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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

INFORMATION REPORT

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COUNTRY	West Germany	REPORT NO.	CS DB-X -23564
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THE SOURCE EVALUATIONS IN THIS REPORT ARE DEFINITIVE. THE APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE. (FOR KEY SEE REVERSE)

- SOURCE: The following report represents statements made privately by former General Adolf Heusinger (B) during the last week of May 1954. Appraisal of Content: 2.
 - 1. The creation of a German "national security council", patterned after that in the United States, is being advocated by Heusinger, Theodor Blank, and former General Reinhard Gehlen, among others. Gehlen and Blank believe that Gehlen's organization should be put under the supervision of such a council. Heusinger adds that the council could be established by Chancellor Adenauer without reference to the status of ratification of the defense treaties, provided that the Chancellor's initiative is followed by United States endorsement.
 - 2. Heusinger believes that a member of the SFD should be included in the national security council, and recommends the selection of Fritz Erler, deputy chairman of the Bundestag Committee on European Security. Other members would be the Chancellor, the Vice-Chancellor, the Ministers of Economy and Finance, and the (hypothetical) Minister of Defense.
 - 3. Heusinger no longer believes that the EDC can provide a solution for the German defense problem, since French procrastination has destroyed the willingness of the Germans to cooperate. The Socialist leader, Erich Ollenhauer, has also recently pointed out to Heusinger that if the French do ratify the treaty, they will do so by such a small majority as to emphasize their lack of enthusiasm, and that this will further impair its prospects of success. This situation is recognized by many former German officers, and affords some pleasure to those who were basically opposed to the EDC from the first.
 - 4.) Heusinger and his colleague Dr. Hans Speidel have considered resigning their positions on account of the French obstructionism and the resultant failure of their military planning. They think that no other qualified German general would then consent to take over their assignments.
 - 5. Although Heusinger thinks it is good propaganda to assert that the NATO has made tremendous strides in its effectiveness, he says that in fact little progress has been made, except in the development of American air power and of atomic and hydrogen weapons. It is his opinion that General Gruenther is unrealistically <u>SECRET CONTROL</u>. S. OFFICIALS ONLY

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-2-

CSDB-X-23564

optimistic on this subject.

- 6. In order to solve the present impasse concerning German remilitarization, Heusinger thinks the United States and Great Britain will have to declare their intention to bring about the creation of German contingents for the EDC by activating ten divisions in their zones of Germany. He believes that the French would then have to follow suit. He also proposes that the United States and Great Britain reject the EDC concept as unsuccessful, since no progress has been made in two years. The German national forces would have to be subordinated to SHAPE within the NATO, and again the French would be compelled to acquiesce.
- 7. Heusinger disapproves of Dr. Karl Georg Pfleiderer's plan to negotiate with the Russians. He says Pfleiderer is a radical who is not really representative of the FDF. He feels that there is some sentiment in favor of the plan, but that it is not favored by the majority of German politicians. That it has received any support at all is due to the confusion prevailing in West Germany as to many major problems, both political and economic.

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