

DISPATCH		CLASSIFICATION	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO FJTA-26716
TO INFO	Chief, FE	HEADQUARTERS FILE NO.	Unknown
FROM	Chief of Station, () <i>JK</i>	DATE	DEC 5-1958
SUBJECT	Operational/Psych IDENTITY C	RE: "433" - (CHECK "X" ONE)	
		<input type="checkbox"/> MARKED FOR INDEXING	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ACTION REQUIRED	Consideration and action in accordance with Para 5.	INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ. DESK ONLY	

REFERENCE(S)
DIR-461140, 18 October 1958

1. Upon reading the 18 November New York Times and noting that an IDEN A has been urged by IDEN B, () Station would like to raise once more the possibility of a joint IDEN C.

2. () Station believes that there is a tremendous psychological potential in such a joint program. It combines the present Japanese red-hot enthusiasm for science and peaceful exploration (witness the South Pole expedition). It appeals to the quick Japanese pride and desire to keep up, and to prove they are not unequal. It calls on the Japanese electronic industry, which some observers believe may surpass the U.S. in some aspects, to prove itself. It can potentially be a subject on the mind of every Japanese from the announcement through the post launching fan-fare. We think it no exaggeration to say that the whole Japanese nation, and particularly the youth, will be at their radios at the historic moment of the count-down, and that such joint scientific endeavors as this can influence a whole generation by helping to augment and strengthen a favorable image of America.

3. Our specific suggestion is that we approach IDEN D with the proposal that he undertake the role of sparking the first phase of the problem, catalyzing the Japanese side and providing the initial public relations activity. We see the following advantages in this proposed course of action:

a. IDEN D has spent his life making grandstand plays--stopping rice riots, saving the life of a Prime Minister, the introduction of baseball (plus bringing Babe Ruth to Japan), the idea of the world's only indoor baseball stadium, the rise of IDEN E to a claimed top circulation in Japan, introduction of Atomic Energy and sponsoring of the Atoms for Peace Exhibit, etc. In spite of his age, he is the most logical man to catalyze the Japanese side, and we believe he will take to this suggestion rapidly and effectively, perhaps embracing it as a chance to crown his colorful career.

b. The problem of who would handle the technical aspects of such a project on the Japanese side is a difficult one indeed, and would be one that the Japanese themselves would have to solve during phase two of the project. There is presently no one official, semi-official, or private organization which might handle the Japanese initiative. Possibly the closest prototype of the organization required would be the Japanese IGY and the Antarctic Expedition. Possibly the Defense Agency might be considered as a co-sponsor, with the Technical Research Agency, which is a semi-official organ, as the focal point of the endeavor. The Japan Science Council with its known anti-rearmament bias will have to be considered on the technical side. Parenthetically we can expect opposition from the Anti-A-and-H-Bomb Council, and perhaps ZENGAKUREN and the Leftist Socialists; but we expect that this will only serve to make them more unpopular. These are organizational and political questions which we are not prepared to answer, and which we will discuss with the Embassy upon receipt of Headquarters reaction, if favorable. We have only preliminary thinking on the problem. We feel that for maximum psychological exploitation a joint U.S.-Japanese military program would lose considerable impact and give the Leftists the entering wedge they need. However, if the spark is provided by IDEN D, we can expect public relations activities on a scale and of a professionalism found nowhere else in the Japanese scene. In addition, we can imagine that he can marshal the necessary assets from Japanese military, academic and industrial groups all under the public relations and publicity banner needed in phase three, an "Atoms for Peace"-type publicity campaign.

c. The IDEN C project stands on its own feet and is justified on its own merits, but it is not all that we plan to harvest. Nor do we believe that we will be leading ourselves into a trap with IDEN D. Arguing that the joint endeavor proves

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- EXEMPTIONS Section 3(b)
- () Exempt
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what America and Japan can do together, and that any circulation lost would be made up in readership to follow developments on the IDEN C, we will ask for IDEN E support for the U.S. - Japanese alliance. On the other hand, while we do not feel that we can (or need to) drive a quid pro quo bargain with IDEN D and his organization on specifics, we fully intend to use the overall program to make our points: e.g., anti-American articles for IDEN E; and the attack on Pasternak (and its elimination); and similar specific points.

4. Our preliminary thinking on the budget is also quite tentative and in some ways speculative. The principle as we imagine it is that the Japanese are responsible for the IDEN C (with U.S. technical cooperation only), and the U.S. supplies the vehicle, as in the pattern of IDEN A. We have heard that the latter may be available from "surplus." We do not know if the finances on the Japanese side will come from the Government, industry, private collection, or a combination of all three; but we feel that there is little meaning in anything but a pure Japanese effort. We will lose psychological impact and perhaps run the risk of wounding Japanese pride if we supply parts or funds to have parts fabricated.

5. We request Headquarters' comments after consideration of this plan. If Headquarters is receptive and wishes to go ahead with further exploration, we suggest that we be given permission to approach the Embassy locally in order to begin concrete planning.

Enclosure:
Iden Sheet, in trip, USC

4 December 1958

Distribution:
3 - Addressee, w/encl a/s USC

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SEPARATE COVER ENCLOSURE TO

FJTA-26716

DATED: DEC 5-1958

IDENTITY A - NATO Satellite

B - Senator Henry M. Jackson of Washington

C - U.S.-Japanese Satellite for Peaceful
Exploration of Space

D - POJACKPOT/1

E - Yomiuri Shimbun

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