer decisions. Heavy-duty trucks, generators, electronic and communications equipment, and some arms and medicine go to the Second Logistical Command on Okinawa, where a bank of six computers—rented for \$117,000 per month—decides what equipment goes where.

From July, 1968, through April, 1971, the command disposed of 938 million dollars' worth of equipment—more than 2 million different items ranging from 10-cent cotter pins to \$15,000 trucks. Savings to U.S. taxpayers from the Okinawa operations are estimated at about 310 million dollars a year.

Wrecked or damaged vehicles also are shipped to Okinawa for repair—provided that repair and transportation do not

exceed 65 per cent of the cost of a new vehicle.

In 1968, the command repaired 463 trucks. This year, the total should reach 2,730 and next year, 5,058.

Realizing the risks' involved in the selling or giving away of surplus Government property, U.S. officials have set up complicated safeguards to prevent fraud or profiteering. For example, the U.S. has the right to check back for up to two years on property turned over to the South Vietnamese Government to make certain it has not been sold on the civilian market.

Scrap metal also is sold on the condition that it cannot be resold, a regulation designed to keep it away from Communist countries.

Gathering brass. One item the U.S. does not sell to anyone is brass shell casings. They are so valuable they are gathered after each battle—sometimes by villagers who are paid 40 cents for each 2.2 pounds of brass they turn in.

Despite the safeguards against fraud, no supply authority here claims the system is foolproof. One official says:

"We have elaborate machinery set up to prevent the unauthorized use of our excess material. We're trying to prevent thievery and diversion, but who knows how successful we are?"

About 450 civilians, representing companies in Hong Kong, Tokyo, Singapore and New York, are permitted to buy surplus. Agents for or from Communist countries are excluded. Most of the bidders are well-established businessmen, yet one Saigon trader says: "Some are only as honest as they have to be—and as dishonest as they can be."

Some shady dealers have been barred from further bidding after trying to bribe officers or rig the bidding.

Not all scrap is piled in disposal yards. River boats and barges sunk by the enemy are sold on condition that buyers pay the costs of raising them.

Says Col. Norman J. Le Mere, commander of the Property Disposal Agency in South Vietnam:

"This is a business. It's our job to get the very best return we can from our sales for the U.S. taxpayer."

U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT
19 July 1971

Vietnam Pullout

ALLIES JOIN THE PARADE HOME

Not only the U.S. is pulling up stakes: Other "free world" allies—with 70,000 men—have concluded that their own missions are nearly completed.

America's combat allies in Vietnam—Thailand, Korea, Australia and New Zealand—are following the U.S. lead in withdrawing troops from the war.

Thailand, with a division of about 11,000 men in Vietnam, will pull half of its force out by the end of this month. The remainder are likely to follow later this year. That was announced on July 8.

Korea is now proposing to withdraw part of its 50,000-man force—the biggest Allied contingent supporting the U.S. and South Vietnam. Both Australia and New Zealand have already made reductions, with more to come.

"Static" positions. At the peak of their involvement, the Allied nations—

loosely grouped into the Free World Military Assistance Command—fielded a total of nearly 70,000 men, exclusive of U.S. forces. Those remaining are manning defensive positions described by officials as "static."

This command grew out of U.S. hopes in 1964-65 that many nations—particularly Asian—could be mobilized in a show of battlefield solidarity against Communist aggression in South Vietnam. That is what happened in Korea when the South was invaded by the Communist North in 1950. Fifteen countries from Europe and the Far East sent combat units into action in Korea under a United Nations command.

But no such widespread international rescue mission was mounted in Vietnam. The Philippines, Nationalist China and Spain provided small semimilitary units—but restricted them to noncombatant duties. In the case of Spain it involved seven Army doctors.

Those that did send combat troops: South Korea. The Republic of Korea's

involvement in Vietnam began with a mobile Army hospital in September, 1964, and grew to two infantry divisions with their supporting artillery and supply units, plus one Marine brigade. The U.S. picked up a major part of the bill—more than 1 billion dollars to date.

The Koreans also insisted on being equipped with some of the best U.S. arms, including the M-16 rifle, and the latest in communications gear.

How effective have they been? ROK officers claim they have expanded their area of control from 1,300 square miles in early 1965 to 7,500 at present and have more than doubled the number of South Vietnamese under their protection.

The Koreans, who are acknowledged to be tough fighters, have won a variety of battle honors. In a long series of engagements, they claim to have killed 35,406 of the enemy, with losses to their forces of 3,254 men killed and 7,334 wounded. Discussions are now going on between South Korea and the Saigon Government that are expected to lead to

the withdrawal of one Korean division before June, 1972.

Thailand. The Thai division of 11,000 men—all volunteers—operates in Bien Hoa Province east of Saigon. Civic-action projects, more than combat, are their main missions. Contacts with the enemy mostly has been minor. The Thai have suffered fewer than 40 dead.

Testimony before a U. S. Senate committee last year indicated that, under a secret agreement signed in 1967, the United States has paid Thailand 50 million dollars a year to cover costs of its contribution to the Vietnam war.

Australia. A team of 30 Army advisers began Australia's assistance to South Vietnam in 1962. Transport planes and bombers followed.

In 1965 ground-combat units were introduced, and by 1968 the total Aus-

tralian commitment in the conflict had grown to a task-force organization of more than 8,000 men.

Australians have seen their share of action. For its part in the 1966 battle of Long Tan, one company received the U. S. Presidential Unit Citation.

Since first coming to Vietnam, the Aussies have suffered "slightly over" 400 dead and "several thousand" wounded, according to their records.

Recent cutbacks have reduced the Australian force by 2,000 men.

New Zealand. From a detachment of 25 Army engineers in mid-1964, the New Zealand forces in Vietnam grew to a peak of 800. Officials claim that this number is no mere token contribution—that in relation to New Zealand's total population it is one of the largest in

South Vietnam.

An artillery battery and two rifle companies made up the main muscle of the New Zealand force. Most of the time it served with the Australians in an Anzac command. Now New Zealand's force has been cut back to 280 men.

One distinction Anzac officers make: "We paid our own way." Neither country got military support funds from the U. S. Both paid for all supplies and equipment the U. S. provided.

Behind the pullout— Each of the four Allied countries makes the same assumption: With the help provided, the South Vietnamese have grown strong enough to cope with the Red threat.

Whether that hope proves out, there seems little doubt that this mission is soon to wind up.

CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
7 July 1971

Aid to flow in as GIs flow out?

Kissinger gets Thieu's terms

By Daniel Southerland

*Staff correspondent of
The Christian Science Monitor*

Saigon

President Thieu would have no objections to a moderate step-up in American troop withdrawals from South Vietnam if the losses of troops were compensated for by adequate U.S. material aid.

This is the view Mr. Thieu expressed to Henry A. Kissinger, President Nixon's top security adviser, during a meeting between the two here Sunday, according to informed sources in the South Vietnamese capital.

Dr. Kissinger, who just completed a three-day fact-finding visit to Saigon, declined to comment on the substance of his 2½-hour talk with President Thieu.

But it was understood that he asked Mr. Thieu's opinion on a variety of subjects, including the new seven-point Viet Cong peace

plan. And Tin Song (Living News), a newspaper that closely reflects President Thieu's views, said Messrs. Thieu and Kissinger spent a "lot of time" discussing the troop-withdrawal question.

Constant review

"The point of view set forth by President Thieu is that the United States can withdraw troops at any rate, but he emphasized that we believe the United States will not withdraw in an irresponsible manner," the paper said.

The withdrawal program is under constant review, and the United States is apparently considering some moderate step-ups in the withdrawal rate, which is running at about 14,300 men a month.

SOUTH VIETNAMESE PLANS FOR FUTURE ARMED FORCES

South Vietnam is moving toward a military establishment of 1,100,000 men. The army's field force has now reached 427,500 of its scheduled strength of 450,000 men. The field force will be organized into 10 infantry divisions and one airborne division.

The Regional Forces, comparable to the United States National Guard, are formed into about 1,000 companies trained and equipped to assist the field army within their home regions.

Strength of Supporting Forces

The Popular Forces, with a lower scale of equipment, are organized into 7,000 platoons and are trained for village security. The total strength of the two forces will be about 500,000 men. The Peoples's Self Defense Forces, composed of boys and older men, is to be employed as a home guard.

Of the 50 squadrons planned for the air force, 37 are now active and more than 34,000 of a planned total of 45,000 airmen have been trained. The air force is scheduled to have 1,200 aircraft.

Naval strength will be 1,600 vessels and 40,000 men. The United States has already transferred more than 1,400 craft to the South Vietnamese.

The Government, assisted by Americans, has organized a training program that has graduated 108,000 men from a wide variety of service schools ranging from the War College to a school for dog handlers.

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November 1971

MOSCOW AND THE ARAB WORLD: A TURNING POINT?

The USSR, as the only major power bordering on the Near East, believes its national interests require that this area fall within the Soviet sphere of influence. (The activist assumptions of Communist ideology obviously demand something more.) To this end, the USSR has steadily expanded its influence following the withdrawal of Britain and France from the area. The key to Soviet expansion has been Egypt. When Nasser was seeking financial support to construct the Aswan Dam, Moscow proved more than willing to provide the funds. More important, the Soviet Union also agreed at that time to arm and train Egyptian forces for their confrontation with Israel. The Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation which Nasser's successor, Anwar Sadat, signed with Moscow in May of this year may have marked the apogee of Soviet-Egyptian relations.

Two months after the treaty was signed, the local Communist Party in neighboring Sudan attempted to seize power. Bulgaria, known for its role as Moscow's proxy in the Arab world, was implicated in the coup attempt. And the Soviets found themselves in the embarrassing position of having praised the coup (in the Moscow weekly New Times and in the pro-Soviet weekly Link in New Delhi) during the short period before Nimeri was restored to power. The failure of the coup was in part a result of Egypt's prompt support of General Nimeri which paved the way for government reprisals and the subsequent destruction of the Sudanese Communist Party. By coming immediately to Nimeri's aid (There are conflicting reports of the extent to which Soviet-equipped Egyptian troops participated.), Sadat made it clear that despite Soviet military aid and the 15-year treaty, Egypt would continue to play an independent role in Arab politics and would not countenance a Communist state on its borders.

The Soviet Union has probably had few illusions about the short-range potential of Communism in the Arab world. Moscow has been reminded on more than one occasion of the basic incompatibility between Islam, with its fatalism and its strong emphasis on the family, and Communism. However, the events surrounding the Sudan coup have probably also cast doubts on the ultimate rewards of supporting Arab nationalist governments.

Two other developments related to the Sudan incident of July probably served to strengthen Soviet doubts. China was quick to exploit Moscow's dilemma in the Sudan. The Peking People's Daily of 27 July reported that Sudanese armed forces had crushed an attempt by a "clique" to overthrow General Nimeri. On 15 August the same paper conveyed to Nimeri China's support for Sudan's efforts to "preserve her independence and to cope with all forms of pressure." The latter message also offered development aid.

On 20 August in Damascus, leaders of Egypt, Syria and Libya approved the constitution of a Federation of Arab Republics. The constitution emphasizes that Islam is the official religion of the Federation and that one-party governments are the order of the day.

Since 1956 Moscow has given clear, if temporary and tactical, precedence to establishing close relations with nationalist Arab regimes. In so doing, it has found itself on several occasions in the position of helpless witness to the destruction of Communist apparatuses and agents in which it had also heavily invested. The Communist Party in Egypt has been banned during the entire 15 years of Soviet presence. Soviet agents of influence in the Egyptian government are currently on trial for treason. In the Sudan, as a result of the abortive coup, the strongest Communist party in Africa has been destroyed and its leaders executed, despite (on this occasion) Moscow's protests and threats. In Syria and Iraq, where there is a large Soviet military presence, the Communist parties are illegal but tolerated. Recognized Communists serve in the respective Ba'th Party regimes of both countries; this is permitted, largely, to appease the Soviets.

However, it is not only the local Communist parties that understand they can no longer depend on the Soviet Union to support them or save them when they get in trouble. The younger generation of Arab radicals, who grew up with Nasser's aspirations and Nasser's promises ringing in their ears, and who today have risen in the ranks of the military and have taken power in certain countries, are eager to fulfill their political dreams. The watchword of the radicals is Arab unity and revenge against Israel. (Sadat, whose base of power rests in part on Egyptian army support, is not immune to the pressures from this group.) Arab radicals, who have become disenchanted with Soviet counsels of patience and restraint, are increasingly looking eastward to China.

Thus, the price the Soviet Union is paying for its support of "national bourgeois" regimes is the alienation of that very group normally most responsive to Soviet blandishments. Particularly galling to Moscow is the fact that China is moving to exploit this radical group at Soviet expense.

Fifteen years of expanding Soviet influence in the Arab world may have reached a turning point this summer. The Sudan affair served to increase Arab suspicions and to dampen Moscow's enthusiasm. Nimeri's reprisals against local Communists over strong Moscow objections resulted in an acrimonious exchange between the two countries, the expulsion of the Soviet Counsellor and the Bulgarian Ambassador, and almost caused a break in diplomatic relations between the two countries. In Egypt, following the ouster of the pro-Moscow group from the government and the events in the Sudan, the prevalent mood of the government and the military is more anti-

Communist than ever. The Egyptians recently announced that following President Sadat's trip to Moscow, he will talk with President Tito. The latter is known to be concerned about the effect of Soviet initiatives on Egypt's "non-aligned" posture.

The delicate relationship between Moscow, Arab nationalism and Communism has been upset, although it has not necessarily been broken. Moscow is undoubtedly trying to digest and evaluate the events of this summer in terms of their meaning for Soviet Near East policies. Will Moscow in the future continue to give the same priority to support of national Arab regimes at the expense of the local Communist and the radicals? Will it continue its current outsized military investment in Egypt? Or will it exert pressure on Egypt to arrange a modus vivendi with Israel -- and how much pressure is it capable of exerting? What new tactics can Moscow devise to protect its stake in the Arab world from Chinese encroachments? The answers to these questions are not yet apparent. However, Sadat's trip to Moscow and Belgrade, as well as UN discussions of the Arab-Israeli issue, may provide some clues as to Soviet inclinations. Meanwhile, the recent visit of six left-leaning Israelis to the USSR as guests of the Soviet Peace Committee is an indication that Moscow intends to open a channel of communication to the other major party in the Arab-Israeli dispute.

SWISS REVIEW OF WORLD AFFAIRS
September 1971

The Radicalization of Arab Politics

Arnold Hottinger

The attempted coup in Morocco, the putsch and counter-putsch in Sudan, the eviction of the *fedayeen* from their bases in Jordan and the subsequent conflict over the future relations between the guerrillas and Amman, are events which were not directly linked to one another but all served to substantially heighten the tension in the Arab world and had a generally radicalizing effect. This is most clearly shown by the case of the Libyan leader Colonel Gadhafi, who had a hand in all those bloody events, even if only peripherally. In the process he drew his chief ally, Egyptian President Sadat, into the turmoil and prompted him to take a harder line.

In view of Gadhafi's premature support for the Moroccan rebels, Sadat hoped at first to exert a moderating influence on his Libyan colleague. But after a meeting in Marsa Matruh he let himself be persuaded so far by his junior partner that the three heads of the planned Libyan-Egyptian-Syrian federation issued a very sharp communiqué in which they expressed their concern at conditions in Morocco.

Gadhafi then played the role of the leading opponent of the "leftist" coup in Khartoum. He even went so far as to have two leaders of the Sudanese "revolution," an-Nur and Hamadallah, taken from a British aircraft and arrested. At the same time in Tripoli there was a coordination of the available Libyan, Egyptian and Sudanese military forces which obviously played an important or even decisive role in triggering the counter-putsch in Sudan. Sadat accepted in silence his junior partner's radical move with regard to the British airliner. Shortly thereafter, in his speech to the Egyptian party congress, he praised the enthusiasm and energy of the young Libyan revolutionaries who, as he said, have confirmed his faith in the "Arab revolution." In the question of what the Arab states could do to "punish" King Hussein for his moves against the Palestinian guerrillas and force him to observe the treaties of Cairo and Amman, which guarantee the *fedayeen* freedom of movement in Jordan, Gadhafi once more took the initiative in that he called a "summit meeting" in Tripoli. After initial hesitation Egypt quite suddenly agreed to this step.

In all three cases a similar sequence may be observed: Gadhafi makes a strong move; Sadat seems to hesitate at first, with the intention of urging the Libyan leader to moderation, but then chooses to go along with his young colleague and more or less discreetly support him.

The phase of Sadat's "Egypt first" policy, of promoting Egyptian interests above all else, is apparently nearing its end. This political line, whose chief advocate was Egyptian Premier Fawzi, was based on the premise that a "peaceful solution" could be found to the conflict with Israel — a solution embracing a return of all occupied territories and a "recognition of the rights of the Palestinians." It had been assumed in Cairo that Washington could be moved to put pressure on Israel. But the belief in this possibility is dwindling steadily as peace efforts drag on longer and as the 1972 election year in the USA approaches. It may be that Fawzi and Sadat would prefer to continue pursuing the road of a "peaceful solution" and of promoting Egyptian interests, if they did not have to reckon with Gadhafi's age peers in their own country.

The Libyans have given their military leaders the eloquent generic title of "the generation of Saut al-Arab." This is a new generation of politicians who grew up under the influence of Abdel Nasser's famous radio station, "Voice of the Arabs," which has now been largely tamed, at a time when its commentaries, songs and agitprop speeches were able to bring the entire Arab world to a boil. This made many of them, including Gadhafi, into "Nasserites" more radical than Nasser himself was, at least following the Sinai defeat of 1967. The major themes of that agitation were Arab unity and a campaign of revenge against Israel. At that time "Arab socialism" was still in its infancy, having been worked out only after the separation of Syria from Egypt in 1961 pointed to the beginning of the end of the early Nasserite dreams.

Today, having risen in the ranks of the military and taken power in certain countries, the Saut al-Arab generation is trying to fulfil its youthful political dreams. This is obvious in the case of Gadhafi. And there must be such "Nasserites" in the Egyptian armed forces as well. In their minds the deterrent memory of the defeat suffered in the Six Day War is dwindling steadily. After all, Egypt now has new weapons, newly trained troops and stronger Soviet cover than in 1967. Army officers know that, without a "victory" against Israel, they will be unable to get away from their present uncomfortable positions in the western desert and are condemned to have more and more training imposed upon them under Russian tutelage.

Since the end of the power struggle last spring Sadat is dependent on being able to rule his country in harmony with the Egyptian army, which supported him against the party strongmen and has since been his chief source of strength. There are undoubtedly various schools of thought in the military, some more aggressive and others more cautious, but there are ample signs that the sum total of these divergent opinions is increasingly that Egypt is now ready to take on Israel again. It may be presumed that it is largely internal pressure from the army which is forcing Sadat to give his support and acquiescence to Ghadhafi's policies.

Iraq and Algeria, the "radical" Arab countries which have made it a basic policy goal to outdo Egypt, find themselves constrained by the harder Egyptian line to be even more "revolutionary," at least in their propaganda, and the Syrian regime also feels compelled not to appear laggard in this regard in the eyes of its subjects.

