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Senior Executive Intelligence Brief

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Friday, 28 May 2004

National Security Information

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
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Proposed UN Deployment in Sudan

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AFRICA

Sudan:

Moving Ahead on Peace Deal [REDACTED]

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The framework agreement signed on Wednesday is a major step toward ending the 21-year-long civil war, but Khartoum and the southern-based Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) rebels now must agree on key peacekeeping issues to make the deal stick. According to press reports, the framework covers power sharing, the role of sharia law in the capital, and the administration of three disputed regions. Accords already had been reached on sharing oil revenue, on forming a postwar military, and on a referendum on southern independence in six years.

— [REDACTED] the two sides probably will reconvene in mid-June to draft cease-fire arrangements—including parameters for a peacekeeping mission and possible deployment of international observers—and implementation steps for the framework agreement, which could take months, given lingering mistrust. [REDACTED]

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Giving a peacekeeping mission a mandate and agreeing on its composition will be major challenges. Concerned about Sudanese sovereignty and anxious to minimize oversight of its actions, Khartoum will try to secure the smallest possible mission and will insist it be limited to observing and reporting.

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Sudan's vast size—it is four times the size of Texas—and almost complete lack of infrastructure suggest any peacekeeping mission also will face significant logistic hurdles. Most roads are unpaved and largely impassible during the April-October rainy season, so monitors would have to rely on scarce and expensive air transportation.

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— A peacekeeping mission mandated only to observe and report would be unable to expand to Darfur if fighting there continues, and the violence might deter some potential peacekeeping contributors from participating in the south.

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28 May 2004