

DIVISION OF  
CENTRAL SERVICES  
TELEGRAM SECTION

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
INCOMING TELEGRAM

DST-13147A-1  
INFORMATION  
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ACR/DEL: 10073  
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municating to anyone.  
TOP SECRET

5178  
Frankfurt via War  
Dated February 14, 1946  
Rec'd 6:10 p.m., 14th

Secretary of State

Washington

40, February 14, 1946

TOP SECRET FOR BRADSH

*check*  
~~transcript~~ transcript of Schollenberg interrogation by  
Coglian and Balucke left by reference USPOLAD tele-  
gram Frankfurt 36 of February 11, 1946. Transcript was  
divided into morning and afternoon sessions, but only  
afternoon session was received from Schollenberg properly  
signed and with extra copies. Morning transcript was  
received in only one copy, rough draft and proper copies  
have been requested, but as Schollenberg is sending copies  
made by USPOLAD stenographers.

*selection*  
From our info there follow items from transcript  
which may be of interest in ~~subsequent~~ actual affidavit  
of Schollenberg, already transmitted:

Q. Asked how he had interpreted Argentine Govern-  
mental policy, prisoner said:

"I believe the reason why the Argentine Government  
always endeavored to keep friendly relations with Germany  
was what they saw in the German power in Europe a certain  
security for its (the) own type of government. In addition  
to that, there were historical reasons \* \* \* for example,  
armaments \* \* \* highly specialized instruments \* \* \*  
primarily it was an attempt to strengthen the position  
of Argentina and play a leading part in South American  
politics, also opposed American influence. The  
conditions existing in Argentina were very important because

I could.

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February 14, 1945. From Frankfurt via War

I could count on finding a base there for my secret Foreign Political Intelligence Service in South America, and from there to North America.

Two. Schellenberg admitted SD allowed <sup>Belmont</sup> ~~Hellmuth~~ to use its radio facilities; also said he recalled Ramirez promise of economic aid (railroad, etc) to Bolivian revolutionaries. He was then asked if it did not follow that the revolution in Bolivia was effected through both Argentine and German aid. He replied:

"I would like to put it this way; that the stronger influence was exerted by Argentina and it probably would have come about without our doing anything, but we, however, did give them moral support through the case Belmonte."

Three. Schellenberg answered in the affirmative a question as to whether the Argentine Government approached the SD in the Hellmuth affair in order to get an arms agreement from Germany. Questioned as to ~~purpose~~ <sup>purpose</sup> Hellmuth Mission, Schellenberg opined that Argentina felt that if they wanted to achieve something within Germany they would have to contact strongest German political party, i.e. NSDAP. Also, that Argentina played double game and used both SD and FOROFT channels.

Four. Schellenberg did not recall Prince Schaumburg Lippe's part in Hellmuth affair. Neither did he recall any personal contact between SD and Ribbentrop regarding latter's complaint about SD interference; correspondence on subject was conducted through channels.

Five. Interrogated regarding situation of SD after Farrell expelled Ramirez, prisoner was at first uncertain, said things were hard and Becker had to re-form his ranks. He admitted, however, that Becker's excellent connections with GOU made it possible, though not easy, soon to re-establish his contacts. Asked if his impression had been that Farrell regime had been relatively pro-German, prisoner first said no. Pressed on this point he said: not at first, later it improved became milder.

Six. Asked if he had had any information and did he know that Farrell wanted to send brother to Spain to negotiate with the German Government, prisoner replied:

"I do not

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-3- (44) February 14, 9 a.m. from Frankfurt via War

"I do not know whether it was his brother but we did receive reports about the intention to resume negotiations."

Seven. Regarding Escobar in 1944, most Schellenberg would say, even when pinned down, was that it was possible that Pacetty and Gross had instructed Becker to contact Escobar when latter returned from United States Ambassadorship. Even regarding Escobar's earlier return from Europe in January 1944, Schellenberg stated he did not believe Becker could have established contact because Becker was already on run. All prisoner would say about Amadeo was that he was known to ~~some~~ indirect source of information, through Goyenche. *do*

Eight. Schellenberg's knowledge regarding SD-Integralist connections was strictly limited to Salgado-Lisbon end. He was blank concerning Peron-Gonzalez meetings with Integralists in Buenos Aires.

Nine. Schellenberg knew only that Becker had good connections with Paraguay; remembered no names, not even Stagni. He was vague on Argentine Chilean connections, did not recall Peron's million dollar promise of aid to Chilean revolutionaries.

Ten. Questioned regarding his recollection of Argentine names, prisoner gave following answers: (A) Velasco's name certainly appeared in reports, Schellenberg thought Harnisch mentioned him; (B) Vedasmer drew blank; (C) Peluffo contact ~~was mentioned~~ Becker with him; (D) Sueyro prisoner believed he was close to Peron, and must have had contact with Harnisch; (E) Filippi drew blank; (F) Bernard and Fincati drew blank; (G) Gonzalez had contact with Becker, either direct or indirect, and was very cooperative; (H) Brinkmann drew blank; (I) regarding Aumann, Schellenberg believed he may have had contact with Harnisch.

Regarding Peron, prisoner said he believed SD contact was only indirect, but there was contact and Peron was not always cooperative, but his political concept was sympathetic to

that

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-4- #43, February 14, 9 a.m., from Frankfurt via Var.

that of Germany. Most Foron testimony was vaguer than that contained in affidavit, and not always favorable to our aims.

Please furnish copy of this info and that contained in telegrams on Ribbentrop and Reinebeck to Colonel McKee.

MURPHY

EDA

NOTE: Message badly garbled repeat requested.

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