The fact that there is now hardly any hope left that the fedayeen can accomplish anything significant against Israel is contributing to a situation in which the Arabs are losing their patience and growing more eager for the "decisive struggle." As long as the guerrilla movement appeared to be growing and the Arab masses could bask in the illusion that it would ultimately, as a "revolutionary force," sweep away everything -- including Israel -- waiting was not too difficult even for the radical intellectuals. But today even former advocates of a "peaceful solution," such as Hasmonei Heikal, are beating the drums of

war. The revolution-oriented majority of intellectuals now speaks of the necessity of opening urban guerrilla warfare against King Hussein and makes no bones about its distrust of Sadat and his "year of decision." In their opinion, if it was up to the Egyptian leaders the "decision" would be postponed again and again for a long time to come, so that the leaders must be forced to wage war through "revolutionary acts."

Naturally the Soviets will also have an important say in developments. Until now the impression predominated that Moscow did not wish to let matters reach the point of open warfare. In the joint communiqués issued after Egyptian-Soviet conferences one regularly finds a sentence stating that both parties intend to continue their efforts to achieve a just solution with "political means." But during the last visit of the Egyptian foreign minister the Soviets also spoke of an "action plan" which has been established in order to bring about such a "just solution." It is conceivable that a certain heightening of tension is part of that action plan. But the main pressure undoubtedly arises from Egypt's internal situation. Sadat's declaration that a solution, whether by peaceful means or force of arms, must come during 1971 was probably something of a surprise to the Russians. There are signs of a conflict of interests developing between Moscow and Cairo: the Egyptians regard it as urgent to achieve a solution, whether by war or diplomacy, while the Soviets can have little interest in a "solution" which might possibly make their role as the chief supporters of the Arabs superfluous.

BALTIMORE SUN
24 September 1971

Soviet Backed Abortive Coup, Sudan Charges

Beirut, Lebanon (AP)—Maj. Gen. Gaafar, al-Numairy Sudan's president, has charged the Soviet Union with masterminding both the abortive coup against him in July and the plot against Anwar Sadat, Egypt's president two months earlier.

He claimed that all the Communist countries of Eastern Europe, except Yugoslavia were party to the unsuccessful leftist bid to oust him and that they were acting on orders from Moscow.

General Numairy's charges, his most direct against the Soviet Union since the July coup,

were made in a speech at East Gereif, near Khartoum, September 10.

Unreported Speech

The speech, part of his campaign in Sudan's current presidential referendum, went unreported by Arab news agencies. His remarks have become known through diplomatic sources.

"Moscow wants its agents to seize power and govern this country," said General Numairy. "But Moscow was as stupid as the conspirators were."

Sabry On Trial

"I want to tell you this fact:

The conspiracy began in the United Arab Republic (Egypt) two months earlier with Ali Sabry, who is now on trial there. When they failed there, and were rounded up, they decided to try their luck with the Hashem Atta group."

The former Egyptian vice president, Ali Sabry, and 11 other former ministers and top political leaders are on trial in Cairo for their lives, accused of plotting to overthrow President Sadat.

Maj. Hashem Atta, who staged the coup against General Numairy, was executed by firing squad.

THE LISTENER, London
5 August 1971

Godless Rigmarole

Going from Western Europe to the Orient, a traveller may well feel that after some three thousand miles he is midway on his journey and entitled to call this strange new area the Middle East. But in Russian, the term is the Near East. It's not only near: it's a neighbour. The Soviet Union is the only major power which borders on the Near East. Soviet soldiers stand watch on the frontier with Turkey and Persia, and for a decade after the war the Soviet Union could do little but watch the success of the United States in making these countries advance bastions of American defence. But since then, the Soviet Union has carried out two counter-moves. The first has been a programme of economic aid in Turkey and Persia which has led to friendlier relations. The Shah of Persia has twice been received in Russia by the republican comrades who ignore the complete ban on the Communist Party in Persia and Turkey. The second move has been to outflank both countries by establishing a Soviet military presence in the Arab states of Syria and Iraq. A leaf out of the American book.

The Soviet Union treats Syria and Iraq as outposts of her home defence. She uses Egypt as a pivot for expansion in the Mediterranean, down the Red Sea and in Africa. Yet throughout Russia's 15 years in Egypt, she has had to accept the ban on the Communist Party there. Even when Khrushchev was welcomed triumphantly to the Aswan Dam, the most Nasser conceded was the release of some hundreds of Communist prisoners—who remained under police surveillance. Yemen was even more striking. To secure her foothold there, the Soviet Union gave small arms lavishly to the old Imam, who ruled in medieval tyranny until the revolution of 1962. The Russians built this tyrant a new port and an airfield, useful then, and now, as Soviet staging-posts to the Indian Ocean. Across the Red Sea, Sudan came voluntarily into the Soviet sphere with the advent of President Numeiry, and the country is now equipped with Soviet guns and aircraft. But Numeiry may be remembering the anxious advice given to Nasser by his Chief of Staff during one of his quarrels with Khrushchev: 'Gamal, Gamal, please remember the

spares.' The Arabs know well that the Soviet Union does use sanctions against delinquent states. She can withhold spare parts for aero-engines, ammunition for guns or equipment for economic development. Even so, the Communist Party, proscribed throughout the area, is from time to time ferociously attacked, and the Soviet reaction is usually mild. Why is this? Well, the pact between Stalin and Hitler should have made it clear, once for all, that a mere ideological difference would never be allowed to stand in the way of Russia's national interests. Russia, Communist or Czarist, has always felt that her national interest and security demand a powerful sphere of influence in what is, to her, the Near East.

The present Russian rulers, continually disputing with Peking, are probably satisfied with socialistic regimes in the Arab republics, regimes which use Communist jargon, nationalise foreign capitalist companies, but do not give doctrinal allegiance either to Lenin or to Mao. Moreover, the Russians realise that the Arab republics, proud of the independence they have achieved from colonial rule, are in no mood to accept those limitations of sovereignty which Moscow can impose on East European states. They will not even forgo national independence to achieve Arab political unity of which they talk so much.

The Russians are also well aware that a real, more subtle Arab unity already exists and presents an innate opposition to Communist ideology. It lies in the whole heritage of Islam. The most obvious opposition is between the Muslim's submission to God and the Communist's exaltation of man, but there's very much more than that: Arab individualism, the strong sense of duty to the family, and also a sense of fatalism. I had a drink recently with an Egyptian engineer at Aswan—he was not an orthodox Muslim—and a likable Russian engineer. As the Russian left, the Egyptian said: 'Those people, they were barbarians when the Arabs were laying the foundations of modern learning; and they come to us and ask us to believe a godless rigmarole elaborated by a renegade German Jew!'

PETER FLINN: Radio 4

THE WASHINGTON POST
24 October 1971

Moscow's Mideast Hopes Have Faded

By Walter Laqueur

The writer is director of the Institute of Contemporary History in London and author of "The Soviet Union and the Middle East." This article is adapted from his testimony last week before two House Foreign Affairs subcommittees.

THE INTEREST of the Soviet Union in the Middle East is that of a superpower (which, unlike the United States, is not—or not yet—a status quo power) in an adjacent area that offers good prospects for extending its political and military influence. Several circumstances have favored these designs: The area is militarily weak, politically unstable and divided, economically, with a few exceptions, underdeveloped. Unlike Western Europe, the Middle East—with the exception of Turkey—is not part of the Western defense system. The risks the Soviet Union is likely to incur in its forward policy in the area are therefore less than in Europe, or indeed in many other parts of the world.

Nevertheless, direct Soviet military involvement in the area at present is not very likely; at any rate, not substantially in excess of what there is already. While the Chinese danger is uppermost in Soviet minds, Moscow has other, more urgent preoccupations: To neutralize Western Europe on the basis of the status quo, to pursue an active role in the Indian subcontinent, to bring about the withdrawal of American forces from Europe and other parts of the world.

This is not to say that the Middle East no longer enjoys high priority in Soviet strategy. It simply means that at present the Soviet leaders want no more than controlled tension in the area. Direct Soviet military involvement there, quite apart from the risk of a wider conflagration, would defeat some of their designs elsewhere, such as the European Security Conference to which they currently attribute greater importance. The Soviet leaders

seem to have realized that it is impossible to combine a detente even in the limited sense (as they interpret it), with a war involving Soviet forces in the Middle East.

But two caveats should be added to this seemingly reassuring perspective: Once the Soviet Union will be under less pressure from China, once it has made more progress in Europe, once it has restored "order" as far as the unruly satellites are concerned, it will no doubt pursue a more determined, higher-risk policy in the Middle East. The second caveat is this: The Soviet Union is not in full control in the Middle East, not even after having concluded a pact with Egypt which provides for very close ties indeed between the two countries. The tension may get out of control; one can imagine more than one such scenario.

The attractions of the Middle East as far as the Soviet Union is concerned can be easily defined. Geographically, proximity is an obvious factor. Ten years ago, or even five, one would not have mentioned oil in this context, for until recently the Soviet Union was self-sufficient in this respect. But Soviet (and East European) consumption is now outstripping production and there is little doubt that toward the end of the present decade Middle Eastern oil will figure as a major factor in Soviet strategy.

But more important than economic and even military factors (such as bases in Egypt and elsewhere) are political considerations, even if these may appear at first sight somewhat abstract and intangible. Expansion in a southward direction has been one of the constant factors in Russian foreign policy for more than 200 years. Furthermore, and more concretely, if the Middle East became an exclusive Soviet sphere of influence this would have far-reaching repercussions on the situation in Europe as well as in Africa and Asia. It would constitute, in fact, a

radical change in the global balance of power.

Great Expectations

SOVIET POLICY in the Middle East at present aims, very briefly, at the neutralization of Turkey and Iran and at the installation in the Arab world of regimes on which it can rely for close collaboration on the pattern established under President Nasser. The general assumption behind this policy was that power in the Arab countries, despite occasional setbacks, is bound to pass gradually into the hands of people even more closely identified with Soviet policies.

There is no denying that events in Egypt, Syria, Algeria and other countries in the 1960s seemed to bear out Soviet expectations. There was a progressive radicalization in domestic affairs in these countries as well as growing identification with Soviet policies: Factories and banks were nationalized, important sections of the state apparatus were revamped according to the Soviet model, etc. But beyond a certain point the Soviet Union has so far failed to make progress, and therefore more sober thoughts have prevailed in Moscow about the rate of political progress, not only in the Middle East but in the Third World in general.

The intrinsic weakness of the area—political, military, and economic—has been mentioned. To this one should add the shortsightedness and political inexperience of some of its leaders. These are no doubt absolutely genuine in their frequent professions of unswerving devotion to national independence. But the result of the policies they have pursued has not been to strengthen their independence; on the contrary, they have become dependent upon the Soviet Union to a growing degree.

True enough, there have been growing misgivings in the Arab world—not only since the recent events in the Sudan. But to assuage these misgivings it is usually argued that the Soviet Union is a disinterested country which, in contrast to the Western imperialists, has no desire to interfere in internal Arab affairs. The simple geopolitical facts of life have not yet been fully accepted in the Arab world: The mistaken idea still persists that the Soviet Union is not only a well meaning but also a geographically distant country. (The distance between Egypt and the Soviet border—not to mention Iraq and Syria—is in fact less than that between Cairo and Khartoum or between Cairo and Tripoli.)

The countries of the Middle East have been sidetracked by their internal quarrels to such an extent that the question whether an Egyptian (or Syrian or Iraqi) victory over Israel would be worthwhile if it could be achieved only at the price of Egypt's independence is brushed aside as irrelevant. Whatever Arab feelings about Israel, it does not constitute a serious threat to the independence and sovereignty of the Arab countries, for the simple reason that a small country cannot threaten their very existence. Moreover there is, for obvious reasons, no "Israeli party" in Cairo, Damascus, and Baghdad which could seize power from within.

But there is a "Russian party" which, as recent events have shown, is a strong contender for leadership. Yet in most Arab eyes Israel is still the main, not the lesser, danger: Somehow, it is argued, they will get rid of the Russians once Israel is defeated and the Arab world will then regain its full independence and freedom of action. It is a striking example of what some Marxist philosophers call "false consciousness."

Getting In Deeper

BUT THE MORE DEEPLY the Soviet Union has become involved in the Middle East, the more complicated its position. To a certain extent this was an inevitable process: While the West was "in" and the Soviet Union "out" in the Middle East, Moscow did not have to take sides—just as it could be on friendly terms with both India and Pakistan. The West had the monopoly of committing mistakes, whereas the Soviet Union could do no wrong.

Progressive involvement in Arab affairs meant that Moscow has had to choose sides in the main existing conflicts. The existence of communist parties and pro-Russian factions in the Arab world is the main bone of contention but by no means the only one. The Soviet Union cannot at one and the same time support the Sudan's General Nimeri and those who want to overthrow his regime; it can be tried—but the attempt is bound to fail.

If the Soviet Union were just a big power such a dilemma would not exist. But since it is also the head of the world Communist movement, it cannot opt out entirely from its commitments to its local followers without causing fatal damage to the legitimacy of its claims for leadership—and this at a time when its authority as the leader of the Communist camp is in dispute anyway.

Soviet policy makers have become reconciled to the fact that political power in the Arab world will remain for a long time to come in the hands of military juntas, rather than political parties supporting Moscow. This, from the Soviet point of view, is not in itself a major disaster. Anyway, the Soviet Union can no longer count on the automatic support of other Communist parties, unless it also happens to be in physical domination of the country concerned. Albania is Communist and Finland is not, but there is little doubt that Soviet policy makers vastly prefer the Helsinki over the Tirana government. To give another example: Many Communist parties dissented from the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 whereas the military governments of Egypt, Syria or Algeria supported it without reservation. Unlike purely ideologically motivated supporters, the clients can be relied upon to support Soviet policy in a critical situation, because they need Soviet help.

And yet, there is a basic element of uncertainty with regard to the political orientation of these military regimes. Ten years ago Soviet policy makers were far more optimistic about the intentions and political prospects of the military dictatorships in the Third World than at present. The reasoning at the time was briefly this: Military leaders such as Nasser were "radical democrats in uniform." Even though their outlook was as yet clouded by certain "petty bourgeois" prejudices, it was assumed that the "objective logic" of events would carry them into much

closer collaboration with the Communists and the Soviet Union than they had originally envisaged and intended. For they were not acting in a political vacuum; once the means of production had been nationalized and capitalism was on the way out, the ruling officers, needing a political mass basis, were bound to turn to "scientific socialism"; i.e., to the Communists. For only these could provide the doctrine and the political know-how needed for the mobilization of the masses.

In recent years it has been realized that this appraisal has been overoptimistic. Military leaders can turn "left" and "right" in rapid succession, with equal ease, to apply terms of classification which should be used as sparingly as possible with reference to Middle Eastern politics. As a result there is now hardly veiled disappointment in Moscow about the agonizingly slow progress made by communism in parts of the Third World, about the fact that army officers may be power-hungry, or "career motivated" even if they constantly use the anti-imperialist political rhetoric of the Communist camp. These shortcomings and "inconsistencies" of the juntas are more frequently attributed to the "petty bourgeois background" of the military rulers. But there is nothing "petty bourgeois" about a man who was born in a Bedouin tent and now disposes of billions of dollars such as Libya's Colonel Khadafi.

The real explanation for the apparent "inconsistencies" is much easier: In the struggle for power between rival officers' groups, ideological considerations usually play a secondary role. Nationalization of industries and banks and agrarian reform by no means lead to socialism or communism. The decisive issue in the Third World, including the Arab countries, is not whether the banks have been nationalized but in whose hands political power has come to rest: who is running the state.

Series of Dilemmas

IN THIS CONTEXT Soviet policy in the Middle East has to face several dilemmas to which so far it has not been able to find a satisfactory answer. The first has already been hinted at: According to the Soviet blueprint the progressive military rulers were gradually to "democratize political life," i.e., hand over power to the avant-garde, the Communists. But in fact the colonels and the majors

have not shown the slightest intention to do so. They have been dealing ruthlessly with those challenging their power. According to Soviet expectations the military were to be politicized, i.e., made to share power with civilian leaders. In fact, the opposite has happened: Political life has been militarized, with Syria as a striking example.

True enough, in view of the weakness of political structures in the Arab world a handful of determined people stand a good chance to make a successful bid for power, provided, of course, they are in control of army units or the political police. And, with a little luck, they may keep it. But a pro-Communist or pro-Russian coup in one country is almost certainly bound to provoke suspicion and antagonism in others and to give rise to counterforces: Victory in one country will mean defeat elsewhere. In other words: Unless the pro-Russian forces make steady and even progress in *all* the key countries of the Arab world, the overall balance as far as the Soviet Union is concerned may be negative.

The Arab-Israeli dispute has become increasingly problematical from the Soviet point of view. Earlier on it undoubtedly facilitated the Soviet advance in the Middle East. It was not the only, nor the single most important factor. The forces supporting the Soviet Union have made their greatest strides in those parts of the Middle East least affected by the Arab-Israeli dispute such as the Sudan. But in recent years the conflict has become a major obstacle as far as the further progress of communism is concerned. While the conflict lasts, the overriding aim of defeating the common enemy—Israel—narrowly circumscribes Communist action or tends altogether to prevent it. For the Communists cannot afford to ignore the appeals for national solidarity and for a truce both inside the Arab countries and between them. Soviet observers assume, not perhaps altogether wrongly, that but for the continuation of the Arab-Israeli conflict, power in the Arab capitals may well have passed from the "bourgeois nationalist elements" into the hands of the "radical democrats" if not the Communists. Certainly the Arab world would be in a state of far greater internal turmoil but for the struggle against Israel which acts as a stabilizing factor.

Soviet leaders could have instructed their followers according to the basic tenets of Leninist strategy to transform the war against Israel into a "revolutionary war." They have not done so, partly because the Communists are too weak, given the present balance of power in the Arab world, partly be-

cause such a course of action, if successful, would result in a state of anarchy which might well benefit the pro-Chinese rather than the pro-Soviet elements among the radicals in the Arab world.

Options Are Limited

THESSE ARE SOME of the sources of conflict facing the Soviet Union in its policy vis-a-vis the Arab countries. There is every reason to assume that these contradictions will loom even larger in the years ahead.

But what are the options open to Soviet policy? Developments in Algeria over the last few years have been disappointing from the Soviet point of view, Khadafi's regime in Libya and Nimeri's in the Sudan are at present openly anti-Communist, and Sadat's rule constitutes a retreat in comparison with Nasser's. Soviet policy makers cannot possibly be very happy about the new Arab federation. For its political significance, if any, will be that of a reactionary "Holy Alliance" preventing revolutionary uprisings in its component parts. It is the Arab version of the Brezhnev doctrine—stood on its head. The fact that it might be applied against Jordan, for instance, does not offer much comfort.

Soviet expectations that military dictatorships cannot hold on to power for long because they lack political know-how and a mass basis have not so far been borne out by the course of events. These assumptions may still be correct in the long run; Nasser, too, had his quarrels with the Communists and the Soviet Union but mended his ways towards the end of his rule. But it cannot be taken for granted that the present rulers will emulate Nasser; moreover, there is no certainty at all that the military leaders in their search for political allies will turn to the Communists for help. If the Soviet Union should decide to support the opposition to the military regimes, they will be inviting open conflict, risking their past gains in the area and even a restoration of closer relations between these leaders and the West. For despite the vituperation heaped on the West, it cannot be excluded that the help of the West will be looked for by military dictators facing defeat by the Communists.

