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*Sources*



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April 27, 1976

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
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
April 27, 1976

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## CONTENTS



ARGENTINA: Military  
criticizes Videla . . . . . 18



NR

**Page Denied**

**Page Denied**

**Page Denied**

**Page Denied**

**Page Denied**



**Page Denied**

**Page Denied**

**Page Denied**

**Page Denied**

**Page Denied**

**Page Denied**

**Page Denied**

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**Page Denied**

**Page Denied**

**National Intelligence Bulletin**

April 27, 1976

**ARGENTINA**

Officers of all three military services are already said to be complaining about what they view as President Videla's overly conciliatory, indecisive policies. The dissidents are urging tougher measures against subversives and the Peronist labor movement.

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[redacted] Videla's military critics believe he has allowed only halfway measures against the guerrillas, whose attacks have mounted in recent weeks. The officers want to use any and all means to deal with not only the guerrillas, but also with individuals accused of other types of crimes. This view, [redacted] is said to be gaining favor in the other services as well.

[redacted] Videla's moderate policies could eventually weaken his authority. [redacted] there is considerable criticism of the President's tolerant attitude toward the ousted Peronists. A number of officers, including [redacted] the Army III Corps, are of the opinion that Videla should finish off the Peronist movement by jailing all its prominent leaders and dismantle the Peronist labor movement.

Videla's fellow junta member, navy chief Admiral Massera, reportedly shares the conviction that the government has thus far acted indecisively. He points to failures to move against certain labor unions and slowness in replacing many of the ambassadors removed after the coup. Massera complains that army chief of staff General Viola, a confidant of Videla's, frequently impedes actions that Massera and air force chief General Agosti urge on the President.

Videla, as President, is acting in the same deliberate fashion that characterized his preparations for the coup itself. Faced with a subversive movement that has flourished since the late 1960s, he is loath to commit his administration to the unrealistic goal of a rapid solution to the problem. Moreover, he fears that alienating the Peronists will drive at least some of them into the arms of the terrorists.

Videla, by means of an innovative, wide-ranging economic plan, clearly seeks to achieve early success in this crucial area. He hopes to gain momentum for his administration and to undercut those who would have the government become obsessed with questions of security. For the time being, Videla's critics seem prepared to go along with him, albeit grudgingly. [redacted]

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