If, on the other hand, the Soviet Union and its supporters in the Arab countries should prefer a policy of wait-and-see, on the assumption that the political constellation will be more auspicious at some future date (after another lost war against Israel, or the continuation of the military stalemate and the ensuing frustration, or some

economic setback, or the growth of popular discontent for yet other reasons) they will be in danger of being outflanked from the left by more extreme factions.

No Guarantee of Control

IT CANNOT BE STRESSED too often that since the Soviet Union is not in full control as far as events in the Middle East are concerned, not even over the actions of its followers and clients, there is always a very considerable element of uncertainty. It would be foolish for this, as well as for other reasons, to assume that the Soviet leadership will automatically pursue a cautious policy simply because this is at the present moment in its best interest. Moreover, caution in the Middle East context means the continuation of "controlled tension"—but there is no guarantee that tension will not go out of control. Nor is the Soviet Union condemned to prolonged inactivity. The treaty of friendship between the Soviet Union and Egypt concluded in May, 1971, undoubtedly constitutes a step forward from the Soviet point of view. More recently, President Sadat had to sign a document condemning anti-communism, i.e. the policy pursued by his colleagues in Khartoum and Tripoli, not to mention his own action vis-a-vis the Russian party in Cairo.

At present the main aim of Soviet policy in the Middle East remains, to summarize, the consolidation of its gains, and at the same time the creation of a political climate in which the replacement of the present rulers by others more closely identified with Soviet ambitions in the area will be possible with a minimum of friction. The longer-range aim is the transformation of the military regimes into political coalitions dominated (or at least guided by) the Communists. But this remains, for the time being, a fairly remote prospect inasmuch as the key countries in the Arab world are concerned.

Soviet policy towards Israel will not undergo any basic change, though it is quite possible, and indeed likely, that there will be occasional friendly gestures towards Jerusalem in order to impress the Arabs that they must not take Soviet assistance for granted in all circumstances.

Altogether, the Middle East is an area in world politics to which Soviet commentators apply the term *slozhni* (complicated) more and more frequently. Ten years ago they were more confident of having all the answers.

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November 1971

WHITHER POLAND? THE DECEMBER PARTY CONGRESS

The Sixth Congress of the Polish United Workers' Party (Communist) will open 6 December, one year before scheduled and one year after a workers' rebellion toppled the regime of Wladyslaw Gomulka, who had come to power as a reformer 15 years earlier. The unusually early date, the Party says, is to get new programs underway. It is more likely that the new Party Secretary, Edward Gierek, wishes to move quickly to consolidate his position, to distract attention from the upcoming anniversary of the December rebellion, and to persuade the Polish people, by sheer busyness that some progress is being made toward improving the deplorable economic situation.

Guidelines for the Congress have been approved by a September plenum and made public. The greatest emphasis is on the same economic problems which brought Gierek to power in January 1971. The guidelines give at least the appearance of reform whatever their effectiveness proves to be. Centralized economic planning is to be retained while production and executive responsibility are to lie with regional officials and industrial associations. The Party's meddling in economic operations is to be discouraged. Increased productivity and higher living standards are given a top priority. The guidelines encourage a "hospitable climate" for the growth of small enterprises. There has also been a notable effort to popularize the regime: people are urged to participate in pre-Congress discussions and to make suggestions; an effort has been made to humanize the regime.

Such promises are almost as old as the Polish Communist regime itself. In 1956, Wladyslaw Gomulka was installed as Party chief in a wave of anti-Stalinism. He embarked on a decentralizing reform program to undo some of the worst effects of years of forced industrialization and collectivization modeled on the equally brutal Soviet effort of the '30's. The reforms were abandoned by 1959 at the expense of the Polish consumer. Some familiar Communist jargon in the 1971 guidelines points to continuing political restrictions which would nullify any intended reforms: "democratic centralism" (or, Party rule without popular participation), "strengthening the leading role of the Party" (or, continued political domination by the Party of all aspects of Polish life), "no free play for alien political tendencies" (or, the Soviet Union is to be our model).

It is precisely the degree to which the Poles adhere to the Soviet model of economic development which will determine the

success or failure of the program. If Gierek, the clever and efficient former Silesian Party leader, who is widely regarded as a pragmatist and a technocrat, has examined Gomulka's failures, talked with Polish workers, studied production failures and alternative organizational procedures, he is well aware of the problems and weaknesses of Polish economic institutions. He will have found every proof that the Party-dominated economic machinery (following the Soviet example) has failed to improve living standards or achieve a viable economy. The failure is as evident in Poland as it is in the USSR. Yet there is little reason to hope that Party domination of the economy is to be scrapped.

Many factors will influence the Polish decision concerning the Soviet model. Reforms worth considering, such as the decentralization of planning and essential decision-making, giving workers the right to participate in the management of enterprises (as in Yugoslavia), permitting more play to market forces, etc. all carry risks. Polish leaders dare not relinquish too much Party control or deviate too far from the Soviet model in other respects as well, for fear of Soviet intervention. Soviet requirements for integration of the East European economies, as outlined in the August meeting of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (Comecon) will also hamper the development of the Polish economy, no matter what solutions Gierek may wish to entertain.

It may be that the Soviets will permit Gierek some leeway in his effort to revitalize the stagnant Polish economy. Last December's worker revolt against the workers' Party and State was a traumatic experience for the Communist world -- an experience which they fear may repeat itself in Poland and elsewhere in the Soviet sphere.

In the meantime, Gierek has used the past year to rid the Party of deadwood. But in the end, such half-measures, encouraging words, and superficial reforms are not likely to bring about the radically needed improvements so long as the Soviet model must be followed in its essential forms.

Publicly Gierek and the new leaders blame all Polish problems on the Gomulka regime, apparently believing that they will thereby relieve themselves somewhat of the need to make solid reforms. Gierek has said that the major weakness of the Gomulka regime -- and the principal cause of the uprising -- was its isolation and inability to gauge the depth of popular discontent. Without facing the fact that despots tend to be told what they want to hear, Gierek implies that public discussion of Party programs might improve their content. Yet the man in the street is well aware that it is Party control which throttles progress and that no amount of discussion is likely to lessen that control.

A Polish Communist economist, Wlodimierz Brus, writing in the Italian Communist journal Rinascita of 25 June 1971 described the deadening effect of following the Soviet model as Gomulka had done for 15 years (may the same words not apply to Gierek some years hence):

" . . . it is not enough to denounce and condemn even with the greatest good will, the errors and distortions of the Stalinist period; neither is it enough to effect certain changes, if those changes deal only with the surface and neither attack the root of the problems nor create conditions for a continual adaptive process."

"In a certain sense, the whole history of the unsuccessful attempts undertaken during the past 15 years to effect economic reform in Poland can serve as an example of the negative influence of the existing political mechanism on the economic processes."

The world will be watching the December Congress and subsequent actions to see whether Gierek attacks the roots of the problem, offers any truly basic and innovative reforms, establishes any responsive organizations or takes any non-Soviet initiatives in the political and economic areas. Or whether this regime will be just another proof of the truth of Polish Marxist philosopher Leszek Kolakowski's observation that "...when the (Communist) leaders affirm their wish to ensure technical progress and an improvement in the material situation of the population, they are generally sincere. But these intentions are in contradiction to their desire to reinforce the monopoly of uncontrolled power in all fields of social life. (See attachment for other penetrating observations by Kolakowski on the self-defeating mechanisms built into the Soviet system of socialism.)

NEW YORK TIMES
5 September 1971

Polish Party Congress To Be Held Year Early

Special to the New York Times

WARSAW, Sept. 4—The Polish Communist party has decided to convene its Sixth Congress on Dec. 6, a year ahead of schedule.

Edward Gierek, the party leader, announced this today in Warsaw at a special meeting of the Central Committee. He said the Congress, to be attended by leaders of other Communist parties, would focus on the Polish economy.

Mr. Gierek, who assumed power from Wladyslaw Gomulka last December after a week of riots protesting economic conditions, outlined several innovations in a major address to party leaders.

He said the traditional system of presenting "detailed and fixed drafts of the proposed economic plan" had been abandoned. Instead, the program will be open for discussion and alteration.

The intention, he said, is to produce a more realistic program — previous preliminary drafts were "hardly readable," he said — and to encourage wider participation.

Experts to Be Consulted

Non-Communist experts and others who have assisted in the draft commissions will be encouraged to remain with the

program as it is given final shape, he said.

The program will be handled in its last stages by "problem commissions," or groups of experts, Mr. Gierek said.

Previously, delegates have been obliged to sit through discussions of the entire economic program, a time-consuming procedure that produced little in the way of constructive comment.

Mr. Gierek sought to emphasize that the new Congress would be considerably more open than any previous one. The last was held in 1968.

In the past, he said, party leaders told delegates "what would be done." This discouraged discussion and action, he said. "We are trying to present an analysis of the problems facing the nation, state and party," he said.

Since taking over, Mr. Gierek has altered the economic program to aid consumers and the lowest paid workers.

Calls for New Members

Today, he stressed the need to draw new members into the party, especially from the ranks of workers. He said the Central Committee was determined to "strengthen the workers' nucleus at all party levels."

His pledge follows the near completion of a purge of the

party's middle and lower ranks. Officials have been anxious to remove indecisive, inactive and politically unreliable members before delegates and selected for the congress.

Party leaders began the intensive stage of their reform early this summer. The screening was conducted through interviews with party members at the factory and village level.

Many party members and some officials have since been removed from the rolls, usually for inactivity, or have been expelled, probably for administrative or ideological errors.

The process reached the county level last month and, according to accounts in newspapers, was completed at the province level in the last few days.

Indifference is Reported

Unofficial reports in recent months have indicated that party leaders are facing indifference and even hostility in their efforts to introduce reforms and to secure pledges of increased production.

A leading economist who is working on Mr. Gierek's reform plan said that many middle-level bureaucrats were reluc-

tant to change their ways. He told a Western diplomat that they "are still waiting to see if Gierek survives."

Some workers who were unhappy in their dealings with party leaders under Mr. Gomulka are reportedly responding to pleas for greater productivity with demands for increased pay. They are being told that the higher pay can come only from increased productivity.

Trybuna Ludu, the official party newspaper, provided lengthy accounts of party meetings this week in Bydgoszcz, Kielce, Lublin, Szczecin and Wroclaw. Most of the meetings were attended by politburo members.

The newspaper spoke of the meetings as having revealed "still existing ineptitude in personnel policy, bad organization work and many shortcomings in human relations." It said that "higher ideological criteria" would be required for admitting new members.

In Kielce, it reported, party leaders had spoken with every third party member or candidate. In Opole, where the party met on provincial level on Monday, Trybuna Ludu said "a review of party ranks" had led to "3,864 people being crossed off the records and 789 expelled from the party."

"Six Months After the Baltic Crisis," by Wlodimierz Brus, in Rinascita (theoretical journal of the Italian Communist Party), 25 June 1971.

Half a year has already elapsed. The "December events" in Poland disappeared some time ago from front pages in the international press. Yet it would be damaging for socialism and for the international workers' movement if the great experiences arising out of those events in Poland were to be erased or blurred by the passage of time. This concern is not imaginary but real, not only because the law of "panta rei" [Everything is in a state of flux] is universal and inexorable, but also because of the very understandable tendency to forget what is unpleasant and difficult; and the Polish events were unpleasant and difficult for the Communist Party in both socialist and nonsocialist countries. Yet it is nevertheless

necessary to profit by the time elapsed to attempt a concrete, scientific analysis, which can be the more profound and courageous by being free of the emotions reigning at the time.

Significance of the Working Class Demonstrations

In the long run, the essential significance of last December's events in Poland lies in several simple facts:

1. The demonstrations were authentic workers' demonstrations; they involved the proletariat of the large industries. The former government and party leadership's initial attempt to present the demonstrations as the work of "hooligans and asocial elements" collapsed noisily. Since then, no one has ventured to publicly deny the genuine workers' character of the demonstrations. Furthermore, no one has sought to connect the demonstrations with activities of the circles of domestic or foreign opposition; in particular, accusations of revisionism have not been made. Leaving aside the problem of the underlying origin of the December events, it can thus be said that the spontaneous character of the movement has been recognized, although at the same time it seemed to demonstrate a really surprising capacity, under the circumstances, to organize itself rapidly and efficiently, and in such a way as to conform to the traditions of the Polish working class.

2. The immediate effect of the workers' demonstrations and the tragic bloodshed was a change in Poland's political leadership. Wladyslaw Gomulka and his closest collaborators, the politicians responsible for governing the country for the last 15 years, who in a certain sense symbolized that period, were forced to leave the political scene.

Following the December demonstrations, and under the pressure exerted by the working class in the succeeding months, price increases were cancelled (although up until the last moment justification for the necessity of maintaining them was sought); the policy of freezing salaries and stipends was abandoned (introduced under the guise of a so-called new system of economic incentives); essential changes in favor of the consumer were effected in the economic plan for 1971; and so on.

These facts taken together testify to the depth and range of the social conflict with which Poland was afflicted. We are no longer dealing with the theoretical problem of recognizing the existence of conflicts within socialist countries in an abstract way; but with a concrete framework, a tangible one for these conflicts -- a framework which imposes conclusions of a general character. Add to that, because of the validity of the Marxist method if it is effectively adapted to realities in the socialist countries, that the conclusions from the Polish events cannot be limited strictly to the problem of the particular personalities

or the errors committed on this particular occasion. The result is that it is not enough to denounce and condemn, even with the greatest good will, the "errors and distortions" of the Stalinist period; neither is it enough to affect certain changes, if those changes deal only with the surface and neither attack the root of the problems nor create conditions for a continual adaptive process. The politicians who were forced to leave the government helm in December 1970 participated actively in the communist resistance to the Nazi occupation of Poland; three of them -- Gomulka, Kliszko, and especially Spychalski -- had been persecuted during the Stalinist period. The fact that the triumphal return of Wladyslaw Gomulka to the political scene in October 1956 took place with the rallying cry, "Never again a Poznan," takes on symbolic, almost tragic, dimensions if it is borne in mind that his inglorious disappearance from the political scene after governing for 15 years took place once again under pressure from the workers, this time even stronger pressure, and unfortunately at the cost of an even greater number of victims. The inquiry is closed, although there would be no reason to doubt that Gomulka really wished to avoid repeating the Poznan experience and was deeply convinced he was doing everything to that end.

The conclusion is so obvious that it seems quite unnecessary to formulate it: in the functioning mechanism of the existing system in Poland -- and it seems that this system does not differ essentially from that existing in other Eastern European socialist countries -- there must have been factors which did not favor the overcoming of social and economic conflicts, but on the contrary concealed them; so that after a certain period of time those conflicts emerged with greater force, and exploded. As a Marxist, I think that this is the only basis for explaining to ourselves and to others the causes of the tragic events and the paradox of fate which befell several eminent personalities in the Polish workers' movement.

An Attempt To Define the Causes of the Crisis

An exhaustive answer to the question of what the causes were for the growth of the conflicts which blossomed in the explosion will of course require a many-faceted analysis. The more the climate of research is a free climate of true research, the more effective the analysis will be. It is no longer useful to cling to defeated schemes. The attempt which follows is therefore in the spirit of logical discussion.

The direct cause of the Polish workers' demonstrations in December 1970 was economic difficulties, and the attempt to overcome them at the expense of the working masses. But what was the cause of the economic difficulties, and of the choice of that particular method of dealing with them rather than some other method?

The writer holds the principal causes of the trouble to be in the political mechanism. This statement should not be surprising, inasmuch as in a socialist country -- where the principal means of production have been nationalized and the state has shaped the economy as a whole by means of a central economic plan -- political power and the method of government become an inseparable element, and perhaps the central element, of the system of productive relationships. Without taking into account the characteristic of the state and of the measure of real participation of the popular masses in the exercise of power, it is impossible to define the essence of the ownership of the means of production which is the basis of every system of productive relationships. It could therefore be expected that under these conditions the classical Marxist theory of development through the manifesting and surmounting of conflicts between the needs of the development of productive forces and the character of the productive relationships would find its expression in the conflicts between the political mechanism and the needs of the economy. It does not seem too difficult to prove this thesis: we shall limit ourselves to events in recent Polish history.

The modern theory of decision-making, as is well known, attaches great importance to the creation of premises for a rapid, free, and -- extremely important -- potentially genuine flow of information. This factor increases in importance as the importance of the decision to be made and the level of its consequences increase. From this point of view, the narrowness and the degree of distortion of the information at the disposal of the former leadership of the Polish Unified Workers' Party (PZPR) in making the decision to raise food prices in December 1970 (right before Christmas, to make matters worse) is truly surprising. To judge from statements made after the December events, the party leadership was not only in the dark about the real economic situation, but also about the political climate prevailing both among broad strata of the population and in high party and government circles. It has been learned that the centers of decision were not receiving adequate input regarding the situation. From materials published after the December events, it appears that many members of the central committee, of the government, of the trade union leadership, and even members of the political office and the secretariat of the PZPR criticized, and perhaps even strongly objected to, the proposed decisions. Yet there is no proof of any attempt whatsoever on anyone's part to get these decisions reversed; there is no proof that any energetic action was taken against them. The issue here is not to evaluate or pass judgment on the politicians for not having done so in time; the problem lies in a political mechanism in which it becomes the rule not to furnish to higher offices an item of potentially true information, but to furnish instead information adhering to the point of view (previously expressed, or anticipated) of the superior.

The total paralysis of the flow of information which manifested itself last December in Poland -- completely incomprehensible for anyone who was not present -- was the result of an experience of several years' duration. This experience inescapably taught that, from a personal point of view, political conformism paid off, independently of actual social results -- while one suffered personally for criticism. As far as the economic sector is concerned, one of the most characteristic examples of this phenomenon was the unsuccessful attempt to hold discussions on the projected economic 5-year plan for 1966-1970, whose implementation led to, among other things, the tragic finale of last December. The projected plan, in particular as it affected agricultural policies and foreign trade of agricultural products, contained concepts which aroused great uneasiness and opposition from some economists concerned with the negative consequences for meat production and thus for the people's standard of living. This took place in 1964, in the period of public discussion officially opened prior to the Fourth PZPR Congress. There were attempts to express these reservations publicly, especially since the reservations did not have to do with the principles of socialism but rather with some concrete economic policy solutions. One of Poland's most noted and internationally famous economists expressed his point of view in writing, not limiting himself merely to criticism, but at the same time formulating concrete alternative solutions. The party summit promptly reacted in a negative and exceptionally violent manner. Every attempt at concrete discussion was immediately cut off, and no party group -- including the congress -- even considered the possibility of studying the indicated alternatives. After this experience, it is therefore logical that it would not have been possible to expect a ground of independent economic appraisal to exist.

In a certain sense, the whole history of the unsuccessful attempts undertaken during the past 15 years to effect economic reform in Poland can serve as an example of the negative influence of the existing political mechanism on the economic processes. It goes without saying that economic reform cannot be considered a panacea for all economic difficulties, but even within these limitations the results of economic reform would certainly have a positive importance. This is particularly true for a country like Poland, which must count first of all upon mobilizing the so-called sources of intensive development: increased labor productivity; improved exploitation of raw materials and resources; improved adaptation of production structure to demand structure; more efficient investment processes; and so on. Poland was among the first socialist countries to develop advanced projects for economic reform, since efforts to implement them commenced immediately after October 1956. These projects were now and again in their program speeches declared their repeated willingness to put them into effect. But nothing was done in practice, primarily because of concern that reforms

could eventually have a limiting effect on the autocratic and arbitrary nature of the political mechanism. Particularly unfavorable was the attitude toward the attempt to link changes in the functioning of the economic system with the development of self-administration among the workers. The role of the workers' councils which spontaneously arose in the factories during the "Polish October" became in practice reduced to a purely formal aspect, and the councils completely lost the characteristics of genuine representation of the workers in the economic administrative system. In 1970 the former PZPR leadership sought to exploit the ideas of reform in order to conceal a rigid deflationary policy, aiming in practice at freezing salaries and stipends for a minimum period of 2 years. The so-called new system of economic incentives which was supposed to have begun functioning at the beginning of 1971 -- cancelled as of 20 December 1970 -- could thus only have jeopardized the idea of economic reform in the eyes of public opinion.

The cited examples relate to problems connected directly or indirectly with the economic causes of the events of the past few months. Their significance, however, is of a more general character, in that they clearly demonstrate the role of restraint exercised by a defective political mechanism in the process of development of the productive forces and their social implications. It is worthwhile to understand, particularly in this age of the so-called informative revolution, that the formation of an adequate information system, in the broad sense of that concept, requires not only adequate solutions of a technical nature, but also the right political conditions.

The Workers' Demonstrations and the Intellectual Situation

The conflict between the needs of economic development and the inadequate mechanism is of a dynamic rather than a static nature: if it does not result in an adequate adaptation of the political mechanism (and its progressive democratization), it becomes exacerbated. From this point of view, it is necessary in the light of the events of December 1970 to return once more to the events of March 1968 in Poland.

I consider it proper to give the reader a suggestion before approaching this problem: Do not look for or make analogies between demonstrations in intellectual circles (primarily students) in the West and in Poland. The attempt at analogy cannot hold up, since the causes of the demonstrations were due to concrete and thus different reasons in the West and in Poland. In Poland in 1968 the protest of a good part of the students and intellectuals was an expression of unrest owing to the growing awareness of an involuted process in the political mechanism, inconsistent both with socialist ideas about individual freedom and with the purely practical needs of social and economic development discussed

above. The demand to restore the fundamental liberties of the citizen, and particularly to abandon the practice of partial and even false information, was at the center of those demonstrations, which at the same time already showed that it was not a question of undermining the foundations of the socialist regime, but on the contrary of safeguarding it from the dangerous upheavals which inevitably result from political involution. "There is no bread without freedom," the students' rallying crying in March 1968, expressed in a very concise way the idea of the connections between the economy and the political system in a socialist country. December 1970 gave very quick confirmation to this idea, unfortunately in a very painful way.

The response of the Polish political leadership forces at that time proved extremely inauspicious in its consequences. It was decided to exploit the students' and intellectuals' demonstrations to definitively cut off all of the actual and potential sources of independent criticism. As often happens in such cases, it was evidently held that the trouble itself did not lie in the conflicts of real life, but rather in the attempts, minimal as they might be, to call a spade a spade.

A vast range of instruments was used to realize this plan, commencing with an exceptionally brutal and repressive action, utilizing the monopoly of mass information media to completely distort the true character and intentions of the students' and intellectuals' demonstrations. This is not the place to analyze in depth the methods adopted; it must be said, however, that this ideological campaign was fought in ways never yet touched upon on such a broad and open scale, not even during the darker period of the Stalinist purges. (Here one thinks especially of the so-called anti-Zionist campaign which in Poland was generally interpreted as a direct blow aimed conscientiously against the few -- but politically relatively active -- Poles of Jewish origin.) As a result, they succeeded not only in eliminating from the public scene those who were directly involved in the criticism of existing reality, but they also succeeded in intimidating the whole intellectual community. To a certain degree, and thanks to the above-mentioned ideological campaign, they even succeeded in separating the working class from the protesting students and intellectuals.

In the light of the events which followed, it can be said that they succeeded in obtaining results in conformity with these wishes, in the sense that in December 1970 the intellectual community, and particularly its official representatives, did not raise any protest even during the most dramatic moments. This fact does not seem destined to become part of the heritage of positive experiences of socialism. Very great importance is attached instead to another fact -- namely that from March 1968 onward there was

heard in Poland no further critical voice against the policy (economic policy in particular) of the leadership of the country at that time, although -- as it is today generally and officially admitted -- various decisions were often bad and arbitrary. On the other hand, the connection between lack of criticism and the degree of bad and arbitrary decision is evident. The success obtained in March 1968 gave its authors and beneficiaries a sense of absolute freedom to act in an autocratic way, which led in the end to December 1970. Here is the true connection between March 1968 and December 1970, a connection which can serve as a classic, though negative, example of the dialectic functioning of the socialist processes: The stifling of the external aspects of conflicts without an effective solution of them becomes in itself the source of aggravation of the conflicts and multiplication of the force, the level, and the dangerous significance of the retarded explosion. In fact, from the point of view of the social and political dangers, what did the demonstrations of young students and of a certain number of writers and scholars in March 1968 amount to, compared with the demonstrations of the proletariat of the great industries in a series of important Polish economic centers in December 1970? It is truly difficult to overvalue the significance of this concrete lesson in dialectical and historical materialism.

Often people try to deny the interdependence of the political and economic factors in the development of the latter events, limiting themselves to indicating the apparently purely economic character of the workers' demands. This reasoning does not seem well founded. First: Even admitting that the nature of the demands was purely economic, the thesis regarding the interdependence of economic and political factors in creating the situation which was at the root of the demonstrations remains absolutely valid. Second: The workers' demands were directly and indirectly related to important political problems, even though perhaps they were not sufficiently generalized (in form and not in substance) to do so clearly. (This, I think, is owing to the lack of collaboration with the students and intellectuals; on the other hand, however, one must ask oneself whether in the given concrete situation this fact itself did not have positive consequences.) The demands were related especially to democratization of relationships at the factory level; changing the character of elections in the various organizations, including party organizations; a true autonomy and a new style of work for the trade unions; diffusion of information to all of public opinion without distortions; an effective struggle against bureaucracy; abolition of ceremonial privileges, especially when not public; and so forth. In the economic sector, there were numerous demands to increase autonomy of businesses as a condition for a greater and more efficient exploitation of productive possibilities, and as a basis for a real rather than fictional workers' self-administration. Therefore, examining the demands more closely,

their broader political significance cannot be escaped altogether. From this point of view, the Polish working class has given proof of its maturity by correctly understanding the connections between economics and politics in a socialist country, and also by demonstrating a high sense of realism as regards the level and method of putting forth its demands.

Toward Full Exploitation of the Experience

The fact that the workers' demonstrations brought about a change in Poland's political leadership is in itself positive; on the condition, however, that it is interpreted correctly. The problem is that the change in political leaders is considered the beginning and not the end of a process; as a potential opening for the conflicts which have come to maturity, and not as their effective solution. A series of measures taken immediately by the present leadership, especially in the economic area, seems to be leading in the right direction. However, it is obvious that the problem consists not in immediate but rather in long-range activity. It is necessary to attack not the symptoms, but the cause at its source. This is not the place for a detailed analysis of the elements of a vast and courageous program of activities which should transform possibilities into reality. However, such a program results on the contrary from a critical analysis of the causes of the crisis.

The elaboration of an adequate program certainly must in conclusion take into account the personal characteristics of party and government leaders, and the extent to which they understand the causes of the trouble, as well as the extent to which they are prepared (and have the desire) to effect the necessary changes. But let us not delude ourselves. Conservative forces will be opposed to their implementation. These forces are accustomed to acting with repressive methods rather than with methods normal to the reality of political activity, such as broader participation of the workers in the solution of important problems of the present and the future. This is why it seems so important to eliminate everything which, in the recent past, made it impossible to assume and to freely express a critical position toward the problems relating to the whole society, and which, in a socialist regime, should be the concern of everyone; otherwise, the people will continue to have a feeling of impotence and to feel that it is impossible to influence the decisions made in their name.

A particularly important conclusion to be drawn from the experience of December 1970 and the period following is that of understanding that even in a socialist regime the adaptation of the productive relationships to the needs of development of productive forces does not come about in a mechanical way, but rather in the course of a vital social process. And its result depends not only on the good will

of individuals (although, as we have emphasized, this is an element which is anything but negligible) but also on the interaction of social forces. From this point of view, it is necessary to evaluate the significance of the social pressure we are witnessing in Poland, a pressure exercised especially by the working class. We are accustomed to evaluating such phenomena in a socialist country as deplorable facts, to be eliminated at whatever cost and with whatever method; and if it is not possible to eliminate the causes, we at least eliminate the effects, burying them as deep as possible. I think that by now we ought to be able to do without such unilateral attitudes, which basically mean nothing more than loss of faith in the force and the wisdom of the working class; these are nothing more than expressions of an attitude which denies to the working class in practice what is ascribed to it in the textbooks -- the political role of vanguard. With the demonstrations of December 1970 the Polish working class affirmed in a concrete way, through strong enough and continuous enough pressure on those who govern, the role which holds true and which should hold true not only in exceptional situations but on a day-to-day basis. Only in this way will the forces within the party which truly reflect these transformations have a social base, indispensable for the formulation of and achievement of a program of activities corresponding to the needs and potential of socialism. It is unnecessary to emphasize that the role of the vanguard of the working class not only does not exclude active collaboration with other social groups -- in particular intellectuals -- but on the contrary presupposes it.

In conclusion, permit me to offer some reflections on the conclusions the Polish events imply for the international communist movement. Whether we wish it or not, the reality is this: Communist and workers' parties in non-socialist countries, and in particular in the developed countries of the West, are held responsible for what happens in the socialist countries. This implies, indeed imposes upon Communist and workers' parties operating outside socialist countries, a duty of autonomous analysis of the processes taking place in the socialist countries; it imposes the political necessity that they assume an active position in confronting them. This seems all the more indispensable in view of the fact that the many conclusions drawn from concrete experiences in socialist countries contribute to the elaboration of their own program, their own strategy, their own vision of socialism. It is neither right nor proper for the opponents of socialism to have a monopoly on critical analysis of the socialist world, since by the nature of the case they interpret reality in the socialist countries in a unilateral way. It therefore seems that a critical, but communist, analysis of socialist experiences, along with a renunciation of the "sweetness and light" type of analysis, is indispensable for the international communist movement and for individual Communist parties, as well as for the future of socialism on a world scale.

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Hope and Hopelessness

Leszek Kolakowski*

LET us summarize briefly the arguments which are most often advanced in support of the thesis that the communist social system in its present form is *unreformable*. These arguments hold that the main function of this system is to uphold the monopolistic and uncontrolled power of the ruling apparatus; all institutional or actual changes which have occurred, or which one could imagine occurring, will not undermine this basic principle, to which are subordinated all political and economic actions of the rulers. For the monopoly of despotic power cannot be partially abolished (this is almost a tautology, since by definition a monopoly cannot be 'partial'). Thus all past and foreseeable changes within the framework of the system are unimportant and can easily be reversed, for they cannot be institutionalized without destroying the whole mechanism. The satisfaction of the basic expectations both of the working class and of the intelligentsia is thus an impossibility within the limits imposed by the main function of the system. We are dealing here with a totally inflexible mechanism, lacking self-regulating devices and capable of change only in the face of violent catastrophes, which do occur from time to time, but which do not, apart from a number of superficial concessions and reorganizations within the ruling cliques, leave any scars on the physiology of the whole. Stalinism in the strict sense, i.e. the bloody and unrestrained

tyranny of an individual, was the most perfect embodiment of the practical premises of the system; later changes, in particular the considerable attenuation of terroristic forms of governing, however important from the point of view of the security of individuals, have in no way altered the despotic nature of the system or limited the characteristically socialist forms of oppression and exploitation. Since the basic functions of this social system are directed against society, which in turn is deprived of any constitutional means of self-defence, the only conceivable change must thus take the form of violent revolution. Such a revolution, moreover, is possible only on the scale of the whole socialist world system, since, as experience has shown, Soviet military predominance will always be employed to crush local attempts at revolution. The result of this revolution is to be—according to the hopes of some—a socialist society in the sense defined by Marxist tradition (i.e. the social organization of the processes of production and distribution and the establishment of a representative system) or—according to others—the introduction of the Western European model of capitalism, which in the face of the economic and ideological bankruptcy of socialism would seem the only trustworthy path of development.

These are the basic peculiarities of the Soviet model of socialism which determine—according to this line of argument—that all hopes for its partial, gradual 'humanization' by the introduction of successive reforms must be vain (we refer here to 'structural' peculiarities which can be detected in all countries building socialism on the Soviet pattern).

(1) What is often called the 'democratization' of the system of governing is inconceivable in terms of this model. For political despotism

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and the monopoly of the ruling apparatus in controlling the means of production, investment, employment and the division of the national income are mutually interdependent. The political monopoly of the ruling oligarchy rests on its position as the sole employer and sole controller of the means of production. Thus every movement in the direction of political democracy, if genuine, no matter how partial, just involve the *partial expropriation* of the ruling class, which, though not the legal owner of the means of production, has all the rights and privileges of a collective owner. In this fundamental sphere, all departures from this principle are illusory: one can, without danger, allow workers' discussions about their place of work and one can allow commissions of the *Sejm*, a 'parliament' by the grace of the Party apparatus, to discuss the details of economic policy. All decisions will still in one way or another be made by the same bodies, which are in no way controlled by society. Any dissent from the desires of these bodies, revealed in discussion, will have no significance since as a result of the detailed control of information it will not be able to take the form of social pressure. All plans for reform proposed by economists aim at significantly weakening the monopoly over economic decisions possessed by the ruling apparatus and threaten its partial expropriation; they have thus no chance of success.

(2) A natural tendency of the system is the continual reduction of the role of experts, in particular in the sphere of economic, social and cultural policy. Groups of experts are tolerated, insofar as they do not claim for themselves any rights to take decisions, but even in this purely advisory capacity, as experience has shown, they are unwillingly tolerated and are done away with or replaced as far as possible by mock bodies chosen in advance according to the criterion of political servility. To allow experts any truly significant role in taking decisions would involve a reduction in the scope of the ruling elite's power. Thus inefficiency, the waste of social energies and of material, the rule of incompetents, are, as it were, built into the mechanism of government and cannot be seen as temporary defects corrigible in the future. The mechanism does not allow purely 'technical' criteria, not subordinated to the function of maintaining and strengthening the existing authority, to have any influence on its functioning.

(3) Freedom of information—the indispensable condition for the present operation both of the economy and of education and culture—is naturally unthinkable without the ruin of the whole system of government, which, in conditions of the free exchange of information, would inevitably collapse in a short period. In addition, the idea of limited information, made available to the rulers in doses corresponding to their places in the hierarchy is impossible to introduce. In other words, the

refers, though they might delude themselves in this regard, and even actively seek unfalsified information for their own use, will inevitably be misinformed and will, from time to time, fall victim to their own lies. The time is indeed past when Stalin dealt with insufficiently optimistic statistics by murdering statisticians, and obtained information about *kolkhozes* from propaganda films about them. Nevertheless, the doing-away with the most blatantly caricatural misinformation has not changed the fact that the misinformation of the rulers is built into the system. This is the result of at least two sets of circumstances. In the first place, the providers of hermetic information are most often the same people who, on the lower levels of the ruling apparatus, are responsible for the matters on which they provide information. It is thus a normal phenomenon, and not at all exceptional, that unfavourable information can prove self-denunciatory, which can hardly be expected to be practised by people on a large scale, and also that the bringing of desired news is rewarded while that of unfavourable information is punished. This system, as one would expect, spreads inevitably and affects all categories of information-providers. Examples of punishment for bringing bad news are countless and everybody knows them. Secondly, the gathering of information about social life, not affected by anything apart from the desire to establish the actual state of affairs, would require the creation of a considerable apparatus, free from any special political obligations and allowed to work in conditions of complete freedom at least to assemble, if not to pass on, information. Such an apparatus would not only be an unnatural freak within the system, but would also constitute a source of political insecurity, for it would, by its very nature, be an organism not subject to 'ideological' restrictions, and free from the necessity to pay ideological tributes and thus to be servile. In addition, a large amount of the information collected in this way would inevitably increase internal tension and conflict at the higher levels of the apparatus. For there is practically no information which is entirely neutral, and unfalsified information about social life is immediately exploited by all competing groups or cliques aspiring to higher positions against those who are the present holders of these positions. Thus, although the universal rule of self-delusion and self-deceit may seem at first glance to be senseless, it is, in fact, one of the means employed by the system in self-defence. The ruling groups do, it is true, sometimes pay for the lies which they themselves produce, but on balance it pays them to bear these costs (the more so since a greater part of the cost is borne by society) which seem to increase stability and the security of the government.

(4) A further characteristic of socialism in its present Soviet version is the inevitable mental and moral degradation of the apparatus taking the most vital decisions affecting the life of society. This is also inherent in the functioning of the political mechanism and does not result from the bad or good will of the rulers. This mechanism demands a strict subordination within the hierarchy, which is closely related to the principle of the monopoly of power. In this way, as in all despotic systems, the positively effective characteristics in the career pattern of an individual (i.e. the characteristics which facilitate his advance up the ladder of the hierarchy) are servility, cowardice, the lack of initiative, readiness to obey superiors, readiness to inform on people, indifference to social opinion and public interest. By contrast, capacity to take initiative, concern about public good and attachment to truth, efficiency and social interest, with no regard to the interests of the apparatus, become negative characteristics for the individual's promotion. The mechanism of power produces thus a negative natural selection of the leading cadres in all parts of the ruling apparatus, but, above all, in the Party apparatus. The fourteen years of Gomulka's rule in Poland are the most striking confirmation of this truth. Their most outstanding characteristic was the systematic weeding out of individuals with competence and initiative and their replacement by cowardly and submissive mediocrities. The process which took place from March 1968 on—the massive promotion of ignoramuses, informers or simple leuts (the 'invasion of the lice' as it was called in Warsaw) was merely the acceleration and intensification of phenomena which had been occurring for many years. As in all matters in this world, one can cite exceptions, but they are few. The reverse process can sometimes be seen at critical moments, but these do not change the basic tendency of the system, which, inevitably, must treat competence and the capacity to take initiative as phenomena hostile to itself. Different parts of the ruling machinery undergo this process of negative selection in different degrees, so that in the economic and industrial administration one can always find a significant number of competent and courageous people beating their heads stubbornly against the wall of indifference, fear and incompetence which encompasses the Party apparatus and its political and propaganda branches, where the principle of the selection of the worst elements achieves its greatest triumph.

(5) Despotic forms of government inevitably produce the need for permanent, or at least periodically repeated, aggression. That war is a grave for democracy has been known for centuries. For this reason it is also the ally of tyranny. In the absence of foreign wars, a similar function is performed by various forms of internal aggression, whose aim is the maintenance of a continuous state of threat and the preservation of the siege psychosis, using the most artificial methods and the most imaginary enemies. The renewal of acts of brutal aggression against successive groups of the population, selected by the most varied criteria, are not at all the consequences of folly, but an inherent function

of the mechanism of power, which cannot do without mortal enemies, lying in wait to take advantage of its least weakness. for only in this way can it ensure the necessary readiness for mobilization. It thus invents its own enemies, creating real ones in the process, for the acts of renewed aggression inevitably promote hostility and resistance in the persecuted and lead to a situation where repression can be justified as necessary. The system of repression is thus self-propelled, and acts of internal aggression create of themselves the need for further repression.

(6) The same principle of the monopoly of power creates the necessity to encourage the disintegration of society and to destroy all forms of social life not decreed by the ruling apparatus. Since social conflicts are not done away with, but stifled by repression and camouflaged by ideological phraseology, they seek the most varied forms of expression, which consequently means that even the most innocent forms of social organization, if not subject to proper police control, can indeed transform themselves into centres of opposition. This fosters the need to 'nationalize' all forms of social life and leads to continuous pressure aimed at destroying all spontaneous social ties in favour of compulsory pseudo-associations, whose only functions are negative and destructive and which do not represent anyone's interests, but those of the ruling class. Although the system needs enemies, it mortally fears any form of organized opposition; it wants to have only those enemies which it selects itself and which it can fight in conditions of its own choice. The natural need of despotism is to frighten individuals by depriving them of the means of organized resistance. One method which serves this function is the creation of a criminal code which is consciously vague and ambiguous, so that the largest possible number of citizens can feel and be treated as criminals, and so that the scale of actual repression is not linked to rigorously laid down legal norms, but is subject to arbitrary manipulation and arbitrary decisions of the police and the Party.

(7) The ruling apparatus has, moreover, no freedom in the question of citizens' rights. It cannot, under the threat of its own ruin, widen those rights even if this were the intention of the rulers. Experience has shown that concessions in the face of demands for democracy, rather than causing satisfaction with partial gains, become, on the contrary, the reason for increased pressure from below which begins to grow like an avalanche, threatening the whole political order. The enslavement of society is so great and the feeling of oppression and exploitation so strong that the smallest crack in the system of institutionalized violence or the smallest reform which promises its relaxation immediately sets in motion huge reserves of hidden hostility and suppressed demands which threaten to explode and which it then becomes impossible to control. It is not surprising that, after so many experiences, the philanthropy of the rulers, even should it exist, could not relieve the political and economic slavery of the population.

THESE are the most important arguments advanced in support of the thesis—which is moreover consistent with the spirit of Marxist tradition—that the characteristically socialist form of slavery cannot be partially done away with or reduced by partial reforms, but requires total and simultaneous destruction.

In my view this thesis is incorrect, and its propagation constitutes an ideology of defeatism rather than a revolutionary appeal. I base this conviction on four general principles. First, we are never in a position to decide in advance on the degree of flexibility of any social organization; events so far have not proved at all that the despotic model of socialism is in fact completely rigid. Secondly, the rigidity of the system depends *partly* on the degree to which the people living under it are *convinced of its rigidity*. Thirdly, the thesis of unreformability is based on the ideology of 'all or nothing', which is characteristic of people who have been educated in the Marxist tradition, but which is not at all confirmed by general historical experience. Fourthly, bureaucratic despotic socialism is entangled in contradictory internal tendencies, which it is incapable of resolving into any kind of synthesis, and which inevitably weaken its cohesion—a development which is becoming more acute rather than diminishing in intensity.

All the mechanisms which have been mentioned so far and seem to justify the argument that socialist despotism is incapable of reform do in fact operate within the system, have been noted on many occasions and can be personally confirmed by all who live in the socialist countries. They all reveal the logic inherent in this system whose basic forms of action are directed against society. What follows from these observations is that if the mechanism of the bureaucratic rule functions without any resistance on the part of society, it will be inevitably producing, in ever more intensive forms, all the phenomena which we have described, leading ultimately to a society organized on strictly Orwellian lines. It does not, however, follow from these observations that these tendencies cannot be countervailed by a movement of resistance capable of limiting and weakening their operation, which will not lead to any perfect society, but which will create viable forms of socialist organization capable of offering its members a reasonable life. The reformist position would be absurd if it was dependent on the goodwill of the exploiting class, on the philanthropic attitude of the apparatus of coercion or on the automatic mechanisms of the organization. The reformist position is not absurd, however, if it is understood as an idea of active resistance exploiting inherent contradictions of the system. All the characteristics of bureaucratic socialism described so far emphatically indicate that it has built-in tendencies leading to the continuous growth of police methods of government, to social disintegration and demoralization, to the persistence of economic inefficiencies and to the perpetuation of all those negative social characteristics which are universally known and which make life a torment for working people. However, in this general

respect, it has one feature in common with the capitalist system as analyzed by Marx. All the productive and social tendencies inherent in this economic system which were discussed by Marx, did not come arbitrarily out of his imagination, but were based on a detailed observation of society. There were reasons to believe that a growing class polarization was inherent in capitalism, along with the absolute impoverishment of the proletariat, a progressive fall in the rate of profit, anarchy and periodic crises of overproduction, massive unemployment and the disappearance of the middle classes; that all reforms which could be conceived within the framework of this system could not be lasting, since the fundamental laws caused by 'the wolf-like hunger for surplus value' which determined the totality of productive processes could not be abolished within this framework; thus the real importance of reforms is in their political significance, as means for training in the struggle and for the consolidation of class solidarity before the final conflict. Marx, of course, was quite aware of all the counter-trends weakening the operation of capitalist laws of accumulation, the most important of which, though not the only one, was the resistance of the working class. It was not possible, however, to assess quantitatively the tendencies and counter-tendencies in the future evolution of the system. Thus, although Marx's analyses were well grounded, his belief that 'ultimately' the laws of capitalism will always prove themselves stronger within the system than the resistance of the oppressed has proved to be only an expression of his ideological position. In fact, the failure of the expected progressive impoverishment of the proletariat and of the growing anarchy of production to materialize in the end was the result, not of the philanthropic attitude of the bourgeoisie or of its moral transformation. It was the result of long years of struggle and confrontations which forced bourgeois society to recognize certain principles of social organization as its permanent features. Exploitation was not done away with but was limited in an important way in industrially developed countries; the possessing classes agreed to the limitation of their privileges in order to preserve what could be preserved of them without bringing society to ruin.

NATURALLY analogies of this type are not completely satisfactory. It is true that socialist bureaucracy has learnt from the defeats of the bourgeoisie, i.e. how dangerous can be the freedom of information and assembly. Thus resistance to exploitation and oppression in the Soviet system of despotism takes place in worse social conditions than ever before; no oppressing class in history has had power of such scope at its disposal. But this concentration of power is not only a source of strength, but also of weakness, as has been revealed by the whole post-Stalin history of communism.

The very nature of this system demands complete concentration of power at the centre of command. That is why it is true that Stalin's power (and that of his local miniatures) was the most perfect embodi-

ment of the principles of despotic socialism. However the impossibility of re-establishing it stems from the impossibility of reconciling two values, both important for the ruling apparatus; unity and security. The conflicts for power within the system cannot be institutionalized without threatening the ruin of the whole system, for institutionalization would mean the legalization of fractional activity within the Party, which would only differ in an insignificant way from the establishment of a multi-party system. Yet groups, cliques and cabals which organize themselves in accordance with various criteria of choice and with different bonds of interest are an inevitable product of social life. Therefore for a system facing a constant threat of political escalation, the ideal is the absolute tyranny of one autocrat with so limited an intelligence and morality that he will not be held back by any 'abstract' principles, yet so shrewd that he is able to prevent all crystallization of groups within the apparatus by periodic massacres and purges, and in this way maintain the instrument of government in a proper state of constant fluidity and fear. However this is drastically at odds with the need for security of the apparatus, which not surprisingly does not want to live in a situation where every one of its functionaries, including the members of the Party Secretariat and of the Politburo, can at any moment be transferred from his office to the dungeons of the police at a nod from his chief. Therefore the move away from one-man to oligarchic rule, the so-called 'collective leadership', was in the highest interest of the ruling machine. This is certainly not without significance, though it might not seem that it makes much difference to the oppressed whether the documents of their oppression are signed by one or ten individuals. Oligarchy does not, of course, involve any 'democratization' although it does involve a significant limitation of terroristic methods of government. Moreover it also involves a serious undermining of the stability of the government and its inevitable decentralization (still—no democratization), e.g. the consolidation of the positions and extension of the rights of the local *apparatchiks*. This apparatus is not able to prevent concealed fractionalism and to avoid creating competing bodies which continuously undermine its efficiency. Moreover, from another point of view, resistance is most likely and most effective not when oppression is at its worst and terror strongest, but, on the contrary, at moments of relative loosening caused by the disaggregation of the ruling apparatus: we have to thank Lenin for this perceptive observation. The present-day apparatus is not subject, it is true, to ideological shocks, as was Stalin's apparatus, which lost its balance for that very reason after the moral discreditation of the leader, but it is demoralized and suffers chronically from the internal conflicts of rival groups. It is true that it is in the interests of these groups to keep their existence a secret from society, but in this sphere concealment cannot be wholly successful and is wholly unsuccessful within the political machinery. The partial paralysis of the apparatus is thus

becoming incurable and follows a natural course of successive remissions and deteriorations; its stability depends on several independent factors, whose interaction is difficult to predict. In this sense, one can say that the partial 'destalinization' which has been forced on the system has introduced a degradation of power into the mechanism and this makes effective resistance possible. In other words: as long as the apparatus is stable and immunized against political shocks it can, in general, disregard popular dissatisfaction. But once it has lost this stability and no longer fears its leader or its police so much, it pays for this by continual fear of society, of its competitors for power, of domestic and foreign bosses, of the working class, of the intelligentsia, and even of small groups of intellectuals.

THE next ineradicable internal contradiction of bureaucratic socialism is the conflict between the need for a radical change in ideology and the impossibility of getting rid of the Stalinist-Leninist ideology. As distinct from democratic political organizations, which can refer back to social consensus as the basis of their legality, despotism lacks any representative organs and must inevitably possess some sort of ideological 'system', even if of the most paltry kind, in order to establish the apparent legality of its existence. No state and no system can exist without legitimacy—whether it be the inheritance of royal charisma or free elections. In the absence of such possibilities, legitimization takes on an ideological character—the principle that the Party is the embodiment of the interests of the working class or of the whole nation, that the state is part of the great international working-class movement, consolidating its power in one part of the world in expectation of its further extension. Obviously ideology plays an entirely different role in this system of government than it does in the democratic states, no matter how pathetic may seem the clash of principles with reality. At the moment ideology in the socialist world is a burdensome hump which cannot be dispensed with in any way. Internationalist phraseology is indispensable to the Soviet authorities, since it offers the only legitimation of their rule abroad; it is indispensable to the local rulers who are dependent on the Soviets, as the justification of their dependence and of their own power. It might seem that the Soviet rulers can completely disregard the non-ruling communist parties, whom they hardly wish to incite to a real struggle for power, and that their splits and deviations are of no political significance. In reality, this is not the case, for an open and complete abandonment of the communist movement in countries which are not under Soviet control could only occur if they were to abandon the principles which justify this control where it exists. The rulers are thus the victims of their own ideology with all its nonsensical baggage. It is a paradox that this ideology, in which practically everybody has ceased to believe—those who propagate it, those who profit from it, and those who must listen to it—is still a matter of the most vital importance for the continuing existence of this

political system. The dead and by now also grotesque creature called Marxism-Leninism still hangs at the necks of the rulers like a hopeless tumour, limiting their freedom of movement. This ideology has no force of persuasion in the countries of the Soviet bloc as the rulers well know: thus propaganda intended to make an effective appeal to the population, or even to the Party itself, uses ideology less and less, confining itself almost entirely to arguments based on the notions of *raison d'état* and of national interest. But this development brings forth another contradiction within the system. As we know, apart from articulated propaganda, there also exists in these countries an esoteric propaganda, which is sometimes more important, and which cannot be formulated in speeches and articles, but must somehow be conveyed to the people. In the Soviet Union it is the idea of being a great power, the glory emanating from an empire which rules over large parts of the globe more or less directly. In contrast to the official Marxism-Leninism, the imperial ideology can produce a certain real response. But in the countries of the People's Democracies this unspoken ideology is an ideology of the fear of Soviet tanks, imparted by the use of the most varied forms of allusion. Here also the unarticulated ideology, unlike the articulated one, can count on a certain success among the population: one does not need particularly subtle arguments to convince the people that the Russian leaders are capable of producing massacres in any insufficiently obedient protectorate. To some extent the two unarticulated ideologies—that of the centre and that of the periphery—converge in their effects, but it would be shortsighted to count on this convergence as a lasting basis for ruling: not only because in both cases the unarticulated ideology is not complementary but clearly contrary to the official ideology, but also because it can achieve its goal—temporary pacification—only at the cost of the perpetuation and intensification of national hostilities, which though advantageous in times of peace, are extremely dangerous in times of crisis. For the time being, there is no other solution, if the ruling apparatus is to retain even a minimal contact with society.

Among the historic quips of Stalin there was the famous question: 'How many divisions has the Pope?' The poverty of this question illustrates most clearly the poverty of a political system which has lost everything except divisions (no mean thing to be sure), which does not know how to believe in anything apart from divisions, and boasts of this as an example of healthy realism, forgetting that it emerged as a result of the Russian revolutions of February and October 1917, which were successful, not by virtue of possessing many divisions, but as a result of the moral collapse of the Tsar's empire and army.

THE ideological paralysis of bureaucratic socialism is ever more extensive and irreversible; successive campaigns and conferences of Party officials on the theme of 'ideological struggle' may work out new methods of repression and intimidation, but they are not able to offer society anything apart from the usual insipid phrases. All attempts to

reverse this catastrophic trend follow two courses—nationalistic phraseology or phraseology of order and efficiency, and around these catchwords loose factions form themselves. The first is of little value, since the central and basic question—real national sovereignty—constitutes by its very nature an impassable barrier. The second would be more effective, if it could demonstrate that it possessed a programme capable of being implemented on 'technocratic' principles. But the 'technocratic' programme implies the primacy of criteria of productive efficiency and of technological progress over political values, and as such could only be implemented as a result of the ruling apparatus progressively abandoning its power, or again, at the price of the partial expropriation of the ruling class. We touch here upon successive internal contradictions of the system of government: contradictions, often analysed, between technological and industrial progress and the system of political power which continually hampers that progress. This contradiction falls within the scope of Marx's classic definition of capitalist production, but has never manifested itself so strikingly as in the regime which, according to its principles emerged to end such contradictions. All the characteristics of despotic socialism which we have thus far mentioned are, for obvious reasons, powerful brakes on technical and productive progress and perpetuate the stagnation of the system. But technological progress (not limited only to military technique) and even the increase of consumption (in spite of certain political advantages which poverty and an inadequate supply of elementary needs give to the rulers) are in the interests of the ruling class for various reasons; the higher the general level of development, the more difficult it is to achieve outstanding results in one area of production, such as military production, treated as an isolated branch; the expectations of the population depend to a considerable degree on their comparison of their situation with that of highly developed countries, a phenomenon impossible to avoid because a complete blockage of information is, for many reasons, already impossible to achieve. Thus in a situation of stagnation or even one in which the level of consumption is increasing slowly, the level of subjective dissatisfaction and discontent can grow. One can indeed never foresee when it will reach the point of explosion in conjunction with other circumstances; in general it is impossible to avoid a situation of international competition even when this imposes an unfavourable situation, and the conditions of this competition are ever more difficult. Thus the rulers, when they stress their desire for technological progress and the improvement of the material situation of the population, are, in general, stating their true intentions. These intentions are, however, in conflict with a second group of intentions, related to the perpetuation of their own monopoly of uncontrolled power in all fields of social life.

But if this contradiction is unavoidable, this does not mean as Isaac Deutscher seemed to hope that the socialist system will 'democratize' itself as a result of the automatic pressure of technical progress. The contradiction between technological development and the system of

political government and economic organization can only foster development where it emerges as social conflict: a conflict between all strata interested in maintaining the existing mechanism of exploitation, and the working class and intelligentsia, above all—though not exclusively—the technical and managerial intelligentsia.

The conflicts which we have mentioned are strengthened by an additional contradiction resulting from the national situation of the countries making up the Soviet Empire. The ruling apparatus aims at maintaining the dependence on the Soviet Union as a guarantee of its own position, but at the same time it wants to weaken it to increase its own freedom of decision-making. This situation inevitably creates tensions in the political machine and also creates a point where social pressure can be effective. National sovereignty is not sufficient in itself for the social emancipation of working people, but it is obviously an indispensable precondition of that emancipation. Fear of the fraternal guns from the East is, of course, not unjustified but it is consciously exaggerated as a 'patriotic device' for stifling the smallest demands and as a means of convincing the nation of the absolute hopelessness of all its efforts. In reality, the goal of Poland, as of the other nations of the Soviet zone, is not to provoke an armed conflict, but a ceaseless pressure aimed at diminishing Polish dependence on the USSR, a dependence which can only be weakened through pressure. In this sphere, too, thinking along the lines of 'all or nothing' is futile and the adoption of such a principle means in practice to accept 'nothing'. No one can be so blind as to argue that there is no difference between the national situation of Poland and Lithuania, or that the degree of dependence of Poland did not change at all between 1952 and 1957. Dependence and non-sovereignty can exist in different degrees and the difference in the degree of dependence is of enormous significance for the existence of the nation. The function of the humanistic intelligentsia and, in general, of the teaching intelligentsia is of key importance in this respect.

If the Polish nation was able to resist Germanization and Russification in the partition period, this was primarily the achievement of this social stratum. If it had not possessed this group, it would have remained in the same position as the Lusatian nation, which did indeed preserve its language but because it has failed to produce its own original culture and its own intelligentsia has little chance of survival. Poland was preserved as a cultural entity thanks to those who created the Commission for National Education and those who continued its work, thanks to the teachers, writers, historians, philologists and philosophers of the nineteenth century, who, in very difficult conditions, worked to increase the nation's cultural heritage. The Czech nation, which was on the brink of being Germanized culturally, was saved thanks to the similarly conscious efforts of its nineteenth-century intelligentsia. Those who today stifle the free development of the national culture are the enemies of Poland.

If I declare myself in favour of the 'reformist' principle, it is not in the sense that I believe one can define reformism as a 'legal' means of struggle, as distinct from 'illegal' means. This distinction is simply without meaning in a situation in which the decision as to what is or is not legal is decided, not by the law, but by the arbitrary interpretation of ambiguous laws by the police and the Party apparatus. In conditions where the rulers can, if they wish, arrest and condemn citizens for possessing unorthodox books, for conversations between individuals on political subjects, for telling jokes and for the expression of improper ideas in private letters, the application of the concept of legality has no meaning whatsoever. On the contrary, the best way to counteract prosecutions of this type of 'crime' is their massive committal. I am thinking of a reformist orientation in the sense of a belief in the possibility of effective gradual and partial pressures, exercised in a long-term perspective, a perspective of social and national liberation. Despotism cannot be seen as a totally inflexible system, for there are no such systems. Its capacity for a certain flexibility has been revealed in recent years even in fields as decisive as the scope of decision-making which is to be subject to official ideological control. The scope of this ideological control has diminished to a not insignificant degree: Party officials no longer have to know more about medicine than professors of medicine and more about philology than philologists. They do still, it is true, know more about literature than writers. But in Poland, even in this field, certain irreversible changes have taken place. The area subject to interference by the ideological authorities is still unbearable, but it is significantly smaller than it was, when compared with those times not long past, when state doctrine decided the width of trousers, the colour of shoes and the truths of genetics. One can perhaps say that this constitutes progress from slavery to feudalism. However, we are not confronted with a choice between complete decay and perfection, but only with the choice of agreeing to decay or making an unceasing effort to preserve in our national life such values and standards which, once preserved, will not easily be destroyed. The cultural pogrom of 1968 left a great heritage of discouragement because, though unavoidable, it was a confrontation which took place in conditions chosen and imposed by the coercive apparatus. But we are now witnessing in the world the breaking down of rigid orthodoxies, the abandoning of rules, taboos, saints and beliefs, which, not long before, seemed the absolute condition of their existence. It might seem that analogies with church history are beside the point since churches do not have police and prisons at their disposal. Nevertheless, churches have also lost their means of compulsion because of the pressure of cultural change, while the police have since time immemorial deluded itself as to its own omnipotence, and have attempted to delude others, because it retains its power only so long as others continue to believe in its omnipotence. If it has to face strong social pressures, the police reveals itself as ulti-

entirely powerless, and the fear of those who live by spreading fear becomes greater than the fear of the persecuted.

Bureaucratic socialism has lost its ideological base. In spite of all the monstrous features of Stalinism, the Stalinist apparatus, at least in the People's Democracies, was incomparably more dependent in its activity on its ideological links with the system than the present apparatus. It might seem that a cynical apparatus, whose members measure the achievements of socialism by their own privileges and careers is more efficient, since it lacks encumbrances and restraints, is not threatened by ideological shocks, is capable of arbitrary and lightning transformations and is more subject to manipulation. But this is less than half the truth. Such an apparatus is not only weak in moments of crisis and unable to survive real tests, not only highly vulnerable to self-destruction through its tendency to form cliques, but itself appears as a symptom of historical decay of the system which it serves. A system which nobody serves disinterestedly is doomed—I quote this sentence from Victor Serge's book on the *Okhrana*—a sentence which no policeman will ever believe, until he loses his job. Despotic socialism is dying the slow death described by Hegel; it seems untouched but it is sinking down into an inert boredom and numbness, relieved only by everyone's fear of everyone else, a fear discharged in aggression. The loss of its ideas means a loss of its *raison d'être* for the system. Let us note some small changes in phraseology: the word 'freedom' was always on Stalin's lips when torture and massacres were the order of the day in his empire; today when the massacres have stopped, the faint cry of 'freedom' puts the entire police force on the alert. All the old-fashioned words—'freedom', 'independence', 'law', 'justice', 'truth'—can turn against the bureaucratic tyranny. All that is valuable and lasting in the present-day culture of the nations under the rule of this system rises against it. The international communist movement has ceased to exist; the idea of communism in its Soviet version has also ceased to exist.

Probably in conditions of freedom of choice the majority of the Polish working class and intelligentsia would opt for socialism as would the writer of this article. Socialism, as understood here, can only be implemented in a sovereign national organism, and it presupposes the control of society over the means of production and distribution of the national income and over the administrative and political apparatus, working as an organ of society, and not as a master for whom society is a hand-maiden. They would opt for an organism which would establish freedom of information and communication, political pluralism and a multiplicity of forms of social ownership, respect for the criteria of truth, of effectiveness and of public interest, freedom to form trade unions and freedom from the arbitrariness of political police, a criminal code under which prison will exist to protect society against anti-social behaviour and not in order to transform all citizens into criminals, so as to be able to blackmail everyone.

To what extent a movement for the establishment of such a society is possible depends to a considerable degree, though of course not completely, on the extent to which society believes that it is possible. As the nature of a given society is dependent *in part* on its own self-image, there cannot be in social change a pure potential concealed in material circumstances alone and independent of the degree of awareness of potentialities by the people. Thus in the countries of socialist despotism, those who inspire hope are also the inspirers of a movement which could make this hope real—just as in society's attempts to understand itself, object and subject often coincide.

THE belief that socialism in its present form is totally inflexible and can only be destroyed at one fell swoop, and therefore that no partial changes are in essence changes in its social nature, easily lends itself to justifying opportunism and pure knavery. For if it was true, there would be no significance in any individual or collective initiative to counteract the monstrous behaviour of the neo-Stalinist bureaucracy, nor in any struggle to preserve in society respect for the truth, for competence, for honesty, for justice and for intelligence; in short, on this premise each individual act of knavery can be justified, since it can be interpreted simply as an element of the universal knavery, which 'for the moment' is unavoidable and is not the work of individuals but the result of the system. The principle of unreformability can thus serve as an absolution granted in advance for every act of cowardice, passivity and co-operation with evil. The fact that a large part of the Polish intelligentsia has been persuaded to believe in the complete inflexibility of the shameful system under which they live is almost certainly responsible for the regrettable passivity which they displayed during the dramatic action of the Polish workers in 1970.

The worst service one could possibly do to the cause of Polish independence and democracy is to perpetuate nationalist anti-Russian stereotypes. The Russian nation, which has been through a most terrible *gehenna* of recent times, is used by its rulers as a tool in their imperialist policies. But it is itself a victim of these policies to a greater extent than anyone else. Given the atrophy of internationalist ideology, the fostering of nationalism within the Soviet 'sphere of influence' is, despite certain inherent risks, an indispensable tool of the most traditional kind for maintaining power. 'The friendship of nations' in the official doctrine consists of the drinking of toasts of friendship by official delegations, and of visits by folk dance groups under strict police supervision. True friendship and understanding between nations, whose mutual distrust and hostility may have deep historical roots, can only be anchored in uncontrolled contacts and exchanges—but this the ruling strata fear above all. Polish anti-Russian nationalism, in provoking a natural reaction, only strengthens Great Russian nationalism and contributes to the prolongation of both nations' enslavement. It is a pity that it should be necessary to repeat this truth which already during the

'Peoples' Spring' of 1848 was quite banal for the revolutionary democracy of that period, but, as long as it still applies, it will have to be repeated. Those people who, instead of seeking to know and understand the true national culture of Russia, perpetuate anti-Russian stereotypes in Poland are the unconscious spokesmen of the power which holds both nations in slavery.

In spite of the Soviet empire's military power and of the invasion of Czechoslovakia, decentralizing tendencies within the 'bloc' have not ceased and nationalism will continue to erode the organism evermore, lacking, as it does, any ideological cement. It is not in any nation's interest that national hatreds should provide the fuel for this disintegration, since such hatreds could end in apocalyptic massacres. One can only offset this fearful perspective by putting new life into the traditional, old-fashioned idea of the brotherhood of nations united against their oppressors.

TO conclude: all the internal contradictions of despotic socialism which we have described can be resolved in one of two ways. If left to its own inertia, in silence and fear, the system will always and inevitably tend to such a solution of its own contradictions which will increase, and not decrease oppression; tighten, not loosen the bondage. *The growth of police methods of rule is the result not of increased resistance, but, on the contrary, of its absence.* The flexibility of this social forma-

tion—a flexibility whose limits cannot be established in advance—will manifest itself in its re-Stalinization, if no effective forces to oppose this trend emerge. It can manifest itself in a form more in accordance with the needs of society only under pressure from this society; this is a lesson which follows irrefutably from our experience. Those who think that they can buy their personal tranquillity with small concessions will discover that the price of their tranquillity will rise continually. Those who today pay only with innocent toadying, will be compelled tomorrow to pay with denunciation of their colleagues for the same commodity; those who buy miserable privileges only by being silent in the face of knavery which they could oppose, will soon be forced to pay by actively participating in knavery. The natural law of despotism is moral inflation, whereby the distributor of goods compels people to pay ever-higher prices, if social pressure does not enforce cuts.

This perspective is perhaps not an encouraging one, but at least it is not a fantasy, in contrast to perspectives which would have us wait for a miracle, for help from outside, or for the automatic self-correction of the system's jarring machinery left to its own inertia. What is important is that instruments of pressure are available and are at nearly everybody's disposal. They consist in drawing obvious conclusions from the most simple precepts—those which forbid silence in the face of knavery, servile subservience to those in authority, accepting alms with humility or other similar attitudes. Our own dignity gives us the right to proclaim out loud the old words 'freedom', 'justice', and 'Poland'.

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WITHOUT MARX OR JESUS
Jean-Francois Revel
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Chapter 3

AN IMPOSSIBLE REVOLUTION:

The Communist Nations

NO ONE TODAY, even within the communist parties of the western world, seriously contends that the Soviet Union is a revolutionary model for other countries. Hopes for a form of "socialism with a human face," and expectations of a spontaneous liberalization of the Soviet regime, have been periodically, and invariably, disappointed. At the same time, the Soviet Union's lack of success in the economic field has made its totalitarian regime less and less acceptable. It is no longer possible to justify the suppression of liberty by the imperatives of industrial discipline—especially since it has become obvious that Soviet industry is characterized by waste and inefficiency.

The China of Mao Tse-tung offers no more promise than does the U.S.S.R. China has repudiated "economism"; but, for all of that, her people have not regained their freedom. The so-called cultural revolution—which seems to have been essentially a purge, reinforced, in some instances, by an ominous explosion of collective sadism—has left intact, or even strengthened, China's dictatorial political regime and her all-powerful political propaganda machine. It is hard to see the sense in declaring economic productivity to be of secondary importance in an underdeveloped country; and that is particularly true if, as in the case of China, the ideal of austerity which is offered to the people is not offset by the right to individual development, and if it is accompanied instead by an ever more oppressive climate of moral, intellectual, and physical terrorism.

This refers particularly to austerity in the communist countries, which is not the kind of austerity that one can interpret as an investment in the future; it is not planned, coherent, or due (as we are expected to believe) to "primitive socialist accumulation." Rather, it is a state of anarchic poverty, resulting from the underproductivity of a badly managed industrial machine. Thus, we are treated today to the spectacle of the Soviets borrowing capital from Japanese (that is, American) banks, and asking Ford to build, at its expense, an automobile

factory in Russia. In other words, they are soliciting the honor of being included among the victims of neocolonialism.

These indications of failure are more or less accepted as such, depending upon the bias of the individual. Even on the European Left, which is traditionally well disposed toward China and the U.S.S.R., it is difficult to find any one still willing to declare that every instance of Soviet expansion represents a step forward for world socialism or that the Chinese system is a freely exportable mode of "socialism with liberty." (It is true that some students regard themselves as "Maoists" because they reject all authority and demand complete individual freedom; but these individuals are simply badly informed on the state of present-day Chinese society.) On the whole, most militant socialists-communists and their sympathizers, or at least those who are open-minded and have access even to a minimum of information, have gradually been forced to recognize, either openly or in their own minds, that the Marxist-Leninist states represent a revolutionary failure. It is no longer possible to maintain that there can be progress in socialism without equal progress in human freedom, and particularly in freedom of expression. We have already seen where that road leads, in the case of National Socialism in Germany and Fascism in Italy. Yet, once we abandon this thesis, we must also abandon all hope in "democratic centralism"—that is, in the Soviet system and the Chinese system. We must even question whether the system of economic management practiced in Russia, China, Yugoslavia, and Cuba deserves the name of socialism—that is, whether it is possible to have a socialist economy without a political democracy. Can we say that the total or partial collectivization of the means of production is "socialist" if, at the same time, the people are not allowed to exercise individual initiative and control, or to share in decision-making and in the exercise of power? Can we say that a system is "socialist" if the great options (often a synonym for great errors)

that determine the destiny of a people for generations are determined by an authoritarian minority? Can a repressive totalitarianism which generates underdevelopment be called socialism, even at a purely material level? It is high time to preach what we have learned at high cost: economic socialism cannot exist in an atmosphere of political dictatorship. Any attempt to establish one alongside the other must lead either to caricature, or to tragedy. Yugoslavia, in which non-Stalinist Marxists have placed such great hope, has confirmed this principle by remaining both ineffectual and repressive. And Cuba, ten years after Castro's triumph, is still bogged down in the morass of authoritarian nonproductivity.* In the most conservative terms, this situation may be expressed by a formula: "Socialism has not yet been realized anywhere in the world." As a corollary, we might add: "The U.S.S.R. is, in any case, the last place where it may be realized; and it is likely that, henceforth, the same prognosis applies to China." To put it brutally: the events of October 1917 in Russia were not the beginning, and cannot become the model, of world-wide socialist revolution.

If socialism, with or without its "human face," has not been realized anywhere, then it is foolish to continue referring automatically to the "socialist camp" and the "imperialist camp," as though revolutionary action were merely a problem of mechanics or of transportation, by virtue of which a maximum number of territories or political regimes would enter into one camp to the detriment of the other. Moreover, this attitude presupposes that only capitalistic expansion is "imperialistic," and that socialistic expansion is not; that is, that only capitalistic nations are capable of seeking to increase their influence in international affairs so as to strengthen themselves as geographic realities. The truth, if we are impartial in our judgment, is that the communist nations and the capitalist nations have been endowed with the spirit of imperialism in approximately equal portions. It is hardly worth mentioning such obvious examples as the invasion of Tibet by China, or of Czechoslovakia by the U.S.S.R.; for those were old-fashioned, almost Hitlerian enterprises, unworthy of the more subtle methods of modern imperialism which seek to avoid outright military conquest. More representative of imperialism at a refined level is the Soviet presence in the Arab nations of the Middle East, which utilizes the very real problems of these states to aid them in their war—or rather, to push them toward war—while satisfying Russia's own ancient expansionist ambitions in this region. Similarly, the hatred which exists between the Chinese and the Soviets

* See especially *Cuba est-elle socialiste?* by René Dumont (Paris, 1970), and *Guerillas in Action* by K. S. Karol (New York, 1970).

is of the kind that can flourish only when two imperialistic powers have conflicting designs on the same sphere of influence—on black Africa, for example. It means nothing to say that these penetrations into other states are not manifestations of imperialism simply because they are accompanied by an ideological message. Let us recall that it was in the name of an ideology—Christianity—that Latin America was conquered in the sixteenth century, and that Christian principles were as little applied in those countries then as socialist principles are applied in Africa now. It was also in the name of an ideology, which was to remain wholly academic—that of "republicanism" and "progress"—that France built her colonial empire between 1880 and 1914. Ironically, France's ideological pretexts were not far removed from those of communism. Marx deplored the cruel methods of the European powers (particularly those of Great Britain in India) in their seizure of territory and commercial rights in Asia; but he considered that, in the final analysis, this eruption of colonialism represented a progress in civilization, for it would rouse the Asiatic peoples from their torpor and plunge them "into the mainstream of historical development."*

It is clearly a mistake to believe that only capitalism is imperialistic, or that the U.S.S.R. and China are congenitally incapable of using their systems of alliances to further their own economic, political, and military interests at the expense of weaker nations. We may conclude, then, that there has been no more a revolution in the foreign policies of the communist countries than there has been internal revolution in those same countries.

For the past fifty years, every road seems to have led to increased socialism. Every road, that is, except the socialist road. And the reason is obvious. The purpose of the second world revolution is to create real equality among men, and to give to men the political means to decide for themselves on the great matters affecting their destiny. Therefore, the concentration of all power—political, economic, military, technological, judicial, constitutional, cultural, and informational—in the hands of an oligarchy, or even, in certain cases (Stalin, Tito, Castro), of an autocracy must be the method least likely to lead to such a revolution. And, in fact, what happens under these oligarchies and autocracies is that the oligarchs and autocrats become more and more entrenched in their positions of power, and the solutions that society expects from them are more and more rarely forthcoming. For, unfortunately, the qualities necessary to acquire power (even heroically) and to exercise power (even ineffectually) are

* Wolfe, B. D., *Marxism: One Hundred Years in the Life of a Doctrine*. New York, 1965, p. 36.

not the same as the qualities necessary to resolve the problems of modern society. The result is that, as authority increases, competence decreases. And since no amount of criticism seems able to halt either the increase of the former or the decrease of the latter, society is becoming

more and more dominated and less and less governed. In such a predicament, the question of whether one social system is better or worse than another becomes a matter of purely academic interest.

WASHINGTON POST
BOOK WORLD
19 September 1971

THE BOOK, reviewed by Theodore Roszak

The subtitle of this book in the original French was "*la nouvelle révolution mondiale est commencée aux Etats-Unis.*" "The new world revolution has begun . . . in the United States"!

Imagine how that brazen announcement comes across to French intellectuals who were born believing they hold the patent rights on revolutionary politics—and for whom the last word on America has long been Jean-Paul Sartre's *The Respectful Prostitute*. There must have been many who at once identified the book as satire. It isn't. Revel means it. The man knows how to be outrageous.

The main audience this book addresses is the French left wing. Its real subject matter is the stagnation and self-congratulations of French radicalism. Revel spends about a third of his space specifically on France, lambasting radical nonperformance under the de Gaulle and Pompidou governments. Even when he is talking about America, he is really using us like a whip on his left-wing compatriots. A witty, wickedly incisive polemic, this—and thoroughly French in substance and style. But Americans will find it fascinating to eavesdrop on the argument. For Revel is a first-class political journalist (he is a leading columnist for the liberal weekly *L'Express*) and his comments on the American scene hold many home truths.

Moreover, what Revel lets us overhear about ourselves is flattering—in the extreme. Think of it: Here is an obviously sane, highly knowledgeable writer who has nice things to say about *us*! That is very nearly a newsworthy event. Lots of book-reading Americans, by now lacerated to the bone with our copious literature of national self-recrimination, will surely love Revel (as they did Charles Reich) for breathing a precious little zephyr of euphoria through the miasmatic social climate.

Of course, Revel has his own good reasons for lavish compliments on America. Idiot anti-Americanism is the hard core orthodoxy of the European left: the demonology of every radical true-believer. So Revel takes it deftly to pieces, in the process giving even the most cynical American food for thought.

For example, he reminds us that, by European standards, many of America's poor look almost like a comfortable middle class. Further, by comparison with the current anemic condition of French civil liberties, Americans are living in the democratic promised land. Again by comparison with France (where official, unofficial, and self censorship now works to prune controversy at the roots) the American political forum smokes with healthy debate and action.

And Revel goes on to marvel at how many more Americans go to college and how many more books they read; how dissent commands prime time on U.S. television; how Black Panthers are (occasionally) exonerated by the courts; how issues as yet esoteric in some major European countries—like Gay and Women's Liberation, like environmental defense—fill our popular awareness. If we experience little and reluctant reform, Revel sees at least much vitality and originality of approach. He even concludes that America is "one of the least racist countries in the world today"—that is, insofar as racism here is under pressure by a lively militancy. Whereas in France, the growing number of exploited nonwhite aliens (now totaling some four million) is still an invisible, powerless population.

On Revel's balance sheet, we do indeed pick up lots of points against weak competition. Because the situation in France (always his main point of reference) has been dismal since de Gaulle, and especially since May '68. The left bank of Paris is all but under martial law each night; it swarms with surly cops checking identity papers. The crude harassment of students by special police squads (like the super tough CRS) is an open disgrace—but French courts have yet to decide a case against the gendarmerie. Moreover, when Revel poses America against the even gloomier backdrop of many communist and third world countries, our merits shine with brighter magnitude still. Myself, I cannot cheer very loudly for teams that win by default. But then discriminating comparisons have their place (I suppose) in any intelligent politics—though I think only a foreign observer like Revel could make the judgments in this book sound like more than special pleading.

In Revel's view, the sum total of America's relative virtues adds up to the world's only hope of true revolution since the great liberal breakthrough made in France in 1789—"the first revolution," as he calls it. As a revolutionary vanguard, the communist and third world

countries are dismissed as non-starters. Much of Europe remains "mesmerized and immobilized by the past . . . pervaded by the idea that nothing can happen here." But

today in America a new revolution is rising. It is *the* revolution of our time. It is the only revolution that involves radical, moral, and practical opposition to the spirit of nationalism. It is the only revolution that, to that opposition, joins culture, economic and technological power, and a total affirmation of liberty for all. . . . It therefore offers the only possible escape for mankind today: the acceptance of technological civilization as a means and not an end, and . . . the ability to reshape that civilization without annihilating it.

All the things Revel identifies as signs of the revolutionary dawn have by now been much discussed in America: student radicalism, hippies, the militant minorities, the new feminism, ecological activism, the consumer crusaders, above all the massive war resistance. Revel even finds a small residue of radical promise in Marshall McLuhan and *Playboy* magazine.

The revolution toward which these forces build, Revel argues, is something "wholly new and . . . has nothing to do with the revolutions of the nineteenth century." By this he means it must be constructively nonviolent in its tactics (his critique of revolutionary violence—the more violence, the less revolution—is especially wise): it must use the system against itself, exploiting its many legal resources; it must rely on "prepared extemporization," avoiding the doctrinaire paralysis of

the European left wing where "everything that is workable is considered to be nonrevolutionary, and everything that is revolutionary is nonworkable"; above all, it must have world government as its highest goal—something I cannot recall hearing much discussed among young radicals.

That is not too specific a program—but then only dilettantes and dinkwits draw up detailed blueprints for revolution these days. I would take more issue with other aspects of Revel's analysis. I think he grossly underestimates the American corporate economy's sheer, greedy, foolish inertia and the sad loyalty that a corrupted establishment commands in mindless "middle America." Then too, he has the odd belief that economic growth is the *sine qua non* of radical social change. But our bloated GNP is largely a proliferation of swanky garbage. Clearly, zero growth is the only sane economics for the industrial societies—and the only economics that does not play into technocratic hands.

Revel also plays down the importance of religious vision to the new radicalism (he is very secular-minded; hence the "without Jesus" in the title) and gives little attention to the handicraft-communitarianism that is pioneering the counter culture. He is perhaps a little too hooked on obsolescent superindustrial values.

Serious shortcomings, these. And yet Revel's shrewd study stems from a sojourn of only a few months in America; his overall perceptiveness during so brief a visit is really too dazzling to be much faulted. But who can tell? If he had stayed longer, would his optimism have survived?

FOR BACKGROUND USE ONLY

November 1971

DATES WORTH NOTING

November 17	International	International Students Day promoted annually by the (Communist) International Union of Students. IUS, which is observing its 25th anniversary this year, chose this date after WW II to commemorate the death of a Czech medical student, Jan Opletal, killed November 1939 during mass student demonstrations against Nazi occupation of Czechoslovakia. For the Prague-based IUS, the history of this date is embarrassingly parallel to the mass student demonstrations in 1968 against the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia and the death of another Czech student, Jan Palach, who set himself afire in downtown Prague to protest the Soviet occupation.
November 21-23	East Berlin	Conference on ABC Weapons (atomic, biological, chemical) sponsored by the (Communist) World Federation of Scientific Workers. The conference is expected to stress European security as part of the Soviet drive to promote a people-to-people approach to it, thereby creating a climate of opinion in Europe that would exert pressure for the convening of a governmental European security conference "without prior conditions."
November 26-27	Czechoslovakia	Confirmed dates for parliamentary elections. There

have been no parliamentary elections since 1964; the elections scheduled for 1968 were not held because of the Soviet invasion. The elections this year will be held under provisions of a new repressive law passed in July that insures the Communist Party control of the selection of candidates.

November 28	Uruguay	General elections. A leftist Frente Amplio (Broad Front), under strong Communist influence, is striving to duplicate the Allende victory in Chile.
November 28	Mexico City	5th World Congress of the World Psychiatric Association. Western correspondents in Moscow reported 18 September that according to Soviet dissidents the unofficial Soviet Human Rights Committee (led by Sakharov and others) has appealed to the World Psychiatric Association to help establish international guarantees for the rights of the mentally ill. Previously, Soviet dissidents have complained about the KGB's use of Soviet mental hospitals for the imprisonment and torture of political dissidents who are sane.
December 2	Florence	International Youth Meeting on European Security sponsored by the (Communist) World Federation of Democratic Youth. Although WFDY is currently promoting a campaign of militancy in Latin America under the slogan "Youth Accuses Imperialism,"

		WFDY is avoiding a militant posture in Europe to gain backing for the Soviet drive for a governmental European security conference.
December 5	USSR	Constitution Day and 35th anniversary of the present Soviet Constitution, adopted under Stalin in 1936. For several years dissidents have held a brief public vigil in Moscow on this day, which the police break up. The government's failure to observe the Constitution is a major theme in Soviet dissidence.
December 6	Poland	The Polish Party Congress is to meet (see article, "Whither Poland," in this issue).
December 10	Worldwide USSR	Human Rights Day, commemorating the adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights by the UN General Assembly in 1948. In 1970 the unofficial Soviet Human Rights Committee was formed by Sakharov and other Soviets who said their independent organization would be guided by the principles of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
December 14	Poland	1st anniversary of the December Workers Riots (see article, "Whither Poland," in this issue).
December 19	Indochina	25th anniversary of the beginning of the French Indochina War.
December 21	USSR	Anniversary of Stalin's birth, 1879. The way the

Brezhnev regime handles this day will be watched for signs of renewed Stalinization in the USSR.

December 26

China

Mao Tse-tung's 78th birthday.

December 31

New York

Expiration of U Thant's term as UN Secretary General. U Thant has announced he is retiring.

FOR BACKGROUND USE ONLY

November 1971

SHORT SUBJECTS

Malaysia's Scarlet Pimpernel. The legendary Chin Peng, long-time leader of Malaysia's ghostly Communist Terrorist Organization, is once again leading his 1,500-man guerrilla force into Malaysia. Not long ago Malaysian Government security officials intercepted a Malayan Communist Party directive ordering Chin's guerrillas to move out of their Thai-Malaysian border sanctuaries and to reestablish their old bases and supply networks on Malaysian soil. A few weeks ago Malaysian Government troops discovered a Communist guerrilla training camp a few miles outside Ipoh, capital of tin-rich Perak State and one of Malaysia's major towns.

The potential danger of a new outbreak of carefully planned militant Communism in Malaysia (attested to by foreign military attaches in Kuala Lumpur and neighboring Singapore) has revived all the old stories about Chin, widely known in Western circles as Asia's Scarlet Pimpernel. Chin, who has survived nearly three decades of hit-and-run existence dating back to the Japanese invasion of Malaya in World War II, began his career by supplanting his Communist commanding officer after finding the man with his hand in the Party till. An instant hero to his guerrilla followers, Chin carried out military action against the invading Japanese with such elan that the British awarded him the Order of the British Empire. By 1948 his love affair with the British had cooled as his guerrilla forces began their 12-year harassment of Commonwealth forces in Malaysia. The mini-war ended with the British driving the CTO to the Thai-Malaysia border, declaring themselves the victors and smartly departing the country. Since the departure of the Commonwealth forces, the CTO has harassed the Malaysian Government with major logistical support being furnished by the Chinese Communists. It is possible, in fact, that the present CTO forays, which are the deepest penetrations of Malaysian soil in many years, were ordered by the Chinese. A number of recent reports have placed Chin, in fact, temporarily in Peking. Happily for his Chinese benefactors he speaks fluent Chinese.

The interest in Chin's flamboyant history, of which the preceding is only a part, plus the concern being expressed by foreign observers, has caused some observers to ponder about Peking's support for militant Communist forces in the less-developed nations. Peking recently initiated contacts with Kuala Lumpur which culminated in the exchange of trade missions. Peking also recently initiated contacts with Rangoon which culminated in the August visit of Burmese Premier Ne Win to Peking shortly after Burma's Kachin guerrillas agreed to accept Chinese aid for their insurgency

against the Ne Win government. In the midst of all this action on the government-to-government front, Peking has obviously remained as active as ever in offering secret tactical and logistical support for militant Communist forces in Malaysia and Burma and, implicitly, in a number of other nations as well.

* * * * *

The Smrkovsky Incident. Josef Smrkovsky, Chairman of the Czechoslovak parliament during the Prague Spring of 1968 and a key figure in the Dubcek regime, now expelled from the Party and living in Prague as a private citizen, gave an interview to the Italian weekly Giorni Vie Nuove (appearing in the 22 September 1971 issue). The interview was a forthright condemnation of the fraudulent accounts of the events surrounding the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia and an exposure of current conditions. Especially poignant is his account of the fate of former Dubcek supporters and the article has caused a sensation in Western Europe. In the first place, Smrkovsky could speak as revealingly and authoritatively as almost anyone participating in the great Czechoslovak experiment. Second, his was an extremely courageous act since he obviously placed his personal safety in jeopardy at the hands of the current Czech regime. Finally, Giorni Vie Nuove was formerly an Italian Communist Party (PCI) organ and still is close to the Communist Party with its publisher a PCI Central Committee member.

The interview was published in various European newspapers. A shortened version appeared in the London Times.

The leading Czech Communist newspaper Rude Pravo attacked both Smrkovsky and the Italian magazine for the interview. At the same time the newspaper claimed the regime did not intend to make a "Smrkovsky case," and implied that he would not be prosecuted, though calling him a "traitor" and "renegade."

The PCI in its official organ, l'Unita, took due note of the Rude Pravo attack and indicated its concern about the possible consequences to Smrkovsky. There have been unconfirmed reports about Smrkovsky's disappearance in Prague. No doubt the Soviet-backed Husak regime would like to punish him, but it may be that current international publicity may be enough to prevent Smrkovsky's persecution.

CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
16 September 1971

Does Chin still guide guerrillas?

By Henry S. Hayward

Staff correspondent of
The Christian Science Monitor

Hong Kong Propaganda continues

He's as elusive as the fictitious Scarlet Impernel.

No one outside the jungles and mountains high mark Malaysia's border with Thailand knows for certain where Chin Peng is.

Indeed, none but his close followers (with the possible exception of top Peking officials) can be sure that this home-bred Communist revolutionary is still alive. If so, he links as a master of survival, too.

But wherever the elusive Chin is today and his mantle and even his name may have been taken by a successor, he and his men have Malaysia worried.

Best estimates are that his Communist Terrorist Organization (CTO) numbers about 1,000 hard-core fighters. In recent years, they have penetrated farther south to Malaysia from their border hideouts and for many years past.

Information scarce

"The situation is serious, very serious," said Malaysian Prime Minister Tun Abdul Razak recently.

Factual information about Chin Peng is most as hard to locate as his jungle headquarters. Twelve years ago one of his bodyguards surrendered; he confirmed that the legendary Chin was then alive and still in control of the CTO. Since then, silence.

But not quite total silence. A ranking Thai army marshal told a newsman two years ago he always receives a Chinese new year greeting from Chin.

Recent reports have placed the man in Communist China, which is not unlikely since he is of Chinese descent and speaks Chinese as well as English.

What makes this senior guerrilla leader Asia a man to reckon with is the fact that he has a very powerful ally on his side — the People's Republic of China.

Despite the recent exchange of trade missions between Kuala Lumpur and Peking, mainland China still supports the militant Communist forces in such states as Malaysia and Burma — even while supposedly seeking closer political or economic ties.

Peking permits, and doubtless operates, the continuous propaganda campaign against Malaysian leaders aired over the "Voice of Malayan Revolution" in radio broadcasts from southern China. It does the same against Burmese leaders in the "Voice of the People of Burma."

Moreover, the chief of staff of China's People's Liberation Army recently went out of his way to repeat the pledge that China will do its utmost to back "the revolutionary struggle" of the peoples of the world.

Statements like these keep the Chin Pengs of Asia and their followers going.

But actions such as Chinese backing for Communist insurgents make Kuala Lumpur and Rangoon long to say to Peking: You can't have it both ways—either turn off the guerrillas or stop pretending we can warm up relations at the same time.

Chin Peng's history meanwhile gives fascinating glimpses of a dedicated, determined Communist who appears to have survived nearly three decades of hit-and-run existence dating back to World War II days.

Decorated by British

He was awarded the Order of the British Empire for his anti-Japanese efforts. But by 1948, he was struck off the honors list for his efforts against Britain during the Malayan "emergency."

Chin was born above a bicycle shop on the island of Penang about 48 years ago, the second son of a Chinese bicycle dealer. He studied at a Methodist missionary school in Perak and proved a smart pupil. He left school at 15 and three years later joined the Malaya Communist Party (MCP).

During the Japanese occupation of Malaya, the MCP formed the Malayan People's anti-Japanese Army, led by Lai Tek. Chin was one of his wartime lieutenants. In 1947, Chin replaced Lai after the former leader absconded with the party funds.

Although only 25, Chin already was an experienced revolutionary when he took charge of the ghostly guerrilla force. Ever since, British and Malaysians have been looking for a legend named Chin Peng.

No-surrender pledge

Once he agreed to talk with the man who was to become Malaysia's long-time Prime Minister, Tunku Abdul Rahman, who had made an amnesty offer to the Communists. The meeting of the cultured Tunku and the jungle guerrilla leader took place in Baling in North Malaya in December, 1955.

The two could not agree, and Chin Peng stalked back into the jungle after declaring the Malayan Communist Party would never surrender.

Nor did it. For the past 11 years since the "emergency" ended, the terrorists have kept alive their cause with sporadic forays from their strongholds. They led a will-o'-the-wisp existence, often chased by government units, usually avoiding frontal combat, but occasionally ambushing a small detachment or bombing a bridge or railway line.

This June one of their camps was found at Chemor in the jungles of Perak 70 miles south of their normal operating area. The Sultan of Perak warned that the Communists were planning a "major comeback" next year.

Assurance sought

Tun Abdul Razak, Prime Minister and Tunku's successor, is anxious to move ahead with Malaysia's ambitious development plans. He has asked the great powers, especially China, to guarantee the neutrality of southeast Asia—to ensure that development can continue. Peking has not responded.

Asia's real-life Red Pimpernel, having survived the Japanese and the British, is always a potential threat to Malaysian peace, even though "Peng" can be translated as level or peaceful.

THE WASHINGTON POST
7 October 1971

Guerrillas on Rise in Malaysia

By Anthony Polsky
Intrasia News Service

KUALA LUMPUR, Malaysia—The erratic guerrilla warfare along Malaysia's jungled and mountainous border with Thailand is expected to reach a serious new stage next year, according to documents reportedly captured by government security forces.

Compared with guerrilla wars elsewhere in Southeast Asia, the Thai-Malaysia frontier troubles have so far been little more than a series of skirmishes with occasional casualties.

The guerrilla bands are known as CTs—for Communist terrorists—but they are not all members of the outlawed Malayan Communist Party. They include bandits, Thai Moslem separatists disaffected from Bangkok's Buddhist government, and members of the Communist Party of Thailand, whose objectives differ from those of their Malaysian colleagues.

The Malaysian army, which controls operational areas of the border, is disinclined to extend facilities to foreign observers, particularly newsmen. But diplomats and foreign military attaches both here and in neighboring Singapore say insurgency in Malaysia is reaching new dimensions. Prime Minister Tun Abdul Razak has commented on the resurgence.

One of the most dramatic recent developments was the discovery of a Communist guerrilla training camp just a few miles outside Ipoh, capital of tin-rich Perak State. Ipoh is one of Malaysia's major towns and

such a camp could not have existed without clandestine support from some of the townspeople.

Until quite recently, the guerrillas stayed in relatively remote base areas on both sides of the border. They were regarded as a nuisance, not as a serious threat.

Popular Support

They had been driven to the border at the end of the Malayan Emergency in 1960 after a 12-year campaign spearheaded by British Commonwealth forces. Malaysia had gained independence in 1957.

Malayan Communist Party leader Chin Peng, whose World War II anti-Japanese exploits earned him a British award which was later rescinded, took the remnants of his bands across the border into Thailand. From there, they occasionally crossed to harass Malaysian patrols.

Government security forces set about dismantling the Communist Party infrastructure in Malaysia's cities and towns, but they never really succeeded. "The British did not completely defeat the guerrillas in the field," said one senior political observer, a long-time resident of this country. "But they played their trump political card. Once Malaysia achieved merdeka (independence, or freedom) popular support for the guerrillas dropped sharply."

Today there is concern but little hard evidence that this urban infrastructure is being revived to support the Communists. The training camp uncovered near Ipoh,

almost certainly derived its trainees and logistic support from the town. And in a candid interview the Sultan of Perak—a member of the State Operations Council which deals, among other things, with insurgency problems—said the Communists were planning a "major comeback" next year.

The number of guerrillas is anybody's guess, but 1,200-1,500 hardcore fighters on both sides of the frontier is considered a reasonable estimate by independent intelligence sources. A year ago, Britain's crack Special Air Services troops were on more or less continuous "training missions" along the central sector of the border. At that time, the guerrillas seemed to be organized into three regiments—one in the Changloong triangle along the border's western sector, around Kedah and Perlis states; a second in the mountainous central sector around the Betong salient in upper Perak, and the third in the eastern sector, the Weng district, around Kelantan state.

Small SAS units maintained contact with the aborigines who live in Malaysia's mountains. The aborigines, some of whom are in a special police force, are a prime source of intelligence because they know the almost-invisible jungle trails used by the Communist guerrillas.

But sometime during the past year, the Malaysian government requested that the British send SAS "training" in the frontier region. This was done despite evi-

dence that Malaysian security forces—especially army units—have been unable to establish the same rapport with the aborigines.

Politically, economically and racially, Malaysia now is going through a delicate period. The nation has largely surmounted the immediate crisis caused by Malay-Chinese riots in Kuala Lumpur in May, 1969, when more than 200 persons were killed.

Tun Razak, who took over the premiership from Tunku Abdul Rahman in September, 1970, has launched an economic development program of crucial importance to the country's future.

His government has determined that a major cause of the 1969 riots was the economic imbalance between Chinese and Malays. (Malays comprise about half of the country's 10 million population. The other half is made up of Chinese and Indians and the tribal peoples of Borneo. Basically, the Malays control the government while the Chinese hold the economic power.)

While Tun Razak's government is trying to end the disparities, the Chinese in particular are bound to feel they are being inequitably treated because of Malay development policies. Racial antagonisms have become somewhat hardened racial attitudes. And if each of the country's two major races is unwilling to be conciliatory toward the other, Malaysia is in serious trouble.

The Communists, whatever their actual numbers, obviously hope to capitalize on such problems.

LONDON TIMES
17 September 1971

Watching over the sick patient of Prague

Joseph Smrkovsky was chairman of parliament and one of the most popular leading figures under Dubcek in the Czechoslovak leadership in 1968. After the Russian invasion, he was progressively demoted and expelled from the Communist Party in 1970. This is a shortened version of an interview given exclusively to the Italian weekly paper *Vie Nuove*, edited by Davide Lajolo, a communist deputy and member of the Central Committee of the Italian Communist Party.

Q: How do you yourself live?

A: There are few reasons for contentment, none for joy. For two years now I have been almost daily the target of attacks in the press, on the radio and television and at party meetings. My political as well as my personal honour is being assailed. If truthful facts were being used, I could admit that this is criticism, although one-sided. But it is not truthful information that they work with, and there is no way of defending oneself against slander and smear.

Q: What happened to your former collaborators and to people who held the same political views as you did?

A: My collaborators: they were all communists. They were erudite people, specialists, political scientists, economists, historians, party officials, trade unionists, etc. None of them holds a job today in which he can use his specialized knowledge. They all work as unskilled workers, mostly on digging jobs in the country. And they are supposed to be happy to have got a job at all. One of them, father of a family with two children, has been in six months to 34 different factories, enterprises and institutions which advertised vacancies, but in each case—after a decision taken by the local party organization—he was rejected. Professors work as stokers or as warehouse attendants, former ambassadors work as porters, a doctor is now a delivery-man, a journalist works as a driver.

This has been the lot of the intellectuals and the former party and state officials who in

1968 supported the then policy of the communist party and refused to accept the occupation of Czechoslovakia by the Warsaw Pact armies. If you do not endorse the occupation of your country by foreign troops you will lose your livelihood.

Q: Your attitude to August, 1968, is well known and we do not have to deal with it. But in recent months Czechoslovak communications media have been claiming that the Warsaw Pact troops were invited to the country by a number of Czechoslovak party and state leaders. Would you comment on this?

A: The third anniversary has just passed of the moment when we, the presidium of the communist party central committee, were informed at 11.30 pm that those troops had crossed the borders of our country and would have it occupied by 6 am. Up to this day no one has said, no one has made public in the press who those people were who issued that "invitation".

There has been some talk of the members of the National Assembly of which I was the chairman at that time. Shortly after August 21 1968 the presidium of the National Assembly asked all members of the parliament, all deputies and members of the government to submit sworn statements in writing saying whether anyone of them had invited the troops in. All 296 deputies (that is how many there were in the parliament at that time) submitted to the presidium their written statements that they had not invited anybody, any troops to Czechoslovakia.

Since when does a state or a group of states send its troops to another country at the request of "many" or "a number of" people, without the knowledge of the government, the parliament and other relevant organs of the country concerned? All that argument about an "invitation" is just naive talk.

That there were people in this country who wished it, that is another matter. And they would have signed. There have been such people. But at their "invitation" troops do not come. In spite of that this justification of the military action in Czechoslovakia is now to become—after various other versions—the official version. And there are efforts to find an appropriate ideological justification. But why, then, are both communists and non-communists in Czechoslovakia being compelled to declare, one just like another, that they agree with the military occupation of the country and that this was correct? They want to involve the whole nation in the blame—though after the event—so that in the future they will again be able to say that "we all made mistakes, we all are guilty"—just as they tried to do after the dark years of the 1950s.

Q: The present leadership of the communist party has referred to you many times as a right-wing opportunist and a renegade. How would you yourself characterize your present political standpoint?

A: Right-wing opportunist, renegade: I used to hear those words as long as forty years ago. At that time we, young people, were scared by them. Today I see them as clichés, as abuses, as the junk of dogmatists who—in one case—substitute abuse for the lack of arguments and knowledge, while others—that is the second case—try to cover up with these clichés aims quite different from those which they talk about.

What is my political standpoint today? The same as in 1968. But more reasoned and clearer today than at that time. The main proposition, the principle, on which the party policy is based, is that in our country we have the dictatorship of the working class, on whose behalf power is exercised by the party. In practice this principle is further reduced to the point where the dictatorship is exercised on behalf of the party by the salaried party apparatus. The presidium and the secretariat of the central committee, the secretaries. The party as such, the party membership and the elected bodies—except for the presidium—are in fact the executive organs of the apparatus.

Even if we admit that this concept of the dictatorship of the working class, where it is exercised on behalf of the working class by the party, was justified shortly after the defeat of capitalism and the assuming of power, still it cannot remain as a permanent mode of existence for an advanced socialist state. In the quarter of a century of a socialist Czechoslovakia our people have become a socialist people, supporting this system such as it is, in their overwhelming, decisive majority. The six

of seven per cent of Czechoslovak citizens who were in principle against socialism, they are just opponents without any power, without any chances as well, and they are not even actively trying to change this system.

The administration of all affairs of the country as well as of the lives of the citizens, is exercised by the party and state apparatus. Whether this concerns 100 per cent of all affairs or "only" 95 per cent of them, that does not make any difference. Where is the participation of the people—including the working class itself—in the decision-making concerning its affairs? In the outlining of policy; in its execution and control? How can the working people, the intelligentsia, the economists, the scientists, show their initiative when "standards" for their activity are being set up by a bureaucratic apparatus which lacks any expert knowledge?

And is this supposed to be the result of the struggle of generations of working people for their liberation and that of all mankind? Who then has betrayed the programme and the aims of the revolution? Who is a renegade and an opportunist in relation to the historic struggle of the working people for a new, humane system for the socialist system? It is not we, who in 1968 strove to correct deformations and arbitrary methods, and who worked for a socialist democracy, for a humane socialist order, for the opening of doors so that progress and science could penetrate all areas of our national life. Neither is it our people who in 1968 spontaneously adopted the communists' new policy and identified with it.

Renegades and opportunists are to be looked for elsewhere. Not among us!

Q: Where do you see the main difference between your standpoint and the views of the present Czechoslovak party and state leadership?

A: August 1968: the claim that here was a threat of, or actual, counter-revolution in our country is a propaganda invention. There was no force in this country which could have removed the communist party from power and overthrown the social system. At any time about 90 per cent of the citizens spontaneously supported the then policy of the Czechoslovak communist

party. **Approved for Release: 2021/12/15 C02062642** Journalists or other writers or articles in the press, and of speakers, did not find any serious response and neither did they influence mass opinion, although they stirred up a lot of noise. The main and decisive reason for the military intervention was that early in September, 1968, a party congress was to be held, which would have approved the then policy of the party and which would have excluded from decision-making the representatives of the past, pre-January policy. And this had to be prevented at all costs, even by military means when other means were not available.

How can I come to terms with this or even endorse it when the sovereignty of the people and the nation to which I belong is trampled and violated, the sovereignty of a socialist people and nation at that, when all standards of relations between parties and states are brushed away, when the declaration of the international workers and communist movement on the rights of nations is turned into a piece of crumpled paper?

Sovereignty: how many different ways have been tried to confuse people about sovereignty. The citizen, "the man in the street", as he is sometimes called, possesses a normal brain and therefore he knows that the Czech and Slovak lands have belonged for the last 1,500 years to the Czechs and the Slovaks and that in this country Czech and Slovaks should rule over their affairs, over the affairs of their country and its people, and at the same time to stand up properly to commitments given to allies and friends. What is, however, a "limited sovereignty", a "class sovereignty", a sovereignty subordinated to internationalism and similar bunkum, according to which a nation is supposed to leave to somebody else its inalienable right to determine its own destiny and the destiny of its country, even though that somebody be the dearest ally? If someone "cedes" this right, the sovereignty of the state and the people, to other officials or states, he is giving away something that does not belong to him. Neither the party leadership, nor the entire party membership, nor the government, not even an entire living generation of the nation can surrender the sovereignty of the nation.

of political trials have taken place in Czechoslovakia. Does this really mean a return to the situation existing in the 1950s?

A: I don't think so. Despite the fact that there have been some trials and people are being held in jail, even without trial.

However, in 1971 it is not possible, I think, to arrest tens of thousands of people and throw them in jail. It is not possible to concoct charges against thousands of people and then to force them to sign such inventions and recite them in "court". It is probably impossible to execute dozens of innocent people. I think it is no longer possible. The power of world public opinion and the weight which official state declarations carry are today different from what they were 20 years ago. The power, experience and knowledge of the world communist movement are different, too.

But is only that horrible which happened 20 years ago? Are not other things and other methods horrible as well? If in our case over half a million party members have either been expelled or have left the party because they did not agree with its policy and if they are then deprived of their livelihood, if they are denied any chance to work in that field which is their occupation—is not that horrible?

Q: How would you briefly characterize the results of the line taken by the Husák leadership from April 1969 up to the present?

A: For two years all the efforts of the party leadership and of the subordinated institutions have concentrated on liquidating the views, resolution and results of the policy introduced in 1968. The past two years have been two years of negation. Everything has been denounced as bad and revisionist and fit to be extirpated, including people. And the occupation of the country by the troops of the Warsaw Pact had to be accepted everywhere as a gift from heaven.

These efforts, which developed into blind fanaticism and cynicism, have consumed all the energy of the present party and its leadership and have brought about an isolation of the party from the people. They have deadened the people's initiative, have laid waste the soul

of the nation, have thrown it into lethargy. Does life go on, are industry, transport and agriculture working? Of course they are. They always work under any régime, because people depend on them for their livelihood. But how they work is another matter. People do not consider the present policy to be their own, so they behave accordingly. Scarcely more than 10 per cent of the population supports the present policy. The future will show whether it was or is otherwise. I do not think it is.

Our people decided for socialism in our country out of their own free will and they see it as their cause.

In 1968 they adopted the programme of the communist party, the programme of democratic socialism, so spontaneously and in such an overwhelming majority, that the communist party had never before had such a natural authority and power, and our people have kept this attitude to the programme of 1968. They live in the conviction that the present times will pass, that the attitude of allies to the policy of our party in 1968 will be revised, that the attitude to August 21 will be revised, and that this will provide for the normalization of relations between Czechoslovakia and the other countries of the Warsaw Pact, in the first place relations with the Soviet Union, which are not normal.

The Czechoslovak people and the Czechoslovak Republic are not such an insignificant factor on the map of Europe that they need not be taken into consideration. The allies and neighbouring states cannot and should not remain permanently indifferent to the fact that this people and this country have been driven by force and are still being pushed further into opposition and into a longing for freedom. The "calm" in this country is an active calm. Our people is like a doctor, watching over a sick patient, ready to intervene and act immediately should it come to a crisis. That is a situation which nobody has to organize. That is how it is!

NEW YORK TIMES
18 September 1971

Prague Liberal Says in Interview Barely 10%

Back New Regime

By PAUL HOFMANN

Special to The New York Times

ROME, Sept. 17 — Josef Smrkovsky, one of the leaders of the short-lived "Prague spring" of liberalization in 1968, said in an interview published by an Italian Communist magazine yesterday that barely 10 per cent of the Czechoslovak people supported the present pro-Soviet regime.

Now ill and under police surveillance in Czechoslovakia, Mr. Smrkovsky, who is 60 years old, declared that he considered his country's continued occupation by Soviet-bloc troops one of the basic problems of the international Communist movement.

"Our people will never recognize the accomplished fact, will never resign themselves to it," Mr. Smrkovsky warned, "even if they were forced to raise arms every day to vote for the sending of resolutions and letters of thanks for that 'fraternal help.'"

Mr. Smrkovsky said that anyone who approached him faced "persecution," that his former aides were under "insupportable pressure," and that some Czechoslovaks were being held in jail without trial.

Mr. Smrkovsky's statements appeared in an interview in *Giorni-Vie Nuove* of Milan, a magazine close to the Italian Communist party, the strongest in the west, although ostensibly independent of it.

Authentic, an Editor Says

In a telephone interview, the assistant editor of *Giorni-Vie Nuove*, Clemente Azzini, said the staff was convinced that the interview was authentic, and that a message received from Mr. Smrkovsky was unmistakably in his handwriting. The magazine's editor, Davide Lajolo, is a Communist deputy in parliament and a for-

mer editor of *L'Unita*, the official party organ.

The cover of *Giorni-Vie Nuove* carried a photograph of Mr. Smrkovsky in a windbreaker and holding an ax. He looked old but vigorous. An autograph in Czech read: "Greetings to Friends—J. J. Smrkovsky—1971."

The magazine did not identify the interviewer. Mr. Azzini said the reason was "to spare him trouble." He hinted that the interviewer was not Italian.

Mr. Lajolo said in a commentary printed with the interview that *Giorni-Vie Nuove* would be glad to print interviews with the present Czechoslovak leaders.

In the interview, Mr. Smrkovsky said he had "few reasons to be satisfied," because he had for the last two years been the target of, "one may say, only" attacks by Czechoslovak

papers, broadcasts and Communist organs.

Mr. Smrkovsky said he had learned from an article in the Czechoslovak Communist party newspaper, *Rude Pravo*, last year that he had been expelled from the party, but had never been notified, orally or in writing, which party organ had made this decision.

Mr. Smrkovsky, chief of the Communist-led anti-Nazi resistance movement in Prague during World War II, was president of the National Assembly during the liberalization drive early in 1968. He was one of the main lieutenants of Alexander Dubcek, then first secretary of the party.

Mr. Smrkovsky said in the interview that his former collaborators, all of them Communists and many highly educated, were in grave difficulties today.

"All of them work today as unskilled laborers, mostly in building projects outside Prague," Mr. Smrkovsky said, "and they must be glad to have found work. One of them, a father of two children, applied during six months at no fewer than 34 plants, enterprises and agencies that had job openings, but was always rejected by decision of the local party organizations."

"Former professors work as stokers or storeroom attendants, former ambassadors work as janitors, former physicians are porters, former newsmen are drivers," he said.

Many of these, Mr. Smrkovsky charged, are living in misery, "multiplied by the insupportable pressure on the consciences of these comrades to force them to say that black is no longer black but white and vice versa."

Referring to the contention by the present leaders that the Soviet-bloc forces invaded

Czechoslovakia on Aug. 21, 1968, following requests from Prague, Mr. Smrkovsky remarked:

"Up to this day nobody has told us, or printed in the newspapers, who attended this famous 'invitation.'"

In 1968, Mr. Smrkovsky declared, he and like-minded communists fought "for socialist democracy, for humanity in a socialist order."


He said the main reason for the Soviet-bloc invasion was Moscow's determination to prevent endorsement of this policy

by the Czechoslovak party congress that was to have met in September.

Mr. Smrkovsky described the present leaders in Prague as a clique of cynical party bureaucrats, but said he was confident that his country would not regress into the Stalinist terrorism of the early nineties, "even though various trials have been held and though there are also persons in prison without trial."

This confidence was based, he said, on his belief that world public opinion today has a

greater weight than 20 years ago.



Camera Press-Pix

Josef Smrkovsky

CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
23 September 1971

Italians help former Czech leader assail Soviets

By Eric Bourne
Special correspondent of
The Christian Science Monitor

Vienna

One of Alexander Dubcek's most popular aides during the 1968 "Prague spring" has revived Communist acrimony over the Soviet invasion.

Josef Smrkovsky, humiliated, isolated, ridiculed at home, has broken his silence with the cooperation and evident approval of the largest and most powerful Communist party outside the Soviet Union—the Italian.

The event could have serious implications for international communism, which already is fraught with ideological squabbling.

Mr. Smrkovsky's criticisms came in the form of a lengthy question-and-answer interview published in Italy by *Vie Nuovi Giorni*, a large circulation picture weekly close to the Italian Communist Party.

As one of the most progressive members of the party Presidium and chairman of the National Assembly, Mr. Smrkovsky was closely associated with the democratizing reforms written into the action program, since suppressed in the "normalization" (the Soviet term for invasion) process.

Forceful challenge

His comments pose a forceful challenge to regime arguments on all counts covering the circumstances of the invasion and everything that has happened under the cloak of "normalization" in Czechoslovakia since.

To that extent an official reaction, and possibly some further sanctions against him, might appear inevitable.

In the interview, Mr. Smrkovsky ridiculed the contentions that the Soviets decided to intervene after an "invitation" from "responsible" Communists in Prague disturbed by events under Mr. Dubcek and the "threat" of "counterrevolution."

"To this day," he said, "nobody has told us, or printed in the newspapers, who gave this famous 'invitation.'"

Still more pertinently, he described the occupation by Soviet forces and their continued presence as a problem on the "road to socialism" not only for Czechoslovakia but for all parties and the whole Communist movement.

"Our people," said Mr. Smrkovsky, "will never recognize the accomplished fact, will never resign themselves to it, even if forced every day to raise their hands for resolutions and letters of thanks for that fraternal aid."

Prepared indictment

This was no "off the cuff" outburst by an embittered man. It was clearly a carefully prepared "indictment" made with the full approval of the powerful Italian Communist Party with which the Kremlin's relations have been gravely strained through the three years since the events of 1968.

The protest was one of the most stoutly argued from the "liberal" side and must be deemed the one most likely to command popular sympathy and respect in Czech minds because it was made not by an émigré

living outside, but by a man still living in the country, sharing its disappointments with that great majority which supported the reform movement.

But whatever official Prague's anger—and angered, indeed, one may assume it is—it is unlikely to act without the fullest consultation with the Soviet Party.

It is not hard to see that any hasty, punitive action would only sharpen differences between the Soviet party and the Italian.

Rekindling held possible

It could also rekindle all the old criticisms widespread in the international movement over the Soviet action against Czechoslovakia. Moreover, it could disturb public opinion elsewhere at a time when the Soviet leaders are concerned to gain goodwill and support for major policy initiatives on the general international scene.

The Soviets do not normally pay much heed to other parties, where major questions are concerned. But they might be reluctant just now to further aggravate their relations with the Italians.

The Italian party is unique. It is not only the largest outside the 14 parties in power. It also commands a big popular vote and could conceivably come out on top, in a country where Moscow knows large areas of opinion are lukewarm on NATO and shapes its propaganda accordingly.

In 1968, *Vie Nuovi Giorni* (which was "Vie Nuovi" and was then owned by the party) created a stir in the Communist world by printing one of the most graphic and forthright condemnations of the invasion.

Party leaders approved

Subsequently it was taken over by a group connected with export-import business with the Soviets. Editorially, it continued along the Italian party line and its present editor, Davide Lajolo—a former editor of *Unita*, the party's official daily—is a Communist member of Parliament and a member of the party's Central Committee.

Obviously, therefore, the decision to afford Mr. Smrkovsky a platform to uphold views which he is not at liberty to present in his own country was undertaken with

the full knowledge of the Italian party leadership.

The implication is that the latter regards the subject of the interview as one covering issues which need still to be considered—as Mr. Smrkovsky himself suggested—within the Communist movement and not just by parties directly concerned.

So far Mr. Smrkovsky's comments have drawn no public reaction from the ruling regime in Prague. But a few weeks ago, he was publicly derided by the present party leader, Dr. Gustav Husak, because of a picture published by a German news magazine showing him, a pensioner, sitting silent and alone on a park bench.

The Italian and other Western Communist parties — and many Communists in Eastern Europe, too — will be watching Prague's attitudes now that he has broken his silence.

L'UNITA, Rome
26 September 1971

UNITA REPORTS ON SMRKOVSKY ATTACK

An article in *Rude Pravo*, organ of the Czechoslovak Communist Party, signed by Vlacav Dolezala, bitterly attacks Josef Smrkovsky, who was President of the Czechoslovak Parliament and who today lives in retirement in Prague, because of an interview given to the weekly *Giorni-Vie Nuove*, an interview that is described as slanderous.

The article attacks Smrkovsky claiming that in the past he had two-faced contradictory positions, that he was treated with magnanimity, and that today he supposedly is abusing it.

The article says that there is no desire to open any Smrkovsky affair; for us it has been definitively closed.

The article itself, however, asserts further on that, with this interview, Smrkovsky has placed himself on the side of the renegades and traitors and that he sold himself to the enemy against which he himself in the past more than once found himself face to face.

[L'Unita Footnote]:

We know how bitter can be the polemic within our own movement even if this is not the style we choose and if, moreover, we think that polemic should concern the subject matter of the positions enunciated from time to time.

Moreover, we cannot but view with concern the appellations of 'renegades' and 'traitor' and 'bribed' used by *Rude Pravo's* journalist over an interview given to an Italian leftist weekly.